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Battle Group Tactical Proficiency___________
by Lieutenant Commander Dean L. Knuth, U. S. Naval Reserve
“Three green flares 1,000 yards on the port bow of Eisenhower, Admiral.’’
“Dammit, why can't you ASW types get it right?”
“Sir, you tasked all of the S-3s for surface surveillance; the surface combatants are in long-range SAM stations or on surface SAGs; and our helos are in plane guard.”
“That’s no excuse; this should not have happened. Where did that submarine come from, anyway?”
This story and variations of it in antiair warfare (AAW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW) have occurred with such frequency that many naval officers conclude that our carrier battle groups (BGs), around which our entire Navy is structured, are not effective in a multi-threat environment. This does not necessarily have to be the case. Lack of adequate assets to fight a multi-threat war contributes to the problem, but much of the problem lies in our battle group commands’ and staffs’ inability to coordinate and integrate effectively the tactical employment of our assets against a changing threat. This could be called BG tactical proficiency or BG professionalism, which is a level beyond warfare specialty professionalism.
Having had the privilege of serving temporarily on the staff of Commander Antisubmarine Group Two (ComASGru Two—a Royal Navy vice admiral in HMS Bristol) who functioned as the ASW commander for the NATO Striking Fleet for the past two fall NATO exercises, I have seen high-level BG professionalism demonstrated. ComASGru Two and his staff got the most out of their assets, and when they were given U. S. Navy assets in an exercise, they employed them very effectively. A review of the lessons learned from the NATO exercise analysis reports confirms that their demonstrated tactical proficiency was better than ours. My two-year tour on a carrier group staff also supports this opinion.
Generally, I think that our flag officers and staffs have shown a lack of BG tactical experience and too often have demonstrated parochial approaches to naval warfare. I have heard a carrier group (CarGru) commander exclaim, “Nothing can overcome naval air, and that will be what we use.” And I have also heard a cruiser destroyer group (CruDesGru) commander say, “Surface combatant SAGs [surface action groups] firing Harpoons are our best offense.” Both points have merit. Coordinated attacks, however, probably produce the best results, while maintaining a good multi-threat defense. Based on the current numbers of threats and the variety of specific missions, chances are that the best combination of forces will never be the same in any two situations.
How has the Royal Navy attained greater BG tactical proficiency than the U. S. Navy with an officer corps that is much smaller than ours and with equipment which is inferior to ours? Generally, Royal Navy officers are not as formally educated in theory as ours are. In fact, few Royal Navy officers have bachelor of science degrees, and they have no program leading to master’s degrees. Royal Navy officers are “Masters" nonetheless: Masters of Methodical Procedures. They achieve this proficiency by receiving heavy doses of training at tactical schools, which they begin attending at the senior lieutenant level. The most valuable of these is the Maritime Tactical School (MTS) at HMS
Dryad in Fort Southwick, near Portsmouth, England.
The maritime tactical course (MTC) is conducted four times a year at the MTS, and each course has up to 70 officers enrolled in it. The ranks of those who attend range from senior lieutenants to rear admirals, and one- third are from other nations. However, only two Americans (both going to exchange officer tours) attend each year. The schedule consists of five weeks of intensive training. In week one, the class is brought up to speed on weapon systems, NATO, threat capabilities, and environmental considerations. Weeks two and three cover each of the three major warfare disciplines—air, surface, and subsurface. The procedure includes formal lectures, tactical floor demonstrations, problem planning in syndicates, exercising in the tactical trainer, and, most valuable of all, a plans tactical washup on the tactical floor for each discipline. Weeks four and five merge the threats and repeat the process in terms of multi-threat games. Finally, they study rules of engagement and look at procedures to reduce the enemy threat. The last game pits a realistic multi-threat against a NATO striking force approaching the G-I- UK Gap. .The resulting discussions and arguments between warfare disciplines, between various services, between nationalities, and even between ranks are extremely important to stimulating tactical thinking. The current ComASGru Two has attended the MTC six times.
In the Royal Navy, a senior lieutenant who is not designated an engineer first attends the principal warfare officer (PWO) course which lasts about nine months. At the lieutenant commander level, he goes on to sub-
specialize in an advanced warfare officer (AWO) course which runs for at least six months. He first attends the MTC as part of the AWO training. Officers designated to command repeat the MTC. It is significant that AWOs are never trained in engineering. Career engineers handle all engineering functions. This prevents any distraction from tactics and warfare training in the warfare branch.
The PWO and AWO courses for mid-level officers are held at the School of Maritime Operations (SMOPs). These courses include command team training and the study of warfare publications and fighting instructions. Most U. S. Navy officers are familiar with only a few of our naval warfare publications (NWPs), but Royal Navy officers have read all of their navy’s warfare publications and their fighting instructions as well. The fighting instructions originated before the days of Lord Nelson. They have been modernized, and are reviewed and updated annually by flotilla commanders (i.e., battle group commanders) and at the MTS.
Where do U. S. Navy officers receive their battle group tactical training? Until February 1980, aviators and submariners received almost no formal BG training. Some surface warfare officers received a little tactical training at the Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) department head course. But training for these officers involved only using team trainers for ASW and AAW and receiving six weeks’ tactical action officer (TAO) training to learn how to fight one’s ship. Until the tactical training groups (TacTraGrus) began to be established in 1978, our schools did not teach BG tactics. In fact, it appears that the U. S. Navy continues to be oriented toward administrative trivia, inspections, and attempting to make every officer a qualified engineer. All of these are to the exclusion of the development of tactical professionalism.
Atlantic Fleet battle groups operate together very little outside of the classroom. Fleet exercises are mostly
The Royal Navy may not have any CVs anymore, but RN officers demonstrate battle group tactical proficiency which U. S. naval officers do not seem able to match.
unit training events with perhaps a short period for combined BG operations in a war-at-sea phase. Carriers and surface combatants work up for deployments separately in the Atlantic command and can, and often do, deploy together as total strangers. For example, during my carrier group staff tour, we deployed with a battle group that first met each other at a pre-sail two weeks before leaving for a Mediterranean deployment.
Even the Naval Military Personnel Command’s detailing policy works against tactical proficiency and experience. Non-sea tours seem to be where officers make their reputations, and sea tours become rewards for a good job ashore. BG commanders usually come from the Washington arena after being out of the fleet for
109
Proceedings / December 1981
years. Few staff members have had previous staff experience or have ever worked outside of their warfare specialty before being assigned to the BG staff. For example, the operations officer on the BG staff on which I served came on board as a “frocked” captain with no previous BG experience, and if the subject at hand was not tactical air related, he was lost. Also, few staff officers make more than one deployment or participate in more than one NATO exercise before they are on their way to the next ticket-punch stop. One simply cannot learn enough during a single group staff tour to become a good BG tactician.
Most of ComASGru Two’s staff members have had more than five years of BG staff experience. All have been through the MTC once and most have been through it several times. These officers understand BG tactics before they arrive on ComASGru Two’s staff, and they know more than just one warfare specialty well. Their “appointers” place BG staff assignment at the top of assignment lists. Our detailers need to put BG staffs in the center of the career pipeline for all officers as well. The eight carrier groups and six cruiser destroyer groups in the Navy should be the places where our most experienced officers serve. Prerequisite BG tours for the senior officers going to these staffs should be mandatory.
Service colleges do not fill the BG tactical training void because they are oriented almost exclusively toward strategy. And, even if these schools were helpful in the area of tactics, too few officers are able to attend for them to have much impact. The National War College has a primary interest in national and international strategy and national security. The command and staff course at the Naval War College does address BG tactics. Again, it is more strategic than tactical, while emphasizing damage assessment, engagement analysis, and force structure. Generally, their material is not current, although a few courses do use fleet tactical memos (TacMemos) as texts for broad overview discussions. The Armed Forces Staff College is a six-month course which prepares mid-grade officers to be joint staff planners. The Naval Postgraduate School’s operations analysis curriculum has initiated a few general tactics courses, but unfortunately, only a handful of Navy line officers are exposed to it. There are more restricted line officers and foreign officers in the operations analysis course than there are U. S. Navy line officers. All of these avenues offer little support for providing BG tactical expertise for our Navy.
The U. S. Navy is coming around slowly, however. The CNO has taken a few weeks from the engineering training curriculum and given them to the still new Tactical Training Group Atlantic (Norfolk) and Pacific (San Diego).* They have been assigned the formidable task of trying to “unpar- ochialize” non-tacticians and teach them battle group tactics.
TacTraGruLant has a staff of nine (mostly post-command) commanders and captains who represent the Navy’s various warfare disciplines. These officers teach three courses. The first is a two-week tactical planning course (tactical platform coordination course) for all commander- grade prospective commanding officers, prospective executive officers (aviators), and other commanders and captains en route to sea duty staffs. Nine of these courses are held a year, and about 30 students attend each class. The second is the four-week commander’s tactical training course (CTTC) for numbered fleet commanders, group commanders, captain-rank staff officers, DesRon commanders, chief-of-staff officers, and captain- rank COs, including CV COs. About 25 students attend each class, and it is scheduled six times a year. The third is a new one-week course, the staff tactical training course, which provides tailored training for group staffs and the group commander. Commander Amphibious Group Two was the first to attend. He considered the course a success. Group staffs are now slated to attend this course once a year.
The two major courses teach BG planning, BG tactics preparation (OP- GEN), and planning for BG force asset employment versus today’s threat. They key on preparing pre-planned responses to different situations. The school conducts seminars, problemsolving by syndicates, discussion groups, and one or two large BG games on a tactical floor at the end.
*For a description of the courses and objectives of Tactical Training Group Pacific see S. D. Lan- dersman’s “Pacific Fleet Tactical Training," pp. 104-106, April 1980 Proceedings.
The composite warfare commander (CWC) concept and other defined warfare procedures are taught in the course. However, with the paucity of defined procedures, this program is difficult to execute. One area of concern is that only about half of the instructors at TacTraGruLant have had previous BG staff experience. The impact that this course has on BG tactical proficiency will take time to recognize. It is certainly a good beginning.
How do we develop BG tactics? It is, of course, a very slow process because developing tactics without tacticians is a “Which came first, the chicken or the egg?” situation. Commander Second Fleet and Commander Third Fleet have made progress, but the input of ideas for new tactics is almost nonexistent from fleet units and group staffs. Battle group tactical development and evaluation (TAC D&E) project officer billets are being reduced, and the Naval Military Personnel Command has declared that the one operations analyst billet can remain unfilled between reliefs. Two Second Fleet CruDesGru commanders have conducted tactical seminars for their commanding officers in the past year. It is a great initiative, getting senior officers together to discuss BG tactics, but the program would benefit from increased support from higher commands.
