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Contents:
Gramm-Rudman and the Future of the 600-Ship Fleet
Why Are Britain’s Great Naval Historians Americans?
U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1986
Should the Navy Build the A-6F?
Coast Guard Commandant Meets the Press
Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step
The Maritime Strategy: An Allied Reaction
Uncertain Outlook for the Royal New Zealand Navy
Short and Fat or Long and Thin?
Mines: A New Lease on SSBNs’ Lives?
Let’s Practice the Way We Expect to Fight
1986 Naval and Maritime Prize Photography
Stemming the Haitian Tide
Officer/Athlete: The Navy Needs a Rule
Where Did My People Go?
Trimming Shore Base Encroachment
Rx for Contingency Medical Support
DoD Reorganization
Canada’s Blind Spot
The War on Paper
Bear in the Backyard
Mine Awareness
“Gramm-Rudman and the Future of the 600-Ship Fleet”
0See S. C. Truver, pp. 110-123, May 1987
Proceedings)
Captain Charles L. Becker, U. S. Navy— The aspect of Mr. Truver’s article I found most encouraging was that he dealt with budget restrictions without truculence or animosity. More times than I can recall I have heard discussions of Gramm-Rudman which boiled down to little more than, “If they don’t want to give us what we want, then the heck with them.” Dealing with the economic situation realistically is a sign of maturity. Our goal should be to provide adequate defense within the means allotted, without recrimination. This can only be accomplished through fresh thinking, honest evaluation, and maintaining the focus on the desired result rather than the means.
I find it ironic that better results are more often achieved by spending less rather than more. Improved procurement procedures may eliminate $600 toilet seats, but that good is too often undone by six- and seven-figure expenditures that do not address the stated objective. I do not suggest a “penny-wise, pound-foolish” policy of scrimping on necessities, but I recommend that each expenditure be carefully evaluated on the basis of improved capability, priority, and payback.
Recognizing the need for both leadership and management and keeping their sometimes conflicting requirements in balance is a sign of level-headedness. It is easy to lead in times of plenty, when money lies under every rock. The challenge is leading in times of austerity, maintaining morale while accomplishing the mission. That is the challenge that faces our military and civilian leadership.
thanked for this new opportunity to vital concerns and observations on
air
the
maritime past—observations which may help shape the future.
To that end, I offer you two comments. First, The Proceedings of the U. S. Na%'a Institute have long been referred to 1,1 conversation and in footnotes by scholafS as “The Proceedings.” The use of P'° ceedings to denominate the journal stings the eye and nettles the mental process’ Second, from reading John Keega(1 article, it appears that the time has come for the British to forswear ventures inl° U. S. naval history—unless they ha'e read the sources. And the sources they should read are contained in The P'° ceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute- If Keegan had read the General Pf*ze Essays published in Volume Eight, Num ber One, 1882 of The Proceedings, *° example, he would have had mu® greater insight into American naval on cers, their educations, and into Alfr® Thayer Mahan. The predetermined top11 of that contest was “Our Merchant rine: The Causes of Its Decline and tjj Steps to Be Taken For Its Revival.” authors of the essays were Lieutem1 Carlos G. Calkins, Lieutenant Com mander French Ensor Chadwick, Ens1? W. G. David, Lieutenant J. D. J. Kell^' and Lieutenant Richard Wainwrig1^ These officers and their prize essay en
tries had a great deal of influence on
the
“Why Are Britain’s Great Naval Historians Americans?”
(See J. Keegan, pp. 7-11, April 1987 Naval History)
Dr. Lawrence C. Allin, Maritime Historian, University of Maine—The appearance of the premier issue of Naval History is an event long-awaited by professional oceanic historians and interested laymen. You are to be congratulated and
U. S. Navy and Alfred Thayer Mah3^ because they set out the concepts and m basic facts which Mahan would incorp0 rate in The Influence of Sea-power VP°. History, 1660-1783, and, I think. 1 L rest of his sea power classics.
Keegan could have made a much bed ^ case for himself if he had mention® these young officers, the ideas they s out, and the fact that Mahan was a v>c president of the Naval Institute, a some time judge of its essay contest, and reader of its Proceedings.
Readers and members know that tn U. S. Naval Institute and its Proceeding are now in their 114th year. No historm or commentator on America’s ocean1 past can write fairly without reference t0 them. Nava! History now offers the °P portunity for such fair writing and for tn writing of rigorous, excellent ocean1 history.
Proceedings)
^j°m'nander R. W. Kiefer, Supply Corps, ■ S. Navy, A-6/EA-6 Deputy Program onager, Naval Air Systems Command-
*0e prnfooo;___ i_______ :_________ :
relies
'.e Professional sea-service community tai'leS °nProceedings as the authori- ^Ve source for accurate information, ordingly, I was astonished and disap- lr>ted by several inaccuracies in Com-
ander Kennedy’s article on the A-6 air- c*att.
^ correct the misstatements deli
a'rcraft The
ISsi°n computer system software for the
ne government-furnished AYK-14
A'6pTs‘i
s central processor.
Sc ■ developed through the F-14D full ae development program. In its A-6F d»L . at*on> the computer supports the
tie
c'ud,
p^l'cal aircraft (ATA) and recognizes its r hi'se. However, contrary to Captain oj. °uture’s assertions, the development ^ any Weapon system—particularly one h an already ambitious schedule that
Quires
state-of-the-art technological
bi
S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1986”
D- Kennedy, pp. 80-84, 263-272, May Proceedings)
Should the Navy Build the A-6F?
‘Xee J. Lacouture, pp. 20-21, June 1987
Boeing Military Airplane Company of ,Vereci the first new wings for retrofit on l anci KA-6D and new equipment die A-6F Intruders.” n Point of fact, the first Boeing com- la(Slte wing will not be delivered until e 1987 (November is the contractual Virement), and it is not intended for the KA-6D.
bel C0mP0site wing is slightly
lino W sPecif'e(d contract weight, net-
§ Boeing a performance bonus” the °e’n§ *s st'B challenged to achieve ^ 22*1 weight; no contract bonus ^ ^ been either earned or paid.
