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We can preempt the Kremlin’s strategy for seizure of Eurafrica by curtailing communist subversion in Pan-America before it becomes a threat of consuming proportions. Persuading Cuba to cut the ties that bind it to its Marxist masters is an urgent geostrategic necessity.
The New Geopoliticians: There is more than meets the eye in the ongoing communist adventurism in Latin America. Castro’s crusade to install new leftist strongholds in the Caribbean basin is cause for alarm, of course. But the greater danger lies in the role which communization of the Caribbean plays in the geopolitical strategy of the Soviet Union.
To place Cuba in proper perspective within the Soviet design, it is necessary to project an assessment of the Soviet Union’s political and military strategy. That may not be as difficult as it seems. Familiar patterns are discernible which suggest that the Soviet Union has resurrected several old geopolitical theories and has combined them into a master plan for world conquest.
The Soviet Union occupies that land area labeled by early geopolitical writers as the “pivot area” or “heartland.” “Whoever rules the heartland rules the world.
Not all geopoliticians are heartland advocates. A countertheory to the heartland hypothesis argues that only a maritime power might dominate the world.
and that whoever controls the rimlands, or littorals of Eurasia, will control world destiny.
Other geopoliticians theorize that no single power can control the entire globe, and therefore divide the world into three major zones of influence, or panregions, each headed by a dominant power. Either the Soviet Union or Germany, operating from the heartland, would rule Eurafrica (Europe and Africa); the United States would dominate Pan-America (North and South America); and Japan or China would control Pan-Asia (Asia and Australia).
There are many who doubt that geopolitical treatises can affect a nation’s thoughts or actions. Others, however, have argued that the aggressions committed by Germany and Japan in World War II clearly constituted unsuccessful attempts by both to seize their perceived geopolitical birthrights, Eurafrica and Pan-Asia.
As World War II neared its end, Eurafrica and Pan-Asia literally became panregions in search of power bases. The communists were quick to recognize these power vacuums and the opportunities for expansion. During the last phases of the war, the Soviet Union gathered a cluster of contiguous Eastern European nations under its domination and occupied Manchuria and the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula as well.
When the Soviets also attempted to capture Greece, Turkey, and Iran shortly after World War II had ended, President Harry S Truman initiated a policy of containment of communist expansion. The Kremlin. reluctant to confront the United States at that time, adopted oblique expansionist tactics designed to produce additional communist gains without becoming directly involved in major conflicts.
Since the Kremlin’s expansionism commenced during World War II. continued through the postwar period, and is ongoing today, it might be debated
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that World War II has not really ended, since at least one of the major participants is still aggressively pursuing conquests. Moreover, it appears that the same World War II objectives initially sought by Germany and Japan became Soviet objectives even before Germany and Japan surrendered, thus perpetuating their geopolitical designs.
The communists, then, have emerged as the new geopoliticians of the 20th century. The Soviet Union, as master geopolitician, is pulling the strings and calling the plays. A few subtleties and sophisticated techniques have been added since World War II, and some players are different, but the geopolitical gameboard looks very familiar: panregion maps are still in vogue.
With those thoughts in mind, it is worthwhile to look at the world as the Soviet Union sees it. If we examine international developments from a geopolitical viewpoint, we can determine Soviet intentions. In fact, we can outline an ambitious Soviet strategy aimed at seizing Eurafrica within the next decade by capitalizing upon the geopolitical ambitions of Vietnam, North Korea, Libya, and Cuba, while exploiting perceived weaknesses and limitations of both Free World and Third World nations.
In the 1990s, the Kremlin would like to see a world that looks like this, with both Eurafrica and Pan-Asia under the heel of the Soviet boot and an outflanked, outnumbered Pan-America waiting for the other shoe to fall. It could all be done by control of or over II naval bases—and the Soviet Union already owns or has access to eight of them.
The Kremlin’s Logic: The Soviet goal of a world communist community directed from Moscow remains doctrine. However, the Soviets understand that they will not be able to establish and maintain a global communist structure until they attain control of the world oceans. The Soviet Union already has greater land power than any other nation, but dominant sea power will also be required to support conquest of noncommunist nations, to enforce compliance with Moscow’s will among both contiguous and noncontiguous communist satellites, and to interdict interference by other major powers.
