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The Trident submarine Ohio (SSBN-726) dominates the view ^hile in dry dock at her base in Bangor, Washington, and in a Very real sense nuclear subma- naes and nuclear submariners have come to dominate the S. Navy in recent years. The Passive dimensions and massive Capabilities of the Ohio represent a level of achievement s°arcely imagined a generation aSo. In the years after World ^ar II, the aircraft carrier was the capital ship of the Navy, and naval aviators held much of the power within the Navy.
^°w, though, the submarine has emerged as the potent force, ®nd a the number of top-rank- lfS submarine admirals has lncreased in the process. In the years ahead, it is entirely possi- te that submarines—nuclear Powered ones in all likelihood— H’1^ take over roles and missions that have in the past been °ssigned to other types of naval Platforms.
The American Submarine, 1984-2014
By Norman Polmar
For the past 70 years, since undersea craft were first used in combat, the submarine has been looked upon mainly as an underwater torpedo boat that could close with an enemy to fire torpedoes and, more recently, cruise missiles. (The strategic or fleet ballistic missile submarine, developed since the late 1950s, is a different type of ship, with a very different mission than attack or cruise missile submarines.)
In the past, when submarine proponents suggested that undersea craft could replace surface warships the argument was that surface ships were vulnerable; that only submarines could survive such threats as submarines, aircraft, and guided missiles. However, the submarine could not replace the surface ship because the undersea craft could not perform a number of important missions as well as surface ships, if at all. For example, the submarine could not effectively launch aircraft, or fire antiaircraft missiles, or launch conventional attacks against land targets.1
Today’s Submarines
The U. S. Navy began concentrating on a single submarine mission by the late 1950s—antisubmarine warfare. This course led to the successive Thresher!Permit (SSN-593/594), Sturgeon (SSN-637), and Los Angeles (SSN-688) classes. These submarines are all characterized by their very quiet operation and emphasis on acoustic (sonar) detection. All other features have been subsumed by this emphasis. Indeed, there was a significant loss of speed from the previous Skipjack (SSN- 585) to the Permit and to the Sturgeon classes.
Compared with the Permit, the subsequent Sturgeon has improved buoyancy, safety features, and under-ice and intelligence collection capabilities. The cost was a larger submarine. The increase in size-— while retaining the same S5W reactor plant of about 15,000 shaft horsepower—resulted in the slower speed. The eventual concern for this loss of speed led Admiral H. G. Rickover, head of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, to propose about 1970 a reactor plant of some 30,000 horsepower for the next submarine class. These efforts were in part a reaction to the appearance in the late 1960s of new Soviet submarine classes with surprisingly high speeds, especially the “Victor” torpedo- attack submarine and the “Yankee” ballistic missile submarine. And,
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Norman Polmar is an author, columnist, and defense consultant, specializing in U. S. and Soviet naval, aviation, and strategic matters. He has written frequently for the Naval Review and Proceedings and is the author or coauthor of numerous books, including the most recent editions of The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet and a biography titled Rickover: Controversy and Genius. From 1967 to 1977, Mr. Polmar was editor of the U. S. sections of Jane's Fighting Ships. His articles have appeared in newspapers and magazines throughout the United States; among them was an article on U. S. nuclear submarines in the 1 January 1984 issue of The New York Times Magazine. He is a graduate of the American University in Washington, D.C., former assistant editor of the Proceedings, and is currently a member of the Secretary of the Navy’s Research Advisory Committee (NRAC).
The Narwhal has a natural-circulation reactor, that uses the convection characteristics of hot water to alleviate the need for noisy pumps at low speeds, while the Lipscomb has turbo-electric drive in place of conventional gears for her turbines. Both submarines are much larger than the contemporary Sturgeon, and the Lipscomb is several knots slower. While these are quieter submarines, they were larger and cost more than the Sturgeon and neither one entered series production, although Rickover had proposed the Lipscomb type for series production concurrent with the Los Angeles.
Thus, the emphasis in U. S. attack submarines has been very quiet operation with high-performance sonars. This vital combination of quieting and sonar improvements has been aptly called the “goodness factor” by Melvyn Paisley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, engineering, and systems. According to Mr. Paisley, “We have a lead on the Soviets and if you take what submarines are all about, it’s sensors and the noise level of the submarine. One could say it’s the goodness product of those two things, and our goodness product is better than theirs.”3
in 1970 the Soviets put into service the “Papa,” a prototype cruise missile submarine with a propulsion plant that could produce as much as 60,000 horsepower, providing a speed of 35 knots or more, performance that one U. S. official has called “remarkable.” Another prototype nuclear submarine, the “Alfa,” had been at sea for several years and, despite experiencing major engineering problems, was believed by some analysts to be an extremely high-speed craft.
The new S6G reactor plant of approximately 30,000 horsepower was joined to essentially the same “front end” as the Permit and Sturgeon to produce the Los Angeles class, with the lead ship being commissioned late in 1976. Admiral Kinnaird McKee was described how, “To achieve higher speed, we simply added a more powerful propulsion plant to the basic weapons and sensors arrangement of the 637 class. When the importance of increasing speed became evident, what was intended as a one-of-a- kind experiment quickly expanded into an entire class of submarines—our present 688s.”2
Anyone walking through these submarine classes will observe the great similarity of their “front ends.” The Los Angeles does have the more-advanced BQQ-5 sonar and the Mark 117 fire control system, both of which are being backfitted into the Permit and Sturgeon classes. The S6G plant of the Los Angeles provides an increase of about five knots of speed over the Sturgeon class, but at a significant size and hence cost increase, while some features had to be deleted, such as the under-ice capabilities and minelaying.
Beyond this straight-line development of attack submarines, Admiral Rickover urged the development of two other submarine designs to evaluate quiet-machinery concepts, the Narwhal (SSN-671), completed in 1969, and the Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN-686), completed in 1974.
Roles and Missions
The hostile submarine threats to the West are considerable. They can be addressed in three general categories, in order of development: ^ Less-capable attack submarines that threaten Western Merchant shipping
* Modem torpedo and cruise-missile attack submarines that threaten Western warships
\ Strategic missile submarines that can launch nuclear- t'Pped missiles against the United States The initial U. S. strategy after World War II for dealing w'th these threats was to develop large numbers of antisubmarine carriers and escort ships—many hundreds of them.4 This requirement was subsequently mitigated by two factors, geography and technology.
After World War II, the primary Soviet submarine bases Were in the Baltic, and to exit into the Atlantic the submarines would have had to transit narrow, NATO-controlled Mraits. Subsequently, in the 1950s, the oceangoing Soviet submarines intended for Atlantic operations were shifted •° the Northern Fleet, where they would have to transit the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gaps to reach the open ocean.
The technological development was the sound surveillance system or SOSUS, an array of hydrophones anchored to the ocean floor that could detect submarines at relatively great distances. Beginning in the late 1940s, the SOSUS arrays provided centers ashore with acoustic data that succeeding generations of computers could analyze and, hopefully, use to locate hostile submarines. This meant that land-based patrol aircraft and submarines could be vectored to the vicinity of enemy submarines.
U. S. attack submarines would thus find and attack Soviet undersea craft by lying in wait in “barriers” across the GIUK gap, supported by SOSUS, or would be guided to possible contacts in other areas by SOSUS. While the attack submarine was an excellent ASW platform, its onboard detection capabilities are severely range-limited in terms of the total ocean area.
