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the^16 NaVy’s P^A-18 Hornet is one of anc| 0st eye“Watcring aerial performers, as ' et 't's hamstrung in its intended role ■pQ rnuB’rn’ss*on complement to the F-14 desrea‘ antl the A-6 Intruder. It has been airnl0 ^ aS Prc,bably the best turning Weti 3nC 'n tBe wor'd and one of the best the F/a systems yet developed.”1 Yet ars ‘•toes not have the speed and
the 113 tBe P'14, nor does it have
Weaih^6’ Payload, and low-level, all- it re Cr caPability of the A-6.2 Although 0ver*tvfSentS 3 s'8n’ficant improvement it ■ e P'4 Phantoms and A-7 Corsairs ever r®placing- the F/A-18 cannot do Ihture uf ■'* sBou*^ he ahle to do in the PronV lh's *s an acceptable com-
f]ee(lse l°r a light aircraft in today’s short " become an uncomfortable
are :C.°min8 when the F-14D and A-6F deem* H°^UCe^’ anc* eventuaHy >t will be e enviable beside the Advanced
Technology Fighter (ATF) and the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA).
Upgrades to the F/A-18 have been incremental modifications to exterior surfaces and interior hardware and software.1 This is cost-effective for the near future, but it leads to long-term performance stagnation. Still, redesigning the aircraft from the ground up is unnecessary and would drain resources now earmarked for the ATF and ATA programs.
One solution is to design and build a radically modified F/A-18, aiming for substantial increases in range, endurance, and payload, while retaining the aircraft’s small, light, agile, and mission-flexible character. Because of the inherent risk of such a major upgrade, it should be built and test flown as a joint Navy/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/McDonnell Douglas integrated technology demonstrator. It could be called the SuperHornet, designated an X-series aircraft, and fly in 1990, with a production version available by 1993.
There are several advantages to basing the design on the F/A-18 and forming the Navy/DARPA/McDonnell Douglas team. The F/A-18 is suitable for an upgrade because:
► It has been in production for several years, and thus has an established technological data base, i.e., one that is not too old for future application. This greatly simplifies the computer-aided design and manufacturing process, an important cat-
Navy-Marine Corps F/A-18s, like these Hornets from VMFA-314, must be upgraded for increased range, endurance, and payload if they are to meet increasing demands on the carrier air wings.
in^
► Install movable ramps in engine
Two-dimensional, thrust-vectoring
u«e
lOS1
these designs virtually demands their ^ in our future fighter aircraft.11 The nl0^ apparent advantage, of course, is an crease in maneuverability, particularly pitch.14 Operated differentially, nozzles can also enhance roll per*011^ ance to a degree. Of great importance the F/A-18 is the added short takeoffan landing (STOL) capability.15 This all0
for operation from crater-shortened r1
tis^
top
size and complexity of the F-14’s bees1 the aircraft does not need the same speed capability.19 A simple ‘ p.( shaped design employing lightwetf- composites will provide the SuperHorn1- with the capability for sustained °P. ‘ ( tion in the transonic and supersonic regimes, at an acceptable empty weie price. ■
Replacing the four vertical and ho zontal stabilizers with twin, single-pieC ’ all-moving stabilizers mounted on SP°..| sons at a highly canted angle (50°) *
alyst for an accelerated program.
- It makes significant use of composites, making it readily adaptable to even more extensive use of these materials.4
- It was designed for avionics expandability.5
- Its software flight control system can easily accommodate a new configuration, and can be quickly changed for performance refinement.6
DARPA is in the midst of a one-year search for technologies on which to concentrate in the next five to ten years.7 The SuperHomet may be just the kind of program they are looking for. DARPA also offers the following advantages:
- An open project (like the X-29) yields high international visibility, good national publicity, and stimulates technological dialogue. At a time when the French Rafale, British European Aircraft Program (EAP), and Israeli Lavi are already flying, the United States needs tangible assurance that our aerospace industry is still the world’s leader.8
- A multimember team shares the cost of development and spreads out the technological risk, making a program commitment less perilous.
- Including a second government agency in the design and testing phase allows for a more objective evaluation than could be performed in a single-service project.
- Flying under the auspices of DARPA, the program will avoid the slower conventional military acquisition process—a request for proposals, followed by one or more demonstrators, flight testing, and a flyoff.
McDonnell Douglas is a logical partner in the plan for several reasons:
- It makes the current production F/A- 18, and thus requires a minimum tooling investment to produce the upgrade.
- It is already planning a modest upgrade of the F/A-18, with ideas that may be incorporated in the SuperHomet.9
- It was recently awarded a contract to participate in the ATF demonstrator phase (with Northrop, the F/A-18’s prime subcontractor), assuring compatibility between the aircraft and developing technologies that have parallel application.10
- Being involved in any upgrade program, the company will be in a better position to rapidly transition to a production version of the test vehicle.
A comparison of the current F/A-18 and the proposed upgrade is shown in Figure 1. The major elements of the design upgrade are to:
► Incorporate two-dimensional thru* vectoring nozzles
- Replace four-piece tail with t"1 canted, all-moving stabilizers
- Install the Coronel transverse win-'
system •
- Relocate AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-31 missiles under wings
- Extend and reshape wingtips ,
- Incorporate all-moving, close-coup canards
- Install jump struts on landing gear
- Extend forward fuselage to accoffl111 date second crew member haust nozzles with afterburner, shown Figure 2, are already being develop13 and are currently in the test-stand deni strator stage.11 Although the entries i General Electric and Pratt & Whitney 3 too heavy and bulky for flight, weight versions of the engines are 43 pected to be available in 1989 for 1 ATF program.12 The quantum leap * performance capabilities embodied
n|](
ways—a Marine Corps advantage-'**, permits greater takeoff gross weights carrier launches. Another inherent fcatu of these nozzles is a thrust-reversing pability, which can shorten field lal1 , ings; in flight it can rapidly decre3 one’s forward velocity vector or break lock-on of an infrared missile.16 ActUi tion of the nozzles can be integrated 'V1 the F/A-18’s software flight control sy tern, eliminating a requirement for a P11 decision on optimum nozzle deflection-^ Redesigning the engine air inlets accommodate movable ramps will nc^ optimize the F/A-18’s supersonic r formance.18 The ramps need not be ot
benef!eVera* aerodynamic and structural WettcjS re^uct'°n in the empennage airs(area (he surface exposed to the of tharn7~*0wers the skin friction drag ContM aircra^' The use of all-moving plane” SUr^aces also reduces the air- hol(] tu 'r'm ^ra§—the penalty paid to With - C a'rcrah in an off-design attitude, tail tW0 r°tational actuators in the Produ"CC'lan'Ca^ comPlexity is reduced, ^ c>ng a lighter, simplified structure, on Untln§ the two stabilizers far apart
- It u>I||'0nS ^as a threefold advantage: entrai 1 i ^eeP t*1e stabilizers out of the Whic[,net: aifflow of the exhaust gases, high . ni'8ht have presented a problem at
- It vii S °battack or nozzle deflection. encjn1 keep the stabilizers from experi- forek® excessive interference from the attack ^ vortices at high angles of
enRin°nSOn rnounting affords even greater figUra^jaccessibility than the current con-
attan” >niJ'°r drawback of this stabilizer tionafem"nt ’S a *oss inherent direc- What ,Sta°'''ty. This will be offset some- aft (u ^ mounting the stabilizers farther rerrian t'le current rudder position. Any activ101^ °sc*iiations can be damped by
controlParticiPation the di8ital flight niqu ° astern—an experimental tech-
fedii” CUrrently in use on some airliners to gust loads on the wings. e Coronel transverse wing (CTW)
h"oce system was conceived at least six years ago.20 It was intended to optimize high- performance aircraft for flight at supersonic as well as low subsonic speeds. The problem has always been that supersonic cruise flight is best achieved with a very thin wing cross-section, while flight at very slow speeds requires a thick or highly cambered airfoil section. Large or elaborate flap systems to overcome this dilemma require internal mechanical complexity and reduce the space available for fuel in the wings. The CTW system, shown schematically in Figure 3, allows for a thin main wing (supersonic section) with simple, short-chord leading edge and trailing edge flaps, leaving more space for fuel. The CTW is a small, one-piece, pivoting wing mounted below and behind the main wing. During cruise (light, the left and right CTWs can be used in tandem or differentially for maneuvering. In the slow speed configuration, the main wing flaps are deflected and the CTW pivots up to meet the flap, forming a very large, highly cambered lifting surface. Flight tests with a radio- controlled model showed that the system can be operated at any intermediate arrangement as well.21
Used on the SuperHornet, the CTW system will be much more than a repositioned horizontal stabilizer because it is aerodynamically coupled with the main wing. Its slow-speed configuration will improve STOL performance or allow an increased payload, and will enhance the F/A-18’s low-speed fighter maneuvering capability. At transonic and supersonic speeds in the cruise configuration, the CTW will augment lateral control by increasing the roll moment. At intermediate speeds, such as during a low-altitude, high-subsonic attack run, the CTW can compensate for an asymmetrical stores condition. All of this is in addition to the noted increase in fuel capacity created by mechanical simplification and smaller control surfaces on the main wing.
