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Secretary Nott’s emphasis on submarines and RAF maritime patrol aircraft. Indeed, a new generation of conventional submarines was planned, and nuclear-powered attack submarine construction would continue, reaching a total of 17 by 1990.
The primacy of the strategic nuclear force raised echoes of 1957, as did the apparent new stress on the role of the Royal Navy beyond the NATO area. Although the EastLant war role was still central, the remaining ASW carriers and their escorts seemingly would be spending a good deal of their time in peace in such distant waters as the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Indian Ocean. This new out-ofarea emphasis raised a few questions, both for the U. S. Navy, which presumably would have to fill any possible gaps in the Eastern Atlantic in a worldwide crisis, and for the Royal Navy itself. The latter’s surface forces might be seen in the future as an essentially subordinate part of Britain’s defense capabilities, primarily concerned with less important commitments. As the cost of the higher priority forces increased, it would be harder to defend the surface navy against possible calls for more cuts. Moreover, cancellation of Trident by some future administration was possible. It was doubtful, however, that the cuts in conventional naval forces would be restored. It was a potentially stormy outlook for a navy that had weathered the buffets of 35 years so remarkably well.
'At the outbreak of war, active strength had been 287 units of which 155 were at home. In the middle of 1944, there had been 735 major units with 431 at home. Figures are supplied by Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence. Post-1945 figures and statement of policy are mainly taken from the Statements of the Naval Estimates. Where necessary, postwar fleet strength information has been amplified by Naval Historical Branch material. However, it is not in any way associated with the author’s reading of the figures or his interpretation of them.
J. G. Garnett, “British Strategic Thought.” Edited by J. Bylis, British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London: 1977), pp. 158-60.
'During the 1950s, British active submarine strength was in fact greater than at times during World War II. In 1954, there were 37 active boats; ten years earlier, there had been 31. Postwar submarine strength peaked at 43 boats in 1955.
JJ. Terraine, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten (London: 1968), p. 174.
Fora summary of The Way Ahead process, see C. Hampshire, The Royal Navy Since 1945 (London: 1975), pp. 137-41.
'’Although something of a fundamental policy reorientation, this redeployment was never really spelled out—hence, the popular misconception of a decline in strength. For the classical allusion, see Paul M. Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), p. 205.
Hampshire, op. cit., pp. 246-48. In 1975, it was announced the Royal Navy forces would no longer be permanently deployed in the Mediterranean; although a capability to do so on occasion has been retained and exercised.
8Compared with the early 1950s, the average major British surface combatant of 1979 was 5% larger, and the average submarine, more than 300% larger. On the average, individual fleet units displaced over 20% more than their predecessors. Displacement figures from Jane’s Fighting Ships.
9J.Moore. “The Navy We Need,” The Listener, 8 January 1981, pp. 37-38. 10Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 January 1981. nThe Times, 26 June 1981.
John E. Woods is the pen name of a British naval historian and analyst with special interests in the Royal Navy. He has published books and articles on military and naval affairs and has taught at the U. S. Naval Academy.
The Royal Marines. Since World War II
By Colonel Michael J. Reece, OBE
“I never knew an appeal made to them for honor, courage, or loyalty that they did not more than realize my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England they will be found the Country’s Sheet Anchor.”
Lord St. Vincent, 1802
The Royal Marines (RM) are a corps of
amphibious infantry and an integral part of the Royal Naval Service. They are a small corps with a strength of some 8,000, representing approximately 10% of the Royal Navy’s overall strength. Therefore, throughout its existence, the Corps has been particularly vulnerable to periodic defense reviews and the Royal Navy’s changing roles and force levels.
When the Army Commandos were disbanded in 1946, their role was passed to the Royal Marines. Since then, units of the 3rd Commando Brigade have seen active service in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, Suez (where 45 Commando RM carried
Proceedings / March 1982
out the first operational helicopter assault), Kuwait, Aden, Brunei, Tanganyika, and Borneo. In 1950, 41 Independent Commando was raised especially for service in Korea when it was attached to the U. S. Marine Corps 1st Marine Division. For its part in the fiercely contested retreat from the Chosin Reservoir, the Commando received the Presidential Unit Citation. During the 1960s, 43 Commando RM was reformed but disbanded in 1968 because of manpower economies.
To develop an imaginative amphibious concept borne out of the Suez helicopter operation, HMS Bulwark was converted from a fixed-wing carrier into an amphibious assault ship (LPH) and deployed in 1960 to the Far East with 42 Commando RM on board. They were joined later by Headquarters 3rd Commando Brigade and 40 Commando RM. For a decade, they maintained a viable amphibious presence, enhanced by improved helicopters, amphibious transport docks (LPDs), and landing ships logistic (LSLs) as they entered service. From their Singapore base, the two commandos were also deployed to Borneo during confrontation.
Changing defense policies and economies have inevitably resulted in reorganization within the Royal Marines. In 1947, the old “Grand Divisions” were streamlined into groups. In 1950, Chatham Group closed completely. Further
Soon after World War II, a U. S. Marine Corps gunnery sergeant approached the Royal Marine who was standing Corporal of the Gangway watch. Looking closely at the initials on the Briton’s shoulder, the gunny asked, “What’s the ‘R.M.’ stand for?”
His lips barely moving, the youngster whispered, “The Real Marines.”
adjustments were made in 1970 when the Plymouth and Portsmouth groups, respectively, became Headquarters Commando Forces and Headquarters Training Group—now known as Headquarters Training and Reserve Forces.
For the Corps, the withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971 became somewhat of a watershed. The Royal Marines became firmly committed to NATO with, initially, amphibious options on both flanks, and 45 Commando RM assumed a new role as an Arctic Warfare Commando based in Scotland. Also, Royal Marines Commandos were deployed to Northern Ireland for internal security tours and have been ever since.
The Royal Marines now provide the backbone of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force. The force is highly flexible and largely selfsupporting. It can be sailed toward and held near an area of likely operations without anticipating a political decision to intervene or without formal NATO alert measures. The United Kingdom/ Netherlands Landing Force can be put ashore without relying on reception ports and airfields. It disembarks rapidly using amphibious craft and helicopters and is instantly ready for operations. The force would be equally effective if deployed for operations in North Norway, in the Baltic Approaches, or on certain Atlantic islands in the NATO area. To halt any Soviet attack as early as possible, it can use landing craft, helicopters, and oversnow vehicles to redeploy troops and artillery within its area of operations and, subsequently, resupply and support them.
However, the reduction in dedicated amphibious shipping announced during 1981 means that soon there will no longer be sufficient sealift to move the whole force. Alternative plans are now being developed using all available military and civil movement facilities. Although the Corps' strength today is at its lowest since the reductions following the Napoleonic Wars, it remains a formidable and versatile force of highly trained men, proud of their history and traditions, with an unrivaled esprit de corps.
Colonel Reece is the senior Royal Marines representative to the U. S. Marine Corps and the joint warfare attache at the British Embassy, Washington, D. C.