Despite these positive signs, the U. S. Navy must overcome some major problems before it realizes BG professionalism. One of our biggest problems is that our tactical documentation is in terrible shape. Until recently, NWPs were mostly on microfiche and extremely difficult to use at sea. There are so few naval officers involved in developing BG tactics that at least half are products of TAC D&E civilian analysts and are put into print before being thoroughly reviewed. Worst of all, most are just a compendium of TacMemos which offer few specified tactical procedures.
While U. S. numbered fleet commanders have promulgated generally worded operations orders, the Royal Navy has a set of specific standing operating procedures for many situations. This makes one wonder if the poor performance demonstrated by some of our ships can be attributed to the fact that they often do not know what an operational commander expects of them: perhaps lifting a page
from the Royal Navy’s book would be appropriate.
It is certainly time to reassess and prioritize our BG condition. OpNav plans to spend $5 million to try to assess BG readiness from exercise results. The money would be better spent training the BG staffs. The CNO, at the Naval Institute’s 1981 Annual Meeting, stated that, with new tactical training facilities, “this now completes the structure of career tactical training which will take a naval officer from ensign to admiral and provide him every possible opportunity to become a great tactician and a keen strategist. Our goal is to make our hands-on tacticians the best in the world.” I submit that we have made a start toward this goal but we have a long way to go before we achieve it. My recommendations to help us attain the CNG’s goal are as follows:
► Accept the fact that engineering qualifications are not a necessary prelude to tactical mastery.
► Immediately expand the length of our TacTraGru courses to six weeks for all attendees. There should be only one major course.
► Expand the course size and faculty at the TacTraGrus. All PXOs, PCOs, and up (from every community) should attend the course before commencing a new sea tour. All officers en route to a BG staff should attend this course—hot just the most senior.
► Send prospective TacTraGru instructors to the MTC in the U.K., and ask the Royal Navy to send some of their officers to our TacTraGrus so that tactical ideas can be exchanged.
► Create a set of U. S. Navy battle group fighting instructions, and get substantial inputs from BG commanders and the TacTraGrus. Practice these instructions at sea.
► Ensure that BG operations take precedence over type training in fleet exercises.
► Put BG staff billets into the center of the career paths for our best naval officers. Establish prerequisite BG experience requirements for the senior BG staff billets.
► Remove the administrative burden associated with our social reform programs from the shoulders of commanders who should be devoting their time to tactical thinking and working on how to fight an enemy with the forces available.
Even if these recommendations are
implemented today, it will take years before our BG staffs will become proficient by Royal Navy standards. A Royal Navy officer once told me a little story which describes how the Royal Navy and U. S. Navy are each perceived to operate.
“The battle group objective was to proceed from Point A to Point B and to find submarines. The RN admiral proceeded directly from Point A to Point B, made a. submarine detection en route, continued straight on to Point B, then went back to datum to hunt for the submarine. The USN admiral started his transit on a track away from Point B, discovered a submarine, and never went to Point B at all.”
The Royal Navy is perhaps too structured, and the U. S. Navy is completely unstructured—not so much by choice, but because of a shortcoming in battle group professionalism.
Commander Knuth, a 1970 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, served in the USS Agerholm (DD-826), the USS Bronstein (FF-1037), and on the staffs of Commander Carrier Group Four and Commander Second Fleet. He left active duty in September 1981.
The New (and improved) U. S. Inland Rules of the Road--------------------------------------
By Lieutenant Commander Elbert S. Maloney, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
Naval vessels spend the vast majority of their time under way in waters governed by the International Rules of the Road, formally entitled the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COL- REGS). When naval ships enter bays and harbors within the United States, however, they are subject to the U. S. Inland Rules of the Road. Most foreign nations use the International Rules for their internal waters, but the United States has maintained its own set of regulations. In fact, until 24 December, three sets of rules govern U. S. internal waters—the Inland, Great Lakes, and Western Rivers rules.
These U. S. internal rules have variations among them and significant differences with the International Rules of the Road. Conflicts between the international and U. S. internal rules became pronounced when the new International Rules went into effect in 1977. The 72 COLREGS, having the status of a binding treaty rather than merely of an international agreement, provide in Rule 1 that a nation can have “special rules” for “roadsteads, harbours, rivers, lakes, or inland waterways.” They contain a specific binding requirement that “such special rules shall conform as closely as possible to these [72 COLREGS] Rules.” Thus, the modernization arid consolidation of the three sets of U. S. internal rules became mandatory.
Another consequence of the 72 COLREGS is the replacement of the previous “boundary lines” which had separated waters governed by inland and international rules. Generally, the 72 COLREGS demarcation lines are closer inshore than the old ones. This is necessary to prevent the intrusion of non-complying U. S. rules into international waters.
On 24 December 1980, then-President Jimmy Carter signed PL 96-591,
The Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980. These new internal rules will become effective on the 24th of this month for all U. S. waters, except the Great Lakes where an effective date will be separately promulgated following coordination with Canada.
The format of the new U. S. Inland Navigational Rules follows that of the 72 COLREGS, even to the extent of omitting Rule 28. Major changes from the old internal rules were necessary to bring the U, S. internal rules into close conformity with the international rules. The most significant changes include:
► A requirement for safe speed at all times, not just under conditions of reduced visibility.
► Changes to the right-of-way rules for sailing vessels.
in
► Revised responsibilities for the give-way (burdened) vessel, and broadened options for the stand-on (privileged) vessel.
► Changes in navigation lights.
► Changes in fog signals.
There will still be differences between the new Inland Rules and the 72 COLREGS. The significant ones are:
► The new Inland Rules’ whistle signals remain one of “intent” rather than of “action being taken.”
► The cumbersome 72 COLREGS signals used by vessels overtaking and being overtaken in narrow channels were not adopted.
► Differences in lights on towing vessels exist.
The new Inland Rules contain some provisions that have no parallel in 72 COLREGS, such as:
► On the Great Lakes, an after allround light may be carried in lieu of the after 20-point range light plus a separate stern light.
► On the Great Lakes and Western Rivers, a down-bound vessel has the right-of-way over an up-bound vessel, and either of these has the right-of- way over a vessel crossing a river or channel.
In addition, the new Inland Rules have omitted reference to a “vessel
The New Inland Rules____________________________________
Comparison with 72 COLREGS Comparison with Old Inland Rules j
(By Lieutenant Commander Cutler) (By Lieutenant Commander Maloney)
PART A: GENERAL
Rule I: Application
—The vesting authority and realm of applicability differ as would —Similar to the rules establishing the old Inland Rules,
be expected. A significant factor is the inclusion of applicability to U. S. vessels operating in the Canadian waters of the Great Lakes. The new Inland Rules replace the current Great Lakes Rules and facilitate the handling of reports of violations between the two nations. (Section 7 of the public law enacting these new inland rules exempts the Great Lakes from the 24 December 1981 enactment date in order to provide additional time for the Canadian Government to review the new rules and thereby allow both nations to adopt them simultaneously. It is currently anticipated that the shift will occur on 1 April 1982.)
Rule 2: Responsibility
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —Establishes a clearer definition of the “Rule of Good Seaman
ship” and the “General Prudential Rule.”
Rule 3: General Definitions
—Important changes include the addition of definitions for a nondisplacement craft, seaplanes, vessels not under command, and a change in the definition of Western Rivers.
—While the International Rules simply provide a list of vessels defined as “restricted in their ability to maneuver,” the new Inland Rules include the caveat “but are not limited to” in order to prevent the list of situations from being considered exhaustive.
—The term “vessel constrained by her draft” has been deleted from the new Inland Rules. The U. S. position at the United Nations Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization during the formulation of the 72 COLREGS was in disagreement with the inclusion of special lights and dayshapes for draft-constrained vessels since no special provisions for maneuvering are also included except the warning to “avoid impeding safe passage.” It was believed that the inclusion of special lights and dayshapes might convey an assumption of right-of-way which is not supported in the maneuvering rules. This concept carried over into the development of the new Inland Rules, and resulted in the deletion of the term from Rule 3 and all corresponding references to it in the 72 COLREGS.
—The various U. S. inland waters are defined.
—The term “Secretary” is defined as the secretary of the cabinet department in which the Coast Guard is operating.
—The terms "Inland Waters," “Inland Rules,” and “International Regulations” are also defined.
constrained by her draft.” It was believed that because the international rules do not assign the right-of-way to the constrained vessel, this rule could be abused and might result in situations in which a vessel, constrained by her draft, might attempt to claim a right-of-way when she was not entitled to it.
The new Inland Rules also follow
the 72 COLREGS format by providing for four annexes, paralleling those of the international rules. An additional annex concerning pilot rules is expected to be developed. The five annexes will be promulgated by Coast Guard regulations rather than being spelled out in the act of Congress.
The establishment of the new U. S. Inland Rules of the Road will cause
some problems during the transition period, but the use of a unified set of rules and regulations for all inland waters and their high degree of conformity with 72 COLREGS will ultimately ease the problems of compliance for all mariners.
The following compares the new Inland Rules with the 72 COLREGS and the previous internal U. S. rules.
PART B: STEERING AND SAILING RULES
SUBPART 1: CONDUCT OF VESSELS IN ANY CONDITION OF VISIBILITY
Rule 4: Application
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —No comparable rule.
Rule 5: Lookout
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —The definition of a proper lookout is more definitive than that
found in the old “Rule of Good Seamanship.”
Rule 6: Safe Speed
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —The definition of safe speed is broader in scope than the one
in the old rules. Vessels are now required to travel at a safe speed under all conditions of visibility, commensurate with conditions, equipment, and the maneuverability of the vessel.
Rule 7: Risk of Collision
_ Same as 72 COLREGS. —Amplifies existing rules. The new rule recognizes the wide use
of radar and, while not requiring outfitting of all vessels with radar, requires the use of radar when installed.
Rule 8: Action to Avoid Collision
_ Same as 72 COLREGS. —Essentially a new rule, it directs positive, timely action with
regard for special circumstances, such as other vessels and possible shoal water.
Rule 9: Narrow Chahnels
—Vessels operating in narrow channels on the Great Lakes, Western Rivers, or other waters specified by “the Secretary” must adhere to additional maneuvering requirements which give right-of-way to a vessel proceeding downriver (following current) over one which is proceeding against the current.
—The new Inland Rules replace the word “may” with “shall” in discussing the use of the danger signal to express doubt in both the crossing and overtaking situations, thereby making the employment of this signal mandatory instead of optional.
