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The Falklands Conflict helped to revitalize the Royal Navy, saving it from a declining defense budget and strengthening its defense capabilities. Some of its new strength came from Royal Fleet Auxiliary personnel and vessels, such as the repair ship Diligence, shown with HMS Penelope off the Falklands recently. But as the cries of “Remember the Falklands” die, what will happen to the Royal Navy?
The Royal Navy has had some unlikely friends since the end of World War II: Kim II Sung, whose Korean War allowed some of the navy’s postwar plans to be funded and also staved off a potentially serious defense review; President Gamal Abdal Nasser, whose nationalization of the Suez Canal provided the spur to an operation that demonstrated the continued utility and further potential of naval forces in limited war in the nuclear age; and the recently retired Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, whose development of an oceangoing Soviet fleet came just in time to provide a threat closer to home, for the apparently redundant “East of Suez” navy to deploy against in the 1970s. Just as it seemed the Royal Navy was about to suffer perhaps its most serious defeat at the hands of a traditional opponent (the British Minister of Defence), yet another foreign leader—Argentine President General Leopoldo Galtieri—came to the rescue.
The Argentine invasion of the Falklands saved the Royal Navy from many of the most hurtful cuts of John Nott’s 1981 Way Forward exercise, as set out in a document infamous in naval circles, usually known by its official Command Number, 8288. The Falklands invasion allowed the Royal Navy—at considerable risk—to put on a produce a considerable general enhancement of Britain s capacity to operate outside the NATO area, the minister gave back to the navy much of what he had taken away the third antisubmarine warfare (ASW) carrier, the complete Type-22 frigate program, and the reactivation ot ships retired from service. (The assault ships had already been returned even before the war after another look at the cost and an apparently successful ministerial visit to one of them.) Although much of the general architecture of 8288 remained, the dockyard closures and, perhaps most important of all, the rearranging of Britain’s defense priorities with its North Atlantic role at the bottom of the list, there is no doubt that by 1983-84 the Royal Navy leadership felt relatively happy with both its current situation and its future.
The fundamental problem with this reversal of the Nott review was that the circumstances which had created that review had not gone away. Indeed, short-term benefits apart, the Falklands War and its aftermath—with its extra load on Britain’s defense commitments—only made the situation worse. Command Number 8288 was, in its gem eral intention, a praiseworthy response to the problem ot an overloaded defense program. Britain’s defense ambi-
display of successful naval force. This stimulated pride and interest in the navy that were perhaps unprecedented in the post-World War II period. Moreover, the Falklands War provided a context in which pressing ahead with the Nott review was both politically impossible and, for the time being, financially unnecessary.
The much-maligned minister (now Sir John Nott) must take at least some of the credit for this. By gaining extra money for the defense program from the government’s contingency funds and by using Falklands expenditure to
tions in the late 1970s were outrunning its willingness10 foot the escalating bills. Even before the 1980 decision replace Polaris with a new strategic system, the signs o strain were clear. Not paying the going rate for personne led to a serious hemorrhage of valuable men and wome that caused significant cuts in the active fleet, despite 1 still ambitious building program. When the Thatcher G°v ernment raised pay to staunch the outward flow, the resu ing overspend (admittedly compounded by other fact0^ such as the recession upsetting the Ministry of Defence spending calculations) demonstrated clearly the need ‘ ^ drastic measures—hence the entry of the gaunt figure Mr. Nott from the treasury to put the defense finances on firmer footing.
The result of the Nott review was the production 0 general British force posture for the 1980s that was afioj' ( able, given expected defense expenditures. Moreover, j force posture would be well funded with its less tang1" aspects—such as ammunition stocks—fully provided r° ’
even at some cost to notional front-line strength. Most radical of all, there would even be some slack in the program to cover unforeseen expenses. In fact, one of the first emonstrations of the extent of the slack was the reprieve of the assault ships Fearless and Intrepid. In essence, the °tt review was an attempt to produce a defense policy ramework that would stand the test of time.