Installing the CTW system does not incur an unacceptable weight penalty owing to the transverse wing. At the worst, it negates the weight savings gained by replacing the horizontal stabilizers with a canted arrangement. Of somewhat greater concern is the possibility that a non-ejected stores release or high-drag fin deployment may hit the lower wing. Also, a swept CTW requires anhedral (a downward slope) on the main wing, but this can be considered an advantage because it relaxes lateral stability and increases maneuverability.
The AIM-9 launcher rails can be moved to underwing positions just outboard of the wingfold hinges. This will permit these weapons to be loaded with the aircraft’s wings folded and with greater ease than the current wingtip position. This inward move also simplifies the electrical system and structural reinforcement in the outboard wing panels, opening up the possibility to use these panels as additional fuel cells.22 The new position reduces any aerodynamic effects caused by the coupling of airflows around the missiles and the wingtips. Without the rails, the wingtips can be redesigned
U. *
i off
00
for maximum efficiency, independent of the missile loadout.
The simple wingtip solution, that of increasing the wingspan, offers at least three advantages:
- It increases the aspect ratio, a sort of efficiency measurement that indicates how closely a wing shape approximates the ideal, infinite wing. The direct result is lower induced drag and a lower wing loading, the tangible benefit of which is better turning performance.
- The absence of new control surfaces in the extensions permits the void spaces to be filled with even more fuel.
- Eliminating the missile rails allows smooth rounding of the wingtips, reducing the radar signature.23
The carrier deck-space drawback of longer wings can be partially offset by keeping the wingfold hinges in their current position, so only spreadwing deck considerations will be affected. Also, although the greater span has an increased rolling resistance, the roll-rate performance of the current aircraft should be maintained through the anhedral and coordinated use of the ailerons, wing flaps, CTWs, canards, and stabilizers.
A set of all-moving, close-coupled canards on the SuperHornet would provide additional roll control, a vertical translation capability, and augment the CTW concept at low speed. Also, since canards would assist the airflow by maintaining the upper-surface curvature at slow speeds, the main wing leading edge may be returned to its original sharpness, yielding a reduction in drag at transonic speeds and faster.24 These advantages may or may not offset the added weight of the canards, and a set of fixed canards might be considered as a compromise.
The jump strut is a simple, bolt-on device that extends a landing gear strut to its full length at a certain point in the takeoff roll.25 The nose strut is extended first, providing rotation to the correct aircraft attitude, and then the main struts are extended, giving the aircraft a “jump” that is similar to a ski-jump takeoff. The aircraft can thus attain flight before the conventional control surfaces could accomplish it.26 This either shortens the takeoff roll or allows a higher gross weight for a given takeoff distance. This device has already been studied in taxi tests, and is scheduled for flight testing in 19 8 8.27 The system can also be automated to actuate at the optimum moment. Although its compatibility with a carrier catapult launch remains to be assessed, it is a lightweight add-on, and could simply be deactivated during a catapult launch, if necessary.
The final modification is to extend the
forward fuselage to accommodate a second crew member. Given the aircrew workload attendant to night or allweather, low-level attack missions in hostile territory, a naval flight officer (NFO) operating the aircraft’s navigation and weapon systems is a practical necessity. This option certainly has been debated at length.28 Most arguments to retain the F/A-18 as a single-seat aircraft do not claim the all-weather capability, and those that do usually rely on future technological development of the “virtual cockpit”—a wrap-around-the-cockpit
display concept more advanced than that proposed for the ATF and ATA.29 A second crewman inserted now will allow the SuperHornet to penetrate with the A-6 as an over-the-beach fighter escort, participate in an all-weather strike as a dedicated attack aircraft, or even fly a single plane, self-escort, all-weather raid.30 In aerial combat, the-pilot will not have to rely as heavily on his wingman for lookout protection.31
Adding the rear cockpit as a fuselage plug does not displace any fuel capacity. In fact, if the space below the rear seat is not entirely taken up by new avionics, it can be allocated for additional fuel. The tandem seating arrangement minimizes the visual signature of the aircraft and supersonic wave drag. And because of the longer fuselage, tandem seating allows gradual blending of protruding surfaces—a stealth advantage.32 A voice- activated intercom system will facilitate crew coordination, particularly in terrainfollowing and air intercept operations.
Other suggested improvements may include installing a ring laser gyro, a helmet-mounted target designator, a 360° phased array radar, and an infrared track- while-scan capability, the latter with a handoff feature to/from the AIM-9 missile seeker heads.33 Some of these are already planned.
The ideas presented are intended to stimulate conversation and provide an impetus for action on this or some derivative proposal. Quantitative studies to evaluate weight savings versus penalties, drag improvements, and increases in payload, range, endurance, and maneuverability are best carried out using computer- aided design and modeling techniques.
The potential benefits in mission adaptiveness to be gained by this program certainly justify a preliminary inquiry, and may produce an unexpected technological windfall. The driving concern should be that, with the ATF and ATA being tailored to their respective missions, the F/A-18, which supplements either mission on short notice in a smaller
aircraft produced in greater numbed ^ must be boldly upgraded to continue^ _ filling its role beyond the year 2000. g
the SuperHornet, it can.
‘R. E. Thomas, quoted by J. Tegter, ‘“The Best rier Airplane,’ ” Proceedings, October 1986, PP’ 82.
2N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the Fleet, Naval Institute Press, pp. 376-8, 380- ^ 3“McDonnell Programs Define Chances in F , F/A-18s,” Aviation Week & Space Tcch’ll>‘-^ (AW&ST), 21 July 1986, pp. 58-59. D. Linn. F Hornet (Aero Publishers, Inc., 1982), PP- 48 ' JIbid., p. 56.
5“McDonnell Programs . . . ,” p. 58.
6Linn, p. 51.
7“DARPA Begins Year-Long Study to C>ete^g(j, Development Priorities,” AW&ST. 20 October I p. 38.
'■■‘Rafale A Demonstrates Vertical Accelera1' ' Climb Performance,” AW&ST, 20 October 1986’F. 78-79. "British EAP Displays Platform, Pr°f" ' AW&ST, 15 September 1986, pp. 60-61. 9‘‘McDonnell Programs . . . ,” pp. 58-59. ,
10”USAF Awards ATF Contracts to Lockn Northrop," AW&ST, 10 November 1986. PP’ 18nJ MJ. S. Petty, R. J. Hill, Col. A. C. Piccirill»- ® Maj. A. E. Fanning, "The Next Hot Fighter ^ gine,” Aerospace America, June 1986, pp- , l2“GE, Pratt to Test ATF Demonstrator Eng»ne ’ AW&ST, 10 November 1986, p. 24.
