“Retention: The Pressure Is On”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 40–45, April 1980 Proceedings)
Captain David P. Van Ort, U. S. Naval Reserve—Captain Kelly has delivered another pertinent work. Having been there, I empathize with present commanding officers who must bear the onus of retention as a reflection of their personal performance.
Numerous writings in Proceedings and other media present the fact that without people there is nothing. But I take frank issue with heavy reliance on selective service as the panacea. Recent civil demonstrations indicate a more than minimal vestige of the antimilitary tenor of the 1960s and early 1970s. Liberal demagogues are again scoring with our youth and seemingly with some adults. This “fifth column”–type activity can have significantly negative effects upon what previously has been a reliable manpower source.
Added to this existing logistics situation is the proposed Navy expansion program to meet fait accompli Soviet extensions. Strategic and tactical explorations into what type of carrier to build or whether to recommission old battleships pale in the light of ongoing manning problems.
“The U. S. Marine Corps: Strategy for the Future”
(See W. M. Krulak, pp. 94–105, May 1980 Proceedings)
Captain Robert W. Mixon, Jr., U. S. Army—While the “gallant history” of the Marine Corps is definitely a factor in the status quo, it is not enough to ensure future viability of the marine forces. Colonel Krulak’s description of the evolution of the amphibious mission, from the efforts of Major Ellis in the 1920s to the present, gives a clear picture of how the Corps arrived in its current position. The dangers of naval neglect and warfare sophistication (particularly in NATO) pose a true dilemma to the Marine Corps of 1980, as the author very capably depicts.
Colonel Krulak’s contention that the Army should fight the NATO war while the Marine Corps assumes the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) role to fight the low- or mid-intensity conflicts is perhaps the only way the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) will be sustained into the 21st century. There are obvious conflicts in this thesis. As an Army officer, I can well envision the objections that may be raised (if they have not been already) to the Marine Corps’ assumption of the Rapid Deployment Force mission. The Navy will surely have to divert fleet assets to support forward-deployed stations, both for protection and logistical upkeep. More than anything else, though, the Marine Corps will have to adopt an “expeditionary” posture rather than an "amphibious" posture—and that will be a difficult transition. Despite historical experiences in the last six decades to the contrary, the Corps has steadfastly focused on the amphibious doctrine as its modus vivendi. The necessity of surpassing these obstacles, as Colonel Krulak emphasizes, is paramount to the Marine Corps’ future as a viable fighting force.
In terms of ground equipment, I would agree with Colonel Krulak in the need for immediate procurement of mobile protected weapon system (MPWSs), probably from our European allies. The current structure is cumbersome with the use of the M60A1 tank, while seriously lacking in personnel carriers and antitank assets. Mobility will be critical to exploiting and maneuvering in, the limited combat environment—a mobility that the current Marine Corps structure lacks mobile artillery and an improved antiair capability are two other required elements for the Marine Corps RDF to enjoy some degree of sustainability once introduced.
While I am not entirely convinced that fixed-wing aircraft will ever be effectively employed ashore as long as any threat exists to the carrier battle group, I differ with the author in his contention that these assets should be reduced in favor of helicopters. The need for more attack helicopters is obvious; the requirement for scout helicopters should be similarly apparent. These assets, however, would be best employed as an adjunct to fighter and attack fixed-wing air. The vertical envelopment maneuver, for example, will not work without air superiority—even if it is only temporary—in the area of operations. I contend that the fixed-wing aspect of Marine Corps operations is an ideal element of the Rapid Deployment Force, providing a "deep strike” capability to the marines that potential adversaries cannot equal.
I also disagree with Colonel Krulak in his argument that an evolutionary dissociation will occur between the Marine Corps and the Navy as the former assumes the RDF role. The Corps cannot break away from its naval ties, if for no other reason than the fact that the RDF concept is virtually dependent upon seaborne positioning, Protection, and transport to the combat area. Hopefully, naval neglect will not be continued in the future by a glaring lack of attendance by naval line officers in Marine Corps schools, lack of emphasis upon amphibious and transport shipping, and other such actions. In fact, the two services may find themselves more inexorably linked in the future RDF role than they are presently in their amphibious marriage.