It is also hard to criticize Mr. Nott and his staff, rather an the government in general, for the choice of defense Priorities. Given the Prime Minister’s commitment to the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent and the Defence Min- lstry s assessment that Trident was the best possible sys- em for it, there was no alternative but to put that as the Primary pillar of Britain’s defense policy. It must have een a little surprising to outside observers to see the °yal Navy and some of its spokesmen reacting so adversely to being placed once more at the top of Britain’s efense priorities. It was not that senior naval officers disced acquiring an impressive new generation of nuclear- Powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Tri- ent missiles to go with them; it was that they disliked aving to pay for them within the sea systems budgetary ceilings. Naval forces were thus more vulnerable to cuts an they had been before in order to finance the new nuclear deterrent. If the basis of the program could be roadened, it would command more general support.
Mr. Nott believed that the defense of the United King- had been neglected and should receive greater em- Pnasis. Thus, home defense was placed directly after the nuclear deterrent on the defense priority list. Homeland clense has an important naval dimension, and the effects ,; Ihe revised priorities are clearly seen in the ongoing 'mon-pound smaller craft program. The Hunt-class mine e°untermeasures vessels are being supplemented by new Minesweepers of the River class and a new program of jjMall, single-role minehunters. New coastal training craft °r port defense duties are also being procured. The desire °r greater use of reserve forces adopted generally for the dense of the United Kingdom has seen a new importance d an enlarged Royal Naval Reserve (slated to increase by %) and a new, more combatant emphasis for the duties an enlarged Royal Naval Auxiliary Service. This improves Britain’s capabilities for policing its vital offshore ?°ne that provides, through North Sea oil, the current key 0 British economic health.
,. Mr. Nott, therefore, did not attack the navy, as such, in ls 1981 prescriptions for the future. He questioned the c°ntinued necessity for the deployment of the kind of fleet vvhich the Royal Navy was most interested, a tradi- °nal, ocean-going, general-purpose navy, dedicated pri- urily to operations in the Eastern Atlantic area and the gn§lish Channel. Not only did the 1981 review place the astern Atlantic defense commitment below the forward tense of Western Europe in Britain’s defense priorities, l’ beguiled by superficially persuasive technological or Perational advice, the minister became convinced that the Pensive surface fleet had too uncertain a role in any ^ture battle of the North Atlantic to be worth the previous vel of investment. Submarines and land-based maritime atr°l aircraft would, he decided, henceforth bear the
brunt of the Eastern Atlantic defense. Mr. Nott and his immediate advisers seemed unconvinced of there being any role for surface ships in the Atlantic theater and only retained a surface fleet for these reasons:
- To meet NATO Strike Fleet ASW support commitments that it would have been inadvisable to renege upon
- To avoid the acute political embarrassment large cuts would have involved
- To provide a capability for operations out of area that the minister and the government in general saw as gaining in significance
It is worth emphasizing that, in one sense, the Falklands War fit in with the Nott review’s priorities. The Falklands operation was precisely the kind of out-of-area operation that the Way Forward had reserved for the Royal Navy. In this important sense, Sir John was not eating his words when he used his extra money to enhance naval capabilities. He had never disagreed that naval forces, including surface forces, were appropriate for out-of-area contingencies. If money was available for these, well and good. It was just that those contingencies and those roles were at the bottom of the list of Britain’s defense priorities, not even a “fifth pillar” but something to be done after the four main pillars had been properly provided for.
It is understandable that the Naval Staff should have swallowed the bait in its response to the Falklands War. Authoritative naval spokesmen soon began to stress out- of-area operations as the main rationale for Britain’s continued possession of a balanced fleet of surface ships. For example, in a 1985 interview, Admiral Sir John Field- house argued that the national role of the Royal Navy “has always been one of defence of British interests, and deterrence to potential enemies, world wide. What has changed is the scale at which we are required to perform this role ... as everybody sees this has increased many fold.” He asserted that Britain was “clearly susceptible to threats to its interests in many parts of the world,” and he cited recent operations in the Falklands and Gulf of Suez as examples to support his thesis.1
His statement, and others that solemnly cite long lists of British operations outside the NATO area since 1945, overlooks one fundamental point. For most of the postWorld War II period, Britain owned substantial portions of the world and, even as it successfully arranged its withdrawal, retained the responsibility for defending the chosen successor regimes from internal and external threats. This residual role was given up at the end of the 1960s. The fleet then came home to confront the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic.
