This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Does the terrorist target a U. S. installation—or the U. S. Marine who guards it? Both are in jeopardy, until Marine Corps Security Force units are properly armed, well-trained in close combat skills, and assigned clearly defined responsibilities in hostage or other terrorist situations.
of
sonnel take place at 10-12 feet and last two — jn seconds—usually leaving someone dead. Our . the unlock method of instruction does not enable ^nd ol to develop the necessary speed to survive those engagements.
an°
its
Mar,n
would not want to take a chance with those
Marine Commandant General P. X. Kelley stated in his fiscal year 1986 posture statement that, “The Marine Corps is committed to defeating terrorism, rather than coping with it or ‘weathering it out’ as a rising storm. . . . We intend to prove to enemies that terrorism is too costly a tactic to adopt against Marines.” Marines have faced terrorism many times—in Nicaragua, Haiti, Vietnam, Lebanon. . . . The terrorist is nothing more than an insurgent who has brought his or her campaign to the city.
Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (FMFLant) recently sponsored a conference in Norfolk for ship’s Marine detachments. Terrorism was one of the principal topics; those who attended sought to define the threat and the Marines’ role in countering it. Mr. Jack Wagner, Special Agent-inCharge of the Norfolk FBI office, stated, “If you don’t think it can happen to you, on your watch, you better get out of the Corps.”
Our enemy, however radical his ideology, whatever his background, race, or religion, is still human. He feels fear, makes mistakes, and puts his ski mask on just like you and I. No matter how zealous he may be, Murphy’s Law still applies to him. We need to avoid the mindset frequently found in Vietnam—that Charlie (or the terrorist) controls the night. He only controls what we allow him to; the sooner we come to this realization, the harder it will be for the terrorist to achieve his end.
The MCSF Role: SecNavInst 5530.4 states that the Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) “provides physical security for those portions of naval activities or ships . . . that require the unique capabilities of an armed, combat trained Marine.” (Emphasis added.) This particular mission dates to the founding of the Marine Corps.
Those places that require the best possible security are protected by the MCSF. SecNavInst 5530.4, which dates to 1974, specifies as “inappropriate” the MCSF’s “Providing hostage/antiterrorist units (to include snipers). The mission of MCSF units in hostage or terrorist situations will be limited to initial isolation of the area, crowd control, and establishment of a secure perimeter.”
In 1974, this was a realistic limitation. Today, it is not. In 1974, U. S. naval facilities were not the targets of terrorist groups. We needed to avoid the “Send in the Marines” option as the solution to every problem. But today, since radical Moslem groups have specifically cited U. S. Navy interests as targets, these limitations are no longer reasonable. MCSF units do not adequately prepare for terrorist situations, such as hostage taking or armed penetrations, primarily because their responsibilities are not clearly defined.
If the MCSF unit does not develop an antiterrorist capability specifically for its own particular security interest, then the operational commander is deprived of what may be his only option, short of capitulation to terrorist demands. One of the commander’s most viable options should be the highly disciplined, armed, combat-trained MCSF unit. This unit should possess the requisite close- combat skills and a firsthand knowledge of the terrorist’s operating area.
Antiterrorist Training: Because this ‘ mystlQu jsts’ developed regarding the terrorist, the counter- e0f image has also become distorted into a com 111 .erter- James Bond and Dirty Harry. Antiterrorist and co ^ rorist training should differ little from norma training. The basics are the same, including 111tter of ship, physical conditioning, and agility. It 1Satrajning narrowing the focus within an infantry unit s
cycle. , i expertise
An MCSF unit can never attain the level nterter- that the FBI has achieved in its antiterrorist c° errorist rorist units; but that is not necessary. The FBI anronlTient: team must be prepared to operate in every envi indoors, outdoors, urban, suburban, valley, or jjj0p- An MCSF unit, however, knows exactly where i (jUt erate. Posts and stations do not move. Ships H’^der they remain the same at sea. Thus, the MCSF c° ntSof can tailor his training program to meet the require his ship or station.