“Oman: The Next Crisis?”
(See R. A. Stewart, pp. 97–102, April 1980 Proceedings)
Chief Boatswain C. W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve, naval architect and Marine consultant—Captain Stewart is quite correct in his statement regarding the potential use of U. S. amphibious assault groups in the Dhofar region of Oman.
Coastal supply and support operations by the Sultanate of Oman Navy (SON) have been useful over the past ten years, but are seriously hampered by a lack of adequate equipment for even non-combat situations. Harbor facilities, except for the new port at Matrah/Muscat, are on the primitive side. The movement of large volumes of heavy cargo could be achieved only by an operation as high powered as a marine amphibious task group. Transport from the coast to inland points would not be nearly as simple however, particularly in the Musandam and similar "camel track” areas. The British were quite right when they recruited officers from the Household Cavalry to do service in Oman.
Oman’s strategic location vis-a-vis the Strait of Hormuz has been strangely neglected by Captain Stewart, and the role of the Omani Navy quite ignored. This small force—mainly officered by British, both serving in the Royal Navy and as "contract officers”—consists of seven Brooke Marine, 37.5-meter, fast patrol boats (FPGs), all armed with 76-mm. OTO-Melara guns and three fitted with two XM-38 Exocet missile launchers each.
In addition, there are several auxiliary cargo-type ships, which are used for training and logistic support, and miscellaneous LCVP-size craft. At one time, not long ago, the most heavily armed vessel in the navy was a powered, twin-screw dhow—hull number: Charlie-One—mounting a 105-mm. recoilless rifle.
If one studies a chart of the eastern Persian Gulf, it becomes apparent that the Strait of Hormuz is eminently mineable. But the people who would be the overall beneficiaries of such an act would be the Soviets, not us. Curiously, they have maintained their technology in this warfare department to higher levels than we have, as is noted by Captain Smith's lead article in the same issue.
Estimates made by a number of groups in 1975 concluded that we would be cutting off the nose to spite the face of the Western world should any Western power do such a thing. In 1977 and 1978, the Iranians were quite paranoid over the idea, and sought mine-hunting and minesweeping technology from the United States and Western Europe. They did not, however, achieve a counter-mine capability before the shah’s regime fell, and the present Iranian Navy’s organization is a shambles.
Not only is the Strait of Hormuz mineable, but it is a natural setting for hardened surface-to-surface missile sites. One can stand on top of the precipitous cliffs at Ras Sharitah, Musandam, and see Bandar Abbas to the north and the ground behind Bandar-e-Strik to the east—especially from October to April when the Summer Shamal is not swirling half of the dust of the Middle East around one’s head. As of 1976, the SON people were calling it “Exocet Country.”
One ‘‘Osa”-type missile boat, tucked away into the coastline, could cause utter havoc at this place. Iraq and Iran both have such vessels and fanatics to go with them. The possibility of a terrorist-type action here has been ever-present in the minds of Persian Gulf nations for some time.
The concept of a “Persian Gulf Task Force,” lately bruited about in the press, is asinine. That is, if it were structured around capital ships, such as a conventional carrier. (Remember when the Essex [cva-9] used to run out of sea room in the Sea of Japan?) In the lower gulf, straits and islands leave an operating area of only about 20 x 40 nautical miles. In a Nimitz-size task force, carrier ops aren’t feasible. A better approach would be to reinforce our friends (we still have a few) with capable fast missile boats (we don’t have any), effective mine countermeasure forces (we have damn few), and in-depth capability in amphibious assault forces (it’s been a long time since Inchon).
An "amphibious attack force” bespeaks a major investment and needs a mission to make sense to planners. An amphibious attack capability can be enhanced by, among other things, pre-developed staging areas, logistics and pre-positioned supply points, and useful things such as good detailed intelligence gathering (i.e., Can you support vehicles on that sand? When is that sand really mud?).
The late arrival (September 1979) of a Defense Requirements Survey team of 12 members in Oman is a hopeful indication that someone is finally catching on to what everyone else around the Khalij-e-Fars realized in 1974–75.