Since World War II, the United States has not been involved in conflicts requiring ASW operations. The only operational participation of a U. S. submarine in the Korean or Vietnam wars, other than intelligence collection, was the USS Perch (APSS-313) landing British commandos in raids during the Korean conflict.
Another area of potential wartime submarine operations
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V
Opposite page, the USS Aspro (SSN-648) represents a compromise of capabilities; speed, under-ice capability, and minelaying were sacrificed to provide the “goodness factor” for ASW. Above is the Flasher (SSN-613) of the Permit class; note the relatively short height of the sail structure and the raised periscopes and masts. At left is the USS Atlanta (SSN-712), a submarine of the ever-growing Los Angeles class.
I
is minelaying. As ably documented in the pages of the Proceedings, the U. S. Navy’s interest in mine warfare has been limited at best. Submariners have tried to avoid carrying mines, for they displace torpedoes from their limited weapon capacity or loadout, and firing torpedoes can produce instant, observable results in comparison to mines, “the weapons that wait.”
Of course, on a day-to-day basis, attack submarines carry out a vital mission—intelligence collection. Visual, photographic, and, perhaps most important, acoustic (ACINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) can be garnered by submarines at sea and off enemy coasts. Despite the extensive use of reconnaissance aircraft by the United States beginning after World War II, the submarine has been vital in this role, because it could more easily enter areas where the Soviets or some other nation had good air/surface surveillance. Even in the era of satellite surveillance, the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) is still needed in this role.
A new role for SSNs came to light in the late 1970s as the high-speed, 30+ knot Los Angeles submarines entered the fleet—the direct support of carrier battle groups.5 In this role the attack submarine serves as a deep sonar platform, able to take advantage of deep acoustic ducts while operating in proximity to a battle group. The major problem for the SSN in this role is communicating with the battle group’s surface ships and aircraft. While an SSN can receive transmissions while submerged through trailing a wire antenna or communication buoy, the submarine must raise an antenna above the water to transmit.
To minimize communication requirements, large area separation is used as well as positive control—through satellite relay—in submarine direct support of carrier battle groups. The fear that radio/sonar transmissions will compromise the submarine’s location has prevented the development of effective communications in this role. Direct communication with submarines has been tried in exercises and in the opinion of some exercise participants— including submariners—its value has far outweighed the possible compromise of their position. In the future, sub- marine-to-satellite lasers and other advanced communication concepts, if pursued, could probably make the SSN a full member of the battle group with minimal increase in vulnerability.
other ships, and SSNs operating in direct support of various surface forces may be much more effective than waiting for Soviet submarines to return to port through AS^ barriers.
Similarly, the submarine ASW barrier against Soviet strategic missile submarines may have reduced effectiveness because of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ranges that alleviate the need for the “Delta’ and “Typhoon” submarines to transit through barriers into the Atlantic and Pacific. With ranges of 4,000 +
This direct support role is, of course, another variation of the basic ASW role of attack submarines. This role appears to be a more realistic one than ASW barriers if the combat scenario assumes that Soviet attack submarines will already be at sea when a war begins, and hence less vulnerable to ASW barriers, or that early in a conflict the Soviets can destroy or degrade SOSUS. Rather, the Soviet attack submarines would seek out U. S. carrier groups and
nautical miles, these submarines can remain in Soviet coastal waters, or hide under the Arctic ice pack, while st'H being able to target essentially all American cities and military bases. The reasons for the Soviets to deploy mis- s*'e submarines into the ocean areas would be to reduce SLBM flight time to time-urgent targets, such as U. S. command centers, bomber bases, and ICBM silos, or as a Political ploy. Indeed, the deployment of ”Delta”-class SSBNs into mid-ocean areas in early 1984 was apparently a Political counter to the U. S. deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles to Western Europe.
Antisubmarine warfare would be vital in a conflict a§ainst the Soviets and, increasingly against Third World antagonists. The U. S. Navy must be ready to counter submarine attacks from such antagonists as Cuba, Libya, a°d North Korea, and, in the future, from Syria and other Uations.
ztyond Antisubmarine Warfare . beyond ASW in its various forms, a new series of roles ls being made possible for submarines through the development of cruise missiles. When the Harpoon and then *°mahawk cruise missile programs were being initiated in 'he early 1970s, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, directed that they be compatible with standard, 21-inch-diameter submarine torpedo tubes.
The Harpoon, with a range of 60 miles, and the Toma- awk, with a range of several hundred miles in the antiship configuration, provides U. S. submarines with a °tally new capability for attacking hostile surface ships. ^nd the land-attack version of the Tomahawk can deliver a 1 >000-pound conventional warhead against shore targets j'h'h a high degree of accuracy. Issues still to be resolved, owever, are those of Tomahawk survivability, improved j^'ssile munitions such as runway busters, and the kinds of ar§ets that would be vulnerable to a conventional 1,000- P°Und warhead. Obviously, off-board sensors, e.g., communications intercepts, aircraft, and satellites, are needed 0 exploit these missile ranges and the Navy’s Project Out- avv Shark is being deployed to provide this over-the-hori- A>n (OTH) targeting. However, effective employment of ese cruise missiles may require two-way communications with submarines, because force commanders must know if submarines are receiving OTH targeting data, if they are in position to strike, etc.
The important factor is that these cruise missiles can provide submarines with unprecedented antiship and conventional land-attack capabilities. As Rear Admiral Bruce DeMars, head of the new attack submarine program, has said, “SSNs should be used in offensive missions to put the pressure on the Soviets—not defensive missions. SSNs are uniquely capable by virtue of covertness, mobility, firepower, and endurance to operate in the Soviet’s backyard. Our SSNs are the THREAT!”6
Torpedoes and SUBROC
The Navy has one primary submarine-launched torpedo in service, the Mark 48. This 3,500-pound torpedo is considered the best in the world today, superior to all allied and Soviet ASW torpedoes. (In addition, the diesel submarine Darter (SS-576) carries the older Mark 37 torpedo.
To some extent U. S. torpedoes have lagged behind the potential threat since the appearance of the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarines in the late 1950s. The Mark 48 is now being upgraded to the ADCAP (advanced capability) configuration to better cope with the increased performance of the newer Soviet submarines as well as to remedy some problems with torpedo reliability in certain difficult situations. Torpedo problems identified publicly relate to program issues, submarine characteristics, and the potential threat. With respect to program issues, the Navy has established a goal of 4,000 submarine torpedoes based on a force of 90 to 100 SSNs plus the SSBNs. The Department of Defense has reduced the number being procured— by at least 25%—on the basis of the potential effectiveness of other ASW weapons.
Modem SSN characteristics also limit the use of the submarine-launched Mark 48. U. S. submarines carry about two dozen internal weapons. In addition to Mark 48 torpedoes, submarines can carry the SUBROC antisubmarine rocket (see below), Harpoon and Tomahawk antiship missiles (T-ASM), and nuclear and conventional Tomahawk land-attack missiles (T-LAM). Thus, weapon loadout flexibility is severely limited if submarines are to take advantage of available tube-launched weapons. The
use of mines is a further complication.
The loadout problem is partially remedied in later submarines of the Los Angeles class that are being fitted with 12 vertical-launch Tomahawk tubes external to the pressure hull—a significant increase in submarine firepower at small cost. These vertical tubes will be built into the SSN- 719 and later units.