Marksmanship: The most fundamental requir antiterrorist training is marksmanship. For t^10^.e flee' armed with the M-16, it should differ little ^ ^ for
Marine Force unit marksmanship training- . ^ediat® trained snipers, emphasis should be placed on i (£Cji- action drills and short-range assault or “quick 1terr0rist niques. The M-16 is an effective weapon againsta ^ fitting attack, especially where there is little possibility innocent people. nreferre^
In most situations, however, the pistol is. |fjn cl°se weapon. It can be used accurately and effective z s for quarters. All that is needed is instruction in tec n this style of close-in combat. . ethod
Not too long ago, the FBI discovered that its i ,jeIltjcal pistol marksmanship training—which is almos caipe10 to the Marines’—did not quite fit the bill whenj(,r street preparing agents and law enforcement personne pet' combat. Most gun battles involving law enforce ^lf
3-and-°n „nd
The FBI began to incorporate the Weaver Stance ^ marksmanship training and instruction. This P° 0pen volves looking over the front sight with both ey ^arf and firing when the weapon is aligned on the tafg^ QUafl' Harlow, weapons instructor at the FBI Academy 1 ^ th5 tico, taught this method of firing to those who atte^aS that FMFLant conference. His concluding comment w3nt “after 100 rounds of this type of firing, no one t0
to mess with you.” I subsequently taught this tec the Marines in my security unit. After 100 roLI folk fired a timed course: ten rounds, six in one ma^af n facea in another. We faced the target for two seconds, t ^ away from it for seven. Each time we faced the ^gifl? had to bring our weapon up and fire two rounds, magazines after the third appearance. If y°u cS; y°u where those rounds hit from seven and ten
lsU:?!tl0n> and ir _ The u„f°r training-
unarmed our Marines as unarmed combat instructors in an informal
Gained
c°ntinuneS C3n °n^ Sa’n anc^ ma'nta'n proficiency through gets inS Pract'ce. Courses of fire using silhouette tar- t\Vo terroanOUS con^2urat*ons’ such as a hostage between it win nsts’ wi'i not only sharpen marksmanship skills, S'tUationT ^ ^ar'ne confidence needed in a real W:/. a's lyPe of program requires time, a lot of
sp°nSibief and innovativeness on the part of those re- °ne ste ones need to take their marksmanship program •he arUrther in antiterrorist training. In all probability starts. yrer's not going to be around when the shooting %ht jf °U Cannot raise your hand in the middle of a gun must en?^U *lave a malfunction. The Marines’ training ately -p Pnasize the necessity of taking action immedi- ^aifunct'6 °n*^ WaT t0 know how to deal with the possible valuab]eIOns ‘s trough practice. Dummy rounds are a >to shZ in this respect. Marines need to learn not •he nUrriS, 001 at night, but also how to load, keep track of h°in tbe °f rounds fired, and how to tell the good guy scenarj0 u They need to practice shoot/no-shoot all of 0‘ We have sacrificed realism for safety in almost ^ealisticr Oarsmanship training but we can have both, training and safety are not mutually exclusive.
l° Marjn^ an<^ R°om Clearing: Urban combat is not new fhty tbjsCs' The only difference is that it will not be Hue tot be c n-Oc- It will be our own backyard, and we will °at. <$Uca m8 the tanks and recoilless rifles to blow them r°otn an ,e^sfnl hostage rescues require simple training in mast °U'^*nS Clearing techniques. Once the basics hnes jearC(T the room layouts can be altered so that Malted h^ t0 make sound decisions when conducting sim- u°s.tage rescues. Training can be tailored to fit the W'ts Particular security mission. Training should reduced Cte(l under all conditions, especially at night or in jMt, as ,^ls*hility. Daytime practice may be the most diffi- Someti?St organizations hate to have their day disrupted lng so nerve-wracking.
ph .