The Royal Navy, culturally and emotionally, had problems coming to terms with this fundamental policy choice, confirmed by the Labour Government in the mid-1970s. Group deployments of ships were regularly sent on world cruises in the 1970s to demonstrate a continued capability to operate out of area. Indeed, with the Royal Navy’s regular contribution to mine countermeasures in the Middle East (in the Suez Canal in 1973 and the Red Sea in 1984), as well as in the current Gulf Armilla Patrol, the British were, and are, able to demonstrate the continued ability of what has been called Britain’s “General Capability.” Yet this is a residual role of forces primarily procured for operations closer to home.
In many ways, so was the Falklands. The only differences between that war and a NATO Northern Flank scenario were those of distance (much greater) and threat (much less). The fact that British ships had weaknesses in combating small aircraft in both the open sea and fjordlike conditions resulted less perhaps to single scenario thinking in terms of geography than to restricted interpretations of the Soviet air threat and the negative effect of trying to squeeze too many ships out of inadequate naval budgets. There was also an overreliance (certainly not of the navy’s own making) on other organizations to fight the navy’s air battle for it.
The usefulness of the out-of-area scenario as a key to unlock a secure future for the Royal Navy was always questionable and seems even more so today. Certainly out-of-area provides extra weight to the arguments for a strong Royal Navy, but the navy has to rest on a firm foundation of British strategic interests as perceived at the end of the 20th century. These interests are firmly tied to Britain’s reduced role, power, and status as an important medium power with economic and security interests relatively close to home. Although 95% of British trade goes by sea, 90% of its seaborne exports are to Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and North America. Even in the navalists’ own terms, the focus of Britain’s maritime economic interests is the same as that of its politico-strategic interest—inside the NATO area, not out of it. Britain’s continued reliance on somewhat optional overseas imports from the rest of the world (much of it still Persian Gulf oil) probably gets its just reflection in the essentially limited capabilities (land and air as well as naval) that it deploys for use in these areas. Therefore, it would be a strange priority for a British Government to size its navy for out- of-area contingencies.
Britain’s primary strategic concern is the deterrence of military threats within the North Atlantic area. This still requires a contribution to the forward defense of the NATO Alliance on the continent of Europe. Despite the arguments in its favor, a substantial withdrawal of the land and air contribution to the Central Front would be a move fraught with enormous strategic dangers. There is probably more room for maneuver in reducing costs than implied in the usual all-or-nothing terms of the debate on the “continental commitment,” but any scaling down of Britain’s strength would have to be carefully managed if deterrence in Central Europe is not to unravel disastrously. Continued Dutch, Belgian, and perhaps even U. S. commitments to the conventional defense of Europe might receive a fatal blow if the British Army of the Rhine came home—a move that would not save a great deal of money unless the withdrawn forces were disbanded.
Indeed, the trends in NATO are toward strengthening the Alliance’s conventional options rather than weakening them. This is a favorable development for NATO’s navies and is something that should be encouraged. The longer and more sustained the period of conventional resistance, the more relevant naval forces become as defenses for the reinforcements crossing the North Atlantic. Whatever operational doctrine is adopted, the need for surface and naval air forces in such a battle ought to be relatively easy to demonstrate.
Another aspect of the continental commitment is the Northern Flank, especially the defense of Norway. It lS interesting to note that the 1985 White Paper divided Britain’s priority-three area of the European mainland into two regions, Central and Northern. This effectively transferred a substantial part of Britain’s naval capabilities, its amphibious warfare assets and sufficient warships for their escort, up a notch in official strategic importance. It seems logical for potential operations in this area, rather than the balmier Eastern climes (or the cold waters of the South Atlantic), to be the main reason to argue for the maintenance of a significant British amphibious warfare capability. A considerable struggle seems to have taken place over the future of forces for this rule, notably over the question of possible replacements for the Fearless and the Intrepid. Extending the lives of the ships as long as possible seems to be a front-running option, but the situation seemed far from settled as this new year began.