The effectiveness of the Mark 48 is also inhibited by Soviet submarine characteristics and tactics. The Mark 48, whose basic development began two decades ago, may be hard pressed to counter high-speed, deep-diving Soviet submarines. In addition, the Soviets have long used ane- choic coatings on submarine hulls to absorb acoustic energy, reducing the effectiveness of torpedo guidance. Continuing Soviet improvement in submarine quieting will also reduce expected U. S. detection and torpedo firing ranges.
Soviet submarine tactics appear to emphasize the use of acoustic decoys and jammers, both of which can affect U. S. torpedo effectiveness. And Soviet submarines operating under polar ice could take advantage of downward projecting “ice keels,” hiding among them with positive buoyancy holding them up against the ice, making the submarines difficult to detect with sonar.
The Mark 48/ADCAP will join the fleet in the mid- 1980s. The ADCAP is intended to provide greater target acquisition range, reduce the effects of countermeasures, minimize shipboard constraints such as warmup and reactivation time, and provide enhanced effectiveness against enemy surface ships. (While the Mark 48 was originally intended as a dual-purpose weapon, its antisubmarine features have been emphasized at the cost of antiship capability.) These improvements will be accomplished through changes in the torpedo’s transducer and control system, increased fuel capacity, and faster fuel delivery rate.
In addition to Mark 48 torpedoes, about 30 submarines of the Permit and later classes also carry the SubRoc, a rocket-propelled nuclear depth charge with a range of about 25 miles. The SubRoc cannot be used in submarines fitted with the digital Mark 117 fire control system, which is being provided to all new construction SSNs and back- fitted during overhauls to earlier ships.
A follow-on ASW stand-off weapon (SOW) is in development. This weapon is intended to be compatible with all modern SSNs and will have sufficient range to take advantage of the long-range detections possible with towed sonar arrays. The SOW will deliver a nuclear depth bomb and, possibly, the Mark 50 advanced lightweight torpedo (ALWT), now in development.
(The Navy’s only other submarine nuclear weapon, the Mk 45 antisubmarine torpedo or ASTOR, was phased out of service in 1977 because of the range and effectiveness of the Mark 48. This was probably the first time in history that a conventional weapon replaced a nuclear one.)
The Next Generation SSN
Initial design considerations for the next generation SSN, the successor to the Los Angeles class, formally began in the summer of 1982. The origins of the new SSN are somewhat clouded. On 30 July 1981, the head of the Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Admiral E. B- Fowler, told Congress that the Navy was not designing a new SSN. Rather, he said, “We reviewed this back in early 1981, all the design efforts that we had going on in Electric Boat [shipyard], and decided to stop the design efforts on all the new classes of submarines and to proceed on a course of upgrading the 688 class as the [future] attack submarine.
“No conspicuously cost effective candidate to follow the SSN-688 class emerged from the studies of alternative attack submarines. The CNO [Admiral Thomas B. Hayward] directed that efforts toward the design of the fleet attack submarine, a smaller, less capable submarine, and the SSNX, a larger, more capable submarine, should be discontinued. The CNO also directed that highest program priority be placed on improving the capability of the SSN-688 class and existing ASW weapons.”
Admiral James D. Watkins became CNO in June 1982 and the new SSN program was initiated. The new attack submarine is needed because, according to Mr. Paisley and the uniformed leadership, in less than a decade the Soviets will have submarines with capabilities exceeding
Table 1 Attack Submarine Construction Program Under the Reagan Administration
| FY | FY | FY | FY | FY | FY | FY | FY |
Date of Plan | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 |
January 1981* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
|
|
|
January 1982 |
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
|
|
January 1983 |
|
| 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
|
January 1984 Actual SSN |
|
|
| 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
authorizations | (2) | (2) | (3) |
|
|
|
|
|
*Carter Administration program included for comparison.
those of the Los Angeles class with respect to quieting and sonar—Mr. Paisley’s critical goodness factor.7
Admiral Watkins has addressed the intensive Soviet submarine effort in these terms: “When my first contend, USS Snook, was launched [1960], we were infinitely ahead of the Soviets in nuclear submarine technol- °§y- Later, about ten years ago, we were about ten years ahead of them. Today we are only about five-to-eight years ahead of them and they are still in relentless pursuit.”8
Emphasis in the SSN will be on: (1) improved machinery, (2) quieting, and (3) improved combat systems, both sensors and additional weapons. The improved machinery W|'l provide a slightly faster speed than the Los Angeles class, although still far short of the 43 knots credited to the Soviet “Alfa” class and still higher speeds being proJected for the successor to the “Alfa.” It is not known if lhe new SSN’s propulsion plant will be significantly changed from the S6G of the Los Angeles. However, Propulsors or pump jets are being considered in place of a advanced combat system (SUBACS), that will tie together improved sonars, fire control, and weapon “systems,” as well as increased weapons capacity. The sonar improvements will be largely the result of advancing computer technology as the Navy seeks to distinguish submarine sounds in oceans that are increasingly opaque from a viewpoint of ambient noises, and locate Soviet submarines that are increasingly quieter. Also planned is an advanced conformal sonar acoustic system (ACSAS) that will take advantage of a new submarine hull design for improved sonar antenna placement. Some aspects of SUBACS—but not the conformal sonar—can be backfitted to the SSN- 688 class.
Finally, the Navy plans to increase the internal weapons stowage and torpedo tubes in the next generation SSN. Perhaps double the two dozen or so weapons now carried internally will be accommodated in the new submarine and there will be eight torpedo tubes in the bow. This means that the new submarine will not have the vertical launch tubes being fitted to the later Los Angeles-class
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^nventional propeller for more efficiency and speed. This °uld be similar to the arrangement of the British Trafal- ^Qf'Class SSNs and the Mark 48 propulsor concept. More au>eting will be an important factor, but expensive in size cost to achieve because of the flattening curve of subsound reduction.
y!e improved combat systems will mark “the first ajor effort to improve the ‘front end’ of attack subma- j.nes in more than two decades,” according to a retired °Ur~star submariner.9 These will consist of the submarine
An instructor at the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut, discusses nuclear submarine propulsion plants. Nuclear submariners—officers and enlisted—are among the most highly trained and qualified in the Navy, but training takes time and costs.
submarines. Having the weapons inside the submarine with more torpedo tubes will provide more attack flexibility.
But all of these features—except the sensor improvements—can be accomplished only through increasing the internal volume and hence size of the new submarine. Official size estimates for the new submarine are 10,000 tons submerged displacement (compared to 6,900 tons for the Los Angeles)', unofficial—and critical estimates—feel the submarine will be closer to 12,000 tons. And, of course, increases in size mean increases in cost. Estimates for the cost of the lead ship in the fiscal 1989 budget is officially estimated at $1.6 billion with follow-on ships to cost $1 billion each, i.e., some $4 billion per year. Outfitting and post-delivery costs would increase this amount. By comparison, the three fiscal 1984 submarines of the Los Angeles class are expected to cost about $693 million each and the four fiscal 1985 submarines cost $741 million each.10
All of these costs are in addition to certain reactor costs paid by the Department of Energy.
Selling an Advanced Submarine
Admiral Watkins has identified funding for the research and development of the advanced attack submarine as a top priority item in the fiscal year 1985 defense budget.