—The “Charlie” (affirmative) whistle signal (one prolonged, one short, one prolonged, and one short), used as a reply in the 72 COLREGS overtaking situation, is replaced by a response identical to the proposal (i.e., one or two short blasts depending upon the particular situation). This deviation from the International Rules is consistent with the old Pilot Rules (33 CFR 80.6[a]).
—The new Inland Rules delete the caveat “when overtaking can take place only if the vessel to be overtaken has to take action to permit safe passing,” thereby making the exchange of whistle signals mandatory in all cases of overtaking in a narrow channel.
—Rule 9(a)(i), similar to the old Inland Rules, now requires all vessels, not only steam vessels, to keep to the right of a channel. Rule 9(a)(ii) is similar to existing Western Rivers Rules and has been expanded to include the Great Lakes. Rule 9(d), a new rule, is a directive for vessels crossing a channel to stay clear of vessels which can only navigate within the channel. A vessel that can only navigate within the channel signifies this by sounding the danger signal when the intentions of the crossing vessel are in doubt. This rule does not shift the right-of-way. Rule 9(f), similar to the old “bend” signal, now calls for one prolonged blast instead of one long blast.
Rule 10: Vessel
—While the International Rule 10 addresses traffic separation schemes, the new Inland Rules do not. Inland Rule 10 does ensure compliance with Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) regulations that may be in effect in a given port or geographical area. This gives existing VTS regulations authority under the Inland Rules, permits the establishment of new ones if necessary, and serves to point out to the mariner that such regulations may be in effect in ports on his itinerary.
Traffic Service
—Requires compliance with Federal Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) regulations.
SUBPART II: CONDUCT OF VESSELS IN SIGHT OF ONE ANOTHER
—Same as 72 CoLREGS.
Rule 11: Application
—This rule is consistent with the old Inland Rules.
Rule 12: Sailing Vessels
Same as 72 COLREGS. —Updates the old Inland Rules for the more prevalent fore-and-
aft sailing rigs. The rule deletes the previous reference to vessels running-free.
Rule 13: Overtaking
—The new Inland Rules give precedence to the overtaking sit- —Same as old Inland Rules, uation over all situations included in Rules 4 through 18, whereas the International Rules specify only “Section II,” which equates to Rules 11 through 18.
Rule 14: Head-On Situation
—Same as 72 COLREGS.
Clarifies the old Inland Rules and requires each vessel to turn to the right.
Rule 15: Crossing Situation
—An added paragraph (15[6]), applying only to the Great Lakes —Rule 15(a) is consistent with the old Inland Rules. Rule 15(b)
and Western Rivers, gives right-of-way to a power-driven vessel extends the Western Rivers Rules to the Great Lakes,
ascending or descending a river over one which is crossing.
Rule 16: Action by Give-Way Vessel
—Same as 72 COLREGS
—Same as 72 COLREGS.
—More definitive than the old rules, this rule requires the giveway vessel to take early and substantial action. There is no reference to speed in this rule, as there was in the old rules. Speed is now addressed for all situations by Rule 6.
Rule 17: Action by the Stand-On Vessel
—This rule is a major departure from the requirements levied on a “privileged” vessel under the old rules. The stand-on vessel is now permitted to take action, not only when in extremis, but • also as soon as it becomes apparent that the vessel required to
keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action.
Rule 18: Responsibilities Between Vessels
—As discussed in Rule 3, the new Inland Rules do not include provisions for vessels constrained by draft. Because of this deletion, Rule 18 has a slightly different paragraph designation scheme from that found in the 72 COLREGS. Otherwise, Rule 18 is identical.
—This new rule takes the many different rules, found in various sections of the old rules, and catalogs them in one location. In addition, seaplanes are now addressed.
SUBPART III: CONDUCT OF VESSELS IN RESTRICTED VISIBILITY
Rule 19: Conduct of Vessels in Restricted Visibility
■Same as 72 COLREGS. —This rule now applies to vessels operating near, as well as
under, conditions of restricted visibility. The speed of a vessel is not discussed, since a vessel is now charged to proceed at a safe speed at all times (Rule 6). Rule 19(d), along with Rule 7(b), establishes the importance of radar. A ship is no longer required to stop her engines upon hearing a fog signal forward of the beaim The ship is now directed to reduce her speed to minimum steerage way, removing all way if necessary, unless it has been determined that the risk of collision does not exist.
PART C: LIGHTS AND SHAPES
Rule 20: Application
—Same as 72 COLREGS. It is now a requirement to display navigation lights during day
light hours under conditions of reduced visibility.
Rule 21: Definitions
—The definitions of masthead and sidelights have been extended in the new Inland Rules to permit some deviation from the fore and aft centerline requirement for vessels less than 12 meters in length—i.e., the masthead light and combined sidelight lantern, when used, must be placed as close to the centerline of the vessel as possible, but must not necessarily be on the centerline if not practicable.
—An additional “special flashing light,” to be carried forward on the centerline of a vessel being pushed ahead, is defined as yellow, flashing 50-70 times per minute, and covering an arc from directly forward to anywhere between 90° and 112.5° on each beam.
—Adopts the international flashing light for non-displacement vessels. Previously, it was mandatory for the stern light to be at a ship’s stern. Now, it must be located as near as possible to a vessel’s stern.
Rule 22: Visibility of Lights
—The “special flashing light” described above is further defined —Visibility of all lights have been increased by one mile. Oth-
as having a minimum visible range of two miles in all cases. erwise, the new rule is essentially the same as the old rule.
—The white all-around lights prescribed in Rule 24 for vessels or objects being towed, which are partially submerged such that they are rendered inconspicuous, are defined as having a minimum visibility of three miles.
Rule 23: Powered-Driven Vessels Underway
—The new Inland Rules permit a power-driven vessel of less than 12 meters in length to show one 360° white light instead of the two masthead and separate stern lights prescribed for all other power-driven vessels. This is provided for in the 72 COLREGS as well, but there the limiting length is only 7 meters instead of 12 and there is an additional phrase in the international version which further defines vessels qualifying for this exemp- —These rules, previously found in various rules, are now located in one rule and have been made easier to understand. In addition, there are now provisions for special lighting of non-displacement vessels.
AW U. s. Inland Rules of the Road go into effect this month—standby . . .
tion as having a maximum speed of 7 knots. Further, where the International Rules require sidelights only “if practicable,” the new Inland Rules allow no option in the requirement for sidelights. This was decided upon because it was believed that the types of vessels generally operating in U. S. waters would have no problem in displaying sidelights, unlike other parts of the world where very small vessels with maximum speeds of less than 7 knots are more common and their ability to display sidelights is somewhat more questionable.
—A continuation of an existing Great Lakes Rule permits vessels on the Great Lakes to retain their 360° white light in lieu of the second masthead and stem lights. This exception was adopted because a light which can be seen above a low-lying fog was deemed more desirable than a light which accurately marks the after-limit (stem) of a vessel.
—Vessels less than 20 meters long are exempted from having their forward masthead light forward of amidships but are required to locate it “as far forward as possible.”
Rule 24: Towing and Pushing
—Vessels towing or pushing show the same lights or dayshapes as those in international waters except that the two or three white vertical lights may be displayed at the forward or after masthead light positions and two yellow lights in a vertical line must be displayed in lieu of a stern light by vessels pushing ahead or towing alongside.
—Tugs that are mechanically locked in the pushing mode are considered to be a single vessel instead of a tug and tow. Vessels pressed into towing are exempted from having to show the required lights, but must comply as best they can.
—Vessels being towed are required to display the special flashing light described in Rule 21.
—If the vessel or object being pushed ahead is partially submerged so as to make it difficult to see, the new Inland Rules prescribe the following additional requirements:
(1) If the tow is less than 25 meters wide, one 360° white light at or near each end.
(2) If more than 25 meters wide, four 360° white lights at the comers to mark its length and breadth.
(3) If the tow is greater than 100 meters long, additional white all-around lights must be placed so there is never any more than 100 meters of tow without a light.
(4) A diamond dayshape as close to the end of the tow as is practical.
(5) The towing vessel may illuminate the tow with a searchlight to alert a passing vessel to the tow’s presence.
—The new Inland Rules retain a provision of the Western Rivers Rules that exempts vessels towing or pushing on those rivers from the requirement for masthead lights. This exception was necessitated by the construction of many Western River tow boats with their pilothouses at the highest point permissible for bridge clearance to maximize forward visibility.
Rule 25: Sailing Vessels Underway and Vessels Under Oars
—Both the International Rules and the new Inland Rules permit —This rule adopts the conical shape (apex down)instead of the
sailboats to carry side and stem lights in a combined lantern at previous single black ball dayshape to indicate a sailing vessel
or near the top of the mast, but the International Rules limit the propelled by both sail and power,
vessels to less than 12 meters in length, and the new Inland Rules specify less than 20 meters.
—The new Inland Rules exempt a sailing vessel of less than 12 meters from the requirement to carry a dayshape (cone, apex down) when also being propelled by machinery.
Rule 26: Fishing Vessels
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —This rule adopts a uniform system of lights for fishing vessels.
There are now separate lights for vessels trawling (green over white) and for all other fishing vessels (red over white).
Rule 27: Vessels not Under Command or Restricted in Their Ability to Maneuver
—In prescribing the lights and shapes for dredging and under- —New rules, not previously covered, water operations, the new Inland Rules do not specify masthead, side, and stem lights for vessels making way, as does the International version. Instead, the new Inland Rule discusses, in the corresponding subparagraph, the use of the same lights and shapes while at anchor.
—The new Inland Rules have added a light equivalent (red-white- red vertical) to the “rigid replica of the International Code Flag A” required for vessels engaged in diving operations which are too small to be expected to display the lights or dayshapes prescribed earlier in the rule for larger vessels.
—Unlike the 72 COLREGS, new Inland Rule 27 exempts vessels less than 12 meters long from the various lights and dayshapes prescribed in the rule (except for those involved in diving operations which must display the required lights and/or shapes no matter what their length).
Rule: 28 (Reserved)
—Because of the deletion of the “vessels constrained by their draft” provisions from the new Inland Rules, Rule 28 is simply marked “Reserved” in order to maintain the sequential correspondence of rule numbers between the two sets of rules.
Rule 29: Pilot Vessels
_ The new inland Rules add a phrase of clarification to the word- —The previous rules have been streamlined, and the rule for
ing concerning the lights and shapes required for a pilot vessel sailing pilot vessels has been dropped,
at anchor, but are otherwise identical.