Grumman has run into difficulties j( apting the . . . AYK-14 computer to role in the A-6F (and the F-14D) as the
^elopment and production programs. reWlth regard to Captain Lacouture’s ^’romendation that the Navy scuttle the w: | Program—he misses the target by a ® margin.
he Navy—the A-6 community in- ed-—wants and needs the advanced
J^hroughs in several extremely diffi- w arenas—cannot be accelerated sim- jsy °y “throwing money at it.” To do so “ ereatc a potential disaster. Accordingly, until the ATA is thor- Wjghly developed, tested, and deployed h fU]| capabilities, the A-6F is neces- ry to satisfy the fleet’s capabilities and
inventory deficiencies. This interim requirement is even greater now than it was when the A-6F was conceived, because of the notional air wing concept, which significantly increases the requirement for all-weather, medium attack aircraft. Furthermore, the A-6F may continue to be the optimal platform for certain medium attack missions, even after the ATA becomes fully operational.
The A-6F has remarkable capabilities, including: advanced F-404 engines; a fully integrated/digital avionics suite; a world-class radar; a durable graphite- epoxy composite wing; a multisystem night attack navigation suite for completely passive low-level penetration; vastly improved electronic countermeasures, and defensive avionics; and major vulnerability and survivability improvements.
The crux of the Navy’s requirement to continue the A-6F program, however, is bridging both the operational capabilities and inventory gaps that will exist even if the ATA is successfully developed. The Navy needs both the A-6F and the ATA.
“Coast Guard Commandant
Meets the Press”
(See Seminar Report, pp. 58-63, June 1987
Proceedings)
Harry M. Covert, Jr., Assistant to the Publisher, Insight (The Washington Times)—With one year of his four-year term behind him, Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., is establishing himself as an energetic, able, and determined commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard. He is committed to military preparedness during peacetime and is upgrading the education and skills of his personnel, while improving the technical and physical equipment needed to carry out the Coast Guard’s mandate.
Admiral Yost is a personally modest man who expects a high level of competence from the men and women of the Coast Guard—something he also demands of himself. The armed force has been revered for its service to the nation since 1790; I wouldn’t be surprised if the Coast Guard’s greatest days have begun under Admiral Yost’s watch.
The Coast Guard story hasn’t been told because of its modest budget. While this limits its public renown, it is a credit to the service’s fiscal responsibility.
Today, however, with its mission clearly defined to protect the nation’s ports and to ensure maritime law enforcement and safety, the time is ripe for the Coast Guard Commandant to become a
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Looking
Strategy
1 member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'ttln8 as an equal with leaders of the r™y> Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Coast Guardsmen are the unsung he- es °f America—real top guns. Instead (ocutling their budgets, Congress ought Provide the dollars necessary for addi- °nal quality personnel and modem tjuipment. As its 200th birthday ap- rOaches, it seems appropriate for the , °ast Guard to become a separate entity. s mission for the United States—and e World—would be better executed q er a “Department of the Coast ard." The job would be even more I ass>ve than it is today, but under the leadership of Admiral Yost—and those e hint who are emerging—the nation’s antime interests would be well-served.
Beyond the Maritime
55
(See C. A. H. Trost, pp. 13-16, January 1987
rr°ceedings)
The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step”
?<’e C J. West, pp. 40-49, January 1987;
• urdan, pp. 14-16, March 1987 Proceedings)
views into consideration and raises legitimate European concerns.
Mr. West sees the Maritime Strategy as “planning for a protracted conventional conflict, regardless of the outcome of the initial battle along the inter-German border.” He is correct that our NATO allies would “object strenuously to the perceived decoupling from a near-automatic U. S. nuclear response to conventional aggression.” In an article in Naval Forces (Vol. VII, No. V, 1986, p. 36), Admiral Sir James Eberle, Royal Navy (Retired), stated, “the principal capability of the Western Alliance that prevents war in Europe is that of strategic long range nuclear strike.” Mr. West believes, however, that the NATO nuclear threat is becoming less credible. Accordingly, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop, “without asking the allies,” conventional warfighting plans not based upon the early use of nuclear weapons. “Their [the allies’] involvement and coordination can come later.”
I disagree with Mr. West. Proposals such as his may cause our allies to consider more seriously the words of Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee secretary: “The distancing of Western Europe . . . from U. S. strategic military plans in the near future is neither an excessively rash fantasy nor a nebulous prospect. It is dictated by objective factors having to do with the rational guarantee of all of their political and economic interests, including security.” (Interview in La Repub- blica [Rome], 21 May 1985, p. 7. [Quoted in Foreign Policy, No. 65, Winter 1986-87, p. 8.])
Mr. West reminds me of the old saying, “The operation was a success, but the patient died.” Should our allies accept a strategy that leaves undetermined the role of the fleet in relation to that of the land forces? Are we or our allies well- served by countenancing a protracted-war strategy that ensures the destruction of Europe? Would either the United States or the Western alliance be strengthened by “compartmented U. S. plans” when— in Admiral Trost’s words—our allies’ “local security interests depend on integrated, common defense plans with the United States?” How is “allied cohesion” furthered by "ambiguity”?
While I applaud the introduction of an alternative to nuclear war, I distrust the idea that increased Soviet uncertainty and instability will reinforce deterrence in a crisis. Admiral Eberle echoed many analysts when he wrote, “From my own personal contacts in the Soviet Union, I believe that there are only three conditions that might attract the Soviet Government
The Maritime Strategy: An Allied Reaction”
S. V. Mackay, pp. 82-89, April 1987 r°ceedings)
^“tenant Colonel Ky L. Thompson,
Tr
S • Marine Corps—Commander ckay and Mr. West differ with Admi- Trost on one critical point. Admiral
rost
writes that “the Maritime Strategy
^Presents a consensus of professional L™'°n and carries the acceptance of e the U. S. Government and the gov- oients of our allies . . . whose local SecUri
Urity interests depend on integrated, •Onion defense plans with the United ates ” In contrast, Mr. West states,
he Maritime Strategy is not joint—it as developed unilaterally by the Navy— , a does not have allied consensus, or eessing.” in Mr. West’s view, the strat- fui ■ as an alternative t0 either success- forward defense or early initiation of ^c|ear war . . . will not achieve en- gj'sernent or silent compliance by West q r°pean governments for many years.” i,0rnniander Mackay echoes Mr. West: ^successful and meaningful application the Maritime Strategy is going to pose .•tie difficult political problems within cArO.” Unlike Mr. West, however, 'inlander Mackay takes European
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U.S'
the Maritime Strategy is “genuine
to consider taking military action against Western Europe. One would be the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Europe. That is most unlikely to happen. Another would be the perception by the Soviets that the stability and continuance of their system was at serious risk due to the actions of the Western democracies. It is in our interest to ensure, as far as we are able, that this does not happen. The third scenario is a crisis that escalates out of control.” (Naval Forces, ibid., p. 40.)