Commander G. W. Loveridge, U. S. Navy (Retired)—With reference to the photo caption on page 97, when did the U. S. Navy commence flying the union jack while under way? (EDITOR'S NOTE: It hasn't; our caption writer didn't realize that the ship in question was at anchor.)
“Wanted: Your Thinking and Writing”
(See Secretary’s Notes, p. 18, April 1980 Proceedings)
Captain Randall C. Stout, U. S. Marini Corps—As an aviation supply officer in the Marine Corps, I sometimes hesitate to write for publication because the subject of logistics immediately causes every line officer “to put the telescope to the blind eye." However, I could not let the Secretary’s Notes comment pass by without some sort of input from a non-line group.
Like many of my supply cohorts, I desire to view strategy in four dimensions: the operational, the technological, the social, and the logistical, h seems that the academic curriculum of the junior and senior level schools of the Marine Corps Development and Education Center dwells only on the operational and technological dimensions of strategy. Yet, several pastfield marshals and army commanders, as well as recent authors, have admitted in their writings that logistics embraces approximately nine-tenths the business of war. Something this pervasive should at one time or another have had an effect on strategy and the outcome. Therefore, we should study logistics of past campaigns, digest its lessons, and improve the grooming of those officers who contribute to its effective control.
It is at this point, I would like to recognize a forgotten and truly professional naval officer—Rear Admiral Worrall Reed Carter—for his writing the story of fleet logistics afloat in the Pacific during World War II—Beans, Bullets and Black Oil. The threat of naval conflict in distant waters where sea-lanes and air routes may not be controlled and the lack of available support bases make Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, published in 1953, an opportune primer and checklist as to what problems could be encountered and what is needed to maintain a viable force at sea for sustained periods.
Reprinting Rear Admiral Carter’s book with its many supporting characteristics (reference, chronicle, and truth teller) would be timely and definitely assist in the struggle to have logistics placed on an equal footing with the other so-called dimensions of strategy—instead of being forgotten.
“Military Aspects of the Panama Canal Issue”
(See J. Child, pp. 46–51, January 1980; G. R. Evans, pp. 70–71, February 1980; R. B. Howe, p. 93, March 1980 Proceedings)
Frank B. Turberville, Jr.—One of the interesting diversions in reading the Proceedings in recent years has been the development of perception as to when an active duty officer/author was expressing honest convictions or carrying out orders. I cannot but observe how Captain Howe appears to have done both.
Captain Howe states, “Lieutenant General D. P. McAuliffe, then CINC, the deputy . . ., myself, and many others were able to convince most of our interrogators that the value of the canal to the United States and the free world navies and commerce has not diminished and that, at least until the year 2000, our military posture in the area was not seriously degraded by the treaty (emphasis added).” “At least until the year 2000” appears to be an attempt by Captain Howe to reconcile his personal reservations; but does he think that the year 2000 (a mere 20 years away) is the end of historical necessity for the United States?
All of this brings two quotations to my mind. In December 1944, from a town named Bastogne, a Colonel McAuliffe, gave a one word reply, “Nuts,” to an enemy surrender demand that still rings in history. More recently, in reference to our canal situation in Panama, retired CNO Admiral Thomas H. Moorer made the observation, “In military affairs there is no substitute for possession.” History bears out the truth of Admiral Moorer’s statement, and no one can say that this is not the honest conviction of a distinguished and patriotic American, free from the encumbrances of orders contrary to his better judgment.
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As a former Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, advisor to the President, and long familiar with Panama Canal history and interoceanic transit problems, I read this article with more than cursory interest. Significant for what it fails to state as well as for what it relates, it requires comment derived from the lessons of experience.
The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 represent a profound misjudgment by the U. S. Government in the stream of history. It is still too early to say how these treaties will affect the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is too early to state, or even to estimate, the total impact politically, militarily, and economically on all the nations dependent on the use of the Panama Canal. But the United States is the big loser. We gave away strategic assets vital to U. S. interests.
The Panama Canal, under U. S. sovereign and operational control, represented safe and expeditious transit of ships between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. Tolls were just and equitable. The United States protected the zone and canal from “lawlessness and disorder” in accord with U. S. obligations under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901.