Rule 30: Anchored Vessels and Vessels Aground
—The dayshapes and lights prescribed for anchoring are not —Only significant difference is the requirement for vessels longer
required in the new Inland version for vessels less than 20 meters than 100 meters to use working lights to illuminate their decks,
long when “. . .at anchor in a special anchorage area designated by the Secretary [of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating].” —The lights and shapes prescribed for vessels aground are not required of vessels less than 12 meters in length under the new Inland Rules (less than 7 meters in the International Rules).
Rule 31: Seaplanes
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —This is a new rule.
PART D: SOUND AND LIGHT SIGNALS
Rule 32: Definitions
—Similar to previous rules
Rule 33: Equipment for Sound Signals
—Specifications for whistles and bells are in Annex III.
—Same as 72 COLREGS.
—Same as 72 COLREGS.
Rule 34: Maneuvering
-—The signals of intent currently used under the present Inland Rules are preserved in the new version. The proposal-and-reply whistle signals were considered by the committee to be safer for Use on U. S. inland waterways than the action signals used on the high seas. Convenience is also a factor in that many inland routes are quite snake-like and would require an almost continuous sounding of the whistle were a vessel required to signal the action of his rudder rather than his intended passage of another vessel.
—The optional light used to supplement whistle signals found in the 72 COLREGs appears in the new Inland Rules as well, but the minimum visible range is two miles instead of five, and the light can be yellow instead of just white.
and Warning Signals
—The rule governing when whistle signals are required has been clarified—i.e., “. . . when they will meet or cross within a half of a mile of each other . . .” Whistle signals now may be supplemented by flashing lights. The prolonged blast is now used for entering a bend, and the long blast has been deleted. The use of the bridge-to-bridge radio to exchange signals has been codified.
—The undefined “long” blast has been eliminated from the new rules, but the requirement for a signal upon leaving a berth has been retained and changed to a prolonged blast.
—The new rules recognize bridge-to-bridge communications as legal substitutes for the meeting, crossing, and overtaking whistle signals.
Rule 35: Sound Signals in
— The new inland version adds the phrase “whether underway or at anchor’ ’ to vessels fishing and those restricted in their ability to maneuver in the requirement for sounding one prolonged and two short blasts during periods of restricted visibility.
—Vessels less than 20 meters long, as well as “a barge, canal boat, scow or other nondescript craft," are not required to sound fog signals while anchored in special areas designated by the secretary of the cabinet department in which the Coast Guard is operating.
Restricted Visibility
—The maximum interval between sound signals is now two minutes. Fog signals have now been added for a vessel not under command, a vessel under way but not making way, a vessel being towed, and a vessel aground. The signal previously only used by a towing vessel is now used by all vessels restricted in their ability to maneuver.
NEW INLAND RULES OF THE ROAD QUIZ
1. Which of the following vessels would he treated simply as a power-driven vessel under way?
A. A destroyer launching a helicopter.
B. An oil tanker whose draft restricts her to the channel.
C. A vessel trawling.
D. A tug whose tow severely restricts her maneuverability.
2. Vessel “A” has proposed overtaking vessel "B” on the latter’s port side in a narrow channel. Which signal would be an appropriate reply?
A. One short blast.
B. One prolonged blast, one short blast, one prolonged blast, one short blast.
C. Two short blasts.
D. One short blast, one prolonged blast, one short blast.
3. A partly submerged object <35 meters x 50 meters) being towed should exhibit:
A. Four all-round white lights to mark its length and breadth.
B. Sidelights and a sternlight.
C. Two vertical yellow lights.
D. No special lighting.
6. A power-driven vessel leaving a dock shall sound:
A. A long blast.
B. A short blast.
C. A prolonged blast.
D. No signal.
7. Which power-driven vessel is permitted to carry an all-round
white light in lieu of the second masthead and stern lights?
A. A vessel operating in inland waters only.
B. A vessel operating in international waters only.
C. A vessel whose function requires operating in both inland and international waters.
D. A vessel operating on the Great Lakes only.
8. A vessel minesweeping in daylight should display:
A. Two double frustrums of cones, black and white horizontally striped over red.
B. Three balls—one near the foremast and one at each yardarm.
C. Ball-diamond-ball arranged vertically.
D. No dayshape for minesweeping is provided for under the new Inland Rules.
4. A vessel aground should display what dayshape(s)?
A. One ball.
B. Two balls in a vertical line.
C. Three balls in a vertical line.
D. No dayshape.
9. A vessel not under command at night should display what lights:
A. Red-white-red vertically.
B. Three red vertically.
C. “Special flashing light.”
D. Two red vertically.
5. A yellow "special flashing light" is used to identify:
A. A minesweeper.
B. A self-propelled dredge under way.
C. A vessel being pushed ahead.
D. A dredge at anchor.
10. Two short blasts sounded by a vessel meeting another indicates:
A. “My rudder is left.”
B. “My rudder is right.”
C. “1 intend to leave you on my port side.”
D. “1 intend to leave you on my starboard side.”
Rule 36: Signals to Attract Attention
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —Similar to the old rules.
Rule 37: Distress Signal
—Same as 72 COLREGS. —Adopts the use of the internationally recognized signals. These
signals are contained in Annex IV.
PART E: EXEMPTIONS
Rule 38:
-—This section is of interest only on a one-time basis for vessel owners to determine whether their vessels are exempt from physical configuration changes.
Note: The remaining sections of Public Law 96-591 deal with fines, the establishment of supplementary annexes, the creation of a Rules of the Road Advisory Council to review both the Inland and International Rules, and establishment of the enactment date of the new rules.
Exemptions
—This rule delays/exempts certain portions of the new rules, such as construction requirements for lights, for vessels built in compliance with the old rules.
11. A “long" blast is sounded when:
A. Leaving a dock.
B. Approaching a blind bend.
C. Both a and b above.
D. Not used in new Inland Rules.
12. When a vessel in sight of another is in doubt as to the other’s intentions, the vessel in doubt should:
A. Immediately sound at least five short blasts.
B. Immediately sound four or more short blasts.
C. Signal “November Charlie" by light or flags.
D. Stop all engines as soon as practicable.
13. Which dayshape(s) is!are displayed by a vessel at anchor?
Id. A vessel “trolling" would have right-of-way over:
A. A vessel under sail (only).
B. A vessel launching aircraft.
C. A vessel displaying two balls vertically arranged.
D. Not recognized under the new Inland Rules.
15. An alternate to sounding one short blast in a meeting situation would be:
A. One prolonged followed by two short blasts.
B. Hoisting numeral pennant “one.”
C. Proposing a port-to-port passage via bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone.
D. There is no legal alternative.
16. A green light over a white light would be used by a vessel engaged in:
A. Sailing.
B. Trawling.
C. Towing.
D. Launching aircraft.
17. A vessel fishing while anchored during a period of restricted visibility (fog) would sound:
A. One prolonged followed by two short blasts.
B. Rapid ringing of the bell.
C. One prolonged blast.
D. No signal.
18. A power-driven vessel under way in fog would sound:
A. One prolonged blast every minute.
B. One prolonged blast every two minutes.
C. Two prolonged blasts every two minutes.
D. Five or more short blasts.
19. A vessel pushing another vessel ahead shall display what lights astern:
A. A yellow over white.
B. Two yellow lights arranged vertically.
C. A normal stern light.
D. A searchlight.
20. A sailing vessel 11 meters long must display what dayshape if proceeding with the help of an engine:
A. A cone apex down.
B. A cone apex up.
C. A diamond shape.
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D. No dayshape is required for a vessel of this length.
A Soviet View of Soviet Naval Doctrine and Perceptions
By Theodore A. Neely, Jr., and Donald C. Daniel
Editor’s Note: In recent years, we have published an annual feature which examines a year’s developments in the Soviet Navy. Publication of “The Soviet Navy in 1980,” encountered delays caused by the retirement of the feature's original author, Captain William H. J. Man- thorpe, Jr., the search for a qualified replacement or replacements, and a long security review process.
What follows is an extract from “The Soviet Navy in 1980.” We intend to publish “The Soviet Navy in 1981” in the April 1982 Proceedings.
One of the best windows on current Soviet naval doctrine and their perceptions of specific naval issues is their professional military literature. We can count ships and aircraft and observe exercises, but insights into such issues as Soviet intentions, views of war, and the general Soviet naval Weltmeranschauung are best captured by delving into the professional journals in which the Soviet naval leadership communicates with its own people. Sometimes this officially approved literature is interesting for what it discusses—other times, for what it fails to mention.
Soviet doctrine is closely intertwined with the Soviets’ perceptions of the Western threat and technological developments. Too often we fail to take these perceptions into account when looking at evolving Soviet doctrine and naval capabilities. This feature examines certain Soviet perceptions of naval issues in 1980 and the possible relationship of these perceptions to specific doctrinal issues. Much of the analysis is focused primarily on Morskoy Sbornik (The Soviet Naval Digest) because it is the Soviet Navy’s own official periodical and is most illustrative of current Soviet naval views on naval warfare today.
Strategic Strike Warfare: The Soviets show in their writings that they are giving a great deal of thought as to how the new generation of SSBNs—i.e., “Typhoon” and Trident—will be employed in war. This is natural in that strategic warfare—strategic strike, providing a strategic reserve, and strategic ASW—remains the main mission of the Soviet Navy. Since the Soviets cannot write about the “Typhoon” in the open press, Soviet authors review the U. S. SSBN programs in great detail, and, at the same time, provide their readers with an overall perception of where the strategic arms race at sea is headed, and thereby, to a degree, what we may expect of them in this arena. The operative Lenin quote in this context is that only a fool does not adopt the weapons of his enemy. We have learned that the Soviets are no fools, and are learning that their technology now allows them to compete with the West in most areas where they choose.
The Soviets claim to see a clear trend toward the U. S. use of SLBMs as first-strike weapons in a counterforce role against enemy ICBM silos. They could, however, in this case, be using the Trident as a surrogate for their “Typhoon” submarine and their own desire for a first-strike capability. They note that first-strike accuracy is dependent on how well an SSBN can determine her own launch position and velocity. They state that, by the mid-1980s, the Trident will be able to achieve CEPs (circular error probables) of about 180 meters and that CEPs of 180 meters and less will provide an almost 100% probability of destroying the enemy’s missile silos. It is interesting that, in addition to the use of navigational satellites to support SSBN operations, the Soviets list other ways of improving navigational accuracy—i.e., through the use of magnetic charts and sea-bottom relief charts. If these are indeed the best ways to improve SLBM launch accuracy and if one looks at the size of the Soviet scientific research fleet and their acknowledged prowess in the areas of marine geodesy and oceanography, then it would appear that the Soviets could be in a good position to markedly improve their SLBM accuracy over time.