After discussing the need for protracted-war planning, Mr. West asks a key question: “Do we have the wherewithal to fight beyond 30 days?” As Mr. West assumes that NATO will be “in extremis on the English Channel coast,” he must look for allies elsewhere among “competent and friendly non-European nations.” He assumes the production bases of these nations can be brought to bear “as long as the United States holds the sea and air lines of communication around the globe.”
But keeping the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open (with little NATO support) will be no small task. While an analogy between World War II and present-day anti-SLOC campaigns is not exact, it is worth noting that in 1939 Germany possessed 57 U-boats, of which 49 were operational; today, the Soviets have more than 220 active conventional and nuclear attack submarines.
Mr. West did not address the fact that the Maritime Strategy postulates that the Soviet Navy would fall back to bastions on the periphery of the Soviet Union, rather than predeploying. If this were so, it would minimize the. Soviet submarine threat to the Atlantic SLOCs, and reduce the allied need for convoy measures worldwide. Some analysts believe, however, that SLOC warfare would become far more important for the Soviets in a protracted war. If the Soviets assigned significant assets to anti-SLOC missions, keeping the SLOCs open would be far more demanding. In the words of the Atlantic Council Working Group: “ . . .we have too few escorts—particularly if scenarios other than the ‘NATO-first’ one are given serious consideration. Even if the United States developed a ‘600-ship’ navy . . . composed of more lower-cost escort-type ships, it is doubtful that we could conservatively deploy an escort force to cover all contingencies. Escorts for our military cargoes may be adequate, but it appears virtually impossible to provide suitable escort for economic cargoes. . . . somewhere between 300 and 600 merchant ships (and escorts) would be lost within 4-12 weeks of the onset of a major war at sea. . . . Unless means were found to ameliorate those tolls . . . we would be faced with the destruction of one-third to one-half of our military equipment in transit across the seas, even if the Soviets dedicated a relatively small number of their submarines to anti-SLOC activities.” (Paul H. Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979], pp. 371-374.)
Those concerned with strategic planning should take a lesson from the first rule of architecture: Form follows function. Mr. West, believing the issue is how the United States would fight conventionally, has concentrated on “form.” If the defense of NATO remains a valid strategic “function” for the United States, then Mr. West violates the rule.
Commander Mackay errs when he accepts the old shibboleth that the “Soviet Union is strategically landlocked.” In the words of one naval analyst:
“One of the most popular, and most ill-considered, conventional wisdoms about the Soviet Navy is that the handful of straits and narrows lying athwart its path to the open ocean have somehow condemned it to an inferior geostrategic position. That may have been true in the day of Peter the Great, when the challenge of wresting these choke points from foreign control was beyond the capabilities of the sailing navies and foot-marching armies of the times. . . . Today, however, when the operational and strategic mobility of armed forces is measured in bounds spanning countries, not counties, the gateways to the Arctic TVD [theater of operations] have become the maritime equivalent of defiles in land warfare—natural defensive positions, the key not only to the Soviet Navy’s mastery of the seas behind them, but also to the ability of its nuclear submarine force to exploit the theater’s central position in the Northern Hemisphere.” (Charles C. Petersen, Center for Naval Analysis Research Memo 86-204, September 1986.)
Commander Mackay, like others, has written about a naval strategy rather than a maritime strategy. A true maritime strategy constitutes the national military strategy of a maritime nation (i.e., the United States, Britain). In the words of the eminent naval historian Sir Julian Corbett: “By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces.” (&"" Principles of Maritime Strategy [^e''J York, NY: AMS Press, 1911 reprin Commander Mackay does move closet the traditional definition when he rais£! the issue, “We in Europe must be sutt that the Maritime Strategy is a genu'111 U. S. policy for the future and not jus1 product of the current administration 1 policy,” then someone at an appropr'al!l level must address these problems.
For a strategy to succeed it should h"' | solidarity of purpose and unity of co"1 mand at the highest levels. Althou- Commander Mackay is obviously not wj First Sea Lord, he does express suffice doubts to call into question joint execl1 tion of the Maritime Strategy—iej whose rules of engagement will be t°. lowed, whose policy regarding an" nuclear ballistic missile submarine oper3i tions, etc. These issues must be resold | to allow our allies to feel secure VJW the strategy and to ensure the success01 U. S.-NATO joint operations.
Commander Mackay should be co*l gratulated for his candor in addressi"' topics which others have chosen to tfj nore. He recognizes that the Sov Northern Fleet will conduct offensive °P! erations against NATO, including in<ef diction of Atlantic SLOCs, and he pr3-,] matically addresses the ramifications1 Soviet early, forward deployment.
“Uncertain Outlook for the
Royal New Zealand Navy”
{See T. D. Young, pp. 103-104, December
1986 Proceedings)
Commodore J. O'H. Tobin, Royal Ne" Zealand Navy (Retired)—In spite of stated increase in the defense budgct; New Zealand, which spends less than 2'1 of its gross domestic product on defend could be classed as a world leader in disnr mament. A substantial proportion of ^ increase was required to cover a pay r's£ and new taxes.
The presence (or absence) of U. p Navy afloat support has made little d1 ference to South Pacific deployments ,lj the past because the Royal New Zeals'1 Navy (RNZN) has usually depended 0,1 fuel stocks stored on a few islands. lengthy deployment to Mururoa in l9> was made possible by the Austral'311 Government.
“Block obsolescence” has become 5 catch phrase, but the RNZN has had th'1 problem since it acquired six Wom War II frigates in the late 1940s. Thes£ ships were replaced by two RothesO class frigates in 1959-61 and t"° Leander-class frigates in 1966-71, withJ
hired
•%0i
havi
Whitby to fill the gap in the late ls- Two more second-hand Leanders
of r eiTIS 'nv°lved in a four-ship change ferns*6 type would pose massive prob-
through the hands of the Fleet 'ning Group Pearl Harbor, govS 3 ^'na* observation, it seems that cUrCrnrnents have short memories. The t0Jen> attitude of the U. S. Government the a,X* ‘^cw Zealand, albeit in reaction to aritj Present New Zealand Government’s ouUclear policies, is having a deleteri- Pav e,^ect on R-NZN. In view of our the
0rt and Fat or Long and
b
test
incorporated the elaborate program lng and research agreed to between
Editor’s Note: The Ethan Allen-c/cm John Marshall (SSN-611—formerly an SSBN), which was converted for special operations, was misidentified as the Benjamin Franklin-daw George C. Marshall (SSBN-654) on page 99.
th e replaced the earlier ships and one of wklf ^aS rccent|y become operational i an equipment fit and machinery /^ements that could last until the end
HiYim century- The second Leander, a . .ZS Canterbury, is programmed for 'vilT'lar nK,hernization. The requirement atp (t^eref°re be to replace half the frige torce in the early i990s.