The first of these advanced submarines is planned for the fiscal 1989 shipbuilding program with completion about 1995. The selling process began when Admiral Watkins appointed Rear Admiral DeMars, the Assistant Deputy CNO for Submarine Warfare, as Navy-wide coordinator for the new submarine program, introducing him to the key congressional “players” at a Pentagon breakfast last November.
Admiral Watkins himself will be a key figure in the selling of the new SSN. But it could be a difficult sale because of the retirement of Admiral Rickover. His successor, Admiral Kinnaird McKee, does not enjoy the influence on Capitol Hill that provided support to nuclear ship programs under Rickover’s tenure. And nuclear submarine programs could be hurt by the decision of Senator John Tower not to continue in Congress and the death last November of Senator Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson. Many of the younger, increasingly influential members of Congress have not had the Cold War “education” that influenced so many of their predecessors.
While the Reagan Administration, and especially Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, support a Navy buildup, dollars will become more critical in the 1984 election year and more difficult to obtain should the Democrats gain the number of congressional seats generally predicted. The Navy’s leadership will need a hard sell to gain congressional approval for the new SSN program.
Submarine Alternatives
The new attack submarine will be a multi-role “attack” submarine—in some respects the first SSN not optimized for ASW in some 30 years. As noted above, since the late 1950s the Navy has developed submarines primarily for the ASW role but that seek to perform all attack submarine roles. This emphasis led to the Permit, Sturgeon, and Los Angeles classes all having features that improve or restrict their performance in various roles: the Permits are poor at intelligence collection because of their sail/mast height, the Sturgeons are the only modem submarines fitted to operate under Arctic ice, and the Los Angeles class has the best speed for supporting carrier battle groups, while the lone Lipscomb is a slow SSN.
Thus, the Navy does in fact have specialized attack submarines. Several persons have proposed a broader submarine program that (1) recognizes this fact and (2) takes advantage of cruise missiles and related technologies. For example, George Sawyer, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for shipbuilding in 1981-1983, told an audience that “specialized attack submarines should be considered . . ■ especially guided missile submarines.”11 Sawyer, who had been a nuclear-trained submariner, is one of many who have voiced this view.
To some extent the Navy is already following this course. Beginning with the Los Angeles-class submarines being completed this year, 12 vertical-launch Tomahawk missile tubes will be fitted in the ballast tank area between the pressure hull and the bow sonar sphere. In effect, these will be guided missile submarines (SSGNs). While able to perform all other Los Angeles roles, they will have addi' tional capabilities for antiship (T-ASM) and land attack (T-LAM) strikes. Are there cruise missile roles for specialized SSGNs that could be built for less than the current Los Angeles cost, a cost that is expected to continue to increase despite production improvements?
Perhaps a future SSGN could be designed with more Tomahawk launch tubes as well as improved OTH target- ing/communications capabilities. Such a submarine would naturally be larger than a Los Angeles unless some other capability were reduced or deleted. On a practical basis an SSGN would probably not provide direct support to a carrier battle group, although a Tomahawk SSGN could attack hostile airfields in advance of a carrier entering the area. Could such an SSGN have a smaller reactor plant, perhaps a modified S5W plant, and give up a few knots of speed, permitting a smaller submarine? Again, a smalls (i.e., S5W) plant could mean a much smaller submarine-
Or, could a zero-base redesign of submarine electronics permit the next-generation SSN optimized for the antisubmarine role to be significantly smaller than the Los Ang?' lesl Again, what is the real operational cost of losing pef' haps five knots with the use of an upgraded S5W reactor vice the S6G of the Los Angelesl (Attack submarines spend very little time at their higher speeds.)
And some space and weight savings could probably be achieved through some degree of automation. To aga'11 quote Secretary Sawyer, the Navy “needs to go long ways in the area of automation.” That potential for automatic11 can be seen in the early USS Tullibee (SSN-597), which has 20 to 30 men fewer than a contemporary Permit-class submarine, while the Soviet “Alfa”-class SSN may have a crew of only 50 men or fewer. While there are special circumstances and limitations in both the Tullibee and “Alfa” manning factors, the opportunities for reduced banning demand serious attention in this area. Navies have made significant strides in reducing crews for surface ships through automation; submarines, with fewer weap- °ns and sensors, should be able to profit even more from modem automation techniques.
The Navy, shipbuilding industry, and aerospace industry have conducted studies of crew reduction since the late 1950s, with some hardware development. But there has been little implementation. One of the Navy’s most forward-looking officers of that period, Captain Richard B. Laning, who was the first commanding officer of the Seawolf (SSN-575), predicted that major crew reductions Were possible. Using aeronautical techniques of designing a complete weapon system while moving forward simulta- aeously on several technology fronts could, he predicted, reduce an SSN crew to as few as 12 men!12
The Los Angeles-class submarines have a crew of 13 officers and 120 enlisted men, about the same number as Ihc two previous SSN classes. But the Los Angeles, desPite larger volume, is so tight that berths are provided for 0nly 95 enlisted men. (Some of the crew are normally in lining ashore.)
Another factor that could radically affect submarine design is the potential for reactor plants with a higher power density. During the past two decades, U. S. nuclear plant development has been constrained for several reasons.13 The result has been a quest for more horsepower with pressurized-water reactors coupled with the continued emphasis on silencing along a narrow path of development. The Seawolf had demonstrated the feasibility of a liquid-metal (sodium) reactor plant with its potential for greater horsepower for reactor volume. However, the state-of-the-art in metallurgy was unable to support the plant and the program was stopped.
The Soviets pursued the liquid-metal plant, probably initiating the “Alfa” program in the late 1950s in response to the Seawolf effort and press reports that the coming Skipjack would be a 45-knot submarine. (The Skipjack
Shown in Hong Kong is the USS Los Angeles (SSN-668), lead ship of the world’s largest class of nuclear submarines. The Los Angeles and her sisters regained the underwater speed lost in the previous Sturgeon and Permit classes but at a cost in size and dollars.
Table 2 Current Submarine Design Emphasis
United States Soviet Union
• On-Board Sensors • Radiated Noise Reduction • Torpedoes (Mk 48/ADCAP) • Firepower (recent emphasis) • Reliability • Personnel —Training —Experience • Habitability | • Off-Board Sensors • Radiated Noise Reduction (recent emphasis) • Weapons Payload (torpedo + cruise missile payload • Minelaying • Decoys, Countermeasures • Speed • Depth • Double Hull, Compartmentation • Number of Submarines • Building Capacity 5 yards + 10 classes in production) • Diesel Submarines | |
Table 3 Active Submarine Strengths (early 1984) | ||
| United | Soviet |
| States | Union |
Nuclear-propelled Submarines |
|
|
Modern Ballistic Missile | (35) | (62) |
SSBN-726 Ohio | 4 |
|
SSBN-616 Lafayette | 31 |
|
Older Ballistic Missile |
| (3) |
Guided/cruise Missile | * | (50 + ) |
Torpedo-attack | (87) | (70 + )** |
SSN-688 Los Angeles | 26 |
|
SSN-685 Glenard P. Lipscomb 1 |
| |
SSN-671 Narwhal | 1 |
|
SSN-637 Sturgeon | 37 |
|
SSN-594 Permit | 13 |
|
SSN-597 Tullibee | 1 |
|
SSN-585 Skipjack | 5 |
|
SSN-578 Skate | 3 |
|
Special-purpose/Experimental | (3) | (2) |
SSN-608 Ethan Allen | 2 |
|
SSN-575 Seawolf | 1 |
|
Diesel-electric Submarines |
|
|
Older Ballistic Missile |
| (15) |
Guided/cruise Missile |
| (18) |
Torpedo-attack | (4) | (145 + ) |
SS-580 Barbel | 3 |
|
SS-576 Darter | 1 |
|
Special-purpose/Experimental | (1) | (10) |
AGSS-555 Dolphin | 1 |
|
Total Nuclear | 125 | 187 + |
Total Diesel | 5 | 188 + |
Total Submarines | 130 | 375 + |
*U. S. torpedo-attack submarines are being fitted to fire the Harpoon and Tom- | ||
ahawk cruise missiles. |
|
|
‘•Includes 10 former Yankec-class SSBNs. some of which are being modified | ||
to SSN/SSGN configurations. |
|
|
is not that fast.) The higher power density of Soviet reactor plants permits them to drive a submarine of any given size at a higher speed than can the U. S. Navy, albeit with a plant that may be noisier, less shock resistant, and less conservative in nuclear shielding than U. S. plants. But while maintaining the power density advantage, the Soviets are also making progress in the quieting and shock areas, as indicated by Paisley and Watkins.