That, however, the maintenance of a relatively high prl" ority-three capability has been the subject of a review is a sign that cold financial realities are beginning to impinge once more into the euphoria generated by the Falklands victory and the budgetary bonanza that followed in *ts wake. The Thatcher Government, still as committed to the attempt to reduce public expenditure as it has always been, has no intention of allowing defense spending to slip °ut of control. Falklands costs helped the government meet its promise to increase real defense expenditure by the NATO pledged 3% per year throughout the first half of the 1980s- The 1985 White Paper confirmed, however, that this steady increase is to cease, beginning this year. Indeed, the government’s defense spending plans, as announced i° November 1985, make it clear that Britain’s planned expenditures in the late 1980s will barely, if at all, keep Pace with inflation.
Given that the Nott review and its unwelcome cuts were predicated on the continuance of the 3% real increasesomething has to give somewhere. Mr. Michael Heseltu12, Sir John Nott’s successor, made much of the desire f°r extra efficiency as a way of squeezing more capability °u of a given amount of defense pounds. His commitment to managerial reform, begun in the Department of Environ ment and brought into the Ministry of Defence, covere many aspects, from a major centralization of the defend structure to increasing competition in defense procure ment. The most important feature of this efficiency dnve has been the move of personnel from support services to the front line. By the beginning of the next decade the tota manpower of the Royal Navy is scheduled to fall fr0lTl 62,000 in 1981 to 51,000. Such cuts will inevitably cause strains, especially given the announced determination 10 maintain a larger-than-planned active fleet. ._
It was always open to doubt as to whether the new el ciency drive could achieve such significant manpower cu without having an adverse effect on the efficiency of * fleet. By 1985, however, it was becoming clear that less tangible aspects of naval power were indeed beg1*1
coui
n'ng to suffer. The severe cuts in shore training moved s°nie officers to express concern over a serious drop in ^andards among both officers and enlisted men, a drop all e more serious given the increased demands made upon Personnel by modem technology and modes of operation.
report on a collision involving the guided missile de- str°yer Southampton stated that the incident “highlights CUrrent lack of bridge experience not only in the South- atnPton but also in the rest of the surface fleet, and until ■Un|°r officer of the watch training is improved similar lnc'dents will continue to occur.”2 The more general problems of “over stretch” were also dected in overloaded programs and a lack of job satis- ction that was beginning to cause professionals to leave , e navy, creating, in turn, shortages of certain skills. In the Royal Navy was reportedly about 300 officers rider strength, and 1,000 posts were not filled or were *ed by people without the correct training. Such weak- ^esses are less quantifiable than shortfalls in warship num- tErs’ but this perhaps makes them the more sinister long- ,r,n threat to Britain’s naval capabilities. It also leads to ^°ubts about the state of affairs in other areas, such as ^biunition and fuel stocks.
^ *be policies of his successor, in fact, cut right across e Nott intention of a slimmed down but well-funded and . ''Supplied defense policy: the shop window is now sustained at the expense of the stocks behind the nter. Such a policy might enhance deterrence in a
sense, an area in which perception rather than objective reality is the key (Britain’s potential enemies have to assume that its ships are efficient), but it is a little surprising to see a navy that argued (correctly) that its superior skills and training had been vital to its Falklands victory, seriously cutting the way in which these skills were created.
Concern over the government’s naval building plans has been expressed. The Naval Staff has a ship, the Type-23 Duke-class diesel-electric frigate, around which the Royal Navy bases its future hopes. The Type-23 is intended to be a cheaper and less manpower-intensive follow-on to the ultra-sophisticated and impressive (but expensive) Type- 228. The first of the Dwke-class, Norfolk, was ordered in October 1984, but the current state of the program seems to be in some doubt. All the 1985 White Paper stated was that “it has been decided to negotiate an order for the second vessel at Swan Hunter as soon as this can sensibly be done, subject to satisfactory agreement on price and other contract terms; tenders will be invited for a third Type-23 order from all yards capable of carrying out the
work.”3 By the beginning of 1986, the press was saying that the Type-23 program might be a candidate for cuts. With the expenditure of an estimated 746 million dollars from the defense budget, almost half from naval budgetary headings, the deferral of new frigates looked likely. Some even said that the option of curtailing the Type-23 program (originally intended to have at least eight ships in the first batch with further modified versions added later) to only four vessels was being considered.