Ij. | New Zealand Government is un- too * l° cdan8e its naval configuration currC*rast‘cahy. since the investment in ^..,ent assets is very large. The logistical
New CVen t0 a nav^ much larger than prQ) Zealand’s. A phased replacement ev ®ram over an extended period, how- |0a^’ w°tild spread the cost, the logistical > and the training requirement, and new ^ Perrnh an orderly introduction of Pow S*1'^>S w'thout straining limited man- er and support resources.
•hatS a ^na* P°'nt’ most academics forget jn j a navy is only as good as the people f, , \ tanks. The best and most modem of Sajl^,ng equipment is useless without Pair ^ tra'net* t0 °Perate it correctly, redan ltS defects, and make good battle re1a8e- The Falklands Conflict was a p0^lnder of this. The RNZN not only Pro 6SSes sh'Ps °f types that have been ipaVed t° be battle-worthy, but is also j"** by high-quality officers and rat- darriw'10 do their best to maintain the stan- gon S ^ those lucky enough to have
Ti ' "
y history of service in World War II, trc. j1orean War’, and Vietnam, such Ptent is not deserved.
‘Sh
Thin?
(<S
/v"’ E Grove, pp. 120-123, March 1987 to"'dings)
Laurent Giles, Director, Thor- Cites and Associates—In the ala,rests of historical accuracy I must atticj three comments on Mr. Grove’s
clu!rs‘> notwithstanding the 1983 con- 'vlticht'S °* l^C Validation Report- of Lhl the British Ministry of Defence/Depart- ment of Industry and the S90 Consortium—the Defence Scientific Advisory Council (DSAC) has now confirmed that it did not consider this report in reaching its decision that the S90 should be rejected in favor of the traditionally designed Type 23 frigate. Instead, the DSAC used theoretical calculations based on conventional hulls of the size and proportions of the S90, together with some preliminary data provided by me, at the DSAC’s invitation, in a paper on the design philosophy of the S90. I had presented this paper to the DSAC many weeks before either the agreed test program was completed or the design was refined to even the quite rudimentary state required by the agreed terms of reference.
I am delighted to say that this matter is at present being considered by the Hull Design Inquiry of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. This follows publication of the findings of the review committee headed by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton and the subsequent recommendations from the British Prime Minister and Defence Secretary.
Second, the Sirius family hull form is not a “planing” hull. However, according to tank test data (which Mr. Grove is welcome to inspect), it appears that, for a ship of this hull form to achieve a speed of 45 knots using a waterjet propulsion system at a displacement of 1,800 tons on a waterline length of 75 meters, it would require about 60,000 kilowatts. Controlled sea-keeping experiments indicate that such a speed would be practicable in significant wave heights of up to about three meters—like one would encounter in the North Atlantic. I can only leave it to your readers to decide whether this represents “enormous” power, as Mr. Grove says, or whether this is, again, “anything remotely approaching acceptable sea-keeping.” As a former submariner, I can think of a number of significant advantages in having such a turn of speed available, although I readily admit that many of your readers will be more qualified than I to comment on this matter.
Incidentally, using the information on the U. S. Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-missile frigate design published in Thomas G. Gilmer’s Naval Institute Press book Modern Ship Design, it would appear that to achieve such a speed, a geosim of the FFG-7 hull would need a waterline length of 293 meters and a displacement of 46,000 tons, requiring about 600,000 kilowatts installed power. Some ship—but at what price?
Third, a reading of Dr. Oscar Parkes’s renowned history of the battleship’s evolution (British Battleships, London: Seely Service & Co., Ltd., 1956) will show that Mr. Grove has been less than fair to Captain Coles and more than forgiving to the shocking lack of supervision by the Admiralty during the construction of HMS Captain. Laird’s, her builder, was roundly condemned for negligence by the Court of Inquiry into the ship's loss. Likewise, I might perhaps point out that in 1906, the revolutionary battleship HMS Dreadnought would never have been built had it not been for a persuasive and forthright first sea lord and a vociferous parliamentary lobby. Democracy and technology have been known to result in progress!
Finally, may I quote the words of your Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: “The Navy must stop designing ships that simply are updates of their World War II forerunners.” That is all we are trying to achieve: a better ship. Perhaps it will not be better in every aspect, but at least it should be superior in the overall balance likely to be required by the surface fleet of the future.
“DoD Reorganization”
(See J. K. Gruetzner and W. D. Caldwell, pp.
136-145, May 1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Sam J. Tangredi, U. S. Navy— I applaud the effort by Lieutenant Commander Gruetzner and Major Caldwell to summarize the myriad academic, congressional, and blue ribbon committee proposals for reorganizing the Department of Defense (DoD). However, while concentrating on particulars, they missed the larger questions. Does this reorganization activity make the Defense Department “more efficient”? Do the proposed changes “improve” our nation’s defense strategy?
Unfortunately, the answers might be “no.” Recent studies have indicated that mandated reorganizations rarely make bureaucracies more efficient—primarily because a bureaucracy’s most “productive” communications rarely follow the organization’s formal wiring diagram. Instead, the decisive communications often occur through informal links between dynamic individuals—no matter what their titular authority. This is what makes a bureaucracy so different from a combat unit with its necessarily firm chain-of-command. This is also why changes in titular authority do not necessarily herald changes in a bureaucracy’s practice.
No one mistakes the Pentagon for a combat unit, even though much of what goes on in the building is a struggle between policy options shaped by military strategy and those guided by politics. This is important to remember when we compare congressional rhetoric about DoD reorganization with what actually takes place.
As one example, congressional and academic reformers have insisted that strengthening the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will “improve” uniformed military advice and ensure that it influences presidential and congressional decisions. However, in practice, no legislation can “improve advice” or ensure that it is heeded. History demonstrates that presidents and congresses can freely dismiss JCS advice if they so choose. Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Holloway has pointed out that when controversial policy decisions pit uniformed military advice against political preferences, presidents and legislators often shop around until they find strategists who will tell them what they want to hear.