Another factor that could have a major influence on U. S. submarine design is the linkage of the impact of a major change in one or more design features. The most obvious change will be in the reduction in space requirements for computers. A reduction in personnel can have more of an impact because of the living space required pet man plus his food and other support. Smaller crews would also mean savings in training, recruiting, and other personnel activities. And reductions in reactor size could permit smaller-diameter hulls with significant impact on total submarine volume and hence performance.
There are other aspects of submarine design that could be considered. Some, such as operating depth, cannot be meaningfully addressed in this open forum. However, since the Thresher was begun in 1959, the U. S. Navy has used HY-80 steel in submarines.14 The Soviets appear to have gone to stronger steels, even before the titanium-hull “Alfa,” which can operate to at least 2,000 feet. The Los Angeles was to have had HY-130 steel, but for several reasons she too was built with HY-80 steel.
Since 1976, Admiral Rickover had sought to build a deep-diving submersible, a successor to the NR-1, a nuclear-powered research submersible that he had constructed. Neither the Navy nor Congress would support the so-called NR-2 at that time. Subsequently, about five years ago the Navy’s leadership decided to proceed with the craft as a hull test vehicle (HTV) to test the suitability of HY-130 steel for submarines, with construction to start in the early 1980s. Now the Navy has decided that instead of the nuclear-powered HTV, to add HY-130 sections to the conventional deep-diving research submarine Dolphin (AGSS-555). In addition, the Navy has fabricated three portions of submarine hulls with HY-130 steel. It is hoped that these efforts will lead to certification of HY-130 for eventual use in the next-generation SSN with the early submarines of the class being built with HY-80.
While increased depth is secondary to most submarine missions, it does increase the safety margin during high' speed maneuvers.
198J
Finally, there is the issue of submarine construction processes. One former commanding officer of the USS Sturgeon, whose last assignment before retiring was com' mand of the Naval Underwater Systems Center in Ne'V London, has called for quality production of nuclear submarines on an assembly line basis as a means of producing cheaper and better submarines. According to Captain Wil' liam L. Bohannan, much submarine construction could be done by computer (robotics), including electronic seamless welding. Shipbuilding in the United States, in his opinion, remains much too labor intensive in comparison with construction technologies used in some other nations- Bohannan also predicted that crew savings could be ac-
c°mplished—he predicted that an innovative approach c°uld save 30 men in an SSN, a reduction of almost 25%.
. Alternative approaches must be investigated if we are to l,Tlprove submarine performance and firepower without c°ntinuing to make our SSNs larger and most costly. The above discussion is intended to illustrate that (1) there may valuable advantages to developing multiple types of attack” submarines and (2) the options in submarine development are much wider than the “straight-line” de- Mopment the U. S. Navy has followed for the past three decades. Captain Laning summed it up when he wrote that ^be current U. S. approach to submarine development, displays some of the worst effects of monopoly. The S. is ahead of Russia in the development of aircraft Where Air Force and Navy compete; we are behind in j^bmarines and tanks where there is no internal U. S. b>°vernment competition. ”15 While there is no question that U. S. combat aircraft, a>rcraft carriers, and surface combatants are superior to ^e*r Soviet counterparts, there are at least questions about *be relative quality of U. S. submarines vis-a-vis Soviet Undersea craft in many areas. There is no question of the 'to-l quantitative advantage of Soviet submarines.
77i •
Diesel Submarine Issue
Much has been written in the Proceedings and else- Vv^lere on the diesel submarine issue. The official Navy P°sition is one of total opposition to any and all discussion ?[ SuPport for nonnuclear undersea craft—at least until the avy has 115 or more SSNs.16 One senior flag officer has °Penly ca]|ed a representative of a shipyard a “snake oil Sa'esman” for proposing diesel boats, while a senior Navy ^lv'lian official has declared that asking U. S. sailors to ;erve in diesel submarines in wartime would be condemn- lri§ them to death. (This was said while the Navy had five
diesel combat submarines in service.)
At this writing the Navy has four diesel attack submarines in service, the three Barbel (SS-580)-class submarines, all completed in 1959, and the Darter, of an earlier design. These boats and the more modern diesel submarines operated by our allies have more than demonstrated their effectiveness in exercises. U. S. ASW forces continue to have difficulty in locating diesel submarines.
Further, in the 1982 Falklands conflict the Argentine Navy was able to operate a nine-year-old, German-built submarine in the vicinity of the British task force for some 34 days. The Royal Navy, generally considered second only to the U. S. Navy in ASW capability, was unable to sink the craft despite several attacks. The Argentine submarine did fire at least three torpedoes at the British force, but faulty fire control sent each “fish” astray. The intensity of the British ASW effort could be seen when a Mark 46 torpedo was launched so close to the carrier Hermes that, reportedly, it homed on the carrier’s towed Nixie torpedo decoy, blowing it off.17
The Falklands also demonstrated the outstanding political as well as military effectiveness of SSNs; but the British need to employ a diesel submarine for special operations as well as the threat posed by the Argentine boats demonstrated the potential of those craft.
Many vocal proponents of diesel submarines have been heard—members of Congress, defense analysts, and retired naval officers. There is also a small number of active officers who will put forth arguments in favor of diesel submarines, almost always in private. There appears to be a definite value in the U. S. Navy having some diesel submarines for ASW training, especially in view of the continued development of advanced diesel submarines by the Soviets, and the increasing number of Third World navies with such craft.
If a diesel submarine can undertake a mission to free a nuclear submarine for those missions that only an SSN can do, then lesser cost diesel boats appear warranted. That cost is an issue of contention. A year ago the German firm of HDW offered to build a modem diesel submarine with U. S. combat systems for approximately $200 million, sell it to the U. S. Navy, and then buy it back after one year for three-quarters of the price if the Navy was not satisfied with the boat. That cost has been called a “buy in,” but other submarine authorities have made estimates only slightly higher, i.e., about one-third the cost of a modem SSN. The lead HDW submarine was to be built in Germany or the United States, with subsequent boats produced in a U. S. shipyard.
