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The myth-fed hysteria that greeted the U. S. violation—by a single delivery vehicle—of the unratified SALT II agreement ignored the current Soviet excess of 240 launchers. But MIRV technology, embodied in the ten-warhead rail-mobile Soviet SS-24 ICBM and the U. S. MX, makes the SALT II numbers moot.
Last November, President Ronald Reagan declined to order the decommissioning of a Poseidon submarine prior to the date the Air Force activated its 131st cruise missile-carrying B-52 bomber. He thus permitted the U. S. strategic nuclear arsenal to exceed one of the sub-limits established by the 1979 SALT II Treaty. The President’s decision drew sharp protest from various segments of the American public, provoked outright anger among several members of Congress, and triggered critical comment in the media. Rather than weighing the merits and demerits of both sides of the issue, however, most of the national and local media have apparently chosen to indict this decision on the basis of incomplete, misleading, or erroneous information.
The sweeping new arms control initiatives raised at the Reykjavik Summit, an increasingly restive Congress eager to push arms control issues to the foreground, and an ad- ministration/media relationship soured by the “arms for Iran” controversy have combined to dampen the prospects for detached analysis of future arms control efforts. Yet before the American public can have intelligent debates about codifying deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, we must first clear up the misinformation and dispel the widely accepted myths of the SALT II era.
In a 4 December 1986 editorial, the Boston Globe denounced the President’s action. The paper justified its attack on the administration’s arms control record by proclaiming, “The Soviets have never breached numerical limits.” During the same period, several members of Congress made public statements echoing similar sentiments,
the first
expressing remorse that the United States was m ^jS violate the numerical tenets of SALT II. The ^actS instance would be enlightening for the general pu and for editors and congressional staffers, as we ^e0llid President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary £ Brezhnev signed the SALT II accord in Vienna on 1979. Under the counting rules of SALT II, warlgVerail ventories were not constrained directly; rather, nn ^ limit on nuclear weapons launchers (strategic nuc livery vehicles [SNDVs]) was set, incorporating s launcher sub-limits. According to SALT II, a ‘ *a^n]yl), consisted of any intercontinental ballistic missile ( ^ any any submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBML ^or6 “heavy” (long-range) bomber that carried one ° ate nuclear weapons. Article III of the treaty set the ag_ tj,e SNDV limit at 2,400 launchers for each side up
tinues to be, “fatally flawed.” In various
ed
treaty’s entry into force, and lowered this maximum permissible SNDV total to 2,250 for each side, effective 1 January 1981. It also set launcher sub-limits of 1,320 for individual SNDVs capable of delivering multiple warheads, 1,200 for ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, and 820 for ICBMs with multiple warheads.
To ensure that both sides had an accurate data base for measuring compliance, each superpower submitted a “Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty.” These unilaterally determined inventories were exchanged when the SALT II Treaty was signed. A review of these June 1979 numbers, coupled with an inventory of each side’s arsenal as of December 1986, reveals some interesting facts and trends in numerical compliance. (See Table 1.)
Since SALT II would officially enter into force only after the U. S. Senate had ratified the treaty, the Soviets were not immediately in violation of the 2,400 SNDV aggregate limit. Rather, provision was made in Article XI for dismantling excess or prohibited strategic offensive arms according to a timetable that would become effective once the treaty was ratified. Following ratification, destruction or dismantling of these launchers would begin immediately and be completed within three months (bombers), four months (ICBM silos), or six months (SLBMs), as applicable. Unfortunately, the Article XI timetable soon became moot. Six months after the Vienna
The Soviets were in violation—by 104 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—at the moment Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II accord in 1979. But lacking the binding mandate to dismantle the excess launchers that would have come with U. S. Senate ratification of the treaty, the Soviets chose instead to increase them.
Summit, Soviet tanks began pouring into Afghanis a ^ Already encountering significant opposition to his supp of SALT II, President Carter had little choice but to a Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) to with ra^ the treaty from Senate consideration until the internatio environment became more conducive to ratification.