^ti°IUnp^ Troi'ning and Unarmed Combat: Physical conacre js° ls a vital aspect of antiterrorist training, not that Se*f'cOnfH muc^ a neC(I f°r endurance as there is for a c°«ibat p ent Marine. Physical training and "’fife tr„- lterally go hand-in-hand. Four of
In antiterrorist marksmanship training, the old must give way to the new. In addition to close-range rapid-fire techniques like the FBI’s Weaver Stance, the Marines should adopt the new 9-mm. personal defense weapon for those MCSF units still using the .45 pistol as the primary weapon for posted sentries.
course established by the Royal Marines. They returned qualified to instruct the Marines in their guard sections. The confidence Marines will develop through this relevant and challenging training will enable them to tackle any assignment.
Mental Preparation: All of the marksmanship training in the world will be of little value to the Marine who is not mentally prepared to use his weapon. My experience in Vietnam was that the enemy was very aware of our lack of security. Marines who are not alert to the possibility of attack are incapable of mounting an adequate response when an attack comes. In security assignments, the threat of terrorist attack always seems to be something for someone else to worry about. This mentality works to the terrorist’s advantage. Yet, the humdrum routine of most MCSF assignments tends to dull the alertness of even the most motivated Marines. MCSF Marines must realize that they are given weapons, hopefully loaded weapons, with the expectation that they may be required to use them.
At the 1984 Marine Barracks Conference at the FBI Academy at Quantico, we were shown a film entitled “Mental Preparation For Combat.” It was thought- provoking. I was skeptical about watching a film by some gun-ranch owner talking to law enforcement people about being prepared to use their weapons, but I came away recognizing that the gent knew what he was talking about. A Marine must continually be aware that, while manning his post, the possibility of using his weapon is a very real one.
This mental preparation can never be maintained unless our highly trained Marines are provided opportunities to test their reactions to situations. MCSF commanders need to conduct carefully structured scenarios to “test” the security force’s response. Is it real, or is it a drill? Only the commanding officer knows. However, the drill must maintain a careful balance between safety and realism.
These drills can range from simple to big time. One payday, I had the corporal of the guard activate the duress alarm in the Marine bunkroom, where the alert relief is required to remain when not on watch. Because it was payday, and three hours prior to when they had to go on post, I half expected that many Marines would be conducting personal business somewhere in the building. This was the first such drill ever conducted during working hours. Everyone was present. When the duress alarm sounded, the alert relief corporal of the guard called the on-watch to see what was going on. He was told that the pay team had been “hit,” and to prepare the alert relief for further word from the sergeant of the guard. In less than a minute and a half from the sounding of the alarm, the sergeant of the guard and I entered the bunkroom to find a fully armed
'8S /
July 1986
51
and equipped relief, adrenalin flowing and ready for action. I was impressed. Not every response will be that rapid. Marines need those kind of tests—not every day, but often enough to keep them from getting complacent. If they are conducted too frequently, then the doubt factor is lost—is it a drill, or is it real? Realism must be a factor if our Marines are to maintain a mental awareness of the terrorist threat.