The crew of a diesel submarine is about one-third that of a nuclear undersea craft, and the training time is much less than that for a nuclear crew. In response to a congressional mandate, the Navy did undertake a study of diesel submarine design in 1982 and concluded that the cost of the lead diesel submarine would be $612 million with follow-on craft costing $310 million. The Navy has not announced probable life-cycle costs of diesel submarines compared to SSNs.
The Navy’s main counter to proponents of diesel submarines is that a large number of such craft are available from America’s allies. This argument is weak in view of political realities of the types of conflicts the United States has been involved in since World War II and the prognosis for the future. At the same time, few allied diesel submarines have the sonars and weapons necessary to be effective against modern submarines. (This also appears to be the only ship category in which foreign warships are cited for meeting U. S. naval missions.) The real issue, which is rarely articulated, is the fear that should Congress vote funds for a diesel submarine it would do so at the cost of an SSN. But an examination of the responsible proponents of diesel boats does not reveal anyone who suggests that diesel craft should replace nuclear ones—only supplement them.
The diesel submarine controversy will not go away. Indeed, in some respects it has intensified. For example, Representative G. William Whitehurst (Democrat-Vir- ginia), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, went before that body last year in an almost unprecedented move to testify in favor of diesel submarines, and at least two foreign navies are actively seeking to build their submarines in American shipyards—a move being eagerly sought by the depressed U. S. shipbuilding industry.
Strategic Missile Submarines
In marked contrast to the debate over diesel and nuclear attack submarine issues, there is little debate over the need for strategic missile submarines—the “boomers.” The Navy has 31 strategic missile submarines of the Lafayette (SSBN-616) class, completed in 1963-1967, and four of the new Ohio (SSBN-726) class, completed since late 1981. These submarines are the sea-based “leg” of U. S- strategic forces; they are the most survivable part of that
triad and offer certain other advantages over land- based missiles and land-based bombers.
The 31 older submarines each carry 16 missiles, the Poseidon C-3 in 19 of the submarines and the Trident C-4 in 12 submarines. The much larger Ohio-class submarines have half again as many missiles, 24 of the Trident C-4 weapons. Beginning with the ninth Trident submarine completed in 1989, the D-5 missile will be fitted, Providing increased range and accuracy.
Providing the longer-range missile will dramatically increase the ocean areas in which these ships can steam while remaining within striking range of key targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Navy planners believe that this missile range, in excess of 6,000 nautical miles carrying multiple warheads, coupled with the very quiet noise levels of the Ohio class when operating at slow patrol speeds, will permit a smaller number of these ships to replace the entire Polaris-Poseidon force. (From 1967 to 1981 the Navy had 41 Polaris-Poseidon submarines in service carrying 656 missiles.) An eventual force of 20 new Trident submarines is planned to be in service by about the year 2000 with ten in each ocean area. These submarines will carry a total of 480 Trident D-5 missiles.
Strategic missile submarines have generally enjoyed support from Congress and various military critics, especially in comparison to such programs as the land-based MX strategic missile and the B-l strategic bomber. Indeed, the development of the Trident submarine was abetted by the unusual collaboration of Admiral Rickover, who supported the design as a platform for the large, S8G reactor plant, and Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, who saw the need for modernization of U. S- strategic strike capabilities.18
The Trident submarines are quiet, capable, and impressive ships. At this time concern is being raised about the small number of Trident submarines that would be avail' able from the late 1990s, when the last of the Lafayette class is retired, and the impact of a small number of submarines carrying a large number of missiles and reentry vehicles on future strategic arms limitation agreements-
No proposals have been reported to complement or succeed the Trident submarines with other sea-based strategy weapons. President Reagan’s commission seeking a pla11 for deploying the MX missiles (the Scowcroft panel) recommended that ... research begin now on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential follow-on to the Trident submarine force. The objective of such research should be to design a submarine and missile system that would, as much as possible, reduce the value of each pl^' form and also present radically different problems to a Soviet attacker than does the Trident submarine force.”[1]
Here too there is a concern within the Navy that at* additional or follow-on SSBN concept would be used by
Congress and critics as a cheaper alternative to the Trident submarines. An Ohio-class submarine costs $1.8 billion in the fiscal 1985 budget, a cost too high to permit the construction of more than one per year. The cost (albeit down from $2.5 billion in fiscal 1984) and the possible advantages of a smaller SSBN or more submarines carrying a given number of warheads could lead to a successor to the trident submarines by the end of the century.
Manning the Submarines [2] *
The Navy requires some 670 nuclear submarine officers per year. During the past few years the Naval Academy quota (about 225) has been met as have the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate (NUPOC) program (265); the NROTC input has been “slightly less” than the quota (185).
Neither the total requirement nor the Naval Academy input had ever been achieved until, in the early 1980s, Naval Academy midshipmen were “drafted” into the nuclear program. Zech has stated, “The nuclear bonus program, sea pay and enhanced submarine pay have made a big difference.” An applicant being accepted into the nuclear program receives a bonus of $3,000 before reporting to initial training; after completing nuclear power training there is another $3,000 bonus; and after the obligated six years of service there is an annual continuation bonus of $6,000.
Another difference has been the changes in procedures for interviewing midshipmen and junior officers. Discussions with first classmen at the Naval Academy and junior officers in the fleet call attention to the changes since March 1982, when Admiral Kinnaird McKee became head of the nuclear propulsion program. McKee, who had served as Superintendent of the Naval Academy and as Third Fleet commander, brought a new, more realistic approach to nuclear personnel selection and handling.
Still, the picture is not all bright. The submarine force remains short about 900 officers, meaning that officers are spending 14 years at sea and 6 years ashore in a 20-year career. The enlisted men spend five years at sea for two years ashore. The recruiting and retention rates for nuclear submarine officers, while higher than ever before, are still comparatively low among the various Navy specialties. But in the important category of first class and chief petty officers the retention rate is approximately 90%.
Money, nuclear officer scholarships, concern at the highest levels of the Navy, more time ashore as the nuclear population increases, a depressed civilian nuclear industry, and other factors tend to indicate that the nuclear manning problems will continue to improve in the near term.
The high quality of the officers brought into the nuclear submarine program can be attested to, in part, by their gaining the senior leadership positions in today’s Navy. Since World War 11 the U. S. Navy has been directed largely by aviation admirals. Of the six Chiefs of Naval
Nuclear submarine officers are in many respects the “best and brightest” of the Navy. But spending most of their careers at sea in submarines may have limited their horizons.
Operations during the two decades 1962 through 1982, all but one were aviators. The exception was Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, a surface officer. The aviation community was the only “union” to have a separate deputy CNO until 1971, when the Deputy CNOs for submarine and surface warfare were established.
Periodically submariners had achieved senior positions in the Navy, as Fleet Admirals E.J. King and C.W. Nim- itz, but they owed their stars to non-submarine achievements and command experience. During the 1960s several submarine officers did attain senior positions, a few achieving full admiral. But they were few and far between. A decade ago there were no submariners among the top echelon of four-star admirals: of the ten active duty admirals in 1973, six were fliers and four were surface officers; none wore the submarine specialist’s dolphin insignia.20 But the submarine community has proved adept at making up for lost time.