The evaporation of SALT II’s chances for Senate ra^ cation took away the impetus for Soviet nuclear weap reductions. Without a binding mandate to begin diSITia ling their “excess” launchers, the Soviets reacted acC0 ingly. They were 104 SNDVs above the SALT II agg gate limit in 1979; they are 240 above that limit today-^ the Reagan administration is to be convicted as the c arms control violator, one must search beyond numeri limits for the evidence. The United States has been violation of SALT II numerical limits since Noyem^ 1986; the Soviets have been in violation since the day treaty was signed.
Curiously, the Reagan administration has chosen 110 justify or qualify publicly its November 1986 dcc■ ^ using the preceding line of reasoning. Instead, it has to its long-standing conviction that SALT II was, an c
. e. ~ .... • speeches and
forcing each side to reduce its nuclear weapons stoc P ^ Moreover, because SALT II distorted the true rneaSll[l|tjng each side’s strategic nuclear force capabilities by coa launchers instead of warheads, the treaty afforded t ^ viets an opportunity to undertake an unpreceden e clear weapons buildup. though
Proponents of the “fatally flawed” school ot point to the 1979 to 1986 trend in the Soviet nuc'e.^J-atally nal and rest their case; opponents dismiss the . flawed” argument as a convenient tactic for the a
Category
Table 1 Compliance with SALT II
SALT II Limit United States
Soviet Union
| 1979 | 19862 | 1979 | 19862 |
2,400/2,250* | 2,283 | 1,926 | 2,504 | 2,490 |
1,320 | 1,209 | 1,321 | 752 | 1,194 |
1,200 | 1,046 | 1,190 | 752 | 1,154 |
820 | 550 | 550 | 608 | 818 |
Total SNDVs
SNDVs with multiple warheads allistic missiles with multiple warheads BMs with multiple warheads
2p1fkctlve 1 January 1981 per Article III.2
°ures from RAND Corporation summary of U. S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, December 1986
. ‘ wab Mgncu.; rui me uiiucu oiaiea uiai
UBM is the MX. Although the 450 single-warhead the i,ernan ff missiles have been in service for 20 years, man ^tates has begun replacing the newer Minute- (ten m*ssde (three warheads each) with the MX missile ‘1>bifVVar*lea^s eacb) on a one-for-one basis. (SALT II pro
"bpact
c°nstr
trol'°n S 'lar<TI'ncrs to use to subvert the entire arms con- the ^r?Cess- Unlike the previous case, the information in ^public domain is not erroneous, but it is incomplete. Tablfeview the Soviet numerical trends highlighted in codif' ^ suPPorts the administration’s claim that SALT II adv 1£(1 3 maj°r Soviet nuclear weapons buildup. Taking dg a.nta§e °f the technology that allows multiple indepen- by ^ targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to be delivered wangle missile, the Soviets have increased their
strenh ICBM stren§th a third> their MIRVed SLBM m , 8 o by a factor of two, and their overall inventory of SALT e Warbead platforms by more than 50% since C|e ff was signed. Because the United States held a ’JJcre ^ *n technology in 1979, the comparable
thQ„ a,Se ln U. S. MIRVed launchers is much less dramatic 7f ‘he Soviets’.
the Soviets are exploiting the lenient SALT II rules, JJiak nitCt^ States should have a similar opportunity to 3p e ‘he most of the “fatally flawed” provisions. That pUc?ars to be happening with the U. S. near-term strategic heat ;'i ^°rCe modernizati°n efforts. Indeed, the same h'ouH un8uaSe that allowed the previous Soviet buildup caD ,. a‘so permit a tremendous increase in the size and tain • * °^Th S. strategic nuclear forces—and even sus- visaand cxpand this buildup far beyond that currently en- ged by the Reagan administration.