In these connections, it must be recognized that the Republic of Panama is not a great power, but a small tropical country of some 1,710,000 population, about one third of which live near the canal. Moreover, it has long been recognized, and stressed in many addresses in the Congress, as an area of “endemic revolution and endless political intrigue.” Its record of instability is truly astounding. (Gustave Anguizola, The Panama Canal: Isthmian Political Instability from 1821 To 1977)
Based primarily in Cuba, Communist power is now well established in the Caribbean and is extending its control with demands for the surrender of U. S. naval bases at Guantanamo, Cuba, and in Puerto Rico. Panama has been closely associated with Soviet Cuba and served as a staging area for the overthrow of the pro-U. S. constitutional government of Nicaragua. The result has been that the entire Caribbean is well on its way toward becoming a Communist sphere of influence.
The assertion that the Panama Canal is becoming “increasingly obsolescent” is unsupported. Extensive studies have shown that it is not obsolete, but approaching capacity saturation with total transit traffic in 1978 of 13,808 vessels (Panama Canal Company—Canal Zone Government, Annual Report, 1978, p. 43).
In regard to vulnerability, the canal was protected during World Wars I and II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the Cuban Missile Crisis without a single injury, and it can be protected again. It goes without saying that any target, regardless of type, is critically vulnerable to atomic attack. Consequently, no passive defense measures, in design features, such as a "sea level” route can offer protection to the Panama Canal. The only effective defense of any target from nuclear attack is the combined military and naval might of the United States, coupled with its statesmanship and industrial capacity.
True, the Navy has 13 large aircraft carriers that cannot transit. But these carriers do not have to transit. They can be, and should be, prepositioned in times of growing tension by use of other routes that are far safer than that through the Soviet-infested waters of the Caribbean. The recently constructed superships, some with nuclear power, were built for use on routes not requiring transit of the canal or use of U. S. ports. Thus, arguments using the carriers’ size are irrelevant and should be so recognized.
One of the major lessons of Panama Canal history is that the canal requires centralized authority for its sustained efficient maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection. Experience in both the construction and operation of the canal has shown that these vital functions cannot be satisfactorily performed by a hodge-podge of commissions, committees, and boards as provided in the 1977 treaties, but require strong executive control.
What has been long needed for the canal, and is still needed, is a project for the major modernization and operational improvement of the existing waterway by the simple and relatively inexpensive method of constructing a third set of larger locks for handling larger vessels. Such a program was developed in the Panama Canal organization as a result of World War II experience, promptly won the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a postwar project, and is provided for in pending legislation (H.R. 1930, 96th Congress). It is known as the Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, or Balanced Lake-Lake Plan, and has been ably described by experienced authorities on the canal question (Proceedings, March 1955, pp. 263–75, and April 1956, pp. 395–99; also, Congressional Record, 21 June 1956, p. 10756, and 29 August 1957, p. 16504).
Recent history, especially that of Nicaragua, after the surrender of sovereign control by the United States of the U. S. Canal Territory conclusively shows that the real struggle on the Isthmus, as stressed in many addresses in the Congress, is not between the United States and Panama, but between the United States and the Soviet Union in what informed leaders recognize as part of the war for the world. The retrocession of the Canal Zone to Panama instead of being “bold and imaginative” was an abject act of appeasement and of abdication of treaty-based responsibilities that will inevitably result in future conflicts and recriminations, as well as much higher transit tolls.
There is no better way to conclude these comments than by quoting the words of the late Major General Thomas A. Lane, a distinguished Army engineer with Canal Zone experience, who stated:
“The belief of some officials that U. S. operations and defense of the Canal under treaty provision, in- stead of under sovereign authority” would eliminate the friction of recent years is a calamitous misjudgment of the present scene. Marxist-Leninist subversion would be intensified by such a retreat. Friction would mount and the U. S. position would become intolerable. The United States would be compelled to use force against the Republic of Panama, or to withdraw and allow the Canal to be operated and defended by another lessee.” (Strategic Review, Winter 1974, p. 4)
“Fitness Report Finesse”
(See G. Haering, pp. 34–38, January 1980; R. A. Fliegel, pp. 23–25, April 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David M. Lee, V- S. Navy—Mr. Haering’s superb Wide on the writing of officer fitness sports is equally applicable to enlisted evaluations. The large population, unstable rating structure, and sharply pyramidal promotion rate place increased emphasis on the need for well-written, definitive evaluations. Just as officer selection boards must frequently decide on the basis of what is not written, so must senior enlisted promotion boards.