The Soviets also recognize that the greatest resistance to their global aspirations will arise from China in Pan-Asia and from the United States in Pan-America. A major conflict in the near term with either China or the United States could result in formation of an American-Chinese pact, with disastrous consequences for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Soviets have sought an interim expansion objective which might be attained without directly confronting either China or the United States. The interim objective is the conquest of Eurafrica.
To avoid confrontation with China or the United States while seizing Eurafrica, the Soviet Union has chosen the technique of employing proxies or surrogates. By cultivating and supporting Third World leaders whose ambitions converge with its own, Moscow plans to expand its sphere of influence without appearing directly attributable when vital interests of either China or the United States are infringed upon.
Moscow’s expansion through multiple Third World proxies is an astute approach for several reasons.
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America
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First, it serves to establish several widely sepa-
rated fronts on which communist advances may be initiated simultaneously or in rapid succession. These multiple fronts for aggression, when complemented by directed terrorist acts, allow Moscow to bombard the noncommunist world with a never-ending and ever-changing series of global crises which, though orchestrated from Moscow, appear to be occurring spontaneously.
Before Free World leaders can resolve one crisis, another is created, and yet another. Free World leaders are thus made to appear inept and unable to deal with international developments. The communists theorize that Free World citizens, assailed by doubt, confusion, and fear, will lose confidence in their leaders and each other and become divided and polarized.
Second, the Soviets have noted the apparent impotence of the Free World in dealing with assertive Third World nations. They sense that major Free World powers are experiencing difficulty in distinguishing exactly where their vital national interests lie with respect to a welter of newly independent sovereign nations, and will tolerate communist insurrection in those nations unless specifically requested to intervene.
Third, the Soviets are aware that many Third World nations, though proud and fiercely nationalistic, are weak economically and militarily, and are not solidly allied with stronger nations. They are soft targets for insurgency or direct military conquest.
Fourth, the Soviet Union senses that the Western world is ill-attuned to the frustrating business of waging a protracted struggle against communist expansion. Our abandonment of South Vietnam is undoubtedly viewed as confirmation of that judgment.
Finally, the Soviets realize that not all Third World nations are content to pursue peaceful independence. Some Third World states are dissatisfied with their current borders. There are ethnic or tribal rivalries within and between some nations. And some Third World leaders visualize a destiny which soars far beyond their present boundary lines; it is from this ambitious group that Moscow has chosen its proxies.
Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Libya are eager to fill supporting roles in the seizure of Eurafrica because each has much to gain through cooperation with the Soviet Union. In the case of Vietnam, dominance over a Greater Indochina, to include Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, is the reward. For Cuba, it is dominion over the Caribbean and Latin America. North Korea will realize its long-term ambition to unify all Koreans under Pyongyang. And Libya will establish a North African empire.
Soviet Strategy: The Kremlin’s offensive strategy, designed to capitalize upon Western world ambivalence and Third World weaknesses and ambitions, consists of these basic themes:
► Overtly posturing as a nation favoring peace and disarmament, thus encouraging others to constrain defenses
►Covertly strengthening both ground and naval forces, including nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare capabilities
►Massing ground power against Western Europe
to draw NATO attention and resources to the Cen-
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tral Front
►Massing ground power against China to draw China’s attention and resources to the Chinese/So- viet border
►Sponsoring Vietnam and North Korea as proxies to communize Pan-Asia, provide a counterweight to China, and serve as advanced naval bases tor extending Soviet naval power into the Western Pacific and Indian oceans
►Sponsoring Libya as a proxy to communize North Africa, export terrorism, and serve as a prepositioning site for Soviet war supplies
►Sponsoring Cuba as a proxy to initially complement Libya in communizing Africa, then shitting its weight of effort to communize the Caribbean Basin and South America
►Financing and directing terrorists and assassins to selectively liquidate opposition leaders, divert attention from ongoing communist advances, and psychologically disorient Free World nations
►Increasing naval force strength, capabilities, and dispositions at a rate calculated to balance or exceed U. S. naval power in the Eurasian littorals by about
1990 . .
