One year ago, Ronald Reagan became President, elected in part on a platform of rebuilding America’s defenses. The Navy phase of that rebuilding calls for increasing the fleet from approximately 460 ships in active commission last year to a 600-ship fleet by 1990, an increase of almost 23%.
The man chosen by the Reagan Administration to direct that buildup as Secretary of the Navy was John Lehman. But Lehman is doing more than building a larger fleet. He is advocating what appears to be a major shift in American defense policy, from one of a continental strategy to a maritime strategy. Whereas for the past few years the principal focus of American defense efforts has been on the European central front, with the Navy’s main responsibility being to resupply and support that front, Lehman has been pushing for a Navy with worldwide capabilities and “superiority” over Soviet naval forces.
Secretary Lehman’s “vehicle” for this shift is a 600-ship Navy, and he seems very pleased with the progress during the past year toward building that fleet. The current Navy planning calls for not just 600 ships, but for specific forces and capabilities significantly superior to today’s fleet.
A few years ago, the Navy developed a goal of 600 ships to recover from the post-Vietnam nadir of some 450 active ships. However, that plan included some 75 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, 30 Pegasus (PHM-l)-class missile hydrofoil craft, and several small carriers (sea control ships). In contrast, the ships that are proposed for the new 600-ship Navy include many large aircraft carriers, Aegis cruisers, new antiair warfare destroyers (DDGXs), nuclear attack submarines, and four reactivated Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships.
The cost of building this fleet will include more people, with relatively high skill levels, and an annual shipbuilding program of almost 30 ships, to carry a cost of perhaps $25 billion per year (in today’s dollars).
Secretary Lehman believes that the Navy is well on the way to achieving the projected 600-ship fleet. In his opinion, the Navy has made significant gains after one year in the manpower and ship acquisition areas. According to Lehman, during the past 12 months, the Navy has had a career retention rate of more than 65%. (This is calculated on personnel remaining on active duty more than two years beyond their obligated time.) This compares with the previous average of 44%. Similarly, recruiting efforts are enjoying success. In addition to new recruits, approximately 1,000 men and women with prior naval service have been returning to the Navy each month—double the rate of prior- service people in any peacetime period. Although the nuclear propulsion program still has the greatest manpower problems, the manning picture is very bright in other categories that previously had difficulties. For example, some 2,000 more pilots and naval flight officers than expected joined the Navy in the last six months.
|
Today |
600-Ship Navy |
Carrier battle groups |
12 |
15 |
Surface action groups |
0 |
4 |
Amphibious lift (marine assault forces)* |
1 |
1.3 |
Underway replenishment groups |
8 |
10 |
Attack submarines (nuclear) |
88 |
100 |
*Reinforced Marine Corps division-aircraft wing team. |
With respect to shipbuilding, when this issue went to press, it appeared that Congress would provide the Navy with 26 or 27 ships in the fiscal year 1982 program. This includes new construction, reactivations (e.g., battleships), and other acquisitions (e.g., purchase of British-built combat store ships). These ships will cost more than $8 billion. (This figure is low compared with the predicted future shipbuilding cost because the planned procurements include more high-cost ships—i.e., nuclear-powered carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and Trident submarines.)
According to Secretary Lehman, for next year (fiscal year 1983), the DoD’s current planning document —program budget decision (PBD)— shows about 25 ships. These will include 18 new construction ships in addition to other acquisitions. Separate from these, the Navy will gain ships through a new long-term charter program that will amortize the costs of new auxiliary ships during their service lives. Operated by civilian crews under the Military Sealift Command (MSC), they will include the proposed hospital ship (T-AH) for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, fleet oilers (T-AO), and other auxiliaries.
The warships planned for the 600- ship fleet will be largely the types now in existence or under construction. For example, Lehman sees two more Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carriers (CVNs 72-73) being built to provide 15 large- deck ships, but he does not believe any small or light carriers will be started during the 1980s. Instead, the Navy plans to procure multipurpose helicopter carriers, now designated LHDXs.(See “The U. S. Navy,” November 1981 Proceedings, pp. 123- 125.) These ships would be able to embark Harrier fighter-attack aircraft. ASW helicopters, and eventually more advanced V/STOL aircraft and troop-carrying helicopters. However, the LHDXs were originally intended to replace the seven Iwo Jima (LPH- 2)-class helicopter assault ships that will reach the end of their effective service lives in the 1990s. But using the decks of the LHDXs for Harriers and antisubmarine warfare aircraft will not contribute to increasing (or maintaining) the Navy’s amphibious lift capability.