Hew , IC*£ ^ °f SALT II allows each party to deploy one to b °f “light” ICBM. (Light ICBMs are understood eithp6 any‘h‘n8 smaller than the heaviest light ICBM in the / S*^e S arsena‘> *n this instance the Soviet SS-17, at
Mi
construction of new, fixed ICBM silos.) The net °n this modernization effort of SALT II numerical hea(jtraints *s nil- The fact that MX has seven more war- accuS.Per missile—and that each MX warhead is twice as in a‘e as its Minuteman III counterpart—means nothing equ ? Con‘ext °f SALT II. In the SALT II regime, one MX rem]S 0ne Minuteman III. The Defense Department cur- auth ^ Pfans to procure 100 MX missiles; Congress has 0r|zed the first 50. Common sense and economic arguments notwithstanding, no SALT II proscription prevents the United States from replacing all 550 Minuteman III missiles with MX missiles. Entirely in consonance with the treaty’s provisions, the United States could thus conceivably trade 1,650 warheads for 5,500 warheads with comparable yield and greater accuracy.
Similar “flexibility” in SALT II exists in the efforts to modernize the other two legs of the triad. As long as new SLBMs have fewer than 14 warheads each and are smaller than the heaviest “light” ICBM at the time SALT II was signed, the submarine deterrent can be modernized and strengthened virtually at will. For example, it is legal under SALT II for the United States to replace the aging Poseidon submarines and their Poseidon or Trident I missiles with the faster and quieter Trident submarine and its soon-to-be-deployed Trident II missile. Well within SALT’S size constraints, Trident II missiles will possess the requisite combination of warhead yield (twice that of the Trident I warheads; more than four times that of Poseidon warheads) and warhead accuracy to threaten hardened targets in the Soviet Union. As with the ICBM force, if the Trident IIs replace the Trident Is and Poseidons on a one- for-one basis, the net impact of SALT II limits would be zero. Yet by modernizing in this fashion, the United States could cover as many hardened targets in the Soviet Union with its submarine deterrent alone by the early 1990s as it can today, using its entire Minuteman III force. Unlike the ICBM leg, however, the submarine-based warheads would still be available after a major Soviet first strike. By acquiring this sea-based retaliatory capability, the United States will be able to respond promptly against any combination of Soviet targets, hardened or not—a capability currently unachievable in light of ICBM vulnerability and bomber/cruise missile flight time requirements.
Modernization efforts for the triad’s final leg, the bomber force, could also proceed, nearly unchecked by SALT II limits. Aside from prohibiting multiple warheads on cruise missiles and limiting the number of allowable cruise missiles per existing heavy bomber to 20 (28 for bombers not yet deployed by the time SALT II entered into force), SALT II did little to constrain the “air-breathing” portion of the superpowers’ strategic arsenals. There is no penalty for replacing a B-52 bomber (eight weapons) with a B-l bomber (12 to 16 weapons); there are no constraints on the size or yield of bomber-deliverable war-
heads. Rather, the treaty’s key “restriction” is a requirement to count cruise missile-carrying bombers against the 1,320 sub-limit for multiple warhead launchers. This indirect constraint on strategic force modernization precipitated the November 1986 violation by the United States. Unwilling to cease converting gravity bombers to cruise missile carriers without concurrently retiring some other multiple-warhead platform assets, President Reagan chose instead to demonstrate concretely that the United States no longer considers itself bound by an unratified treaty that would have expired on 31 December 1985.
Is SALT II “fatally flawed” as the Reagan administration claims? The answer appears to be yes, but it is not clear that such a conclusion should be sufficient grounds for abrogating a process that, if nothing else, has contributed to the predictability of each side’s nuclear arsenal developments for the last 14 years. The administration’s case against SALT II has much merit. But precisely because its case is so strong, one wonders why the United States chose to make a militarily insignificant move certain to evoke passionate denunciations at home and abroad, in order to underscore a conviction well within the bounds of reason.
Without kindling a debate—whether the United States should take steps to return to the SALT II limits—we must make a distinction that is frequently overlooked when assessing the relative severity of alleged arms control treaty violations. The Boston Globe editorial characterized the Reagan administration’s claim of Soviet treaty violations (encrypting missile test data, testing a second new ICBM, etc.) as “secondary” in importance compared to the U. S. numerical violation. This demonstrates a misplaced view of the relative value of qualitative arms control versus quantitative arms control, and fails to distinguish between the severity of the violations that are transient or reversible and those that are not.