►As Soviet naval power approaches parity with United States naval power in the Eurasian littorals, deliberately accelerating the communist otfensive in Latin America to achieve one of two favorable outcomes: First, if the United States shifts naval power from Eurasia to the Caribbean to restore Pan-American integrity, the Soviets may seize Eurafrica, North Korea may overrun South Korea, and Vietnam may consolidate Greater Indochina. Second, if the United States fails to divert sufficient naval forces from
to prevent communist seizuie of the Caribbean Basin and Latin America, the United States will be strategically outflanked, and communist conquest of Eurafrica and Pan-Asia can proceed without significant interference.
When communist advances in the Caribbean are accelerated, we in the United States will be faced with agonizing decisions. Should we maintain our defensive stance with respect to Western Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific, or should we withdraw sufficient assets to restore the integrity of Pan-America? Moscow is betting we will do the latter and knows that it will require a significant portion of our naval strength to do so. The Soviets understand, as we must, that if our southern flank falls into communist hands, our days as a major world power are numbered.
When our naval strength is drawn to the Caribbean, the Soviet Union will launch major assaults to seize Middle East oil fields and warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, gaining also a land bridge to Africa. Western Europe, fixed by Soviet forces on the Central Front and lacking full U. S. support, will play the part of spectator. For all intents and purposes, a communist Eurafrica will have become a reality, and communization of Pan-Asia may be pursued at leisure, with strong Soviet fleets enforcing a Brezhnev Doctrine demanding noninterference with communist activities in Eurasia.
The Soviet strategy is a relatively straightforward blend of Marxism and geopolitical pragmatism. From the Marxist standpoint, it moves toward world communism and has the potential to emblazon the hammer and sickle upon two of the three major world panregions. From a geopolitical viewpoint, it invokes both the heartland and sea power hypotheses and follows panregion logic. Pragmatically, it sacrifices communist gains in Pan-America, if necessary, to communize the world island.
By avoiding direct conflict with the United States and China while seizing Eurafrica, the Soviet Union can husband its military strength for more advantageous uses. It will immediately be able to dispatch ground forces where required and to assign fleets to its new warm water ports to support the consolidation and defense of Eurafrica. Should we consider coming to the aid of Eurasian allies after stabilizing the Caribbean, we will face the bleak prospect of conducting the fight at the end of long supply lines against a well-entrenched enemy operating on relatively short interior lines of communications and logistics. A more likely though distasteful alternative will be the systematic withdrawal from Eurasia of our imperiled forward deployed forces.
The coming decade of Soviet preparation for seizure of Eurafrica will be a period of unprecedented turmoil worldwide. To divert attention from key aspects of its strategy, Moscow will engineer a kaleidoscopic continuum of crises to undermine the status of Free World leaders and create fear and uncertainty among Free World citizens. Terrorists, insurgents, and asassination squads have been trained and bankrolled for this mission. Entire nations may be exploited to create diversions.
Our easily manipulated mass media will be one of the tools used by the communists to mask their intentions and legitimize their aggressive activities. Ambitious journalists and reporters will be courted by leftist elements, propagandized, granted exclusive interviews with insurgent forces and selected civilians, and taken on carefully staged tours and combat operations. The predictable outcome will be a steady stream of inaccurate, shallow, and emotional news coverage sympathetic to leftist efforts and critical of governmental policies and actions.
It is interesting to note, for example, that just when attention in the United States began to focus upon communist advances in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the Polish Solidarity Party was crushed, a U. S. Army brigadier general was seized in Italy by the Red Brigade, and a U. S. Army officer was murdered in France. Our television news media, geared toward short-term and shallow reporting of the most sensational events of the moment, dropped Latin American insurgency from their programs in favor of the events in Poland, Italy, and France. All American eyes shifted to Europe, and communist activities in Latin America virtually were forgotten.
Weaknesses in the Plan: As evidenced by recent punitive expeditions against Vietnam by China, China may act to limit Vietnam's further expansion. Should China’s assertiveness extend to demanding the Soviet Union’s abandonment of Vietnam and Korea as advance naval bases, the Soviet Union would be delayed in attaining the capability to challenge our naval power in the Western Pacific. But we dare not depend upon China as a counterforce to Soviet expansion. China, too, is a communist nation and could reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union designed to terminate American influence in both Eurafrica and Pan-Asia.
The greater weakness is the nature of the key players in the Kremlin plan. Qadhafi is reckless, volatile, and unpredictable. He may grow to resent Moscow’s increasing influence in African affairs. Similarly, Castro may prove to be a poor team player. His ego will surely drive him to attempt establishment of a Caribbean empire under his own hand and in his own time. He may become impatient and balk at expending additional manpower resources in Africa, particularly if pitted against South Africa.