13Petty, et al., p. 40. l4Ibid., p. 43.
,5Ibid.
,6Ibid.
17Ibid.
l8Linn, on p. 30, shows fixed geometry pr0-
l9Lt. T. W. Trotter, “One Seat Versus Two, ceedings, October 1986, pp. 76-81. v-ng
20P. D. Coronel, “The Coronel Transverse . Flight System,” AIAA Student Journal, Sunl 1980, pp. 38ff.
2‘Ibid. ejs
22According to Linn, p. 43, the outboard wing PanL do not carry fuel.
23Trotter, p. 80.
24Linn, p. 50
25R. DeMeis, “Bolt-on STOL Kit,” Aerosp1 America, September 1986, pp. 18-19.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Trotter, p. 78.
29Trotter, as well as others.
30R. R. Ropelewski, “New Technologies Quantum Leap in Future Fighter CapabiliI'eS' AW&ST, 23 June 1986, pp. 48-52.
3l“McDonnell Programs . . . ,” p. 59.
32Trotter, p. 78.
33Ibid., p. 80. ad,
^“Opening New Dimensions,” Singer/Kearfad vertisement, AW&ST, 20 October 1986, pp- 2-3 • also Trotter, p. 80. See also “Advances in S13^ Aircraft Drive ATF Development Effort,”
10 November 1986, pp. 20-21. ,
35N. Polmar, “The U. S. Navy: Tactical Aired1 ’ Proceedings, October 1986; Trotter, p. 78.
Lieutenant Jenista received B.S. and M.S. degr^s^ aerospace engineering from the University of ^ ^ Dame in 1981 and 1983, respectively. He recel $ his wings in June 1985 and was attached to Atta Squadron 42 at Naval Air Station Oceana. Currenng he is in naval flight officer training at Tra'n Squadron 86.
^ggded: Realistic Tactical Doctrine in the CIC
By Captain P. T. Deutermann, U. S. Navy
lab °m|manders surface ships have ta °re i ^°r ycars t0Pr°duce a serviceable that* h3 Com^at systems doctrine—one will de'ailS realdoctrine, and that people Sy . Use' What often passes for a combat rin„ doctrine is a ten-pound, three- able • h er conta'n'ng everything know- nnfi ab0Ut a sh'P’s combat systems, but
are valuah, TreSe sy,stcm~diagram tomes and u, u or training watchstanders cal a .atC" suPerv*s°rs. But a ship’s tacti- trineC*K0n °^ ccrs (TAOs) also need doc- are w ^ answers the question, “What hapDC 8?!"8 t0 do when such and such doctrenS u need comprehensive
•Ion Tif l lUt 'nte8rates the tactical situate^ e tllreat’ the ship’s combat sys- lent and77vital in these days of “vio- ( fleaee the rules of engagement. systemP?SC a realistic tactical combat shins S doctr'ne that officers on surface that u,C°?'d assemble themselves, and Use rUld be convenient for TAOs to 1 would include five sections:
ti0n‘1 Situation: The first sec-
niZatj °U t describe the current task orga- areas°n’ ra'ss‘on statements, operating lectin and any special circumstances af- m 8 the ship’s operations. There would be a table showing command relationships and naming the warfare commanders; it would also list the forces assigned if the ship’s commanding officer is a warfare commander. This section would be about five pages long. The ship’s operations officer would be responsible for preparing it.
- A Threat Summary: This section would describe the threats facing the ship and her task organization. In some cases, there would be no threat—when a single ship crosses the open ocean in peacetime, for instance. On the other hand, a ship operating in the Persian Gulf faces dozens of complex threats. In any case, this section should realistically appraise the threats the ship might encounter, without exhaustively itemizing every element of every potential enemy’s order of battle. It should also tell the TAOs what warning signs each potential threat will display, and the weapons capabilities of each. Depending upon the situation, the threat section would range from zero to perhaps seven pages; the ship’s intelligence officer would prepare it, with review by the tactical board, composed of the captain, his executive officer, and the TAOs.
- Doctrine Statements: The ship’s captain would develop this section in consultation with his tactical board. This is the book’s most important element, because it integrates the rules of engagement, the threats, and the ship’s capabilities into doctrinal statements. Interpreting and executing the rules of engagement are responsibilities of command, which is why the captain must take the lead in creating this section. The point of having a doctrine is to tell the TAOs how to proceed in an emergency during the crucial moments before the captain arrives in the combat information center. The doctrine statements tell the TAOs what the captain wants done in specific (and likely) situations, given the constraints of the rules of engagement. For the TAOs, this tactical doctrine is analogous to what we expect of our engineers in a casualty control situation—the immediate controlling actions.
A ship’s tactical doctrine will clearly be as dynamic as the ever-changing threats, tactical situations, and rules of engagement. A significant change in even one element necessarily changes the doctrine. On the other hand, this section does not need to be detailed, because the captain presumably can get on the scene quickly. Neither is the format important, except that it should be laid out in tables rather than text. The TAOs need just enough information to jog their memories. The length will vary with the complexity of the prevailing situation and rules of engagement. In full-scale warfare, this section might be one succinct page: Bring all combat systems to bear and destroy the enemy. Today’s more complex deployments would require continuous attention to keep the tactical doctrine current.
► Combat Systems Status: In two or three pages this section will show whether each element of the combat systems and their supporting units is up, down, or degraded. It can be done with preprinted hardboard sheets and grease pencils. For fully integrated combat systems, the section would show the mode or current systems setup, including reflexive modes, if applicable. The ship’s combat systems officer or the leader of the electronics readiness team would develop this portion of the book. (See P. T. Deutermann,
If the skipper and his TAOs keep an up-to-date combat systems doctrine close at hand, the TAOs can react instantly—and correctly—in the lifesaving seconds when a crisis explodes.
“Exploiting Shipboard Talents,” Proceedings, June 1986, pp. 110-112.)
► TAO Pass-Down-the-Line Notes: This would contain the usual notes from one watch to another, along with any changes made during the watch to the task organization, mission, threat, or the rules of engagement.
This tactical combat systems doctrine is specifically designed for TAOs, and they would be responsible for keeping it current. It would be the basis for watch changeovers, as the oncoming and off- going TAOs reviewed the information together. When they agree that a substantive change is needed, they will inform the captain. This is what we do now— except that in my scheme, we would write all changes into our book to keep our doctrine pertinent to the situation and the rules. The modular format would make it easy to enter the entire doctrine into a word processing system, to simplify revisions.
Creating doctrine statements for the first time would take significant effort by the captain and his TAOs. But it is vital if the ship is to act quickly and effectively in a threatening situation.
For instance, consider the problem of firing a warning shot with fully automated weapon systems. Such systems are designed to hit a target—sometimes reflexively. Our systems have no mode for “warning shot.” We have to inhibit them somehow to fire a shot that warns without striking. Firing warning shots at night might require different arrangements than firing them in daylight. The captain must consider all this in advance, figuring out what actions are needed in every part of the combat system to fire a warning shot, and ensuring that each conforms to the rules of engagement. The men running the combat systems’ elements need not know the specific engagement rules, but they must know how to reconfigure the systems to stay within those rules.