The four vacant slots, it was suggested, might be taken up by cheaper corvette-type vessels of the OPV-3 type. (OPV stands for offshore patrol vessel, a ship type the Royal Navy was forced, perhaps a little reluctantly, to procure in the 1970s and early 1980s to help fulfill its enhanced offshore patrol task.) Seven Isles-class OPV-1 vessels came into service between 1976 and 1979 and two improved and enlarged helicopter capable Castle-class ships in the early 1980s.
It is not surprising that no room could be found in the program for the OPV-3. It would thus be somewhat ironic natives to the already relatively cheap Type-23. It w°u* raise a question or two over the process that resulted in the Duke design, although it is hard to fault the Ministry 0 Defence (Navy) in its recognition that the highest threat areas require warships of considerable capability. If, h°'v' ever, out of area is the main rationale for frigates, it lS doubly difficult to resist the cries for economy designs to maintain the desired numbers.
There can be little doubt that in current circumstances the ASW protection of NATO’s strike fleet is the Royal Navy’s perceived top priority. ASW protection seems to be what the U. S. Navy requires of its major NATO ally- Certainly, offering the units for the Antisubmarine Strik' ing Force Atlantic gives Britain some influence in the use of the NATO Striking Fleet as a whole that it would other wise not have. This has always been Britain’s primary reason for deploying a major main fleet contribution, eve since the creation of the NATO Alliance. .
The Royal Navy would understandably be loath to give up its ASW task. Yet the Royal Navy’s long-term capah1 ity to take part in the Strike Fleet must be more and m°rt in doubt as the years go by. If, as reported, the An*1 Submarine Striking Force Atlantic will be operating 4 miles ahead of the main carrier battle group, it will be the brunt of the initial air attacks. Despite (presumab y heavy U. S. air cover, this would also require air defend ships of the highest capability. Unfortunately, these veS
sels, Type-43 and Type-44 destroyers, have already been ‘Tandoned by the Royal Navy. Attempts to give some of .. listing Type-42 destroyers improved defense capabil- tties will improve the situation to a limited extent (if funds |jre available for the work), but there must be serious °ubts about the Royal Navy’s ability to take on the Soviet aval Air Force of the next decade, even with advanced Medium-range air-to-air missile-equipped Sea Harriers suPP°rted by airborne early-warning helicopters. Perhaps ln (he medium term, ASW at a prudent distance from So- ^■et air bases will be the order of the day and, if the Type' Program does get severely cut, even this capability will e significantly degraded as time goes on. The extent of i sophistication of the projected “NATO frigate” Planned for the next decade might well become a key issue M defining the extent of the Royal Navy’s capacities into . next century. There are signs that the British are show- lng markedly greater interest in this project than in previ- °Us cooperative ventures. Putting surface escort replaceMent on such a cooperative basis, especially as the zanders approach block obsolescence in the early to Mid-1990s, might make the maintenance of 50 escorts a Mle more likely.
The Royal Navy has an excellent record in the use of the elicopter at sea. In the 1960s it forged ahead of the U. S. avy in small-ship helicopter operations. The Royal fMvy’s plan to procure the EH-101 promises a very capa- e ASW machine that will be able to fly from a wide range of platforms.
The British have been markedly innovative in the recent
-S^HAW
development of more austere ship platforms for the operation of helicopters. The necessities of the Falklands War overcame doubts about using converted merchantmen as helicopter and vertical/short takeoff or landing (V/STOL) auxiliary aircraft carriers, and, since then, two container ships have been converted into aviation support vessels. The first was the Astronomer, which was converted using the U. S. Navy Arapaho system and commissioned as the merchant manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Reliant in 1983. More impressive still is the RFA Argus, another ship taken up from trade and converted during the Falklands War. At a cost of $57,380,000 (17% the cost of an Invincible-type through deck cruiser), the fleet will have more than just a training ship for helicopter and Sea Harrier crews but also a replacement for the old Hermes as a relatively high-capacity V/STOL carrier.