Perhaps we are seeing early indications of Castro’s impatience in the recent surge of leftist advances in the Caribbean. It is unlikely that Moscow intended the communization of Latin America to proceed so swiftly. It appears that someone snapped the ball before all the offensive players were on line. We must not fail to capitalize upon that error.
Countering Soviet Strategy: Defeating Soviet strategy will hinge upon devising and implementing a sensitive counterstrategy which will disrupt the ongoing Soviet offensive, eliminate communist gains, and preempt future offensive plans. In Free World societies like ours, such a counterstrategy can be implemented only if solidly supported by a well- informed citizenry. Thus, the first of seven steps in the counterstrategy outlined here focuses upon mobilizing that support.
We must initiate a massive effort to educate Free World citizens, particularly our own, as to the nature and extent of the communist threat. The citizens must be given full insight into the tremendous growth of Soviet military power since World War II and the imminent danger posed to the Free World by ongoing communist advances. They must be made aware of the techniques being employed by the communists to demoralize them and polarize them against their leaders. We must create and sustain among our citizens a common will and purpose to reject communist expansion.
We must initiate an aggressive program to deny intelligence data to the Soviets, while vastly improving our own intelligence system. It is vital that we curtail, to the greatest degree feasible, Soviet access to military information and advanced technology. Our intelligence system must be faster, more accurate, and more thorough than that of the Soviets so that we may preempt their offensive designs, rather than responding to accomplished actions.
We must announce to all nations of the world our positive, firm, and unyielding stand against communist expansion. We should invite and encourage other nations to join us as allies in this cause and offer them whatever economic and military assistance is necessary to resist communist inroads. However, we also must broadcast a clear declaration that we, as guardian of freedom among all noncommunist nations, assume the right to counter communist expansion whenever and wherever deemed necessary in defense of our vital national interests.
While such a policy may appear naive with respect to national sovereignty principles and international opinion, it is pragmatically correct and appropriate. We must recognize that many Free World and Third World nations openly choose to overlook and even to accommodate communist adventurism. For example, despite Cuba’s 20-year record of subversive activity and aggression, there is no real support in the Organization of American States for any action to curb Cuba’s insurrectionist acts. France is selling arms to Nicaraguan communists, providing aid to Vietnam, and negotiating its dependence upon Soviet energy. Many Western Europeans lately are voicing a “better red than dead” philosophy. The strength, convictions, and loyalties of international friends tend to be transient commodities.
We must define our vital national interests in geographical terms. The line against communist expansion we must draw should be inscribed upon Eurasia at the limit of expansion as we know it today. Of course, communist enclaves now existing in Africa and Pan- America will be on the wrong side of the line. The drawing of the line, however, will have outlined our problem quite clearly. The solution, then, will become apparent and lead to the next step.
We must convince Cuba to terminate its status as a Soviet advance naval base and hired mercenary of the Kremlin. A Soviet satellite in Pan-America is a deadly and unacceptable geopolitical aberration. Castro’s unchecked expansionist adventures create instability within Pan-America and encourage others to seek territorial gains through force and coercion. Communist successes in Grenada and Nicaragua undoubtedly weighed heavily in Argentina’s decision to seize the Falklands. Cuba’s relative immunity while furthering Russia’s global communist campaign is a nicety we can no longer afford.
This need not mean immediate military action against Cuba. Instead, Havana must be persuaded to sever its ties with Moscow and cease both direct aggression and subversive activities against other nations. We have a broad spectrum of resources we may draw upon to assist in Cuba’s reorientation toward becoming a supportive member of the PanAmerican community and a good neighbor to all nations in both North and South America.
We must reduce communist penetrations in Nicaragua, Grenada, and any other Marxist state emerging in Pan-America. This phase of our counterstrategy may be less formidable than it appears. Once Cuban support has been withdrawn, communist activity in Pan- America may diminish somewhat.
We then must deal with communist penetrations in Africa and Southeast Asia. When Cuba is neutralized, the withdrawal or abandonment of Cuban troops and military aid now employed in Africa will, in itself, create new military and political balances less favorable to communism and may even impact upon Vietnam. We will need to assess these altered situations before making judgments as to what must
be done. We then must apply whatever measures are necessary to ensure that African and Southeast Asian nations may determine their destiny free of communist oppression or subversion.