This real world environment places increased responsibility on the commanding officer to help the many Qualified enlisted personnel facing Promotion boards receive the best possible chance for selection. Simply indicating that the individual “does a good job” or even “an outstanding job” will not be much help if that particular individual’s rate is facing a 20% promotion opportunity. The individual must stand out from his or her contemporaries. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways:
- Special Qualifications: A true professional, officer or enlisted, has the capability and motivation for achieving unique qualifications. Command Policies must support and encourage such individuals. There is a need for command programs that allow for thieving legitimate qualifications 'hat will set the individual apart from his peers, as well as better equip him for billets of increased responsibility.
- Assignments: The senior enlisted person is frequently required to fill a billet demanding a unique mix of managerial and technical skills. His future promotion will depend on his performance in such billets. Yet throughout his career, his training has been centered on developing primarily technical expertise. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the command to provide personnel with assignments that will provide the broader experience and exposure necessary to make the individual better qualified managerially and thus more competitive.
- Ranking: Certainly no clearer signal can be sent to a promotion board than the individual’s relative ranking among his peers. Such a decision must be made after the utmost thought and consideration keeping in mind its impact.
Mr. Haering points out the importance of fitness report counsel to the officer. In particular, every officer should know how his fitness reports will be interpreted by a selection board. The same is true of enlisted personnel. A first class petty officer should be aware of what is a good evaluation. He should know what special qualifications will better equip him for assignments of greater responsibility as well as make him more competitive for promotion. He can then better control his future and establish a logical upwardly mobile career pattern. He will also be better qualified to provide counseling to his subordinates as well as write substantive, supporting evaluations.
The retention of the well-qualified enlisted and a reversal of the mass exodus of highly skilled personnel at the 20-year point are going to require a total commitment and awareness to personnel management at the individual command level. Optimum personnel utilization, assignment, and promotion are all related. Dedicated attention to the enlisted evaluation to the extent expected of officer fitness reports is vital to preserving the Navy’s most valuable asset.
"Mine Warfare: Promise Deferred”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 27–33, April 1980 Proceedings)
Commander Daniel G. Powell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—My congratulations on your selection of Captain Smith’s essay for 1980 honors. He has written a perceptive, in-depth discussion of the U. S. Navy’s mine warfare problems and puts in the proper perspective what we in the mine business have preached for years but were unable to articulate as well as Captain Smith.
I question, however, his solution to the problem. I am reminded of an incident which occurred a few years ago shortly after Admiral Zumwalt retired. He was the after-dinner speaker at one of our many conferences and Save his usual “union-busting” speech in which he castigated the surface, air, and submarine unions for pursuing their own courses without being able to see the big picture. On the question of a mine warfare problem—the very first question after his speech—his solution was very simple: You deed a three-star admiral in the Pentagon for mine warfare. While I think that Admiral Zumwalt was proposing something contrary to his union-busting philosophy, I am not that certain that he wasn’t a bit more realistic than Captain Smith. The air community is no more kind to the thought of allocating money for the development of mines than is the surface community.
But the fault with mine warfare must lie with that small, dedicated group of people who have made mines and their use their particular business. It is time mine warfare joined the Navy, not a specific union therein. We can and must sell mine warfare in Peacetime as well as in war.
Isn’t it ironic, though, that as I write this comment. President Carter may be contemplating the use of mines against Iran?
Rear Admiral C. F. Home, III, U. S. Navy, Commander Mine Warfare Command—Captain Smith’s prize- essay has been widely read and discussed by this staff. We view ourselves as both experts and advocates of mine warfare and therefore welcome any contributions on its behalf.
While the essay is fully supportive of the need and hard-hitting on the problems of mine warfare, it rings with less hope for the future than I believe it should.