In 1976, the Soviet Union failed to dismantle a number of its older SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM silos prior to the time one of their new ballistic missile submarines commenced her sea trials, thereby violating one of the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement. After the United States notified the Soviets of the discrepancy, Moscow took the necessary steps to return to the treaty’s limits, completing the silo retirements in approximately three months. Because the Soviets’ non-compliance was transient, it did not present any long-term difficulties with respect to the mutual restraints established by SALT I. Similarly, both the United States and the Soviet Union could, if they desired, reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to the levels specified in the SALT II Treaty. By so doing, each side could “reverse” its previously established non-compliant status, preserving the overall SALT II framework despite the contrary precedents set for future compliance.
Such is not the case with the “secondary” violations alleged by the Reagan administration. If the Soviets are encrypting missile test data required for verification of SALT II provisions, this concealment represents an irreversible violation of Article XV. Likewise, if the Soviets are flight-testing a second new ICBM, they are irreversibly violating Article IV. One cannot “un-encrypt Pre'fl ously coded data or “un-test” an already-tested missi s Sufficient evidence in support of these alleged Soviet m fractions is not available to the public. However, it is n1^ leading to treat a reversible numerical violation more verely than an irreversible violation that could give perpetrator a militarily significant advantage.
One of the most popular blasts against the Presiden decision to breach SALT II plays upon a fear that t single act will launch a new arms race between the Uni States and the Soviet Union. According to this theory, United States has now broken a tacit, if not binding a§r^_ ment, and the only logical Soviet reaction can be to crease its stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Evidence ot ^ Soviet reaction would, in turn, fuel a wave of new L- weapons procurements. So the spiral would go, onW‘of and upward, with no end in sight and nothing to contain reverse the momentum. Such a scenario is unlikely- & if it transpired, however, it could do little to alter the exi- ing strategic balance. . . . e
Though the President’s Strategic Defense Iniha 1 (SDI) has certainly contributed much toward bringing ^ Soviets back to the arms control negotiating table fol
ing their walkout in 1983, the faltering Soviet economy ^ an equally compelling reason for their resurgent ‘ntere jal arms control. With a technologically backward indus ^ base—by Western standards—and a stifling central n1^ ^ agement and control network, the 1980s have revea Soviet economy chronically beset with meager or nej^of. real growth. Responding to these indicators, Mikhail bachev has, at least publicly, made improving the g economy his highest priority. Therefore, a new arms with the United States is the last thing Gorbachev waj 3 Although the Soviets have historically demonstrate^ willingness to forgo “butter” before “guns” in the tradeoffs, the Gorbachev regime appears to be raising
lachsconsists of nearly 12,000 warheads. Although it its ICBM to cover all Soviet hardened targets with inflict I *orce alcmc, the United States could nevertheless tary evastating levels of destruction on the Soviet mili- sets J? a Ushment, using its balanced strategic triad as- rines I'1 nearly half of U. S. warheads based on subma- prepQnft 6 ^oviets would not be able to destroy a stride -p?rance °f U. S. strategic capabilities in a first netab] erefore, if each side has sufficiently large, invul- Sary’seretaliat°ry ^orces’ capable of destroying its adver- threaj S°ciety.In a second strike—and if neither side can heads T ac^'t*onaI military targets by adding more war- numerj° ,lts own arsenal—where is the logic in a costly numbp-1CafarmS race^ II seems senseless to increase the these , Warhcads from 10,000 to 15,000 or more if itional weapons can neither attack submerged (or
act bv° k *°r Suc^ tradeoffs. It is not clear that a symbolic viet II• 6 Pn'te<^ States would, by itself, exceed the So- •p^e^011 .S military response” threshold. reniai 0viet incentives for renewing an arms race may that j|n.a P°'nt °f conjecture, but there can be little doubt rent .eit . suPerpower could upset dramatically the cur-
S°vietrUninnbalanCe,th!'0Ugh a major arms buildup. The neariv , currently has a strategic nuclear arsenal of Warhe- | warheads. With more than half of these alreacja ^ carried by highly accurate ICBMs, the Soviets get jn ^ ave the capability to hit every fixed military tar- dePi0v- e ^n'ted States, hardened or not. They have begun and ar^ a^mobile, single-warhead ICBM,