Regardless of whether or not the United States is seeking a first-strike capability from the sea, the Soviets perceive that it is, and, as prudent planners, this perception will drive both their warfighting doctrine and their technological planning. A first- strike threat by Western SLBMs which jeopardizes Soviet ICBMs will presumably cause the Soviets to place ever greater emphasis on the viability and security of their sea-based strategic forces, and we may see even more assets allocated to the protection of those forces. Thus, the true mission of many of the new surface platforms and submarines now coming into service may be to provide sea control in support of that high-value Soviet SSBN force. On the other hand, if this is the true threat as perceived by the Soviets, and if they, in fact, are using the Trident as a surrogate for the “Typhoon,” then we may see a Soviet first-strike doctrine for at least part of the SSBN force emerging in the coming years.
Automation and Decision-Making: As the Soviet Navy continues to receive modern, sophisticated, high- value platforms such as the Kirov, “Oscar,” “Typhoon,” Sovremen- nyy, et al., it is clear that the naval high command is increasingly concerned about the quality of the leadership and the decision-making capabilities associated with the employment of this weaponry that matches the task. Thus, the key themes for 1980 in Morskoy Sbornik were the use of automation in decision-making and the commander’s role in making combat decisions and controlling forces.
Admiral Gorshkov set the tone with two major articles on the use of automation in the control of forces in naval warfare. Gorshkov used these somewhat esoteric articles to tell his naval commanders that the computer is a tool needed in modern naval warfare to expand the decision-maker’s body of knowledge and allow him to consider a broader range of options in a scientifically sound manner. While he hastened to add that the computer is only a tool and that it is the commander, using his own experience, who must make the ultimate decision, Gorshkov also made it clear that automated decision-making is the way of the future in the navy and that the naval officer must muster this emerging area of technology.
Gorshkov stated that centralized control is preferable in a naval operation, yet acknowledged that today’s fast-paced warfare sometimes precludes this. On the other hand, he
noted that today’s CO has a new weapon in his arsenal: special computer software embodying the “artificial collective intellect” of Soviet naval thinkers to aid him in decisionmaking and the control process. He placed great stress on the quality of the software, noting that the Soviet Navy now has a library of standard algorithms and programs to support not only the automation of a number of staff processes, but also the mathematical modeling of specific operations and combat actions.
Other articles in Morskoy Sbornik dwelled on the naval commander and factors influencing his decisions. These included, for example, “Chance in the Commander’s Decision” and the “Commander’s Thought Process in the Course of Making a Decision in Battle.”
Doctrinally, there are two factors driving the new Soviet emphasis on computers in the control of forces. The first is the stress on correlation of forces calculations in the decisionmaking process. For instance, the computer can quickly show the officer in tactical command (OTC) the number of missile and torpedo tubes he will need to bring to bear against a Western carrier task group of a certain size, what assets he has in the area, their status, the status of enemy forces, and the weather and sonar conditions in the battle area—in short, whether the correlation of forces is sufficiently favorable so that he should
The second factor is the Soviet penchant for control from above. This is the preferred option, but when conditions make this impossible, the software in the OTC’s computer will provide him first with the best “school” solution to his problem, and finally, if that solution is not adequate, he will make his own well-considered solution based on a standard decisionmaking philosophy instilled in him during his training. Thus, it appears that even in a situation where Soviet leaders have to delegate control to the deployed OTC, they will still retain an element of that control by providing commanders with their previously derived preferred option embodied in the new software. Moreover, presumably as these computer systems are further developed, the computers at various levels will talk to one another frequently, thereby updating all command levels on the situation at different operational levels.
Cruise Missile Technology: Another area where Soviet doctrine, perceptions, and technological developments are intertwined is in the field of cruise missile technology. With the appearance of the Kirov, “Oscar,” and Sovremennyy and further additions to the “Backfire” inventory in 1980, the Soviets continue to deploy a broad range of cruise missile platforms well suited for the sea control missions around the Eurasian periphery. With increasing emphasis by the Soviets on sea control operations to support the SSBN, to counter West ern carriers, and to support the flanks of the ground fronts, it is not surprising that Morskoy Sbornik should highlight the cruise missile problem and the attendant warfare areas impacting on it such as electronic warfare and air defense of task groups.
Thus, this year the Soviet navyman was provided with an in-depth treatment of what Admiral Gorshkov has called “the eternal competition between the means of attack and the means of defense.” Specifically, the strengths of the cruise missile, as the Soviets perceive them, and which they will presumably try to capitalize on include:
► The great destructive power and high accuracy of the antiship missile (ASM)
► The range of trajectories of ASMs that allow them to close on a target undetected
► The ability to launch ASMs from a broad range of platforms
► The ASMs’ low radar cross sections which make them difficult to detect with shipboard radars
► The fact that ASMs can be readied to fire quickly and can be employed in heavy weather conditions.
Doctrinally, the Soviets plan to capitalize on these qualities of their ASMs to control the sea against Western strike platforms in support of the Central Front and against Western ASW forces in support of the Soviet Navy’s SSBN forces. Technologically, they acknowledge some key weaknesses in the cruise missile system which we can presume they will be aiming to correct. These weaknesses include the subsonic speed of the ASM which allows defensive forces to detect it and react; its relative vulnerability to ship-based counter weapons; and its poor target selectivity and vulnerability to electronic countermeasures (ECM).
Doctrinally, the writings show that the Soviets will try to make up for these weaknesses by using surprise, by massing of forces, and by placing heavy emphasis on electronic warfare
to support their strike forces whenever possible.
Other articles on cruise missile technology discussed in detail Western cruise missile systems such as Tomahawk, Harpoon, Exocet, etc., and the tactics of employing these systems, U. S. shipboard electronic warfare systems used to counter the ASM threat, and even Western “plans” to use dirigibles to protect task groups from the ASM threat. Admiral Gorshkov has said that the competition between offensive and defensive systems “will continue with unwavering intensity,” and this would certainly appear true for the decade of the 1980s in the cruise missile field.
Antisubmarine Warfare: It is sometimes interesting to also observe what the Soviets have not stressed in their professional literature in a given year. For example, two major articles in Morskoy Sbornik on U. S. SSBN forces failed to mention the quietness of their propulsion plants and their ability to remain undetected by ASW forces during their patrols. Moreover, except for a minor article on the training of the shipboard ASW team, the journal did not feature ASW in 1980. This new lack of emphasis on ASW is quite puzzling. We can only guess what might occasion such a hiatus of articles on such an important subject. It might be a pause prior to the discussion of new approaches to ASW. It will be interesting to see what the future of ASW will be in the Soviet Navy.
Soviet Navy Day Themes: Soviet Navy Day statements in 1980 were quietly upbeat, showing an increasing confidence in the growing naval might of this continental power. Key themes were a slightly increased emphasis on surface forces, obviously in acknowledgement of the new classes of major surface combatants coming on line, stress on political themes in preparation for the scheduled 26th Communist Party Congress in February 1981, and increased polemics against the West in response to Western attacks on the U.S.S.R. for its involvement in Afghanistan.
Most interesting, of course, was the elevated treatment of the surface forces. Traditionally, key Soviet Navy Day writers have pointed to the two main arms of the navy —submarines and aviation—and then have gone on to note that the navy also had surface ships, mainly to provide combat stability to their SSBN force. In contrast, on Navy Day 1980, in his Pravda interview, Admiral Gorshkov referred to the surface ships as an important integral part of the navy, while Soviet Naval Aviation was described only as “an important component of the Soviet Navy’s strike forces.” Moreover, this year, the missile, gunnery, torpedo, ASW, and mine warfare capabilities of the surface forces were stressed, while the old theme of providing communications support and combat stability to the submarine force was missing. It appears that the Soviet Navy may now be able to come out and justify the construction of surface ships for their own utility as opposed to justifying them purely for their role in anti- and pro-SSBN warfare. We also must not forget that Admiral Gorshkov was a surface warfare officer who must be proud of his new major combatants, the most visible manifestation of the U.S.S.R.’s emerging naval might.
Tactical Doctrine: As the Soviets bring more Kiev- and Kirov-class units on line, they may have to adjust their tactical doctrine to protect these high- value units in much the same way as Western navies protect similar units. A December 1980 item in Red Star, the news organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, may be one of the first descriptions of such a doctrinal shift. It describes the “Kara”-class cruiser CG Kerch, which the Soviets call a large ASW ship (BPK), as acting as an escort, screening the “main target” in a Soviet ship formation. In the past, BPKs have usually been described as acting as a part of a hunter- killer group, prosecuting a datum, or as part of an ASW barrier. The term “main target” has usually been reserved to describe the high-value unit in the enemy task group, presumably a carrier, which was under attack by Soviet submarine or strike aircraft. Now, we see the Kerch, possibly in light of the advent of the Kirov and Kiev, making “antisubmarine and antitorpedo maneuvers” to protect its own “main target” (read high-value target). It will be interesting to see if this is truly a shift in the use of the Soviet BPK and what role the new destroyers and older ASW escorts will play in the development of Soviet task group doctrine.
Soviet writings parallel the significant naval hardware developments already identified in earlier issues of the Proceedings. Writings provide insights into Soviet naval thinking on the use of new cruise missile platforms such as the Kirov CGN and the “Oscar” SSGN and the new “Typhoon” SSBN. The heavy emphasis on the topics of automation and decisionmaking reveals a concern on the part of the Soviets to increase the efficient use of the forces now entering their fleet. In short, the Soviets indicate both in writings and naval construction that they are thinking about their requirements for warfare at sea and are preparing for it.
Mr. Neely is a Soviet affairs analyst with the Department of the Navy. He translated the series of articles by Soviet Admiral Gorshkov published by the Naval Institute under the title Red Star Rising at Sea.
Mr. Daniel is an associate professor with the Department of National Security Affairs, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. His book, Srategic Military Deception will be published shortly by the Pergamon Press.
The Soviet Baltic Fleet: an Amphibious Force in Being
By Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U. S. Navy
The Soviets now almost completely dominate the Baltic. World War II not only restored Soviet control over the entrances to the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, but also extended Soviet frontiers along the entire eastern shore of the Baltic. The inclusion of
Poland and East Germany into the Warsaw Pact brought Soviet control/ influence westward almost to the neck of the Jutland Peninsula. Thus, the Soviet Union gained entrance to several key ports along the Baltic littoral: Klaipeda, Kaliningrad, Baltiisk,
Gdynia, Szezcin, Swinoujscie, and Rostock, to name the most important. The remainder of the southern coast, washed by the waters of the Mecklenburg and Kiel bays, as well as the Little Belt and the adjacent waterways of the Baltic Approaches, are
controlled by West Germany and Denmark. The northern shores of the Baltic Approaches belong, of course, to Norway and Sweden.