Captain Smith says mine warfare must have “passionate and enduring advocacy.” I and the staff at CoMineWarCom have just that! He asks for “champions." Mine warfare has just that in our present CNO, VCNO, and each of our present CinCs—CinCTLntFlt, CinCPacFlt, and CinCUSNavEur. We have other champions: our platform/weapon sponsor, OP-03; our warfare mission sponsor, OP-095; and the fleet operational and type commanders. If ever there were a combination of champions it is now, and we collectively intend to make the most of it.
New initiatives have been started, and old ones have been dusted off and put back on track. The CNO’s recent decision to commence contract design for a new mine countermeasures (MCM) ship and his placing of nine such ships in the five-year defense program (FYDP) are examples of new initiatives, as is his recent decision to continue with the development of a much needed intermediate water depth mine (IWDM), which will go against surface ships as well as submarines. The use of power tools and automobile style assembly line practices to build up our current mines much faster when called upon is an example of an old initiative back on track. As a broader example, we are working closely with our allies in pursuing complementary efforts in mine warfare. Suffice to say, U. S. naval mine warfare is on the upswing.
This is nor to say that the problems and the tribulations Captain Smith speaks of are not real and difficult and will continue to be so. On the other hand, the arena he describes is one in which mine warfare, like any other weapon system or strategy, must learn to compete. The champions of mine warfare readiness are, in my view, competing articulately and convincingly for a fair share of the tight dollar budget.
One area in which we have not yet been as successful as I would like is the upgrading of the image of mine warfare and mine warfare duty. Essays like Captain Smith’s and Rear Admiral R. F. Hoffmann’s in the May 1977 Naval Review Issue help. The very visible and strong support that the CNO, VCNO, and CinCs are providing helps greatly. However, the key is an awakened and conversant officer corps, from ensign to captain. This is where we need both the knowledge of and support for mine warfare. As we improve in this essential area, so will our image and our usefulness.
“To Convoy Or Not To Convoy”
(See W. F. Mellin, pp. 48–54, March 1980 Proceedings)
Roy R. Schweiker—Commander Mellin’s article should be retitled, “How to Defend Merchant Ships Against a 1983 Enemy Using 1943 Tactics.” It is unfortunate that he did not have the opportunity to first read some of the excellent articles which appeared in the same issue and described many weapon capabilities of the 1980s and some imagination in their employment. It may be true that shipping should be convoyed in the North Atlantic, but Commander Mellin has failed to deal with the disadvantages of convoys in the 1980s.
Convoys are wasteful of shipping days. Ships must travel to the convoy assembly area, cross with the convoy, and then go to the destination rather than making direct port-to-port transits; faster ships must slow to the convoy’s speed; and 49 ships must wait for the 50th one to arrive. In particular, items in ample supply in North America but critically short in Europe might best be shipped in fast independent ships with the understanding that the greater efficiency of independent sailings will more than make up for the losses.
Modern merchant ships are much faster than their World War II counterparts. High-value convoys might consist of ships capable of 30 knots or more. This would make surface escorts useful only as an aviation base as they would have little opportunity to use hull-mounted sonar, and if left to engage a possible submarine contact, they might never catch up with the convoy. An enemy submarine or trawler with a supply of missiles could turn the convoy into a large sitting duck. (See Captain Ruhe’s “Missiles Make ASW a New Game,” March issue.)
Unlike World War II, a convoy is virtually certain to be detected. Some methods other than coincidental contact with a submarine are:
- Satellites. One ship might slip by, but a convoy? (See Lieutenant Easter’s “ASW Strategy: Issues for the 1980s,” March issue.)
- SOSUS, particularly a covert system with contact-actuated radio buoy. (See Dr. Friedman’s "SOSUS and U. S. ASW Tactics," March issue.)
- Covert shipboard transmitter, manned or unmanned. A radio which transmitted a coded pulse at an exact time would be easy to conceal and hard to detect. Placing one on every ship would be extremely difficult for the Soviets, one on every 50th ship considerably less so.