The advantages of having such a tactical doctrine on board are clear. In creating it, the captain and his principal warfighters, the TAOs, are forced to think ahead about the tactical situation, the rules of engagement, and the threats, and
to devise feasible, allowable responses ^ every conceivable situation. They m condense their plans into easily absor e statements. The requirement to keep ^ trines current will ensure that the ship principals stay abreast of the shiftingta tical situation. Their discussion will e ify how the rules of engagement lirn't combat systems, and this, in turn, , help the captain to fix the threshold ^ tween the constraints of the rules o e gagement and firing in self defense, finally, this would be a convenient, Pra tical doctrine that a ship’s tactical aC ‘ officers would willingly consult w 1 is a lot better than what most of our s *F have today.
A frequent Proceedings contributor, Captain mann was commissioned at the Naval Aca n 1963 and, during Vietnam, served in the ^ (DD-948), Hull (DD-945), Jouett (CG-29), ana ^ officer in charge of Swift gunboat PCF-39. ^
served at the Naval War College, was executive ^ cer in the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) an manded the Tattnall (DDG-19) 1981—84. ^nd is Commander Destroyer Squadron 25 1985-° ’ .jeS now attending the Royal College of Defense in London.
[)f Sub-kiloton Nuclear Torpedoes
firepower to be packed into limited torpedo. Most important,
volume;
skinc
mul1''
Because SKINC torpedoes pack ve small nuclear yields, it is unlikely^
The Implications
By John J. Engelhardt
Arguments against nuclear antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes typically involve four issues:
- Concern over proliferation and potential use of nuclear weapons at sea
- Problems involving a nuclear release authority
- Nuclear weapon safety
- The belief that current torpedoes carry sufficient high-explosive warheads to counter modern Soviet submarine threats
The first three issues relate to defense policy considerations, nuclear weapons design technology, and characteristics of large underwater nuclear explosions. The fourth issue concerns subjective torpedo warhead effectiveness measures, such as a desire to “sink” versus “mission kill” an enemy submarine.
In the past two decades, great advances have been made in the miniaturization, reliability, and safety of nuclear warheads. Today, sub-kiloton insertable nuclear component (SKINC) warheads with yields as small as 0.01 kilotons can be installed in heavyweight and perhaps lightweight ASW torpedoes. In the Mk-48 heavyweight torpedo, a SKINC warhead could be installed without sacrificing a major portion of the 300-kilogram (660-pound) PBNX-103 conventional warhead, thus allowing the Mk-48 warhead to be used in conventional or nuclear modes.
Advances in SKINC warhead technology, improvements in Soviet submarine combat survivability, and changes in undersea warfare requirements will soon lead the U. S. Navy to reconsider decisions not to build SKINC torpedoes. In addition, there is a threshold—less than one kiloton—at which an underwater- detonated SKINC ASW torpedo should not be considered a tactical nuclear weapon simply because nuclear fission drives the explosion. The following factors support these views:
► A SKINC torpedo fitted with a 0.01- kiloton warhead has equivalent to 4,000 kilograms (8,800 pounds) of high-explosive force. This is as much explosive force as 13 Mk-48 heavyweight torpedoes, or one-half the bomb load of a U. S. Navy A-6 Intruder bomber, or one- seventh the bomb load of a U. S. Air Force B-52 strategic bomber (see Table 1). A 0.01-0.05-kiloton SKINC has no more explosive force than other conventional weapon systems, and can be designed to have significantly less explosive force than a squadron of B-52 or A-6 bombers. The primary difference is that a SKINC torpedo releases all of its explosive energy in one concentrated assault.
A SKINC torpedo warhead repress ^ “warhead optimizing technology- type of force multiplier that allows gr
torpedoes are not such great force *- ^ pliers that their use against submerg submarines, if detected, would be vie ^ as disproportionate or cause serious clear escalation concerns. ut
► There are several unique features a sub-kiloton nuclear attacks against s merged submarines. Such attacks are stricted to enemy targets with fewer 150 men, have limited collateral el on the environment and local p°P . f tions, and are proportional to a sim strike involving massive conventi°n depth-bomb attacks. An underwater clear attack against a submerged sU^^jjy fine does not involve the horror norm associated with nuclear war.
that
full nuclear release authority is nee Rules of engagement (ROE) could ^ developed to give submarine or ca^ battle group commanders engagem^ options that include using a SKINC pedo in the nuclear mode without sPeC' release by the National Command thority. For example, SKINC torpedo -
u be restricted for use in the nuclear s ? e against highly survivable Soviet q rnar>nes, such as nuclear-powered lj SCar 8u>ded missile subs, Typhoon bal- ‘c missile subs, and deep-diving/high- SKinP*1 and Mike attack subs,
the torPedoes could also be used in nuclear mode against submarines that poorly localized and time-urgent, It)lns* submarines leaving an engage-
mad area at speed’ or aca'nst sub-
san, „ °Perat>ng in remote areas. The cu e SKlNC torpedoes—with the nu- conv COrnPonent—could be used in the aj)]eVlInt,onal mode against less-surviv- whe °V'et su^mar'nes and in situations
acci>rC.uUC'ear attacks are politically un- Ptable or tactically not feasible.
Similarly, could specify that at-
the k a'nSt surface combatants under fttle I*26 ’ near t*le surface> or in the air be esc- i °Ut ^ecause dicy may create nuclear Aat'on problems. An underwater, strict UKSe'0nly doctrine could greatly re- radi ■ • env>ronmcntal effects of the jty (<'d(~l've surge pool, limit the probabil- <he ' ®tonat'on detection, and minimize ^ nuc*ear escalation.
and r |- torPedoes can be made as safe If ,-!? la^*e as strategic nuclear weapons. incecessary> SKINC torpedoes could friend0™16 encryPted H P (identification cjrc, or I°e) systems in case the torpedo iSaceSaround on the firing submarine or Submar^nta% IauncIted against a friendly
doesUbmarines shoodng SKINC torpedo ln nuclear mode would not be in •ftpa^ s*8n*ficant equipment shock tanPCelrnient as long as engagement dis- (3 fnu rlrC 'n excess of 1,100 meters head Cet) for °- iO-kiloton SKINC war- fee(,S and ln excess of 350 meters (1,150 (see pt0r ° 0l-kiloton SKINC warheads derw- '®Ure It *s unlikely that the un- Seri( at^r ac°ustic environment would be Usly degraded by the acoustic “blue- out” effects of small SKINC warhead detonations. (Blue-out is the neutralization of passive sonar systems caused by the noise of an explosion.)
► Despite official pronouncements about the warhead lethality of existing U. S. ASW torpedoes, most knowledgeable submarine vulnerability analysts recognize that lightweight torpedoes—and, under many scenarios, heavyweight tor
pedoes—are only marginally capable of inflicting the degree of pressure hull rupture and equipment shock damage necessary to sink modern Soviet submarines. SKINC torpedoes will increase singleshot torpedo effectiveness against deepdiving, double-hull, and multiple- compartment Soviet submarines. SKINC torpedoes would allow U. S. submarines to engage and sink a greater number of
Table I Conventional Weaponry | vs. Sub-kiloton Nuclear Firepower | |
| High-explosive1 | Sub-kiloton |
| Bomb Load | Nuclear Equivalent |
Type | (kilograms) | (kiloton RC) |
1 U. S. Navy A-6 bomber2 | 6,356 | 0.02 |
1 U. S. Air Force B-52 bomber3 | 27,252 | 0.07 |
‘A high-explosive bulk charge is defined as 1.5 times more powerful than an equivalent weight TNT bulk charge 2A-6 attack aircraft assumed to be loaded out with: 28 depth-bombs with 227 kilograms of | ||
high explosive B-52 strategic bomber assumed to be loaded out with: | 84 depth-bombs with 227 | |
kilograms of high explosive (bomb bay) and 24 depth-bombs with 341 kilograms of high explosive | ||
(underwing pylons) Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1980-81 |
|
|
Table 2 Nuclear Weapon Yield vs. Submarine Damage Ranges (Meters)
Nuclear Yield—kilotons 0.50 0.10
Equivalent high-explosive-kilograms' 201,000 40,000
0.05
20,000
0.01
4,000
Damage Effect
‘Safe Standoff’
Venous Equipment Shock Kill 'Assure Hull Rupture ' Steel-Hulled2 * Titanium-Hulled3
600hi87h;neXplOSivc charEe>s defined as 1.5 times more powerful than an equivalent weight TNT bulk charge 2Steel hull construction with collapse depth of |qotc. meters 'Titanium hull construction with collapse depth of 1,200-1,500 meters
subtna ' ^ama®e ran8es are calculated for 100-mcter target depth in deep, iso-velocity water; weapon burst depth is assumed to equal the depth of the enemy
2,500 | 1,100 | 780 | 350 |
250-260 | 110-115 | 80-85 | 35-40 |
90-115 | 40-50 | 30-35 | 12-15 |
80-100 | 35-45 | 25-30 | 10-12 |
l‘h
Soviet submarines with a given torpedo loadout.