Unfortunately for the Western countries, the coastline under NATO control is ideally suited for amphibious operations. Further, NATO-controlled waters in the western Baltic are, for the most part, shallow and restricted—i.e., conducive to mine warfare. It is only in moving eastward into the Arcona Basin and further into the central Baltic that the depth and maneuvering room improve to the point that the larger NATO warships and submarines could be employed effectively in combat.
An additional consideration, and one which places severe operational constraints on NATO naval forces operating in the Baltic, is the fact that, from the Approaches in the west to the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia in the north, any ship is within the combat ranges of Pact land-based aircraft.
Today, a Soviet-inspired crisis in the Baltic poses a direct threat to Scandinavia, West Germany, and NATO. However, the significance of control of the Baltic and its Approaches does not lie in the question of access to Baltic ports or whether or not the Soviet Baltic Fleet can reach the North Sea unimpeded. Control of the Baltic is intimately tied to control of the northern flank of the Central Front. Further, such control would act as a hinge upon which swings the ultimate fate of Norway. The preservation or fall of Norway influences events in the Norwegian and North seas, the English Channel, and the North Atlantic.
A Soviet thrust in the Baltic would more than likely be matched by similar movement in the Mediterranean and Barents seas. In a Central Front scenario, this pincer strategy would have two objectives: to turn the flanks of the Central Front and to dismantle the northern tier of NATO. By cutting off and subduing Norway, the transit lanes to the North Atlantic would be open to exploitation by the Soviet Navy’s Northern Fleet submarines and larger surface ships. In this strategy, the Baltic Fleet plays a significant role in that it can serve the dual purpose of turning the northern flank of the Central Front and, at the same time, isolating Norway. Both of these objectives can be accomplished by the successful execution of amphibious operations in the Mecklenburg and Kiel bays, as well as on the Jutland Peninsula.
An understanding of the Baltic Fleet’s role involves the need to appreciate Soviet military emphasis on a combined-arms doctrine. Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet military literature has consistently espoused the concept of a combined-arms doctrine and the necessity of joint operations in order to achieve operational and strategic goals. Major General Pokrovsky, writing in 1956, stated that “without well organized combined operations of all arms and services— land armies, aviation, and the navy— one cannot successfully wage contemporary war.” Admiral Gorshkov informed us in 1979 that “an important task of Soviet military strategy is to unite all components of the military power of the state,” and “modern military operations represent the joint employment of various branches of the Armed Forces in the name of achieving a common goal.” In addition, as early as 1962, Marshal Sokolovskiy, in his book Soviet Military Strategy, and, as late as 1979, Admiral Gorshkov, in his book Sea Power of the State (2nd edition), stated that one of the navy’s missions is to provide support to the ground forces. Consistent with the combined-arms doctrine and the navy’s assigned mission
of support, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1978) contains a discussion of “naval operations” as one of two categories of the navy’s employment in combat (the other being “systematic combat operations”). Included in this discussion is the statement that the joint aspect of naval operations “consists of amphibious landings; anti-landing actions; and operations on the seaward flanks of the Front.” A listing of independent naval operations does not include amphibious warfare.
With these concepts in mind and the fact that control of the Baltic and its Approaches would allow the Soviets to turn the flank of the Central Front, let us review the Baltic Fleet’s order of battle. The composition of this fleet and the Warsaw Pact navies should provide an indication of their intended role.
The Soviet Navy’s Baltic Fleet consists of approximately 12 surface combatants of destroyer size or larger. Included in this number are: a Sverd- lov-class cruiser; “Kresta 11” and “Kashin”-class ASW ships; “Kresta I,” “mod-Kashin,” and “mod- Kildin”-class rocket ships and “Kotlin”-and Skoryy-c\ass destroyers. Finally, the escort ships of the “Krivak,” “Riga,” “Mirka,” and “Petya” classes (approximately 33 ships) make up the remainder of the larger surface units. Compared with the same types of ships in the Black Sea Fleet, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet possesses only 60% of the Black Sea Fleet’s strength. On the other hand, there are approximately 30 amphibious warfare ships assigned to the Baltic, including “Ropucha”-class LSTs, “Polnocny”-class LSMs, various LCT and LCUs, and approximately 17 hovercraft of the “Gus,” “Lebed,” and “Aist” classes. This is not to say that the Baltic Fleet possesses a preponderance of amphibious ships relative to other fleets. Rather, the Baltic Fleet has fewer major surface ships assigned than the other fleets and therefore, the amphibious force is disproportionately larger.
In addition to Soviet assets, the Warsaw Pact navies of East Germany and Poland can supplement Soviet amphibious operations with approximately 55 amphibious warfare ships, ranging from the East German “Frosch”-class LST to the Polish “Polnocny”-class LSM and the newer, but smaller “Marabut”-class LCM.
At the same time, the East German and Polish navies do not possess large surface combatants. The largest ships are the two East German “Koni”- class frigates (Soviet built) and a Polish (ex-Soviet) missile-armed “Ko- tlin” destroyer. The preponderance of ships in the orders of battle of these two navies is in the patrol-fast attack and minesweeping categories.
As would be expected of a force operating in the restricted waters of the Baltic, small combatants are of critical importance. Each type of force has its role, and of these, the minesweeping arm is the vanguard of Soviet amphibious operations. The importance of this force is heightened by the narrow sheltered waters under NATO control along the Jutland coast and in the Approaches. These ships would be deployed in advance of an amphibious landing attempt and, in a large-scale sweeping effort, the Soviets could employ 40 ocean sweepers of the newer “Natya” and older “Yurka,” “T-43,” and “T-58” classes. In addition, and of particular importance, is the availability of approximately 90 coastal and inshore minesweepers. These craft could operate along the beaches and in the inlets which dominate the Jutland coast and the Approaches. East Germany could provide about 50 “Kondor”- class coastal sweepers, and Poland about 24 ocean sweepers (including the Polish Krogulec and Soviet-built “T-43” classes) and more than 30 coastal and inshore minesweepers.
Another key aspect of amphibious warfare operations is protection of the force in transit. The Pact navies in the Baltic are particularly well suited for such an operation. The Soviets alone can deploy more than 100 patrol craft, and East Germany and Poland combined could augment the Soviet force with an additional 100. Included in this inventory is the “SS-N-2”-equipped “Osa” and a mix of gun-, torpedo-, and depth charge-carrying craft that could easily saturate the defenses of any NATO surface force in the area.
A final element of strength that must be considered is Soviet Naval Aviation. The Baltic Fleet has more strike aircraft (“Backfires,” “Badgers,” and “Blinders”) in its inventory than any of the other three fleets. There are approximately 140 strike aircraft available, and they are complemented by about 40 tanker-, reconnaissance-, and electronic warfare-capable aircraft. The Baltic Fleet also has significantly fewer ASW aircraft (“Mays,” “Mails,” “Hormones,” etc.) than any other fleet. On the other side of the coin, Poland can offer only limited assistance, and East Germany does not have a naval air arm.
The punch represented by the Soviets’ Baltic naval air assets raises some questions. Why is there a preponderance of such aircraft, equipped with sophisticated missilery, located in an area where the missiles will be less effective, where there will be a limited number of large targets, and the range of most of these modern aircraft exceeds the requirements of the area under consideration? The range of the aircraft plus the range of the missiles they carry would indicate that their targets are not restricted to the Baltic Sea area.
It is more likely that these aircraft are intended to close down any possible seaborne NATO effort to resupply the Jutland Peninsula or to respond to Soviet moves in the Approaches. The Baltic naval air threat stretches through the English Channel into the Bay of Biscay and into the Atlantic around the British Isles, into the Norwegian Sea and, of course, the North Sea. No doubt the Soviets would face significant antiair defenses en route to these waters, but they may be counting on their drive into Central Europe to draw off Western fighter aircraft from the coast. This would obviously be a factor in any combined-arms planning such as would be expected in a Baltic-Central Front effort.
On the other hand, most of these aircraft can be equipped for conventional bombing. Although this type of activity would provide an assist for a seaborne assault, it is this writer’s opinion that the central theme of Soviet Naval Air operations in the Baltic will be reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and air-to-surface strike operations. Consistent with the combined-arms concept of operation, it could be expected that Air Army and Frontal Aviation assets will be employed in support of an amphibious assault. The Yak-28s could provide reconnaissance, while the MiG-23 “Floggers,” Su-19 “Fencers,” and the Tu-16 “Badgers” would furnish bomber support.
A combined-arms scenario, including an amphibious assault in the Baltic could be constructed as follows.
The initial objective of the operation would be seizure of the Kiel Canal and Schleswig-Holstein, followed by a thrust into Denmark and seizure of the Approaches. The larger ships of the Soviet amphibious force would deploy from Soviet ports and would be joined by elements of the Polish and East German navies. Minesweeping and offensive mining would commence to seal off the intended beachhead. Naval aircraft would conduct reconnaissance and vector strike aircraft against any major surface threat. Simultaneously, land-based fighter aircraft would provide cover for the movement. En route, Pact patrol craft would augment Soviet forces in any engagement with an inshore naval threat, while strike aircraft and the missile-equipped “Osas” would perform coordinated strikes against any force attacking from the sea.
Inland, a coordinated paradrop and heloborne assault would be executed forward of the advancing Central Front forces and forward of the intended amphibious assault point. The paratroops would be expected to seize key transportation junctions, thereby precluding the marshaling of NATO forces in the assault area. The MiG- covered Mi-6 “Hook” and Mi-8 “Hip” heloborne shock troops would be expected to envelop airfields, command posts, and other key military objectives in or adjacent to the assault zone.
Seaward, the accompanying Sver- dlov cruiser with her 156-mm. guns, and the “Krivaks,” “Mirkas,” “Petyas,” and “Rigas,” armed with 76mm. guns, would perform escort duties en route and provide light shore bombardment, along with the rocket- equipped “Polnocnys,” before and during the actual assault. The nature of the coast and the proximity of resupply points to the area of operation can be exploited by the Soviet highspeed hovercraft. For the initial assault, the hovercraft would probably launch from behind the front rather than travel in company with the main force. Once the initial beachhead was established, they could be used in a resupply capacity and then either operate against the offshore islands or carry assault elements in a leap frog action up the coast.
The heavy emphasis on amphibious warfare capability for the Baltic Fleet and its strategic location astride the northern flank of the Central Front are sufficient to predict the role of this fleet in a wartime situation. It is also apparent that Soviet military strategists have established the framework for combined-arms planning, and the Soviet naval leadership has accepted a ground force support role as a mission of the navy. It can be assumed then, that by the nature of its environs and its equipment, the Soviet Baltic Fleet is designed to be an integral component of the forces making up the Central Front, and, based on the hypothesized scenario portrayed above, the Baltic Fleet is assigned the right kinds of forces to carry out its support mission. Neither the types of ships, individually or collectively, nor their total number would indicate that an independent role for the fleet is planned.