Another fruitful way of exploiting RFA assets is to give the Royal Navy’s replenishment ships, used as auxiliary ASW helicopter carriers for some time now, an even greater role as integral, combatant members of task groups. The six new one-stop replenishment vessels, for which design studies have been submitted, are planned to be the maintenance vessels for the helicopters carried by the accompanying Type-23 frigates, thus allowing the latter significant savings in their manpower requirement. A greater combat role for the auxiliaries is also symbolized by much heavier antiair armament (Seawolf missiles), an electronic warfare suite, and even a command and control center. Unfortunately, the cost is too much, and the tendering shipbuilders have been asked to submit less ex-
pensive and less capable designs, with smaller naval contingents in their crews. This in itself indicates that the trend to greater use of partial civilian crews will continue as a way of solving the problems posed by the regular navy’s manpower cuts.
The year 1985 also saw serious concerns expressed about the precipitate decline of Britain’s merchant fleet, which has lost about half its ships and personnel over the past decade. This has two serious implications for the Royal Navy. First, and perhaps less serious, is the reduced number of ships available for use in a crisis situation. As the 1985 Defence White Paper reported, only in the mine countermeasures area do the reductions in large trawlers cause numbers to fall below wartime requirements. The more serious implication is the long-term effect of the decline of Britain’s shipping on its status as a maritime nation. Although the possession of a large merchant marine has never had the positive or negative effect on military naval power that Alfred Thayer Mahan argued, the perception that Britain is ceasing to be a major sea power in the widest sense might well have less than a positive effect on its willingness to maintain substantial naval combat forces.
In one way, the Royal Navy already has little to do with Britain’s merchant marine. The navy has steadily integrated itself into U. S. power projection and strategic defense strategy. Expenditure on the submarine service has increased greatly over the last 15 to 20 years. On average, in real terms, between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, British expenditure on submarines, not counting the strategic force, more than doubled, while that on major surface warships increased by less than one-half. (Interestingly, expenditure on carriers remained roughly the same, despite the abolition of the conventional aircraft carrier.)
By any estimate, Britain’s submarine forces are impressive for a country of its political and economic status. Indeed, Britain’s possession of an operational fleet of 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) (with two more under refit) is perhaps its major claim to preeminence over France as the world’s number three naval power. British submarines are of the highest capability in terms of silent running, and only Britain’s apparent inability to produce fully capable torpedoes limits their utility as ASW weapons, although not by as much as during the 1960s. Britain even withdrew its oldest SSN, the Dreadnought, from service, but still aims at a force of 17 SSNs in the medium term, and the four T-class boats under construction or on order should allow that goal to be realized.
But, are nuclear-powered submarines the most cost- effective way for Britain to spend increasingly scarce defense pounds? Admittedly, as with the Striking Fleet contribution, it might be considered advisable, on grounds of
Nuclear-powered attack submarines, such as this Trafalgar- class boat, serve U. S. interests, but are they in keeping with Britain’s defense needs? The Royal Navy’s budget might be more palatable to the keepers of the purse strings if Britain concentrated on naval tasks closely tied to national interests.
naval
te - case. This national security requirement is the main- ^nance of the status quo within the NATO area, and the jjj to achieving that goal are convincing the United deft£S l^at Britain can fight at acceptable cost in NATO’s Cqense, and showing the Soviets that there is no easy tl)QVentional war-winning option. To do both requires, va]re than anything else, that ships carrying items of CrQe> such as men, equipment, fuel, and supplies, can t0Ss fhe Atlantic, not only to keep the war going, but also Maintain a war economy in as much of Europe as re-
ATO solidarity, for Britain to take part in the naval of- ensive deep into Soviet waters—and SSNs make more sense than carriers do in this role. But how far is this a sensible division of Alliance labor, given the relative in- erest of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Various aspects of the Alliance naval battle? Anti-SSBN operations in the Norwegian Sea and beyond are more in e interest of the United States, given the threat of the systems under attack. Offensive operations in these north- £rn waters might defend the passage of shipping further s°uth by tying down Soviet forces, but that indirect role Probably should not take up such a high proportion of the K°yal Navy’s budget. That budget might be politically n?ore sustainable if Britain concentrated on naval tasks °ser to its national interest, such as the more direct pro- ection of shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas. Given the dependence of SSNs on an intelligence rarastructure that only a superpower can provide, Brit- ajn s SSNs are more or less adjuncts to the U. S. Navy, hough they can be used to good effect on specific na- l0nal interests when required—as the Argentines found °ut to their detriment. Even here, however, the political Pr°blems of using submarines in a politically sensitive sit- rrati°n makes them weapons relevant only in relatively 'gh-level operations.