Increased torpedo warhead firepower is needed to guarantee pressure hull rupture as far as ten meters (33 feet) from a Soviet submarine’s pressure hull. Only a SKINC torpedo can assure such great pressure hull rupture distances. For example, a SKINC torpedo with a 0.01- kiloton warhead should be able to rupture the pressure hull of titanium- and steelhulled submarines at distances of 10 and 15 meters (33 and 50 feet), respectively (see Table 2). The detonation of a 0.01- kiloton SKINC warhead would cause total equipment shock impairment from a distance of 35-40 meters (115-131 feet). The cumulative damage effects of a proximity-detonated 0.01-kiloton warhead would be extensive; rupturing or severely denting a 5-10-meter (1633-foot) length of the pressure hull, flooding at least two compartments, seriously shock-damaging most internal equipment, injuring many crewmen, and probably sinking the submarine.
SKINC torpedoes exhibit several warfare attributes that place them in a gray area between tactical nuclear and conventional high-explosive weapons. SKINC torpedoes have characteristics more akin to a massive conventional weapons attack than to a tactical nuclear weapon attack. Traditional arguments to veto nuclear torpedo designs are largely invalidated by modem SKINC technologies and rules of engagement that properly restrict use SKINC torpedoes to specific targets an environments. SKINC torpedoes are,0Il alternative for solving ASW warhea e fectiveness problems and guaranteeing that U. S. ASW weapons maintain a reasonable margin of lethality over increa^ ingly more survivable Soviet submarine
Mr. Englchardt is a naval architect employed ^
U. S. Navy, and has worked as a structural eng for the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Resea^Cine Development Center, responsible for antisu 1,1 warfare weapon effects and submarine vulnera studies. He received a B.S. degree in engIIK ,s from Vanderbilt University in 1981 and a mas^ ^ degree in the National Security Studies Progw Georgetown University in 1984.
Charting the Rules of the Road
By Lieutenant Commander W. D. Kline, U. S. Coast Guard, and Lieutenant John Harrington, U. S. Coast Guard
tions for Preventing Collisions at Set*\ 1972 (72 ColRegs) and the United ln|an
A thorough understanding of the professional mariners. The body of rules “Rules of the Road” is required of all that make up the International Regula
{^■•es have the force and effect of law for ■ --flag vessels operating on the high seaf and in U. S. waters, an I u fU'e.S are relatively straightforward the t'lere !s *e?al terminology. Yet ThJH3re *'m'tec* t0 providing guidance'. cj ,ec'< watch officer must always exer- e Judgment in their application, as earn‘n§ ‘he rules can be approached and3 fUrely academic task- The 38 rules lve annexes can be committed to sh °ry by nearly anyone, if only for a Pro- J1er'od' Indeed, they are often ap- mac ed *n this manner by those who Qual'r 6 wr'“en exams for licensing or mk ' lcat'on- However, in doing so one tjntke most difficult aspects of put- 6 ru'es *n‘° practice: recognition, asse^ment, and action.
the nrin8 1^81-82 academic year, Law eI>artmen‘ °f Nautical Science and task d1 ^1C ,(“oast Guard Academy was ttcmh W*t'1 mstruct'n8 and qualifying the , ers °‘ the graduating class in the into iT t*le H°ad.” The investigations cut e tragic losses of the Coast Guard thor nxUyah°8a (WIX-157) and Black- in j/1 ‘WLB-391) revealed deficiencies of ,,e n°wledge of the rules on the part Coast'r ass'"ned as watch officers. A all o Guard-wide program that required dard 'CerS serv‘n8 afloat to pass a stan- estabpn111 *n '^u'cs °‘ ‘he Road” was ‘ered , ^ tde same exam adminis- censjn° merchant marine officers for IIS' Passing the exam became an immediate goal for cadets and officers. (A 90% grade is considered passing.)
In teaching the rules as an academic
subject, we found that nearly all cadets could obtain a passing grade after lectures, study, and practice quizzes. But the academic approach satisfied only a small part of the need. The cadets did not understand the logical process necessary to recognize the situation, analyze the appropriate rule(s), and choose the best course of action. The rules are interrelated; your situation relative to other vessels is a fluid one.
Our attempts to place the rules in an operational perspective led to the development of a logic flowchart. The flowchart can be used to structure your thought process in any rules situation, and will reinforce your decisions. We have found it to be a valuable guide for studying the rules, as well.
Commander Kline graduated from the Coast Guard Academy in 1973. Commander Kline is the commanding officer of the Bittersweet (WLB-389). He graduated from the Coast Guard Academy in 1973, and served in the Sassafras (WLB-401), as commanding officer of Loran Station Nantucket, as assistant training officer of Reserve Training Center York- town, commanding officer of the Red Wood (WLM-688), at the Academy in the Department of Nautical Science and Law, and as Chief, Waterfront Branch.
Lieutenant Harrington is the commanding officer of the Monhegan (WPB-1305). He graduated from the Coast Guard Academy in 1977. and served in the Cherokee (WMEC-165), as commanding officer of the Point Knoll (WPB-82367), and in the Department of Nautical Science and Law at the Academy.
jjgwjo Write for Proceedings
aPtain Paul B. Ryan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
offlcee on my experience as a seagoing inom/’ ,can safe‘y state that at this ven are n nt 'terally scores of naval officer: a pie °n ,er'nS whether they should write has c6 °r^roceedings on a subject tha’ Thauf‘ ‘heir professional attention off /C chances are that many will put i ‘hey^ * d‘d years ago), pleading tha Writ fe ‘00 busy and don’t know how tc Was f ^ art'c'e’ anyhow. After I retired,: c°auihrtUnate *n hav'ng the opportunity tc sor Tv,°r tW° h°°ks With the late Profes Versit °mas Hailey of Stanford Uni I°ma/ lhe dean of American dip best.,.14), h's‘°rians, he wrote man) aUd l'6 CrS noted for ‘heir sound conten ‘echn'Vely Wr'‘‘n8 style. He taught me the aSsu1CIUes ‘hat appear below; and I car abili*0 an^ career officers who doubt theii on, 'V to Wr'te an article that these meth
JJ* Write At All? First, it goes withou 8 that members of the U. S. armec
services who read Proceedings can profit from information on navigation, strategy, tactics, weaponry, leadership, and the like. Not by accident has Proceedings become “must-reading” for people all over the world. If you can contribute to the spread of hard knowledge, then you have a responsibility to do so.
Furthermore, young officers with publications to their credit tend to be noticed when it comes time for their services to fill important billets. In short, publishing in Proceedings will benefit your career and your readers—who will be grateful for your authentic and even-handed analyses of naval topics.
► Selecting a Topic: This is the first step in writing an article. Write on a subject in which you have had experience. If possible, search out books and articles that others have written on the subject. Avoid writing on a topic in which you are emotionally involved, simply because that makes it difficult to be objective. Also avoid overworked topics, unless you have uncovered evidence that throws new light on the subject.