Captain Whelan is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings on Soviet naval topics.
North to Alaska-------------------
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Dane S. Egli,
The USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB-11) departed Seattle on 20 January 1981 to conduct Arctic West Winter 1981 (AWW-81) ship operations in support of the scientific goals of the United States. Nine days later, after two medical evacuations, she entered the ice 280 miles north of Unimak Pass. Ahead of the ship lay the challenge of the ice-covered waters of the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas. North of the Bering Strait and along the west slope of Alaska, the ice thickness in-
U. S. Coast Guard
creased to four to five feet, and pressure ridges, caused by strong winds and surface currents, became more common.
During the first phase of the mission, data on ship performance and environment were collected to study the feasibility of year-round marine transportation from Alaska’s north slope. The Polar Sea provided information on ice conditions along potential Arctic trade routes and defined operational requirements for corn- mercial icebreaking ships.
The two weeks after phase one were filled with a series of mishaps which changed the direction of the deployment. On 13 February, while operating in heavy multi-year ice off Point Barrow where no other ship had operated before in the winter, the ship’s rudder and steering engine were damaged so severely that both had to be secured. The Polar Sea turned south to continue the mission, using her engines for steering as well as propulsion.
After leaving Point Barrow, the first 35 miles of icebreaking offered the stiffest challenge the Polar Sea has ever encountered. Winds from the north had pressed multi-year floes against the coast, and the Chukchi pack was under tremendous pressure. On the northbound transit, the ship’s route had been adjusted to take advantage of shore leads from Wain- wright to Point Barrow, but that route was now blocked by some of the heaviest ice fields in the world. Ice reconnaissance flights by the ship’s heli-
copters did not reveal any significant leads. The ship kept moving, but with a very poor ratio of fuel consumption to miles covered.
On 18 February, while operating on three gas turbines, the ship was driven into a cul-de-sac of floes with enough forward momentum to lift her onto the ice. A decision was made to stop and profile the ice floes, waiting until the field relaxed to move again. It was a bad call with temperatures in the -40°F range. Once the turbines were secured and the cold allowed to take hold, it was five days before all three turbines were able to be lit off simultaneously to provide the necessary backing power. The field did not relax during this period. The ship was 27 miles southwest of Point Barrow. Profiling showed that the Polar Sea was wedged between two multi-year floes measuring 60 to 80 feet thick. Five hundred pounds of explosives were expended in two futile attempts to blast the ship free of her prison. Once the three turbines came on line, however, the ship backed clear in half an hour.
The Polar Sea resumed her transit south on 23 February. On 25 February, while making slow progress through heavy ice floes, she suffered damage to the port shaft. It too had to be secured for the remainder of the deployment. The ship now was no longer capable of completing her scheduled AWW-81 missions and was beset. The only U. S. icebreakers capable of offering assistance were operating in Antarctica.
The ship’s company began the necessary preparations to winter over in the ice. One-third of the crew was evacuated. The remaining crew members commenced shutting down nonvital machinery to conserve fuel. Utility services were reduced to a level required to sustain health but not necessarily comfort. Everything was turned off that could be without affecting the ship’s safety and her readiness to move if conditions would allow.
On 13 March, the ship’s mission was dubbed the Polar Sea drift project 81 (PSDP81), making the ship an official drift station tasked with obtaining valuable meteorological and oceanographic information as she drifted in the Chukchi Sea. The drift pattern for the first month was to the northwest, toward the U.S.S.R. This pattern was most undesirable because of the probability of entering the Trans Polar Drift System and the permanent polar pack. By the end of March, the ship had drifted to a position 180 miles west of Point Barrow. The ice conditions worsened. The ship was surrounded by mountainous ridges and heavy ice floes. Scientists profiled an ice ridge with a sail (height above water) and keel (depth below water) that combined to give it a thickness of 90 feet.
Meanwhile, work on the rudder continued; the crew cleared away as much of the damaged metal on the steering engine as possible and made temporary realignments. An emergency tiller arrangement was fabricated and installed so use of the rudder could be attempted if the ice conditions permitted.
Near the end of March, some small leads began to appear as ice floes shifted and wind shifts relieved ice pressures around the ship. The rudder was used cautiously in attempts to reach nearby leads, which finally resulted in breaking free of the immediate heavy floes, even though the ship was hundreds of miles from the ice edge. The ship moved slowly south out of the multi-year fields into a combination of multi-year and first-year fields. During this time, workable parameters for ship movement had to be defined by trial and error. The need to move south always had to be balanced with the need to conserve enough fuel to survive until help could arrive if the ship were to remain beset.
Ice reconnaissance flights scouted ice conditions and helped the ship pick her way through the available leads. By the end of April, the ship had rounded Cape Lisburne and would soon reach the receding ice edge off Cape Prince of Wales.
After 104 days in the ice, the Polar Sea and her 100 ice-breaking sailors exited the pack on 13 May. The ship entered Todd Shipyard in Seattle to repair damages sustained during her recent deployment and to prepare for her second trip to the Antarctic. The Polar Sea is currently back on duty in the ice—this time participating in Deep Freeze 1982.
Lieutenant Egli made one Antarctic and two Arctic deployments on board the Polar Sea. He is currently the executive officer of the USCGC Biscayne Bay (WTGB-104), a 140-foot icebreaking tug stationed in the Great Lakes.
The Joint Staff—Career Boost or Bust?
By Captain J. C. McLaurin, U. S. Navy
The skid marks leading from the Pentagon’s fourth deck to the first deck were mine. I really didn’t want to leave a challenging, interesting assignment in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) for a job on the Joint Staff. But, Vice Admiral Patrick J. Hannifin, then Director of the Joint Staff, and Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, then Op- 60B—Strategy, Plans and Policy Division—thought differently. Now, I’m glad I had that tour. Here’s why.
First, the Joint Staff needs good naval officers. This staff strives to ensure that the options it offers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the best ones for U. S. national security. They believe that a wide variety of expert input is needed and that all alternatives should be heard. Advice from naval officers is sought and carefully considered. Imagine the possible consequences if one were to attempt a Lebanon-type evacuation with utility landing craft without remembering to consult the tide tables.
In OpNav, there is a surfeit of talent. But the Joint Staff has not been at the top of the preference card for ship drivers and naval aviators. It needs experts in antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface Warfare, special operations, law, and Personnel management. For those who answer the call, there is great satisfaction in pitching in and doing well.
Second, the Navy needs good officers on the Joint Staff. One is not asked to forget his parent service While working on the Joint Staff. On the contrary, he is requisitioned on the basis of his background and is expected to stay current in developments within his service.
Therefore, it is in the Navy’s best interest to have knowledgeable people providing input to the JCS decisionmaking process. There are occasions when time does not permit full service coordination on important issues and the Joint Staff must provide positions from in house.
The Army and Air Force seem to concur with this line of reasoning, for they have traditionally assigned very capable officers to key positions on the Joint Staff.
Third, it is important and enriching work. The Joint Chiefs are the military advisors to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. The joint staffer climbs above service issues and helps formulate and execute national security policy. He deals with the staffs of the highest levels of government.
To carry out this role, the Joint Staff is organized into four primary directorates: J-3, J-4, J-5, and C3S. The J-3 oversees operations and exercises. For example, the conduct of the National Military Command Center is a J-3 responsibility. During a crisis, J-3 is the prime-mover, and in the past couple of years, we have had several crises: Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Guyana.
J-4 manages the logistics. It was J-4 that rapidly responded to the top- level decision to strengthen our military capability in the Persian Gulf area. Within the space of a few months, seven near-term prepositioned ships were chartered, loaded, and on station at Diego Garcia. Moreover, top-level approval has been received for the purchase of SL-7s (33- knot, containerized transports). This was no small feat.
J-5 is the plans and policy directorate. Among many tasks, J-5 prepared material for the Chairman, JCS, for meetings at the White House or testimony before Congress, reviewed the operation plans drafted by the unified commanders, and provided support for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiating team. J-5 action officers helped conduct the nuclear targeting policy review so often discussed in the media.
C3S stands for command, control, and communications systems. To carry out the above-mentioned targeting policy against an increasingly sophisticated threat, C3S requirements have risen exponentially. It was C3S that had to explain to the White House the details behind the false missile warning signals in late 1979.
Fourth, the next time we fight, the four services will fight together, so we should think and train together. I am reminded of my own experience in ASW. For such a long time, combined ASW was paid lip service. When we finally learned the capabilities of each other’s platforms (VP, DD, LAMPS,
VS, HS, SSN) and exercised together, we were surprised at how much more effective on station we could be.
If the next military engagement for the United States is in the Persian Gulf region, then resources from all four services will have to be used. The area is too far away and too deficient in base support for any one service to handle a fighting mission there. Moreover, that’s what the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is all about—being able to respond rapidly to contingencies a long way from home. So it would behoove senior and middle management to learn more about our joint capabilities, and to plan and exercise with other services.
Fifth, there is a trend toward better appreciation for the Joint Staff s role. Upon learning that I was moving to the Joint Staff, some of my friends said things like, “kiss of death,” and “we’ll never hear from you again.” That may have been the way things were at one time, but I believe that the trend is otherwise now. For one thing, people who have reviewed the organization of the JCS objectively have recommended more independence for the Joint Staff—less of a requirement to reflect the coordinated service position. If and when this institutional change comes about, you will then see a lively interest in stocking the Joint Staff pond. Moreover, the Secretary of the Navy’s instructions to the fiscal year 1980 captain selection board asked that the board give full consideration to service with joint staffs. Finally, as affirmed by Vice Admiral C. T. Hanson, Director Joint Staff at the time of this writing: “There was a time when naval officers feared their promotion potential would suffer if they were on the Joint Staff. There is no basis for such concern today. Of 14 Joint Staff commanders in the fiscal year 81 promotion zone, 11 were selected for captain—far better than the fleet average.”
Joint operations are here to stay. The true professional will want to be a part of the joint effort.
Captain McLaurin, a commander when this manuscript was submitted, is now serving with OP-OOX, Director, Long-Range Planning.
Strategic Seabed Minerals and Freedom of Navigation
By Burdick H. Brittin
Area of U.S. Naval Task Force Exercise
Libya claims territorial waters including entire Gulf or Sidra
On 19 August 1981, two F-14 fighters from the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) responded to an airborne missile attack and shot down two Libyan fighters some 60 miles off the Libyan coast. The action immediately received worldwide attention.