The proposed political reorientation of Cuba and other communist states will certainly be condemned by many in terms ranging from “warmongering” to “naked aggression.” But we are already at war. The Soviet Union and its bought agents have launched a global attack upon the Free World, have conquered at least a half-dozen nations, have killed millions of world citizens in the process, have subjugated millions more, and are accelerating their offensive to exploit the Free World’s diminished defense posture and decayed will to resist.
We have failed to contain communism thus far. We must now recognize the necessity to roll back communism from our doorstep in the Caribbean, while maintaining our defensive stance in Eurasia. We dare not create fatal vacuums elsewhere by drawing down on deployed forces to deal with matters in the Caribbean.
We must retain absolute naval supremacy over the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. Thoroughly documented studies and assessments, compiled by our most competent military and civilian leaders and analysts, revalidated year after year, have established that we must build and maintain a 600-ship Navy if we are to remain a credible and effective world power. An integral part of that 600-ship Navy must be an amphibious warfare ship force capable of lifting simultaneously at least two Marine division-wing teams, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific.
It is important to realize that the critical calculus of comparative U. S. and Soviet naval strengths will be determined initially in the Eurasian littorals, not on the high seas. Our naval strength must be sufficient to protect our interests elsewhere in the world while also guaranteeing the success of necessary options in Eurasia.
Our current naval assets are far inferior to our needs. An immediate and sustained surge in our shipbuilding program must be initiated to overcome many years of fiscal neglect. Since it takes five to ten years to build a ship, and the ten-year time clock is already running on the Soviet plan for conquest of Eurafrica, we have a tight race ahead of us.
Conclusion: As a near-term objective en route to world communism, the Soviets plan to seize Eurafrica within the coming decade. Their strategy for seizing Eurafrica hinges upon their recognition that the Caribbean is the United States’ Achilles' heel.
If we lose control of the Caribbean, our economy will be jeopardized and our national security compromised. A significant portion of our commerce and critical resources, in peace and war, must transit
the Caribbean, passing through the Panama Canal and in sea-lanes adjacent to Cuba’s shores.
Cuban communism renders vulnerable our southern flank and is a cannon aimed directly at our vitals. More powder is being tamped into the charge daily. When the Kremlin decides that the time is right to pull the trigger, our sphere of international influence will shrink dramatically. Faced with a massive communist onslaught in the Caribbean and South America, we will be forced to abandon Eurasia in order to preserve the integrity of Pan-America.
Our nation can and must mount a timely preemptive counteroffensive against the Kremlin’s offensive strategy. Our counteroffensive must begin in the Caribbean, achieve the early cessation of communist subversion and aggression emanating from Cuba, and be aimed at major control centers rather than guerrilla elements. The sooner we begin, the smaller will be the price in terms of both lives and material. It will require a major national effort, involving both civilian and military commitment over an indefinite time span.
Such an aggressive counterstrategy as the one outlined in this discussion will be bitterly assailed from many quarters. There will be allegations that we are returning to imperialism and reinstating the Monroe Doctrine. It might also be said that we are repeating history because we failed to understand its lessons.
Our forefathers saw long ago that the integrity of Pan-America and our control of the Caribbean were basic linchpins to our security. They understood also that we are a maritime nation, and that dominance on the high seas is basic to our survival. We must see that, and more.
We must recognize that 30 years of stolid, unrelenting perseverence have ripened into major geopolitical gains for the world communist movement, despite wishful thinking and predictions to the contrary. Nation after nation has fallen victim to the communist yoke, while we busy ourselves with feeding, medicating, and housing their starving refugees. Witnesses to the methodical subjugation of millions, we seek solace in comforting the fleeing survivors. The scenario has been repeated so often that many have come to accept it as the norm.
We in the United States dare not repeat the errors of pacifism, ambiguity, and appeasement which resulted in our unpreparedness for World War II; unlike then, the battle lines are now being drawn on our doorstep.
After completing Officers Candidate School, General Hopkins was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1953. He received his master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1970. He was the executive officer of Marine Barracks. Washington. D.C. and commanding officer of the 4th Marine Regiment. 3rd Marine Division. General Hopkins is currently the Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune. North Carolina.