For example, let’s assume that you’re a lieutenant assigned to a battle-group staff. You have been exposed to combat involving command, control, and communications in a major operation—say, the Grenada landings. Afterward, you formed some ideas on how the battle group commander could have improved his control over the operation's events. This would make an excellent subject for a Proceedings article. It will be even better once you limit it to manageable proportions: “Naval-Military Communications at Grenada” is better than “Grenada as an Example of U. S. Policy in the Caribbean.”
► Expanding the Topic: Once you have selected your topic, the next step is to organize your article by setting down on
The Proceedings forum accommodates viewpoints from all naval communities—pictured here are some recent Proceedings authors.
events you’re writing about. Secon a sources are books and articles. Whate the source, examine it scrupulously ® errors, bias, and falsification. The tne ories of participants often cloud with ^ passage of time, so individual reco e tions should be checked against ot sources. Try to find at least two w'tne^\". to confirm visual evidence. Hearsay dence is always suspect. When using ’ alert the reader by words such as al er edly” or “reportedly.” _. j
As you gather evidence, you may your original convictions changing light of new information. Keep an op . mind and guard against selecting e dence simply because it supports y personal bias. ■
Beware, too, of manufactured e
dence. It occurred in A.C. Buell s boo Paul Jones, written in 1900. This be ^ seller contained that famous “quotation^ on the qualifications of a naval oft'c^ that midshipmen, for years, were quired to memorize. Finally, a libra ^ at the Naval Academy proved that m of the book—including the qualificatl° passage—rested on bogus evidence-
Other sources might include reprints congressional hearings; think-tank s ^ ies; official investigation reports; a correspondence and interviews involved.
Another possible source is the Institute Oral History collection of u published memoirs. These recollect*0 of senior retired officers are recorde typed, bound volumes. However, ) must request permission of the indivi als to quote from their memoirs. If s°nl one says no, ask if you may use the ma rial on a not-for-attribution basis.
► The Research Trap: Do not spent*
with those
Nava1
much time on research. Many succ
umb*
the
paper a list of questions that you will answer through your research. For example, for your article dealing with communications at Grenada, possible questions might be:
- Was a communications annex prepared for joint service operations in the Caribbean?
- Did the services have compatible equipment?
- Were the separate services, or units of the same service, ever unable to
communicate? If so, why?
- Did the Pentagon overload the circuits with messages to the combat units?
- How were communications failures corrected?
- What lessons were learned?
► Marshaling the Evidence: Articles on professional subjects should be based on evidence. You obtain primary evidence from original documents and interviews— especially with eyewitnesses to the
the temptation to read too much on subject and to take too many notes subconsciously deferring the day w*1 they must start writing. Focus on y0^ subject and resist the lure of interesting but peripheral, material. To lend cottbb ity to your article, keep a chronology j events in a looseleaf notebook. 1* vv help when you outline your article-
Note-taking is best done on 4 x 6 ca ^ or paper that can be filed in boxes of *1 same size. Use title cards to separate y° cards into various subject headings- ► Tips on Writing: Even the most pro*e sional authors rely on simple techniP*1 ' such as these to make their writing c*eJ ’ direct, and accurate.
- Don’t overprove your thesis.
- Make a production schedule. B*° out a daily quota of pages to be W*1 ten. Start writing by getting sorr^e thing down on paper. It may
r°ugh and unorganized, but you can refine it later. The point is, get
started.
Check all data, particularly dates, igures, and proper names, against t "|e original documents.
Keep your sentences short. One in- ependent and one dependent clause are usually enough.
Try to use the active, not passive, ,TI*^C' This may come hard for those who have drafted a lot of official eorrespondence.
Strive for clarity and vigor in every Paragraph. If you bore the reader, he
# rnay qujt reading.
cnerally, it is best to use a topic , ^nter|ce for each paragraph.
ssume that the reader is intelligent , °Ut knows little of your topic.
. v<nc’ naval jargon. Many Proceed- '"£■5 readers are civilians or live in °reign countries. If you must use acronyms, define them parentheti- y. e.g., sea ]jne 0f communica- ron (SLOC). You may safely use OC in subsequent paragraphs— but not too far apart. If you use dates, include the year: e.g., 12 July 1986. Otherwise, your reader will flounder.
- Add color and readability to your account by weaving in people’s quoted remarks. Personalities spark your reader’s interest.
- Document your evidence with footnotes, if necessary. They also allow your readers to follow up on your findings.
- If possible, send photos, maps, sketches, graphs, or tables to flesh out your article.
- Avoid abstract concepts; stay with the concrete.
- Where convenient, use subheadings about every six paragraphs. They give the reader a set of signposts and prevent the boredom of facing page after page of solid print.
- Smooth any abrupt transitions between paragraphs. Your story should flow evenly.
- Read your finished article aloud to pick up repetition or awkwardness.
- Have a friend read it for comprehension and clarity.
- Before you finish your final draft, you will have sacrificed paragraphs that you are loathe to delete. Accept these deletions as part of the game in writing an article.
- If you can, type your manuscript— double-spaced, with wide margins— and mark it clearly with your address and telephone number.
Finally, all seagoing service professionals who have thought of writing an article should rest assured that the Proceedings editors will assist you. They’ll see to it that your piece achieves the editorial refinement that your ideas deserve.
Captain Ryan is a retired line officer who holds degrees from the Naval Academy (class of 1936), Stanford University, and San Jose State University. He is the author of three books and coauthor of two others. His articles have appeared in Proceedings, The New York Times, and other publications. His latest book. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed, was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1985. He is currently a research fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.
^ggbees With Portfolio___________
cutenant Commander James A. McConnell, Jr., Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy
terrnljn*30at diplomacy” is a familiar Navy’ eSCribin8 one way 'n which the nel c.S e9uipment, training, and person- secur-.n be use(J to advance our national geo ' ^ objectives. I would like to sug- “Seabee
fhst another lhe Nav
diplomacy.”
8an°nf tbe. major objectives of the Rea-
Promo*ministration 'n tb's re8'on ts to
^administration ___________ o_____
veCe sound. long-term economic de-
Pack;
one Uf6 ^Un'ess required for executing t0 l 0 ’be approved programs) is money struUl ^ and maintain the physical infra- ure that developing countries need
tionm s famous fighting construc
ted0 tbe Seabees—represent a v'din 'l UntaPPec* resource capable of proto dgy 'nob''c construction and training geogp0^ 'n® countries that, because of role •,y or politics, play an important Ta'kn U. S. foreign policy.
Am0"~ Ccntral America, for instance.
tor q,,Tlent based on a strong private sec- forf: ° tb‘s cnch Congress appropriated, nomiSCal ^ear ^87, $3.55 billion in eco- li0n f SUpport funds (ESF) and $1.5 bil- Wha ^eve*°Prnent assistance.1 baian ' ° tbe ^SF largely assists with tnentCC ^'Payrocnt Pr°blems, develop- in ass'stance funds support programs njn8nculture’ education, family plan- °tisly ant* bealtb and nutrition. Conspicu na„i absent from this economic aic to sustain economic growth—water catchments, wells, dispensaries, schools, bridges, roads, crop storage facilities, and the like. Rural construction constitutes the weakest element of the entire U. S. foreign aid effort, and that weakness dooms other U. S. aid programs to marginal effectiveness.2
The Naval Construction Force can help fill this void. Its construction battalions— CBs and hence, Seabees—could provide highly skilled and disciplined teams that can efficiently accomplish rural construction projects in Third World countries— and give technical assistance and on-the- job training to the people, as well. Such “civic action” teams do, in fact, have a proven history of accomplishment and popularity.