A convoy is much more vulnerable to tactical nuclear warfare. The use of SSBNs is discussed by Commander Clawson in “The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs—Round Two” (March issue), but the use of land-based missiles should not be ruled out. This could mean IRBMs in the eastern Atlantic, obsolescent high-yield high-CEP ICBMs, or even modern MIRVs if the Soviets believe that convoy destruction is a surer "win” than a nuclear exchange. One possible effect of a nuclear blast not mentioned by Commander Clawson is radioactive fallout from a “dirty” bomb which would inconvenience warships equipped with sprinklers but could result in major problems with merchant vessels and the condemnation of contaminated cargoes.
Convoys result in longer waiting periods in port, during which ships are vulnerable to attacks by bombers and cruise missiles.
The rapidity of mechanized warfare means that if we guess wrong on our first resupply effort, we may not have to bother with a second. I just hope that our choice is based on the capabilities of the Soviets and not the Nazis.
“A Good New Idea”
(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 42-47, March 1980 Proceedings)
Commander Harry D. Cannon, U. S. Naval Reserve—The capability of the U. S. Navy, both present and projected, gives something less than a rosy picture of our ability to maintain vital sea lanes of communications. Deficiencies in both the number of ocean escorts and antisubmarine warfare helicopters will leave a gap that will be hard to fill during a national emergency.
A system such as that envisioned in the Arapaho, which provides a portable, modular, self-contained aviation facility that can be rapidly deployed on board a modern merchant marine containership, appears to be not only feasible but also cost-effective. The problems of the present Arapaho program and its ill-fated predecessor, the Reserve Merchant Ship Defense System (RMSDS), can be traced to a policy of benign neglect. The ultimate goal should be to get additional air support to sea, quickly, to assist and complement other systems, such as the LAMPS.
Captain O’Rourke’s suggestion to look to the rapidly expanding commercial helicopter industry as a possible source of off-the-shelf equipment is worthy of careful consideration. Present commercial helicopter equipment, with items such as full instrument flight rules capability, three- and four-axis autopilots, worldwide navigation capability, and improved airframes and power plants, is proof that the basic idea is sound. Equipping basic aircraft with a portable weapons package for a stated mission, be it sonobuoy screen maintenance, airborne relay, or directed weapon delivery, is a task well within state-of-the-art technology.
“Harpooning the Viking”
(See P. D. Voss, pp. 63–67, February 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Harry T. Hitman, U. S. Navy—As a corollary to Commander Voss’ proposal to offensively arm the S-3 Viking with something other than a sonobuoy, I contend the SH-2F LAMPS should be in line ahead of the competition for any missile weapons for an ASW aircraft.
The H-2 usually operates independently of carrier task forces and the resultant CAP and E-2 services. It is the only embarked air asset available to the CGs, DDs, FFs, and FFGs and operates at maximum range, often without communications for protracted periods.
The over-the-horizon-targeting (OTH) mission during any hostilities will eclipse the current major (peacetime) mission of ASW. Having extensive experience in the OTH mission and having done targeting in all weather, day, night, and every imaginable scenario of a war at sea, the H-2 will not survive the first mission without its own organic antiship missile. Anyone who has been involved in EMCON evolutions knows he who sees first usually wins, or survives to shoot again, hence the absolutely invaluable aid the helicopter serves. However, the difficulty in transmitting targeting information back to home plate undetected is well established. When a target is detected and reasonably well identified, you can assume detection (or should since you are probably in the enemy’s surface-to-air missile envelope), and it’s a certainty after the passage of the information to your ship. If the enemy is found and the H-2 had the capability to immediately launch a missile, your chances for survival would be substantially increased. The cost-effectiveness is obvious.
During the evacuation of Charhahar, Iran, in early 1979, and the scenario conjecture of what may happen in this unusual situation, I was slightly consoled by my detachment’s building and installing a mount for an M-60 machine gun; at least, it would do more damage than an Mk-64 SUS. The next war at sea will prove, in retrospect, that ASW vehicles are the obvious carriers of antiship missiles. Our allies are not oblivious to the potential for victory using helicopters with missiles—for example, a Royal Navy Lynx helicopter outfitted with the Sea Skua antiship missile is pictured on Page 110 of the February Proceedings. The addition of the Harpoon to the S-3 and a derivative of the Sea Skua to the LAMPS I and LAMPS III helicopter would provide a vexing problem to Soviet tactical planning. A new sense of contribution and acceptance into the hallowed halls of “real” ordnance deliverers would be gained for LAMPS and VS. Since the argument for arming these communities is so obvious and pervasive, maybe the “real” reason for the lack of interest to date is that we are treading on some other community’s sacrosanct mission area.