In the 1970s, submarine officers began to rise to the Navy’s top positions—Robert L.J. Long became Vice CNO and then CinC Pacific; William J. Crowe became CinC Allied Forces Southern Europe and then CinC Pacific; Harold E. Shear also served as CinC Allied Forces Southern Europe; and Alfred J. Whittle and subsequently John G. Williams, Jr., became Chief of Naval Material. Then, in July 1982, Admiral James Watkins became Chief of Naval Operations, the first nuclear submariner to attain that position.21 Today, of the Navy’s eight full admirals, four are submarine officers—the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Material, the Commander-inChief of U. S. Forces in the Pacific, and the head of the nuclear propulsion program. The four others are aviators— the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the CinCs of the Atlantic Command, the Pacific Fleet, and U. S. Naval Forces Europe/Allied Forces Southern Europe. There are no officers from the surface warfare union among the Navy’s top leadership.
At the next level of vice admiral there are 30 three-star officers. Of these, 8 are aviators, 12 are surface, 9 are submariners, and 1 is an engineering specialist. Two of the surface admirals are former nuclear submariners and owe their stars to experience in that community, indicating that at the vice admiral level there is about an equal split among the three “unions.”
There are approximately 180 of the two- and one-star flag officers, rear admirals and commodores, respectively. These are apportioned at about the same ratio as the total line officers in the Navy: in rounded numbers, some 40% are aviators, 33% surface officers, 15% submariners, and 12% engineering officers.
Thus, the submarine community has attained a far larger share of the Navy’s three- and four-star positions than can be attributed to their portion of line officers, or number of ships, or dollar cost of their programs, or any other obvious criteria. This shifting from dominance of the Navy by aviators to nuclear submariners appears to have come about because of three factors. First, there has been an increase in the importance of submarines in the nuclear era, the attack submarines and, especially, the strategic missile submarines.
Second, there is great organizational unity among submariners. AH are graduates of the submarine school at New London, Connecticut, and the number of submarines is sufficiently small that most submarine officers know most of their peers. (Neither the aviation nor surface officers are all graduates of the same school.) Also, the submarine community was tightly controlled by Admiral Rickover for three decades as he personally selected, trained, and assigned virtually each nuclear officer.
Third, only the Navy’s best and brightest midshipmen and officers were offered up to Admiral Rickover for his interview and selection. This has resulted in the submarine community having a truly elite group of technical officers. In contrast, the aviators may have lost their position largely because of fragmentation and complacency- Within the naval air community there are fighter, attack, reconnaissance, antisubmarine, helicopter, and other subcommunities, plus the division of pilot and non-pilot flight officers. Complacency set in because the carrier became the capital ship of the fleet in 1942 and the question thereafter was always “how many?” never “what else?” When the nuclear submarines appeared, the number was small and their officers few in number and junior in rank- Thus, the carrier admirals did not consider the submariners a threat to their position of dominance.
Today, surface specialists still comprise most of the Navy’s line officers. The February 1984 flag selection board named 11 surface officers for stars, compared to 14- aviators and only seven submariners, plus 13 restricted line and staff corps officers for one-star rank. But indications are that, for at least the near future, the submarine selectees will rise more rapidly than their aviation and surface colleagues.
There are still relatively few submarine officers beneath flag rank outside of the submarine community. As noted above, most submarine officers are at sea. Accordingly’ few, for example, attended or taught at the Naval War College until last year when a series of mini-courses were established at Newport. It is also rare to find submariners °n major staffs or as program managers outside of subma- nne activities. This problem was addressed by Admiral Williams last May, just before stepping down as Chief of ^aval Material. He exhorted the submarine community to spread” the wealth—to put more good officers in other Navy organizations and commands.
In this vein, Captain A.J. Perry, a nuclear submariner in OpNav, wrote recently that, “Today’s submariner has lit- opportunity to broaden his naval education and experience prior to his fir t command tour. He has even less °Pportunity than his predecessors for pursuing further c°mmand at sea assignments afterwards. This combina- hon of developments and actions is made even more sig- n'ficant by the recent trend towards more and more coordinated naval, joint and combined operations. Also, submariners in the relatively few major command billets °Pen to them, are occupied more with training and readiness or material management than with the exercise of Operational or tactical command of naval forces. Under ue system which has evolved, few, if any submariners ''''ll command naval battle groups—the centerpiece of u- S. naval strategy for this decade.”22 For the foreseeable future submariners will be in the senior Navy positions although comparatively few ^'11 be found outside of the submarine community. This Ration probably will lead to changes in the Navy’s atti- udes and policies:
. Submarines—both attack and strategic missile subma- fines—will have a more important position in naval strat- planning, and economic considerations.
Nuclear training attitudes will prevail over the rest of e fleet; there will be increased emphasis on the use of
precise procedures, more attention to detail, tighter control over personnel career assignments, etc.
► There will be more efforts to recruit enlisted personnel and officers with a technical background.
► While it is highly unlikely that women will serve in submarines, there will be efforts to place more aboard tenders and in the submarine support and training area.23
► There will be less prejudice by the Navy leadership against the Air Force, as has been typical of the aviation community. Land-based aviation was always considered a threat to the justification for aircraft carriers. Submarine admirals can be expected to accept more readily joint Navy-Air Force operations as have occurred during the past couple of years.
While most of these will have a positive impact on the Navy, at least in the long term, there may be another impact of the submarine ascendancy that is questionable. Submariners may have difficulty being the spokesmen for a “balanced” Navy—they may not be able to articulate effectively the case for more aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and amphibious ships. Also, they may lack the broad perspective that has characterized naval officers throughout history, especially those admi-
It is rare for an individual to be present for the launching of a U. S. Navy ship named for himself. At left, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover watches as Mrs. Rickover christens SSN-709 and starts the submarine’s journey down the launching ways. With the microphone is chairman David Lewis of General Dynamics; behind him is Chief of Naval Operations James D. Watkins.
rals who have commanded ships and fleets on distant stations and have understood international politics and relationships. This can be gained to some extent at such schools as the Naval War College and Fletcher School of Diplomacy, but very few submariners have been sent to those schools, and even fewer have commanded surface ships or task forces in the Mediterranean or Western Pacific areas.
Similarly, submariners have not experienced the day-today problems of surface officers and even aviators in dealing with the Navy’s general supply (logistic) system and the myriad of people problems that pervade the rest of the Navy.
Finally, submariners have difficulty in dealing with the public and press, another manifestation of Admiral Rick- over’s obsession with total, centralized control of all communications from the nuclear (submarine) community. A small breakthrough in this attitude was forthcoming with establishment of the Naval Submarine League in 1982, with top-level Navy support, and quarterly publication of an excellent journal, The Submarine Review.22,
Submarines for the Next Three Decades
The U. S. submarines being constructed today should be in service in a “peacetime” environment for some 30 years. At this time the Navy is embarked on a “straight line” course in attack submarines; the long production run of the Los Angeles class (62 ships planned) will be followed by series production of a larger attack submarine class. Similarly, the Ohio class probably will be in production into the next century, building at the rate of one per year to the current force goal of 20 SSBNs.
The Navy has sufficient Los Angeles-class SSNs under construction to reach the 100-SSN goal if retirements of older submarines hold according to schedule. For example, in fiscal 1983 there were four SSN retirements and four SSNs were commissioned, a “wash” in numbers. In other ship categories, destroyers and landing ships, the Navy has been forced to retire ships earlier than planned to help pay for new ships and operations. This situation could affect the submarine program.