The idea of using small detachments of Seabees to provide humanitarian aid overseas emerged during the 1950s, when various African and Latin American nations requested U. S. disaster relief in the wake of floods and earthquakes.3 The success of these emergency relief efforts led to the program’s expansion; in 1962, the government established permanent mobile military units to provide civic assistance as well as emergency relief. These first civic action teams were called Seabee Technical Assistance
Teams, a name later shortened to Seabee Teams. They were first deployed to Southeast Asia in January 1963.
Sending Seabees into the impoverished villages of Southeast Asia had a political as well as a humanitarian purpose. They were there to forestall subversion by demonstrating to local citizens that their government was going forward with community projects to better their way of life.4 However, the Seabees’ role was predictably rewritten as the Vietnam conflict heated up. No longer involved in countering subversion, Seabee Teams became an instrument of war. They joined the ranks of dozens of “pacification” programs in Indochina—their prewar accomplishments and extraordinary potential all but forgotten.5
The concept was reborn in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Micronesia became the new domain of Seabee Teams. When the Seabees were joined, in 1970, by Army and Air Force construction units, the teams became known as Civic Action Teams (CATs). Armed with hammers, wrenches, and welders, the CATs set about to bring the islands out of the obscurity into which they fell after World War II. Military engineers took on a job that no other government agency could do, and no private enterprise was
interested in. The CAT effort in Micronesia continues today as an unqualified success, and a powerful testimony to the capabilities and benefits of military civic action.
However, despite this success, it is difficult to argue that the CAT efforts in Micronesia yield any foreign policy benefits, because of the close relationship between the United States and Micronesia. But the Micronesian experience does provide a model that could easily be factored into our foreign aid packages for countries such as Honduras, Ecuador, and Haiti. Easily, that is, were it not for a combination of laws and circumstances
of Develop1’*"1
Forget top hats and men-of-war—a Seabee with a tool kit may be the most heart-winning U. S. diplomat. Under 1987 legislation, military forces can again give humanitarian assistance in Third World countries.
that—to date—have rendered this promising concept difficult to implement.
Until recently, statutes have limited Department of Defense (DoD) authority to transfer training, services, and consumables to a foreign government.6 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 have generally required that DoD be reimbursed for goods or services, even when the foreign government received them solely because it participated in a program at the request of the United States.7
There has also been the ever-present concern that expanding DoD’s role in humanitarian and civic assistance would conflict with the State Department’s traditional role in administering foreign assistance programs.8
But a good idea dies hard. The Pentagon recognizes that civic action can alleviate social and economic conditions that may trigger low-intensity conflict. Defense officials thus proposed—and the Congress has approved (in the Defense Authorization Act of 1987)—legislation to allow U. S. armed forces to engage in humanitarian and civic assistance around the world, in conjunction with authorized military operations, but as yet, no appropriation has been set. The law will permit military forces to undertake projects to improve health care; build or repair schools, clinics, or community buildings; and construct rudimentary transportation infrastructures. Like the early Seabee Team efforts, these projects would expose U. S. military personnel favorably to the local populace and demonstrate the host government’s sensitivity to the needs of its people. The military’s projects would require the approval of the U. S. chief-of-mission in each country.
Military civic action represents a rare, no-lose opportunity for all concerned.
The Department of Defense gets:
- Excellent training for military struction forces
- Positive public relations both at 1 and in the host nation
The Department of State gets: ,
- A powerful tool for achieving regi°n
objectives .j
- The missing link in economic a packages—funds for constructing pW8 cal infrastructures
- Positive country-to-country assistanc
The host government gets:
- Completed, quality facilities .
- The training to construct and maim improved facilities
- Improved health and welfare ,(S
- An opportunity to demonstrate 1
commitment to its people „a
Oliver Cromwell once said that , man-of-war is the best ambassador- Cromwell never met a Seabee with a10 kit.
'U. S. Department of State, Office Finance. ^
2Spark Matsunaga, “A Military Peace CorpS Ajfd U. S. Construction Battalions Help Build the World,” The Washington Post, 13 December 3U. S. Department of the Navy, Seabee Team gram, NAVFAC P-430, July 1972, p. 31.
“Ibid.
5Matsunaga.
6U. S. Department of Defense, “Unified Comm ^ ers’ Conduct of Cooperative Programs With brie"^or Nations—Action Memorandum,” memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 4 November
p. 2.
7Ibid.
"Ibid.
Lieutenant Commander McConnell is a 1975 P’3( ate of the United States Naval Academy. He .yer. master's degree in civil engineering from the Umj sity of Pittsburgh and is a graduate of the A Forces Staff College. Commander McConne ^ spent much of his career with the Seabees. He’s ^ rently assigned to the Commander Construction talions U. S. Atlantic Fleet as the Atlantic pr°e’ , officer. Commander McConnell is a registere P fessional engineer in the state of Virginia.
LEO: Caribbean Jungle Law
hiniunder Stephen R. Woodall, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander William H. Roberts, U. S. Navy
difecdv'f ‘u6 LEDct or TacLET reports
Naw I the c°mmanding officer of the y smp m whlch the Coast Guardsmen
o ' - . .
a** the SNO is received—and this ake as little as two hours or as long
Guard Ct!mb'ned U. S. Navy and Coast (LFm UW enf°rcement operations the r conducted in the Caribbean under SamH°mrnan^er G°ast Guard Caribbean succpJh0 iComCaribRon), have recently of ill Ci m reduc*n8 the seaborne flow
Then orUgS int0 the United States- Power •' S' Navy can cxcrcisc no police board|S m lheSe °Perations. All LEO Condi, n.gj’ ‘nsPecti°ns, and seizures are ttocord- C . ^y. ^0ast Guard personnel in Each NnCC W'dl Goast Guard procedures. ries a ry Ship Participating in LEO car- tachmp 1Guard 'aw enforcement dement (n GEDet) or tactical law enforce- sional (TacLET)—highly profes- and sP, C,eS comPrised of one officer chap,,. ert' unlisted men. The officer-in-
'[o the commanding officer of the nip m ■ ■ -
ar^embarked.
Whenu,:SN,h0W the operation works. Vessel • e, avy ship locates a suspicious itig a:..11 c*oses to within visual signal- nicate w-in6, l'1C EEEtct tries to contmu- iight m' h,the vessel by radio, flashing Secuic ho'st’ and loud bailer. Using sonne) °'Ce communications, Navy per- Sel an(,rCqUCSt 3 record check on the ves- Agenc,cTCW *rom tbe Drug Enforcement
Texas (EV,r?ligenuce center in El Paso’
comm,, • L ' tbe vessel’s crew will the craft ,Ca!f’ tbe DEDet tries to identify mission and ber crew, and requests per- conspnt ■ ° board- if the vessel’s master sual” hS’1 EEDet performs a “consen- n°t be 0ard'.n8- i* communications can- Vessei ,abllshed' or if the master of the LEDet 6 Uses Permission to board, the Guard nep°rts the situation to the Coast Process perat'ons Center ashore, and the Obion,- 0 obtaining a “Statement of No g t,0n (SNO) begins.
Wh?^’uthe.SN0 is permission Vessel Vu r autb°rity to board the suspect via the r rec,uest §oes fr°m the ship, to the f' °aSl Guard Operations Center, The fCommandant of the Coast Guard.
himself Tmandant may grant the SNO claim ' . vesselis stateless, or if she the fjS' rfs*stry in a country with which eral - o*ted btates has an appropriate bilat- n'and'rCClnent' other cases, the Com- (j natlt routes the request through the
ment , department to the govem- Nav tbe vessel’s flag country. The lancy sb'P maintains close visual surveil- e of the vessel while awaiting a reply.
as two days—the LEDet prepares to board the vessel. If her crew will not communicate, or if they ignore commands to heave to, the Navy ship may request authorization to fire warning shots across the bow; in extreme cases, the ship may stop the vessel with disabling fire.