Since the reality of DoD reorganization is unlikely to match the promise, •* easy to dismiss Congress’s recently II'ir dated changes as ineffectual. Unfoj'J nately, the reorganization debate n"-- indirectly trigger some negative effccl Two things can happen. First, a ® icit-conscious Congress can portray otP nizational changes as the answer to1* duced resources. A DoD made effic’e|1' by reorganization clearly would need k; money. Second, there might be a putl| backlash against bolstered defense spel: ing when the oversold promises of vvn DoD reorganization can accomplish f dashed by the next wave of headli^ about $600 toilet seats. Congress and t1' media might oversell the potential of form. But DoD will be blamed for reorganization cannot do.
“Canada’s Blind Spot”
(See P. J. Taggart, pp. 144-149, March 1?^ Proceedings)
Dennis P. Moore—Canadian official have announced that the Iroquois-d3* destroyer HMCS Huron is to be trai1' ferred to the Pacific from the Atlan1'1 This will double the number of Sea Kj ■ helicopters Canada has on the P;lCI* coast; HMCS Provider now carries t'*,°
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Mil
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ready spa
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'hfthing about priorities, bv k Pr‘or't'es are further illuminated y the inspector’s comment, “You train
lfned that Soviet submarines are oper- ^ln8 practically undetected in the Strait Juan de Fuca and other Canadian hhwest coastal areas, using informa- s',>n supplied by John Walker and his as- ^°t-'iates. As a result, this small but posi- Ve step by Canada’s Maritime Com- and to improve the Pacific defenses has j en rendered negligible—and the task .^scribed by General Taggart is greater lnan ever.
The War on Paper”
T- Soule, pp. 34-39, January 1987;
' C Crossland, pp. 16-17, March 1987;
MSurko, p. 14, April 1987; J. T. Kemper.
B ■ A- McCabe, pp. 20-22, May 1987 Pro^edings)
Y,
e°man Third Class Francis A. Fox,
Reserve—Lieutenant
in .§ard t0 the reserves. As a lawyer eivtlian life—the profession about ich (he most popular recent movie was n _ _ The Paper Chase—I recognize the j Cessity of documentation. But it really Cs seem that the paper monster has got- n °ut of hand.
ecently, our reserve detachment Vgarked on the relatively innocuous spawned an OpNavInst and a revi- a CNavResInst, and a RedCom in- ()iiection. Couldn’t we get by with just
- these? Similarly, it seems every- 11 above the rank of ensign feels com-
ed to issue an instruction or notice r sexual harassment. Again; why? It
- a y shouldn’t be that complex an
certainly one instruction should Uff,ce for all of us.
01 long ago, wc had an admin inspector’ ^ne P0’”1 °f criticism in the inspec- HotS rePort was that the detachment was tr. Part*cipating in consolidated yeoman and1'08' At the time of the inspection, , l°r a significant period before, guess s, ut- The unit had no yeoman! This >sh tunnel-vision adherence to bu- j. cratic requirements—“Damn the th n sPeed ahead”—calls to mind ^ Battle of Isandhlwana, where British niy quartermasters refused to issue ’munition to soldiers without the th- ^Cr cl’’ts- Perhaps not surprisingly, at battle was Britain’s Little Big Horn, hai VCr^ ^act *^at consolidated yeoman tn|ng Was on the inspection guide, and corpsman and ma- mate training were not, says too much.” Forgive me, but I’d always assumed that that was why there was a Naval Reserve.
Next time you watch television, look at the Navy recruiting pitch: Tomcats rocketing off flight decks; submarines crash diving; a destroyer dropping anchor in an exotic port. These images quicken the pulse and induce people—us—to sign up, to go to sea, to get our wings, or dolphins, or swords. These challenges rank high, too, in leading someone already busy with a civilian job and a family to take on the additional demands of service in the Naval Reserve. We want to serve our country and to take part in something we know to be worthwhile.
But unless the paper monster is restrained, truth in advertising will force the ads to show our gallant sailor struggling mightily, his deck—oops, desk— awash in paper, his in-basket swamped, and his morale capsizing. At the end of the commercial, a deep, virile voice will intone: “Navy: it’s a job.”
Then see what kind of people join. And stay. And where our readiness goes.
Let’s Practice the Way We Expect to Fight
Lieutenant Joseph Kline PaskVan II. U. S. Navy—During a recent over-the- horizon targeting (OTH-T) exercise directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, various fleet assets conducted OTH detection. classification, surveillance, and targeting. The exercise evaluators concluded that although search and surveillance assets could almost certainly detect and classify the contacts of interest (COIs), the shooters' ability to put Tomahawk missiles on target was extremely suspect.
While these conclusions were valid from the evaluators’ standpoint, they do not reflect the tactical doctrine we would actually practice in time of war. Certainly, the detection and classification figures were realistic; the P-3s and S-3s— the primary detection and classification platforms—were able to search vast ocean areas, detect a possible battle group, and classify the contacts with certainty. But at this point, the exercise broke down. The shooters assumed that this was targeting-quality information, and thus conducted their attacks based on late, nonorganic targeting data. This is not the way that we should expect to fight the war, and it invalidates any assumptions we might draw from the targeting results of this exercise.
It is not surprising that the antisubmarine aircraft confidently classified the
COIs; they were easily identifiable by a well-briefed aircrew. Passing targeting- quality position information is somewhat more difficult. The shooters’ inconsistent results came from two causes: the aircrews’ unfamiliarity with the OTH-T problem; and the shooters’ overly optimistic assessments of the capabilities of the P-3 and S-3 aircraft.
Further complicating the targeting problem, certain national surveillance assets were not made available to the shooters in the usual manner. Generally, these are the only nonorganic sensors Tomahawk shooters use to conduct an attack without verification by a battle group’s organic targeting assets.
The final way in which this exercise differed from the way we should expect to fight was that the battle group had no organic OTH-T sensors with which to verify nonorganic targeting information, and thus finalize the fire-control solution. There were no LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) Mk-III-equipped ships in the battle group; no OUTBOARD combat direction finding- equipped ships to form a broad electronic surveillance measures baseline; and no attempt to use an antisurface warfare picket ship to pass targeting information. We conducted all our engagements without gridlocking the target ships to the shooters’ positions, so many attacks missed their marks because of navigation inaccuracies and a failure to account for late targeting information.