From the standpoint of the United States, the response by the Navy F-14s was based on the right of a nation to act in self-defense. Further, the U. S. planes were operating in international waters beyond the territorial sea of any country. They had a right to be there while conducting naval exercises which had, in fact, been publicized through a normal notice to mariners.
The Libyans charged that the U. S. aircraft had penetrated the air over Libya’s territorial sea and internal waters without permission and consequently had no right to be there. This claim was based on a 1973 decree in which Libya unilaterally declared sovereignty over the waters and airspace of the Gulf of Sidra extending more than 100 miles into the Mediterranean Sea. Beyond the 295-mile closure line (between the coastal cities of Misratah and Benghazi), the Libyan 12-mile territorial sea claim extends the country’s sovereignty even farther.
Behind the above incident is the still-incomplete Law of the Sea draft treaty; portions of the seabed minerals regime still have to negotiated. All other regimes governing major uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation, have been negotiated. A general consensus of the 150 participating countries has been achieved after several reviews of the draft treaty text. Among other provisions, the treaty includes the thesis that a state does not have the right to claim a territorial sea of more than 12 miles, the closing line for bays and gulfs shall not exceed 24 miles. A right-of-transit passage through straits is also a dom-
inant feature of navigation.
Should the law of the sea effort be successfully completed, these navigational provisions would markedly reduce the probability of incidents such as the Libyan shootdown.
However, there is an impediment to the successful conclusion of the treaty. In March 1981, the new U. S. administration announced that it was going to review the entire Law of the Sea text. Prior administrations had done the same without interruption of the proceedings, but in this case, the principals of the U. S. negotiating team were summarily replaced. The delegation was then instructed to stall negotiations pending completion of the review. One result was to have 150 delegations chafing at the United Nations in New York for the six-week spring session. This abrupt U. S. action was triggered by the dissatisfaction of some U. S. mining companies with certain draft provisions concerning access to seabed mineral resources and related issues. Possibly
MALTA
TUNISIA
Misratah'
as a result of the review, the United States indicated that it would rather drop the treaty effort and go it alone. Some U. S. spokesmen have proposed that in that situation the United States could depend on customary law to protect its essential freedom of navigation.
Regarding that proposition, the key reason for the inception of the third Law of the Sea Conference was to address the question of a uniform breadth of the territorial sea which is the underpinning of freedom of navigation. This was also the basis for the 1930 Hague Conference, the 1958 Law of the Sea Geneva Conference, and the following 1960 Conference, all of which failed. But how is a country such as the United States, standing alone, to obtain international understandings outside of an international forum? Experience shows that without a worldwide treaty the oceans will continue to be a bewildering, dispute- ridden patchwork of claims. How does the United States convince Lib-
THE WASHINGTON POST (D. COOK)
Cuff of Sidra
MILES
Law of the sea is often thought of as a high-up-and-far-away subject—to be discussed “later.” Two U. S. Navy F-14 crews, however, recently found themselves on the cutting edge of this issue—high up and far away over the Gulf of Sidra.
Benghazi
ya that Libya should have the same view on jurisdictional claims as the United States does? How does one approach the many Latin American countries which still subscribe to a 200-mile territorial sea pending worldwide agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea? Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired), in an address in June 1981 on “National Security and the Law of the Sea” presents this view:
“As to bilateral agreements with coastal states on navigation and overflight, anyone familiar with the political, military and economic complications of base rights negotiations would avoid this alternative like the plague. The bargain is often fragile and temporary. . . . Moreover, the concessions and costs are generally high. Further, U. S. interests in global mobility are worldwide and not limited to particular ocean areas. Finally, adoption of a bilateral or regional approach would undermine support for a comprehensive ocean regime.”
Any alternative to seeking worldwide agreement through the treaty- niaking process has little to no chance for success.
Some administration spokesmen consider access to strategic seabed minerals as important as freedom of navigation from the standpoint of national security. In response to that proposition, it is instructive to investigate how countries have reacted to challenges to freedom of navigation and access to ocean resources. Many countries, including the United States, have fought wars over challenges to the principle of freedom of navigation.
► The sinking of neutral shipping by German submarines in World War I produced U. S. entry into the war.
► In 1967, Egypt declared that no shipping destined for Israel would be allowed to enter the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran. Israel responded by starting the Six-Day War less than 24 hours after the declaration.
► At this writing, the United States, along with some allies, is maintaining a battle fleet in the Arabian Sea, in large part, in response to Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz.
There is no equivalent history to mining seabeds because it is a new technology. But there is a history of harvesting living resources of the oceans that includes disputes.
► For more than 30 years, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States have had a running dispute over the harvesting of tuna by U. S. fishing boats in an area within 200 miles of either Peru or Ecuador. A mechanism for reducing that dispute is contained in the draft treaty of the Law of the Sea Conference.
► Similarly, one of the long-standing disputes between Iceland and the United Kingdom involved cod fishing off Iceland by vessels from both countries. It was frequently referred to as the “Cod War;” eventually actions by the International Court of Justice and understandings reached between the two governments quieted that abrasive dispute.
Past actions, including the Libyan incident, indicate that the principle of freedom of navigation strikes a more sensitive chord in sovereign states than do disputes over ocean resources. Looking at the question of seabed resources and freedom of navigation from a different perspective, it is a fact that strategically important manganese and cobalt are both limited source minerals—they are also mined in countries which have differing political perspectives than those of the United States. Both minerals are plentiful in seabed nodules. Therefore, there are two basic situations to be considered.
► Wartime availability: No surplus or stockpile of strategic minerals existed in the United States prior to World War II, but the United States managed to receive a sufficient supply during the war. Under present legislation, which is keyed to national security needs, the United States now has stockpiles of manganese and cobalt. In an emergency the continued supply of these strategic minerals from foreign ports would be subject to the hazards of wartime shipping. Even more vulnerable would be seabed mining operations because they are static in a common area. This national security need is expressed in terms of a stockpile sufficient for three years’ use.
Defense Department war duration criteria are as follows: nuclear war— less than one year; conventional NATO war—90 days to 3 years. Presently, the manganese stockpile almost doubles the three-year requirement. Cobalt, under a 1980 requirement, is approximately 50% of the three-year objective. For wartime, stockpiling it provides the United States with flexibility.
► Peacetime availability: Manganese and cobalt are 2 of 20 metals imported by the United States to the extent of 50% to 100% of requirements. All of them are subject to the specter of OPEC-type cartels; fortunately, manganese and cobalt are also found on the ocean seabeds beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Should effective cartels be established for those two minerals, the United States would have the option to turn more to seabed sources.
But what is the likelihood of cartels for minerals? The majority of experts and scholars in the field note that, unlike OPEC, once a minerals cartel is formed its chance for successfully controlling the marketplace is low. Studies indicate that the likelihood of sustained cartel action is remote. If this oft-stated conclusion is valid, the OPEC-style cartel specter should not be a basis for establishing the criticality of placing emphasis on seabed resources. It appears that the need for source countries to sell minerals is as great as the U. S. need to acquire them.
One of the conclusions that can be drawn is that while seabed nodules are certainly of great importance to the United States, the accessibility of foreign source minerals and U. S. stockpile activities challenge the proposition that seabed minerals are on the same plane of criticality as freedom of navigation. That does not mean that the United States should not continue to press for the best possible arrangements in the Law of the Sea forum for access to seabed minerals, but in doing so the United States should not jeopardize the finely tuned structure in the Law of the Sea draft treaty protecting freedom of navigation.
An amplification of that thought is pertinent. Well over a decade has been expended in negotiating a comprehensive draft treaty yet to be completed. An array of articles on the primary uses of the seas has been hammered out, reaching the acknowledged consensus of the delegations. Among these regimes are freedom of navigation, transit through straits, marine scientific research, pollution control, conservation of living resources and fishing, continental shelf resources, and settlement of disputes. These regimes were not easy to negotiate, nor are they entirely favorable to any one country.
In the United States, the primary users of these activities understand
Despite the crash between an Icelandic Coast Guard vessel and a Royal Navy destroyer escort during the Cod War, disputes over ocean resources seem less volatile and far- reaching than those associated with freedom of navigation.
and indeed took part in the negotiating process. Today, their collective opinion appears to be that the gains accruing to the United States under the draft articles outweigh what might be termed losses in specific regimes.
The negotiating process for the seabed regime must continue until a consensus is reached, including satisfactory access to seabed resources. If not, the fabric of the entire body of sea law can begin to unravel, not only causing more severe problems in attempting to harvest seabed resources but also jeopardizing the fundamental freedom of navigation.
This unraveling potential is best exemplified by the reaction of the delegates during this year’s spring session when no real progress could be made on the seabed negotiations because of the U. S. decision to tread water until a review had been completed. The conference witnessed a clear warning. Some 70 delegations chose to intervene on questions involving freedom of navigation which had been considered completed draft articles more than three years ago with no meaningful interventions since then.
Is the Law of the Sea Treaty viable? Yes, provided the negotiation on the seabed issues can reach a consensus. The alternative to timely completion of the treaty could lead to ocean anarchy inviting disputes and conflicts.
Should that occur, no country would be the winner; collectively, the world community’s choice is clearly to work | together to ensure tranquility on, | over, and in the oceans.
I subscribe to a thought once expressed by an early Roman Emperor—Antoninus: “I am the master of the earth, but the law is the mistress of the seas.”
Mr. Brittin, an advisor on ocean issues, is serving on the Board of Directors of the Citizens for Ocean Law.
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BISMARCK SUNK, POUNDED BY FLEET AND PLANES
1290 pages/
176 illustrations/ appendices/index
The short life and violent end of the great German capital ship Bismarck is one of the best-known dramas of the Second World War. Nevertheless, not until now has her inside story been told. Baron von Miillenheim- Rechberg, senior survivor at the time of her sinking and today her only surviving officer, has filled that void.
Ordered to the Bismarck before she was commissioned, the Baron served in her throughout her career. He relates all that went into making her combat-ready, her sea trials, plans for her first mission, and the awkward visit aboard of Adolf Hitler. As the author lists what seemed to him to be needless security breeches, the reader begins to get caught up in the tension of the Bismarck's first and only mission, Exercise Rhine. The tempo quickens with the battleship’s first encounter in the fog with the stalking British cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, and the sudden sinking of the massive Hood — “terror" of so many German
war games.
But triumph soon turns to tragedy as every British warship in the Atlantic is deployed against the Bismarck and. disabled, she tries to make a dash for the coast of France.
A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $17.95 Member’s price: $14.36
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