Under current plans the Navy will reach 100 SSNs in 1990 with 99 submarines of the Permit and later classes, plus one former SSBN used for research/special missions- After 1990 the rate of retirements will increase, leading to a Navy goal of building five SSNs per year. The plan for fiscal 1989 would fund the last four Los Angeles submarines plus the first new SSN, to be followed by four of. preferably, five SSNs per annum.
fiscal 1984 fiscal 1985
Construction cost $ 663.3 M $ 720.0 M
Escalation/cost growth $ 8.3 M —
Outfitting $ 7.3 M $ 10.5 M
Post delivery costs $ 14.0 M $ 10.9 M
$ 693.0 M $ 741.3 M
Per year from fiscal 1974 through fiscal 1983. The last year that five or more SSNs were authorized was fiscal '974. Table 1 shows the five-year SSN programs of the three Reagan Administration budgets. To again quote Mr. Sawyer while Assistant Secretary of the Navy, “We will have a problem in maintaining [a building rate of] four attack submarines per year.”24 There will probably be continued pressure for the Navy to develop smaller, less-costly attack submarines. During the past few years there has been increasing pressure on the Navy to follow this course of action. It has come from outside analysts, from Congress, and from the civilian leadership of the Navy. W. Graham Claytor, Jr., when Secretary of the Navy, told the 1978 graduating class at the Naval War College, “There is no reason why we should not consider the possibility of developing an attack submarine to complement our present nuclear powered submarines by handling missions that may not demand the full range of capabilities embodied in the high performance Los Angeles class.” That same year the Senate ^nned Services Committee warned the Navy that if the listing submarine force (then less than 80 SSNs) was to he maintained it would be necessary to adopt a “high-low mix” approach to attack submarines, “in which SSN-688 class submarines are complemented in some missions by less capable, less expensive submarines.”
A short time later Dr. David Mann, then Assistant Sec- fetary of the Navy for research, reported that an intensive study effort had recommended the construction of a smaller SSN, with a speed of about five knots less than an ^SN-688 for about three-quarters that submarine’s cost. Except for speed, all other combat capabilities could be ''•dually the same.
. Size is often linked to quality in discussions of subma- jmes. This is certainly true when one examines the current E- S. design and construction procedures. Here again, mere have been enough knowledgeable opinions that there are other and possibly, if not probably, better methods of Producing attack submarines. And, perhaps most important, the oft-cited qualitative superiority of U. S. subma- bUes that has existed in only some areas of submarine CaPability is being eroded. (See Table 2)
The value of even the U. S. qualitative advantage of fencing has been questioned. Dr. Richard Pariseau, a aUclear submariner who served as director of Advanced jmbmarine Technology in the Office of Naval Research, has written: “The danger in emphasizing silence, howeVer, is that U. S. submarine tacticians, submarine hull aud weapon designers, and combat system engineers may r*ot be giving sufficient consideration to wartime scenario the changes which have occurred in the targets since 'jOrld War II, and the specific tactics that will be em- P'°yed by these targets.”25
This is not to imply that quiet operation is not important 0 El. S. submarines. It is. Rather, the issues are complex jmd that American qualitative superiority is limited and c‘ng reduced. This situation must be considered in the jmntext of the large size of the Soviet submarine force and Soviet building rate as well as the improvements they are making.
The case can certainly be made for more U.S. nuclear- propelled attack submarines. While submarines cannot— in the foreseeable future—replace surface warships in many of their roles, submarine activities can be greatly expanded in the future. Beyond the design concepts mentioned above, advanced cruise missiles, off-board sensors, communications, remotely piloted vehicles launched underwater from torpedo tubes, and other systems, coupled with innovative tactics and doctrine could provide new opportunities for U.S. submarines. And, with these opportunities could come the justification for additional construction. But perhaps a larger and wider forum must be concerned with submarine issues as their importance to the United States increases.
‘The U.S. and British navies experimented with floatplane-carrying submarines in the 1920s, did not develop the concept operationally; the French and Japanese navies did have operational aircraft-carrying submarines. There were several experiments with submarines in the other roles mentioned here.
2Adm. McKee, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 6 February 1984.
interview with Mr. Paisley, 24 October 1983.
4For example, a 1948 projection by the U. S. Navy called for 25 ASW aircraft carriers, some 550 surface ASW ships, and 250 specialized ASW submarines to counter the predicted Soviet submarine threat.
5This concept had been discussed earlier, but not put forward by the Navy; see, for example, N. Polmar, comment on “Lone Carrier . . . Fact or Fancy?” Proceedings, April 1963, pp. 121-122.
Statement to the author by Rear Adm. DeMars, 27 January 1984.
7See M. Paisley, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 24 March 1983.
8Adm. Watkins, speech at change of command, Commander Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Va., 27 June 1983.
9Adm. A. J. Whittle, at Georgetown Center for Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 26 September 1983.
,0The average submarine costs for fiscal 1984 and fiscal 1985 are:
“Mr. Sawyer at Naval Submarine League, Washington, D.C., 3 May 1983. 12Richard Witkin, “Small Submarine Planned by U. S.,” New York Times, 1 April 1969.
13The author’s discussions with technical staff of Office of Naval Research, U. S. corporations and laboratories engaged in submarine propulsion projects; also see Deborah Shapley, “Nuclear Navy: Rickover Thwarted Research on Light Weight Reactors,” Science, 18 June 1978, pp. 1210-1213.
14HY-80 indicates high-yield steel capable of withstanding a pressure of 80,000 pounds per square inch.
^Correspondence with the author, 4 February 1982.
^Correspondence from VAdm. N. R. Thunman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare) to Rep. Charles E. Bennett, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategy and Critical Materials, House of Representatives, 11 April 1983.
17A 38-year-old former U. S. GUPPY submarine operated by the Argentines was caught on the surface while being used as a supply ship; she was heavily damaged and sank in shallow water.
l8See N. Polmar and D. A. Paolucci, “Sea-Based ‘Strategic’ Weapons for the 1980s and Beyond,” Proceedings (Naval Review), May 1978, pp. 98-113. ,9See Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1983).
20The exception was, of course, Adm. Rickover, who was a retired officer recalled to active duty. He had qualified in submarines in 1930, but never commanded one. 2,Adm. James L. Holloway III, CNO from 1974-1978, was also nuclear-qualified. An aviator, he had held command of the carrier Enterprise (then CVAN-65). 22A. J. Perry, “Submarine Officer Career Opportunities (Isn’t There A Better Way?),” The Submarine Review, October 1983, p. 42.
23The Naval Submarine League’s current membership is over 1,400.
24Sawyer, op. cit.
25Dr. Richard Pariseau, “How Silent the Silent Service?” Proceedings, July 1983, p. 41.
[1]aris submarines in the early 1960s. This situation is being turned around, according to Vice Admiral Lando P. Zech, 'vho retired last year as Chief of Naval Personnel. Zech told a congressional committee, “The whole nuclear officer program is very healthy now.” And the retention rates are improving—“We have the number [of officers] we teed for manning our ships, but we can’t give them as ttuch shore duty as we would like to do.”
If W'^T’ NAW IFHANCIS O TRAVIS)
The Navy is now having considerable success in manning these nuclear submarines. There has been a serious shortfall of officers and, to a lesser extent, enlisted men in lhe submarine community since the rapid buildup of Po-