Similarly, proposals for new and advanced attack submarines beyond the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class, recommended by a recent Navy study, have been dropped. The Navy will continue building SSN-688s for the foreseeable future. There are no plans now for the U. S. Navy to acquire advanced diesel-electric submarines, according to Lehman. But he has not completely ruled them out, noting that the current buildup of Cuban naval forces and the troubled situation in Central America may provide a valid requirement for such craft, which he cites as being short- range platforms—“floating mines for the barrier [role].”
Beyond maintaining the momentum in the personnel and shipbuilding programs for the near term, Lehman will seek to bring the Navy’s research and development (R&D) program into tighter focus. He considers this the biggest task for the new year. Today, there are more than 500 major Navy R&D programs that are being funded in terms of constant dollars at about the same rate as 250 programs were a decade ago.
His proposed reduction in R&D programs would bring focus on those with high payoffs. To the maximum extent possible, the Navy would capitalize on foreign R&D—including Soviet. Recent examples of this approach include adopting an Army- designed helicopter (the SH-60B) and a British-designed jet trainer (the Hawk). In the future, Lehman does predict wider Navy use of V/STOL aircraft, both the AV-8B Advanced Harrier, for naval missions as well as its Marine role, and later an operational derivative of the XV-15 tilt-rotor V/STOL.
The Secretary’s optimism seems realistic in the sense that so far the Congress is supporting a naval buildup while world problem areas (Libya, the Middle East, Cuba) tend to justify a “naval strategy.” From a practical viewpoint, Lehman is also looking at “next year” and not the five-year and longer plans. He realizes that five-year plans almost invariably put off the big investments until the last year or two, and, being revised every year, the end of the plans are never reached. “Don’t think ‘out years’—reality is this year,” in Lehman’s words.
But the long term may bring to light the problems of a 600-ship fleet in terms of people and ships. A recent analysis of fire control technicians (FTs) by the Naval Military Personnel Command indicates that the four battleships and 20 Aegis cruisers expected to be in commission in 1990 would require all of the current Navy’s FTs at the second class (E-5) and above level. Another area of continued concern is nuclear propulsion. Recruiting and retention are up slightly in this category. The Navy has not been able to reach its goal in nuclear-trained personnel for the submarine force during the past two decades. With the nuclear attack submarine goal being raised to 100 or more, coupled with the Trident SSBN program, there are major questions in this personnel category.
Today, the Navy has some 535,000 officers and enlisted men and women on active duty. This number is expected to increase to about 555,000 by October 1982, the end of the fiscal year. A 600-ship Navy will require some 630,000 men and women. The Navy’s personnel experts predict that if various incentive and benefit programs are continued, including annual cost-of-living increases, and there are no recruiting problems, the Navy could reach about 620,000—i.e., some 10.000 fewer than needed. This would include a shortfall of some 8,000 petty officers (E-4 through E-9).
There are also problems with respect to ships. First and foremost, the up-and-down shipbuilding programs of the past create major problems for the future. For example, in theory, a building rate of 3.5 SSNs per year would provide the goal of 100 attack submarines by 1990 (although some Navy officials have spoken of as many as 130 and even 140 SSNs).
Secretary Lehman believes that a three-per-year SSN rate is feasible. However, because of the large number of older SSNs that will reach retirement age in the 1980s and 1990s and the low building rate of the last few years (an average of 1.6 for the past five years), there is a “catch up” requirement. Realistically, a rate of five to six SSNs will be needed for the next few fiscal years, a rate that is highly improbable, especially at the same time other high-capability/high-cost ships are being built.
The need for a large, capable Navy appears valid in view of the many problem areas in the world today, the continued Soviet and Third World naval and military developments, and the West’s continued dependence upon use of the sea. Apparently, the Navy—aided by several individuals in the Department of Defense and the White House itself—is moving the nation toward a “maritime strategy.” Despite the success of the Navy programs during the first year of the Reagan Administration, however, the prognosis for the long term is not clear. There are a great many problems—adequate numbers of skilled people, ships' costs, shipyard capacity, and simple politics—that must be addressed and solved by the Reagan Administration and the Congress if the United States is to continue to use the seas for its political, economic, and military well-being.