Security Drills: Security drills can run the gamut from bomb threats to attempted intrusion. Something as simple as an attempted entry with an altered identification or invalid badge is also a good drill. Only imagination limits the possibilities for constructing scenarios. We have made these situations a means of evaluating the proficiency of the guard sections. Marines are competitive by nature. During a quarter, we test each section with the same drill
• \ wp evaluate
(actually several different drills per section;, vv ^en< many factors, including the response time, acti°ns re- and whether the proper notifications were made. suits of these evaluations are also used to develop priorities as well as provide another yardstick in ateS ing the Relief of the Quarter—the relief that denio marics- the best average in performance, physical training, manship, and a host of other areas. . strict
Conducting such scenarios, however, requir^^j coordination and supervision. A true incident 1 -jjing the need for this requirement. The Headquarters ^ 0f of U. S. Naval Forces Europe is located in t e ^ t[ie London. A cleaning scaffold had been erecte ntagCof building’s exterior. The guard officer, taking a to
this relatively new and novel means of access, jis- gain entry through any unlocked window he rnc ^, cover. As he began his ascent, a London n°
around the comer, observed this “intruder, £(j him down. The guard officer came down and m .j 0f tbe bobby that he was the guard officer in charge o ‘atternPl Marines in the building, and that he was mere >' ^ for1'1 ing to check, up on them. The bobby requested so> of identification which, unfortunately, the 0e ) unable to provide. (There are several morals tl’
bobby then escorted him into the building an ^gd tt1 speak to the corporal of the guard. The bobby
c
1
*
p
s
d
a
tl
ti
11
o
tl
s
0
h
P
r
ti
b
ti
a
s
If
ti
ti
ti
P
n
s]
d
ti
ti
ti
s
0
tl
tl
Si
t(
P
li
tl
b
The corno - |1C ^Uar<d he could identify the guard officer. ?ent]etlla ra op lhe guard stated that he had never seen the Mice stat' e^°rC; "^hereupon the bobby took him to the Sequent|v *°n’ and lhe barracks commanding officer sub- EveryWas retluired to retrieve him. doim, ,, rne involved must be aware of what you are
°ln§- W . vcu must De aware ot what you ar°Und th6 .not allow Marines with ski masks to Cities & ^?r’meter without first contacting the local au- *r°l [o i'(|an^ dlen meeting with the senior officer on pa- 'vant t0 ""f'fy themselves before they begin. We also °fficer 0na^e sure that the local authorities and senior thing Patrol will check to make sure it is not the real Seven,)
SUch testi ° /ICers a‘ the FMFLant conference opposed °ut. Cann ^ 6CaUSe op ^sks inv°lved- This is a cop- hattce the 6dr'ds’ rePeated over prolonged periods, enacted q Security force’s capability to react to the r°rist _ is never predictable, and neither is a ter-
run
unex-
att i aim iiv^unti is a ici-
^eXpeC(e(tj ’ ®ur Marines must learn to react to the ^ d°ne inecisively; f°r that is exactly the way it must lra'n our 3 rea^ s*tuation. Unless we take these steps to act'°n clri]|SCCUr't^ Porces (something akin to immediate SarV confjj *n pa‘ro“*nS)> they will not develop the neces- ence to react decisively in a real situation.
S Co; and Equipment: One of the emerging prob- spec; e.rnin8 antiterrorist measures is the perception ^Plebep WeaP°ns and equipment are needed. Many ex°tic par!eve *hat unless the Marines have Uzis and other There ^hcrnaliii they cannot cope with terrorists.
SrNl auto' a Certain psychological effect in possessing a I n§ for th131'0 WeaPon ’n certain situations—the perfect etT| With a C mo<dern businessman’s briefcase. The prob- rlQn to fircUJ0rnat'c weapons, however, is that the tempta- r(>unds p . °nger bursts only increases the possibility of
i pp. ■ w illV-lVUJVJ U1V pvjooiuilllj
%ma 'nf where they are not supposed to go. The PlaCe, of ■ ' < -
5l 0:
I ferent rre *S no re;d need f°r weapons and equipment j tning re]an ‘^at issued to FMF units. This makes all ° Pr°PoSeeVant ‘° infantry skills. However, 1 would like ^SniUchSOltle c^an8es in equipment.
'8 p0Wfl„as * Prefcr the .45 as a sidearm, even its stop
We]| ° Marines has always been the ability to eet for ,aiITIed founds on the enemy. This is a require- J°tgun ntiterr°rist operations. Other than the M870 differ ’ there is ™_________ c. .._________ ,
sh.