ICBMe c°ntinuing to develop another potentially mobile nearly\ n 1° addition to their SLBM force of
a sign'f- ^ warheads, these new ICBMs will ensure that ^rab]' 'fant ^ract'on of the Soviet arsenal remains invul- Qnrom attack by the United States or its allies. CuTenti 6 0t^er hand, the U. S. strategic nuclear arsenal y consists of neariv 19 OOH w/^rh^arlc Although it
The 131st cruise-missile carrying B-52 is a faint sign of a quantitative arms control failure. But a myopic concern with numbers ignores a far more serious qualitative arms race, perpetuated by the spirit of SALT II and the Reykjavik Summit—where Reagan and Gorbachev measured one another face-to-face.
land-mobile) targets nor place any targets at risk that are not already vulnerable at existing force levels.
Article I of the SALT II treaty opens with the words, “Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively. ...” Seven-and-a-half years later, the former aim can be judged a qualified success; the latter a dismal failure. Without question, numbers contribute significantly toward perceptions of the strategic balance between the superpowers. Unfortunately, however, fixation solely on the numerical limits of SALT II—at the expense of its other provisions—has fostered and sustained a dangerously naive myth: as long as the numbers remain equal, a stable strategic balance will be preserved.
Despite its outwardly stable quantitative framework, the SALT II era has been marked by a tremendous qualitative arms race that has grown out of the treaty’s permissive provisions for MIRVed missiles, cruise missiles, and other “modernized” strategic platforms. By freezing the number of fixed ICBM silos at the 1979 status quo, while simultaneously exacting no penalty for replacing a three- warhead ICBM with a newer, ten-warhead missile, these tenets have encouraged both sides to press the development of warhead-intensive next-generation missiles. The United States has built the MX; the Soviet Union is developing the SS-24. Both of these new ICBMs will carry ten warheads each. Conversely, the 1983 Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, pointed out the wisdom of moving toward a force structure of lower value individual strategic systems; by deploying a singlewarhead ICBM, the United States could deny Soviet tar- geters the ability to destroy more than one warhead with one Soviet warhead.
In a strategic force “balance” with growing numbers of high-value individual strategic targets on both sides, each superpower is becoming increasingly capable of achieving an advantageous exchange of forces should either decide to launch a limited strike against attractive targets. The presence of such a tempting opportunity is precisely the scenario we wish to avoid, should a deep crisis develop between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather than encouraging stabilization of the superpowers’ strategic nuclear arsenals and laying a foundation conducive to further arms reductions, the SALT II “numbers” mentality has destabilized the ongoing deployments, making realization of major near-term warhead cuts nearly unachievable in view of the current force structures.
At the Reykjavik Summit last fall, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were in apparent agreement with a framework that would reduce the strategic
n-oce,
ed>ngs1 August 1987
308.
when this massive missile, of which the Soviets have
nuclear arsenals of both parties by 50% over a five-year period. Though envisaged as a first step toward the objective of complete nuclear disarmament, a 6,000-warhead/ 1,600 launcher limit would present the United States with a series of terribly difficult tradeoffs during the coming five years. With each Trident submarine “costing” 192 warheads, each converted B-52 20 warheads, and each MX missile ten warheads, it is apparent that the U. S. force posture under the Reyjkavik formula would have the bulk of its most modem assets concentrated into a small number of platforms. To get a sense of the severity of this concentration, consider one of the possible “first cut” tradeoffs in the transition to a 6,000-warhead arsenal: by freezing all ongoing procurements at their current levels, retiring only those strategic platforms older than 20 years, except for the converted B-52s, and retaining all of the remaining assets from the December 1986 inventory, the U. S. strategic nuclear forces would shrink to a level of 5,891 warheads. The available balance (109 warheads) would permit no additional submarines, ten or fewer MX missiles, or five or fewer additional cruise missile-carrying bombers. Moreover, this 5,891-warhead force would be based on only 888 launchers, 60% of which would be Minuteman III ICBMs.