The LEDet takes control of the vessel upon boarding her, examines her papers, and determines the identity and nationality of each crew member. To ensure their own safety, LEDet personnel search every space large enough to conceal someone—no easy task even on a small vessel. If they find contraband, the Coast Guardsmen request permission to seize the vessel and arrest the crew, using the same channels they used to request an SNO.
The LEDet usually transfers the arrested crew to the Navy ship, and sets a custody crew on board the seized vessel. At least one Coast Guardsman must stay on board the vessel to hold the evidence in an unbroken chain of custody. This is essential to successfully prosecuting the smugglers in court. The LEO team may send the seized vessel into a U. S. port under her own power, or tow her in; the arrested crew is turned over to Federal civilian authorities as soon as they can be transported to U. S.-controlled land.
Planning and coordination are vital, especially between ComCaribRon staff and the Navy flagship. During the successful Checkmate 7 operation in November 1986, for instance, the Com- CaribRon staff—composed of professionals in countersmuggling operations—broadly directed the interdiction strategy, while the flagship’s commanding officer drew upon his Navy expertise in directing ships to act as antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC) for interdiction, and as logistics coordinator. Integrating the LEDet officer-in-charge into the wardroom and into the combat information center was equally vital.
Coordination between the embarked staff and the flagship is also essential for maintaining a surface and air Link-11 picture of the area under surveillance, and for integrating ships, helicopters, and land-based aircraft into a proficient search team. Aggressiveness is the key: The more suspicious vessels the ASUWC locates and the Coast Guard team boards, the greater the latter’s chances of seizing contraband.
The ASUWC also evaluates and integrates the reports of assigned surveillance aircraft—generally Coast Guard Falcon jets or C-130s (neither of them Link-11- capable), U. S. Customs Service E-2s, and Navy LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) Mark Is and Mark Ills, and sometimes P-3Cs. Link-11-equipped aircraft are best suited for conducting large-area searches and for identifying contacts, because they can provide realtime surveillance information to Link-11- capable ships.
An accurate navigational picture is essential to a high-quality link. The primary navigation aids used in the southern Caribbean are satellite and, when close enough to land, radar. Loran-C (long- range navigation) is unreliable, since the southern Caribbean is at the limit of the skywave fix area.
Many vessels are under way at any given time in the Caribbean, but few are smuggling drugs. Large ships are generally legitimate traders—and even if they are smuggling, searching large vessels is beyond the capability of the LEDet. Customs agents search large vessels when the ships arrive in U. S. ports. Southbound vessels are generally legitimate, too, since most contraband flows from south to north. Possible smugglers are often identified in intelligence reports from EPIC and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System.
Careful cooperation between the ship and the LEDet comes into play as soon as a suspected smuggler is located. Shiphandling is the first problem. Drug runners are ruthless people who have a lot to lose if they are apprehended, and they will take desperate measures to foil the Navy-Coast Guard team. Drug-laden vessels will maneuver erratically, deliberately cutting close under the bow or even running into the Navy ships— anything to discourage their pursuers. Navy shiphandlers must be bold and vigilant to maneuver their 6,000-ton precision instrument on a dark, windy night to within loud-hailer range of a fleeing vessel (and keep her there); and the engineers must be alert on the throttles as they answer frequent “Back Full" bells during radical maneuvers.
Deck seamanship skills are also tested heavily. Each boarding involves an open- ocean boat transfer. The small boat of choice is the Coast Guard rigid hull interdiction boat (RHIB), a Zodiac-like craft. It is especially useful for boarding sailboats or other small vessels that might be
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damaged by an unyielding utility boat or motor whaleboat. If a vessel is seized, it may have to be towed. In many cases, vessels too small to take the standard destroyer-sized towing rig can be towed with a five-inch mooring line.
Weather is another factor in boarding operations. The trade winds in the southern Caribbean average more than 15 knots, especially in the rainy season, and seas of four to eight feet are common. In these conditions, the seaworthy, tough RHIB really proves its worth. The boathandling detail must be well drilled, ready to put boats in the water frequently, at all hours.
Command presence is important in boarding operations. A slack-looking warship, her topsides covered with gawking crew members, is clearly less impressive than a taut, trim ship with only essential personnel in sight. Besides—even though drug runners would rather run than fight—topside personnel make excellent targets for desperate smugglers. If a suspect vessel does endanger the Navy ship, her crew, or her LEDet, the U. S. Navy rules of engagement are in effect: the commanding officer then has the right and the duty to defend his ship.
Once a seizure is made, LEDet personnel arrest the vessel’s crew members, transport them to the Navy ship, and formally charge them. The ship’s medical personnel examine the prisoners, document their findings, and treat any injuries. The Navy ship must be ready to furnish secure stowage for a significant number of prisoners. They are generally kept topside to preclude security problems, including inadvertent disclosure of classified material. Since the Caribbean climate is mild even in winter, an awning, plus a blanket and a poncho apiece, generally suffice to keep the prisoners in good health. A simple but effective way of restraining prisoners is to tether them to deck fittings using handcuffs and a strap of one-inch nylon line. The prisoners are kept under constant guard. These are hardened criminals, and are not entitled to the privileges afforded prisoners- of-war by the Geneva Convention.
As the prisoners are brought on board the Navy ship, the Coast Guard custody crew boards the seized vessel. First, she is made safe against sinking. This can be difficult, given smugglers’ propensity for scuttling their evidence-packed vessels. When this happens, the boarding party may be able to do no more than recover the evidence before they abandon the vessel to sink. If a seized vessel is still seaworthy, the LEO team can tow the vessel to the nearest U. S.-controlled port or a custody crew can sail her into port under her own power.
Custody crews must be equipped for their journeys with celestial navigation equipment, charts, radio gear, water, rations, and small arms. Sometimes otherwise scruffy drug vessels are outfitted with high-quality electronics, including satellite navigation equipment, but it is not always operable. The uncertain state of sanitation on these vessels makes it unwise to rely on their water and commissary stores. The custody crew needs rifles and pistols to defend the seized vessel and contraband against potential “reseizure.”
When deciding whether to tow a seized vessel, sail her independently to port, or sail her with an escort, the LEO team faces several questions. First, will the navigational situation and the weather make it safe to sail the vessel independently? Many drug carriers, especially smaller vessels, are loaded more heavily and maintained more poorly than they should be. Second, was the vessel damaged in a scuttling attempt or from force used to stop her? Third, is a surface ship available to escort or tow the vessel, or to
Navy-Coast Guard law enforcemc® operations are providing a power combination punch in the Caribb Many suspected smugglers, like t Carib Queen, are stopped by the Navy, but actually boarded by C°a Guard law enforcement detachmen transfer prisoners to another ship Participation in LEO offers the ^ ship some valuable training oppor ties. As a full-fledged sea control °Pe.^, tion, it gives CIC teams realistic trainj, „ in broad-area command-and-control-
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those of multicarrier battle group °P . , tions. The CIC organization main1. Link-11 ASUW and antiair
tures of the entire Caribbean, to tactical and planning decisions, teams get significant experience in cl aboard maneuvering, and deck seat”. ship skills are tested throughout the s The crews also have time during L ^ for drills in shipwide damage control engineering casualty control. j
Recent LEOs have been fast-paC^| real-world operations against a ,. enemy—drug smugglers. They ° e something more than training to all
terdicting illegal drugs bound for sale the United States.
Commander Woodall is serving as the conin1,inf officer of the USS King (DDG-41). His Navy ^ ^ includes command of the USS Luiseno (ATF-1 ' well as service in two other guided missile dc ers, a minesweeper, and a frigate.
Lieutenant Commander Roberts, currently the e* tive officer of the King, has served in two guided missile destroyers, a destroyer, and an phibious transport dock.