This exercise proves not that we need more equipment, or that the fleet does not know how to conduct OTH-T, but that everyone involved in OTH-T must recognize his limitations and exercise as he expects to fight. We must use national assets to cue the long-range search aircraft that locate and classify the COIs; these aircraft can then pass their information to the battle group commander, who can efficiently deploy his assets to gain and maintain real-time, gridlocked positions on the COIs—allowing his shooters to take precise aim.
Future OTH-T exercises can be improved by bringing all the personnel together to discuss how they are going to do the targeting. The button pushers, the naval flight officer of the P-3 passing targeting information, the LAMPS Mk-III air crewman maintaining the real-time data link to his mother ship, and the shooters’ engagement planner—all need to participate in the discussion. Once OTH-T team members appreciate one another’s needs and problems, the fleet’s ability to carry out meaningful exercise scenarios will increase dramatically.
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young people during their two weeks
.a!
“1986 Naval and Maritime Prize
Photography”
(See pp. 49-64, April 1987 Proceedings)
Ensign Letitia A. Dour, U. S. Navy— The USNI-Kodak naval and maritime prize photography contest is a wonderful way of recognizing professional and amateur photographers alike. The results of the 1986 contest produced an outstanding piece!
1 especially enjoyed Felimon Barbante, Jr.’s, picture of the two boys in the outrigger. Also, the joyous expression says it all for the two men in Bob Self’s photo of the return of the USS Saratoga (CV- 60). As for simply excellent photography, Karen Flemer’s second prizewinning photograph was tops.
I am pleased that Proceedings encourages the recording of such touching moments of our lives on film. I hope to see 25 more years of outstanding photography gracing the pages of our magazine.
“Stemming the Haitian Tide”
(See G. D. Bond, pp. 104-106, August 1986;
B. Frelick. p. 29, March 1987; T. A. Nies,
p. 82, June 1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William L. Johnson, U. S. Coast Guard—Since my ship recently completed a week as the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operation (HMIO) cutter, 1 can state unequivocally— counter to Mr. Frelick’s input—that Haiti no longer sends a naval officer on our cutter. A U. S. immigration agent and an interpreter are the only people embarked who question the Haitian migrants to determine their status. We received no explanation as to why Haitians stopped sending the officer, but they did.
One thing that has not really been addressed in this discussion is the smuggling. When we returned 60 Haitians to Port-au-Prince in March, we came across evidence of a rather lucrative smuggling operation. People were paying upward of $2,000 apiece to be taken to Miami. We turned the evidence over to the Haitian authorities. Whether anything will be done with it, I don’t know.
Finally, I can honestly say that the operation is not particularly popular among the crews of the cutters involved. It unfortunately takes us away from putting a full effort into interdicting drugs. Twenty-four to 48 hours can easily be lost if any Haitians have to be returned to their country. It is unfortunate that such an operation has to be mounted, especially since it was started within a year of the end of the Cuban exodus from Mariel. But as long as the operation continues.
the Coast Guard’s cutters assigned to the HMIO will do their best to follow orders-
Officer/Athlete: The Navy Needs A Rule
James L. George—Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman ruled that Annap' olis graduate Ensign Napoleon McCaP lum could play football in his free time as an active-duty naval officer, and that basketball star Ensign David Robinson would have his service obligation te- duced to two years of active duty and a few more in the reserves. New Navy Secretary James Webb, an Annapolis graduate, has other views. I think the dilemma should be solved in the traditional mil1' tary way—there ought to be a fair, standard, rule; fair to the people involved,10 the Navy, and to the athletes’ fellow off*'
The rule should be that military Per' sonnel with exceptional talents employ3' ble only in the civilian sector could apply for transfer to the active reserve after serving on active duty for two years- Once in the reserves, they would serve double their remaining obligated time. Sn Ensigns Robinson and McCallum— five-year obligations—would spend tw° years on active duty and six years in the reserves. This would be fair to them- Starting an athletic career at age 23-24 >s feasible; at age 26-27 it might not be- This arrangement also would be fair t° the Navy. In two years on active duty"'' especially shipboard duty—the officer1’ would learn unforgettable lessons that would magnify their usefulness in *be reserves. These men will make excelled' recruiters: Imagine a Lieutenant Ph1 McConkey, U. S. Naval Reserve-" wearing his New York Giants Superb<"v ring; or a Captain Roger Staubach, U- S- Naval Reserve—among the most admired football players ever—recruit*1'® active duty every year. Ensigns McCal" lum and Robinson would be especially helpful in recruiting minorities.
However, to be universally fair, th1* rule should apply to anyone with a speci skill, not just athletes. Albert Michelso*1' an Annapolis graduate who won the Nobel Prize for physics, would have bed1 eligible. Moreover, the rule should appl) to all members of the military services- not just Naval Academy graduates.
Personally, 1 think John Lehman vvas right. Yet I agree with Jim Webb that obligations should be fulfilled in some manner. What is unfair now is the ad I'1'1 granting of special exceptions.
^ear in the Backyard’
(Sec T
Pr, '
Ashby, pp. 72-77, April 1987
breedings)
Colonel Hector Andres Negroni, U. S. ‘r Force (Retired)—I congratulate Dr. I snby for his jnsjght and perception, but jPlore his unfortunate way of looking Latin America, South America, and entral America as the U. S. “back- • ’ The part of our hemisphere south °ur border is not a front yard, a back- a side yard, a play yard, a doorstep, ^ aek door, or a patio. It is our neighborhood. Only by considering it our 0j. ”"borhood can we underline the sense Urgency that should be given to devel- Pnients taking place there.
the ^evote(^ a large Part of my 24 years in *L L- S. Air Force to dealing with South "encan/Latin American problems and dressing the importance of this area’s ^graphic proximity to the United thftes. This proximity, more than any- Qj,ng else, underlines the strategic value °t>r southern neighbors. I fully under- nd Dr Ashby’s metaphorical refer- lrCe- but nonetheless, we should refrain °ai Using those pejorative terms.
Di u • comment aside, you continue to : *'sh one 0f the finest professional p; ^als in the world. Yes, even Air
th,
°rce people enjoy your stimulating and °r°ugh articles.
Phi
1 We inert—Unwittingly, Proceedings
!"aki
es the concern for U. S. vulnerability
tfei
.’be Carribean Basin doubly strong by
the
tf’ng to Belize as British Honduras on
Pend,
ITlaP on page 73. Belize has been inde-
ent for a number of years.