Although factors other than platform age—vulnerability, accuracy, and triad balance—would be considered during such a massive reduction of the U. S. inventory, the destabilizing qualitative tendencies promoted by SALT II will be difficult to reverse, especially in the near-term. The 131st cruise missile-carrying B-52 bomber is less a sign of quantitative arms control failure than of a much more serious qualitative problem, one that has been largely ignored in the race to find immediate, stop-gap quantitative remedies.
Even if President Reagan were to order the decommissioning of another Poseidon submarine tomorrow, 15 converted B-52 bombers later the United States would be bumping up against the 1,320 sub-limit again. This action would merely perpetuate the qualitative arms race. Recent calls for congressionally mandated initiatives to force the United States to return to numerical compliance with SALT II represent shallow, myopic solutions if they do not also seek to redress the deeper qualitative problems.
SALT II would have covered a fixed duration, from its ratification until the end of 1985. Recognizing this, its negotiators added a provision in Article XIV that states, “It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive
• ■ ” Roth
arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration. . sides probably judged the lenient modernization ProV1 sions of SALT II as acceptable, because each understoo^ that a follow-on agreement was to be completed some t within the next six years. By most procurement standar ^ six years is such a short period of time that it precludes initiation of many programs whose future legality mtg ^ be curtailed at the negotiating table. Regrettably, sue a accord was not concluded. u
Today, a return to the SALT II regime seems to be a idea. This does not mean that SALT II was a bad idea u° its inception, or that it was necessarily a good idea for United States to breach its numerical limits. Despite shortcomings, SALT II did serve several U. S. seCiarl interests during the time it would have been in et e
- It stopped the proliferation of Soviet ICBM silos, by
their favorite basing mode. u
- It limited the Soviet SS-18 missile to ten warheads ea
could easily have been “modernized” to carry many m° warheads per missile.
If ratified and observed, SALT II would have:
- Forced the Soviets to reduce their inventory of strateg
nuclear delivery vehicles by 10% by 1981. sS
- Maintained the momentum for an arms control ProC^e
that could have produced the follow-on agreement await even today. ; . ,
Whether or not one agrees with President Reagan s cision to breach the numerical limits of the unrati i SALT II Treaty, it would be encouraging to see a n'0^ responsible presentation of the pertinent evidence for 0 sides of this issue. The media have focused on just hal evidence for one side of the argument. If we are to reesta^ lish widespread public support for realistic arms c°ntr^ policies and objective standards of evaluation for the ens^ ing provisions, we must first clear up the misinformati0 dispel the myths, and tell the rest of the story, good a bad, of the SALT II era.
Lieutenant Keller graduated from the Naval Academy in 1979. Fo j ing graduation, he spent six months in the Manpower and Pers0^ Policy Branch in the OJCS (J-5) before beginning nuclear training/submarine school. He served in the USS Trepang (SSN- He was then assigned as the Aide and Flag Lieutenant for the Dire ^ Research, Development and Acquisition (Op-098) in Washing!011' 1986, he began a two-year program of study at the John F. ^en!*uaie School of Government at Harvard University under the Navy’s Gra Education Program.
_______________________________________________ Slumber Parties__________________________________
At boot camp, it was almost impossible to stay awake for the classroom sessions: boring films and stale air were just too much. Our drill instructor, however, had an adroit method of keeping us alert. He informed us that it was perfectly fine to take a nap, but the man on each side of the sleeper would be required to do five turns around the parade ground.
That ended the slumber parties.
Henry R. Plante