Pin
Hi.
safe’
45 jla<;uoes not override its drawbacks. As long as a round in its chambers, it cannot be a truly
js J"aP°n. The hammer is cocked back when a JS catchanibered- ^ ‘he hammer is eased forward, the th "'eapo Canno‘ he engaged, which makes it a danger- ^e ne\v 9 0 ^ Practical solution to this would be to issue ^ n0w ^n.m- Personal defense weapon to those MCSF , n,ries Ti,S'n" ‘he -45 as the primary weapon for posted
°ha- *ne inr'ro.„.„,l_____________________ i____ i -i-, .
a sir Increased magazine capacity and capability
h aVg ^ Lapavuj anu v-tipauil 11
l;tr‘ect oh 3 e WeaPon with a chambered round make it
'n 'n issui'Ce' ^ar'ne barracks are at the bottom of the r)jCre thann®‘ Tfet, I believe the 9-mm. is needed more ^ce. ^ ln ‘he FMF where it is used more for conve-
b There wn?Sted sentry needs a pisto1'
* at tbe ■ . Probably be commanding officers who will 1 ea of chambered rounds in pistols. However,
since most gun battles are over so quickly, the time it takes to pull the slide to the rear to chamber a round may give the terrorist or criminal the necessary edge to defeat a Marine, regardless of his skill.
Another matter to consider is the issue to those same MCSF units of the black military police gear that goes with the 9-mm. Current Marine Corps policy is to preserve the uniformity of appearance with the “traditional” white gear. However, the “traditional” role in the performance of MCSF duties disappeared on 23 October 1983. Our once “symbolic” and largely ceremonial presence has given way to a very real security threat to the facilities that we protect. Military police wear black gear for a practical reason—they must be prepared to use the weapons that they carry. The same requirement is now true for MCSF units.
Other gear would include starlights for M-16s and night vision goggles. MCSF units, as in normal infantry training, need to conduct training under reduced visibility conditions as well as night operations. Since we can expect that most potential attacks will take place at night, our training emphasis must take that into account.
MCSF Preparation: Many MCSF units lack the facilities to conduct the type of training I propose. The first alternative would be to establish an MCSF training course at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia (MCDEC). There are numerous resources there: the FBI Academy, the marksmanship training unit, and all the ranges and facilities necessary. The basics of the Weaver Stance can be taught, with plenty of live fire for developing technique. One day would be enough to establish a good foundation.
Long-term costs could be reduced by creating a marksmanship training unit—an audiovisual weapons and training system developed in Great Britain and gaining popularity in Europe as well as in the United States. This unit provides tremendous versatility in marksmanship training. It simulates a multitude of realistic scenarios, giving immediate feedback, yet is unaffected by the weather. Visual moving targets and shoot/no-shoot scenarios are only a few of its attributes. Ammunition costs can be reduced by using .22 ammunition in M-16s and pistols.
The British units for dealing with terrorism are at locations where they can configure buildings to any specification, simulate any hostage or terrorist situation, and enable firing under any condition of light, gas, etc.
The course’s duration and nature can be tailored to the needs of the MCSF personnel attending. Some units require more intensive training than others. We need a uniform course of instruction on terrorist methods, psychology, perimeter operations, and hostage survival. The result would be a uniform policy and training program. And MCSF units would be much better prepared to cope with the threat. At this time, the newest Marine is inevitably the weak link in an MCSF unit. If a terrorist attack were to occur before he could be brought up to speed, his lack of knowledge could be fatal to someone, including himself. If a basic foundation is established prior to deployment, even though the new Marine may still be re-
"1Rs /
•,u,y 1986
has'
ough preparation of key personnel so that no labor to develop a program, as we are now. jn-
If we develop a “pre-deployment” course jonS to bound MCSF members, we should make Pr0 , g0 that have NCOs from current MCSF assignments atte ^rarns. they can return to assist their unit’s training P -
heen b01*13
Why Marines?: Barracks tours have always c3-
valuable retention tool as well as an outlet for n putufe reer-broadening independent duty assignmen ^ey vvere Marines would be denied these opportunities1 ^ s0nie
removed from the security business altogether, have suggested. ■ jp the
Aside from this, however, we should rerna pr0vide 1CSF business for two reasons. First, these P°s tbe
iviajvji i ic-iic cimaicu in i anvj own-u mu . -_.gr
commissioned in 1972 through the Enlisted Commission ^ vafjety followed by a 39-month tour in an Infantry Battalion >n ^d 3s
kllLtt, 1 r,l ut i nfin- knnkalnr nf ortc HpUrCC, ^ « -rtf
aJ> tltf
idem 3f 0f
billets. Upon completing his bachelor of arts degree
ff0 an
’earSCorPs
quired to master the responsibilities of his post, he can be prepared to meet the threat.