^Vhere Did My People Go?”
S. J. Kaufman, p. 122, January 1987, p' Horowitz, pp. 17-18, May 1987 feedings)
p-. letlant Commander Eugene R. 'j'l e^» V. S. Coast Guard Reserve— r\f ^ topics that have long been thought as taboo for wardroom conversation
are e
^ politics, and religion. Feelings strong on such matters, and it is not Qt^'sing that custom discourages debate ^ bem in a military setting, lest the har- bereqtiired to achieve military goals Pr ?0rnPrornised. As a result, there were oabiy more than a few eyebrows sip Ct wben Proceedings published En- hi Kaufman’s “Nobody asked me, but
sis
contribution. Mr. Kaufman’s the-
je ’ln brief, is first, that the proportion of s niaking the service a career is lower
than it should be, given the percentage of Jews in the United States; and second, that this—for lack of a better term— shortfall reflects what Mr. Kaufman reluctantly concludes is an accurate stereotype of “American Jews today” as “preoccupied with money and success.”
No one familiar with the important role Proceedings plays as a forum for views on matters of interest to the naval community could fault the magazine for running Mr. Kaufman’s article. Such is the nature of an open forum; if it did not publish material that was controversial— even infuriating, at times—it would not be worth its salt.
That said, my own reaction was that Mr. Kaufman’s article was so far wide of the mark and potentially so corrosive of intraservice and interfaith harmony that some response was necessary. My only question was whether the cure might do more harm than the disease, by calling additional attention to a view that was better left unexpressed. I discussed Mr. Kaufman’s article with a number of Jews—rabbinical and lay people, civilian and military. All were profoundly concerned that Mr. Kaufman’s article would foster intolerance within the non-Jewish community; all agreed that some response was in order.
Let me place my comments in their proper perspective: I served on active duty with great satisfaction for more than three years in the Coast Guard during the Vietnam War; I never seriously entertained the thought of making the service my career; I am an attorney (and was one before joining the Coast Guard); and I am a Jew.
Since the title of Ensign Kaufman’s essay echoes the Exodus from Egypt, I will organize my comments into four questions, just as the Passover seder meal that commemorates the Exodus focuses on four questions:
- Are Mr. Kaufman's demographic data accurate? This first question is the easiest to answer. Jews do represent a smaller proportion of the armed services than of the population as a whole. I suspect that this has been the case throughout this century whenever there was no draft, and I am equally confident that even when there is a draft, Jews are “underrepresented” among career personnel, either officer or enlisted. From this point on, however, Mr. Kaufman’s position is badly flawed.
- Are the data anything to be concerned about? The short answer is “not really.” On a certain level, one likes to think that the military in any democratic society should roughly mirror the ethnic or religious composition of the society as a
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whole. This is particularly true when a history of intentional exclusion exists; or, on the other hand, when an unrepresentative military community is liable to become insensitive to the principle of civilian control of the military. Neither concern applies to underrepresentation of Jews within the U. S. military.
Ensign Kaufman claims that Jews “shun the profession that protects our way of life” and have “forgotten some of the responsibility that comes with success.” These comments would be beneath response, except that those susceptible to prejudice could cite them as evidence.
Of course, the military protects our way of life in important ways—and this is especially true of those who serve as career personnel, as Herman Wouk (a devout Jew justly proud of his own wartime service as a naval officer) dramatically suggested at the end of the naval novel The Caine Mutiny. But what of those who serve in other ways—Jew and non-Jew? What about those other “professionals” in jobs that society chooses not to compensate generously, such as teachers, medical researchers, social workers, public interest lawyers—all fields in which I daresay Jews are “overrepresented?” Have these people “forgotten some of the responsibility that comes with success?” If Jews have gravitated toward the so-called learned professions, so, too, have we been at the forefront of battle after battle for social and economic justice.
In short, Mr. Kaufman may be correct in saying that Jews are less abundant in the career military than our numbers might warrant, but that is hardly a proper basis for the indictment to which he would plead us guilty. Jews have done plenty not only to protect our American way of life from external menace, but to strengthen that way of life from within. A sense of social responsibility is an integral part of our heritage, and Jewish tradition expressly exhorts the Jew to be loyal to the country to which history has brought him.
3. Is his explanation accurate? Perhaps I have already answered this question. Mr. Kaufman’s explanation of the “underrepresentation” of Jews in the career or non-conscriptcd military has some truth to it, but not much, and certainly not as much as his article suggests.
For many Americans, the military is an appealing career—for the opportunity to serve the nation or to continue a laudable family tradition, and for practical reasons, as well. Practical considerations probably play a substantial role in attracting career personnel from the nation’s depressed areas. There is nothing wrong with this. But there is also nothing to be defensive about if others—for whom education has long been a priceless priority—prefer to make a living and serve society in other ways. Material success, if balanced by a social conscience, is no sin. Indeed, the private enterprise system is integral to our national way of life.
I am not a sociologist or anthropologist, but I would not be as quick as Mr. Kaufman to dismiss the continuing, deep-seated effects of Jewish experience in other countries when assessing what he views as the reluctance of U. S. Jews to take up a military career. For many U. S. Jews, the family tree includes one or more ancestor who fled Czarist Russia because of conscription—long-term conscription under circumstances that destroyed religious, communal, and family ties, all in the service of a tyrannical monarchy that restricted Jews to a territorially defined “Pale of Settlement.” If U. S. blacks still bear the scars of slavery—a “peculiar institution” that ended, at least in name, in 1865—should we be surprised if U. S. Jews, descendants of the “wretched refuse” immortalized by Emma Lazarus, continue to feel, perhaps inarticulably, the pain that led their grandfathers to flee eastern Europe 20 years after Lincoln died?
4. What is to be done? Because I do not share Mr. Kaufman’s view of the “problem,” I disagree as to what should be done. I would certainly not encourage the Navy to “reach out to synagogues and [presumably Jewish] high schools and tell our young people about the excitement and satisfaction of serving their country while receiving educational and travel benefits.” Recruiting in or through places of worship offends me both as a Jew and as a civil libertarian; no thanks!
Instead of touting the virtues of travel and educational benefits, I suggest that the military improve the quality of Jewish life within the services. Let me be specific: Let’s make sure others are not treated as the Jews in my battalion at Officers’ Candidate School (OCS) were when, having requested permission to have matzos during Passover, we were told that there would be “no Jew food in the dining hall.”