Continued investment in SSNs has other negative ef- ects- The effect on the conventional submarine program needs to be considered. The first of the new generation of ^°nventional boats, the Upholder class, remains unique. ■Wportedly, delaying orders for her projected sisters is one ay that the over-strained naval procurement budget can i.f- tlammed. Given Britain’s geographical position and the ' hy of conventional boats for operations in shallower ^°ntinental shelf waters, a sustained British conventional .marine capability could be a useful NATO asset, espe- lally when the U. S. Navy’s near abandonment of this chnoiogy js considered.
• The synergism of the Royal Navy with the U. S. Navy Perhaps the crucial point to consider when looking into e future. It would be helpful if the United States Depart- 1^ent of Defense thought out, much more carefully than it as done so far, just what kind of navy it would like its aJ°r naval ally to deploy and how scarce assets could be S?h to their mutual benefit.
The United States makes much of its desire for the Eu- gPeans to do more in their own defense. Although the K2fh can, and do, provide tokens of support outside the f O area, the strongest rationale for a continued ocean- tjJn§ Royal Navy is a reemphasis on fundamental na- n&l security requirements as the bedrock of Britain’s
mains in NATO’s hands.
If the U. S. Navy insists on making its contribution through offensive operations, as mapped out in the U. S. Navy’s maritime strategy, then all Britain can contribute in the long term to this is some submarines. The lessons of the past, however, clearly show that someone will have to defend the ships and their cargoes directly. The United States has around 70 frigates and destroyers allocated for convoy escort roles. The Royal Navy could, perhaps, replace some of these, allowing the U. S. Navy to concentrate on its own war with the Soviet sea and air forces.
If Britain is to maintain such an escort fleet, it will have to concentrate on that; something else, inevitably naval, will have to go. The Trident program is the obvious candidate. The very favorable terms on which the Americans indulged Britain’s strategic nuclear ambitions seem to demonstrate that they share Mrs. Thatcher’s view that the best contribution Britain could make to the Alliance’s naval assets was four 16-tube Trident submarines. With their missile stocks stored alongside the U. S. Navy’s at King’s Bay, Georgia, the four British Trident submarines would be even more clearly adjuncts to U. S. forces than the existing NATO-assigned Polaris boats. Although it would be a travesty of British policy even to imply that this is the British Government’s intention, it would certainly be the effect. By the late 1990s, with U. S. SSBNs reduced perhaps to 15 to 17 boats, the four British boats might make a considerable difference to the U. S. strategic forces, but they will also make a considerable difference to the Royal Navy.
It is, no doubt, the British Government’s hope that by the next election the Trident program will be beyond cancellation. If it is, perhaps the best service the United States could perform would be to purchase the submarines, selling Britain some cruise missiles for deployment in SSNs as a residual deterrent. In so doing, the United States might give Britain a last chance to maintain the general- purpose navy that is still required by both national and NATO interests. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has already expressed doubts about the Trident program if it involves severe cuts in the rest of Britain’s naval forces. It undoubtedly will. Secretary Lehman might consider following through the logic of his argument with his usual force and radicalism, adding four useful submarines to the U. S. Navy’s depleted deterrent forces, and thus putting himself in the role of the next foreign friend to come to the Royal Navy’s rescue.
'"Interview with the British First Sealord," Navy International, July 1985 pn 390-394. ‘
“D. Wettem, “Training Cut ‘Endangers Warships,'" Daily Telegraph, 3 May 3Command Number 9430-1, para. 439.
Mr. Grove is a British naval historian and strategic analyst who taught for 12 years at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. From 1980-1981 he was an exchange professor at the U. S. Naval Academy. He left Dartmouth in 1985 to take an appointment as Senior Research Officer with the Council for Arms Control. He is the author of The Royal Navy: Vanguard to Trident, soon to be published by the Naval Institute Press. Currently, he is working as a freelance strategic analyst and as a consultant to the Oxfordshire-based Defense Research Trust.