Regarding cost, we may have to work out a cost-sharing plan; the service or agency benefiting could reimburse the cost of the training, which would be significant. Security always will be expensive; but unpreparedness is even more expensive.
The training a Marine might receive in a “pre-deployment” course would be of little value unless he has the opportunity to maintain the necessary level of proficiency at his unit. In severely restricted areas, indoor ranges equipped with marksmanship training units can be invaluable. MCSF units possessing adequate facilities should be assisted in developing their own programs. An effective coordination program must be established to assist those units lacking facilities, or that are too small to undertake their own programs. We may need to allocate resources to establish centrally located ranges and facilities (East and West coasts) where MCSF units can use them. With a little coordination, the current facilities conceivably may be more than adequate.
Key Personnel: One important aspect is the need to provide qualified officers and senior non-commissioned officers to MCSF units. MCSF units’ security missions vary. Some have perimeters to defend; thus, training is in the normal tactical fundamentals of defense, alternate and supplementary positions, reserve, and counterattacks. Some units defend buildings or ships. Regardless of the facility, the threat can be reduced to a manager
mon denominator. rthwhi^
I have had the good fortune to attend two wo conferences on the subject: first, the Headquarters^^ ^ Corps Barracks conference, June 1984, and, seCr£rences FMFLant conference in January 1985. These con ^ n0t provided me with contacts, resources, and ideas- fillet every commanding officer, guard officer, or ^ed- holder is freed from the tyranny of the operation ^ a[t ule to do so. We need to ensure that the key pers -za. adequately qualified before sending them to t^ieir(TC{jier at2 tions; we cannot depend on getting them backt0r. ^or- later date. The reality of the terrorist threat rctf-n^ ^
the Marine Corps with high visibility. We ^avecentu' right to put Marines in these positions throug untry. ries of dedicated professional service to our co ^ it The second is derived from the first: no one ^gd it better. Marine Lieutenant General Alfred Gray s fgienc® up in his concluding statement at the FMFLantc ^ and when he said that we have faced terrorism e ,,
“we must face the challenge, and we must wim^ 1 Some believe that Marines have become pf0;
not believe that is the case. Those facilities t ^ stanJ tect, however, are targets. Our nation has ta esenCeofa against terrorism and all that it portends. The Pr^ t° well-trained Marine security force is in itself a ,jVjdu2*s terrorism. We cannot let a handful of suicidal 10
distort the terrorist threat. Not all terrorists are ^o(jated- die for their cause. Those who are can be accon Those who are not will be deterred. -ngd 3111
The operational commander needs the best We< most highly motivated security force possible- terro^f as the Marine Commandant pointed out, mak too costly an option to employ against U. ^
Major Helle enlisted in 1965 and served two tours in pr°rr9^f
Officer Candidate School Platoon Commander and was ' ^ stal
Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. After one year 11 "
III Marine Amphibious Force in Okinawa, he spent thri"'^jne ^ Inspector-Instructor, Company B, 1st Bn, 23rd Marines,^
Reserve in Austin, Texas. Major Helle subsequently ser curreOt*Y n,p the commanding officer, Marine Barracks, London. He ' de,
G-3 Ground Operations Officer, 5th Marine Amphibious Pendleton, California.