1 recall another instance, again from OCS, when a Navy public affairs office sponsored a blatantly sectarian, Christian-oriented song-and-dance show on base, on a Friday night. There was no prior indication of the content of the program, and the alternative was “Field Night” cleanup. Non-Jewish members of my platoon were aghast that this affair was effectively imposed on me and the
numerous other Jewish officer cat dates. What champion of the separat'0* of church and state thought it approp'1-1' to coerce attendance at such a program government property, under serVS sponsorship?
Finally, let’s see if we can find a "3; to unravel the U. S. Supreme Com1 decision in Goldman v. Weinberg where an observant U. S. Air Force <" cer’s skullcap was treated as an imper missable uniform discrepancy.
Righting actions such as these woUj have tremendous symbolic force- would go far toward reassuring Je"1' Americans that the armed services real- want them.
“Mine Awareness”
(See J. K. Bray, pp. 41-43, April 1987 Proceedings)
,11?
Staszak, U. S. Naval Reserve— Officer Bray emphasized a very imp°( tant problem—the vulnerability of 0 ports to offensive mining operations, y Soviets are enthusiastic and profit
sorely lacking and we face the real P1^ pect of beginning a war with a signified part of the fleet trapped in home por*' Augmentation of our mine countering sures is undoubtedly necessary. In aiP tion to more minesweepers, it would useful to return to the minesweeper sp’ cial (MSS). These old merchant ship filled with styrofoam and fitted with ^ 1960s and 1970s. Manned by minin1,1 crews in shock-mounted pilot house> their mission was to clear a channelp detonating the waiting mines.
Today’s technology may allow unm^ ned operation. The MSS could transit1,1 channel and quickly clear a safe exit ft0. the port. Its size and bulk are sufficient provide the waiting mines a full-si2^ ship signature.
Depending on availability and budgel! each major Navy port should have at le3‘ two MSSs. Members of the Selected serve could crew these minesweepcf Ample hulls, particularly those with 0“
fleets. In addition, the shipping t. means that there would be other use' hulls available, whose acquisition cO’ would be minimal.
While not a substitute for addin0'13 minesweepers, MSSs would be inv^ able in the early stages of a conflie' assist in the sortie of the fleet front mine-blocked home ports.
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e Navy must procure and maintain tiel lf'ent ecluipment and trained person- nUt. ,°r its trauma care plan. Both the arg . ers of personnel and their training the madeciuate- The only trauma unit in p|-|. naval medical system is now closed. terr|°rt's to develop a military trauma sys- and patient care unit at the Naval
SUffi
mming Shore Base
Encroachment”
ee T. J. Tanner, pp. 97-98, February 1987 feedings)
j-' Koch—The photo (left) is not the tiller Naval Air Station (NAS) Los amitos, California, as Proceedings
km
t^uare was used for carrier landing prac- a-e an(i as a “Bingo” strip for military ^bases in the area.
>tor’s Note: Mr. Koch is correct. The . 0,0graph on the right is NAS Los la>nitos in 1942.
jh/,!a‘n M. Reinert and Commander
Kqv ^' B°sse> Medical Corps, U. S.
,. Cursory review of the Navy’s Unw'cal contingency plans might foster the arrantetl confidence in the ability of tra Present system to deliver modem V|j ma care. While Captain Smith pro- pre6S an excellent overview of the Navy’s jnent Plans, he overlooks the most glar- Co ael’c>encies in the Naval Medical t,r T’and’s trauma preparation: its fail- rjen ° Provide ongoing trauma care expe- t0Ce to hospital corpsmen and nurses or to ,L°Vlde continual trauma unit exposure e active-duty military physician.
•he Nav„ ____________
Hospital in Portsmouth, Virginia, were not supported by the Naval Medical Command. Except for the combat casualty care course—consisting of classroom lectures and a laboratory encounter with a wounded goat—intern physicians trained at our naval hospitals deploy to fleet and Marine units inexperienced in the evaluation, resuscitation, or acute management of trauma patients in a controlled hospital environment. These same physicians are expected to be able to deliver advanced trauma care to multiple patients in very uncontrolled environments, without sophisticated backup.
The present experience and skill level of the military surgeon is not comparable to that of civilian colleagues staffing the major urban trauma centers. Staff surgeons at the naval hospitals only occasionally treat complicated-trauma patients because the Navy makes no effort to encourage the direct admission or transfer from civilian emergency rooms of military trauma patients to its facilities. Much money is spent annually to pay for trauma care delivered to military patients in civilian hospitals—many of which are less capable than the local military facility, and few of which are designated trauma centers. The Navy surgeon thus becomes a medical caretaker for active-duty trauma patients; he only provides follow-up and rehabilitative care for these patients once they are transferred to his hospital. He is denied involvement in the patient’s initial assessment, resuscitation, and surgical care. These same surgeons are the nucleus of the contingency plans outlined by Captain Smith.
Maintenance of proficiency is as important to the military surgeon as it is to the carrier pilot, the submariner, the surface line officer, and the Marine Corps infantry officer. Years of operating on uncomplicated hernias, performing routine arthroscopies—of being screened from the complicated and challenging trauma cases—deplete the skills of the best surgeons. There is no substitute for continued trauma-patient care experience. Those evaluating the present capabilities of Navy medicine’s contingency plans must realize that a general proficiency in the skills required for high intensity trauma surgery does not exist in Navy medicine at this time.
This problem has existed for years. Changing priorities in military medical care, reorganization efforts of the Naval Medical Command, and unresolved fiscal and personnel constraints have overshadowed the primary mission of Navy medicine: to provide sophisticated medical care to the active-duty sailor or Ma- tine and to be capable of providing that care in a hostile environment.
Navy corpsmen, nurses, and physicians would enthusiastically support the establishment of trauma training and research units at the major naval hospitals.
Training emphasis and support— integrating the reserves—must go to major military training hospitals. Rather than development of a triservice medical war college as proposed by Captain Smith, a triservice trauma research, development, and education group could be established and based in the Department of Surgery at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. This group could coordinate the efforts of the services in trauma research and planning. In addition, a special reserve trauma surgery unit, staffed by reserve-civilian trauma experts and assigned to the Department of Surgery, could assist the various advisers to the Surgeon General in coordinating triservice contingency medical planning and training.
The Surgeon General of the Navy must give serious consideration to improving Navy trauma care capabilities.