“The Twelve Days of the England’’
(See J. A. Williamson and W. D. Lanier, pp. 76–83, March 1980 Proceedings)
Captain William J. Ruhe, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The story of the England’s submarine killings in World War II aroused the suspicion that the popular hi-lo concept might not be valid.
Were the “cheap” destroyer escorts (DEs) actually less capable than the big, multi-purpose destroyer (DDs) of the same vintage—as they should have been according to hi-lo?
That no DD equaled the England's box score of Japanese submarines sunk was readily ascertained. Also, the performance of DEs, when examined on a comparable basis with DDs, seemed to show that the England's superior ASW capability was no freak.
For comparison’s sake, the ASW results in the Pacific for the year 1944 appear to be appropriate. Not until then were DEs operational in numbers approximating those of the DDs. (In World War II, 401 DEs were built, while 432 DDs saw service in all ocean theaters.) Despite a Japanese policy of using their submarines “to pick off units of the U. S. fleet” (a strategy which should have exposed Japanese submarines to mainly U. S. fleet destroyers), the DEs nevertheless out- scored the DDs 20 to 17 in submarine kills. At the same time, only half as many U. S. DEs were being lost in submarine duels: three DEs to six DDs.
Yet today, it is automatically assumed that the high-cost, multipurpose ship is better in at least her primary mission. Why?
“Golden Life Members”
(See Secretary's Notes, p. 18, April 1980 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Francis D. Foley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Now that the sea dust has settled upon the Annual Meeting of the Naval Institute, I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation for the Institute’s having recognized my 50-year association with our professional society by making me a golden life member. Indeed, my awareness and enjoyment of the Proceedings goes back considerably beyond the 50-year span delineated on my certificate. My father (Paul Foley) was a subscriber and contributing writer to the Proceedings from my earliest awareness that he was a naval officer. He wrote because he had something to say and usually needed the money!
Congratulations on the preeminence which the Proceedings enjoys and sustains in its field. It has been a contributing source of inspiration and enjoyment to me throughout my lifetime and it will continue to be.
“ELF Update”
(See R. K. Jurgen, pp. 135–136, March 1980 Proceedings)
Commander Henry H. Beam, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant Professor of Management. Western Michigan University—Mr. Jurgen’s well-written note on Seafarer, now known as ELF, gives a useful overview of the history and current status of the project. Hence I will restrict my comments to additional aspects of the project.
As a long-time Michigan resident and naval reservist drilling in Detroit, I have made it a point to follow the Navy’s difficulties in presenting its case for Seafarer to the residents of Michigan. Certainly, they are a difficult audience to persuade: a large majority of the residents of the sparsely populated but primitively beautiful Upper Peninsula, where Seafarer would be located, have long been opposed to the project. The project sponsors may have viewed Michigan's Upper Peninsula as akin to the remote desert areas of Nevada. But all Michigan residents view the Upper Peninsula as a very special place to be preserved for summer cottages, wilderness camping, and deer hunting. Yet from the presentations I attended and the materials I reviewed, I believe the Seafarer project team failed to recognize this and went on to create additional problems by the manner in which it presented the Navy’s case. While we can’t change the past, we can learn an important lesson for the future from the Navy’s experiences with Seafarer in Michigan.
The lesson is to tell the whole story the first time, particularly when virtually all the pertinent material is available to the public. Nothing in the several Seafarer presentations I heard was intentionally incorrect or misleading. However, what was presented was not the whole story. Hence, an alert person with an interest in the project could ask some very probing questions which the embarrassed presenters were often unable to answer satisfactorily. For example, the Navy emphasized, as Mr. Jurgen does, that the radiated power would be on the order of 100 watts (a common output figure for home stereo system amplifiers) for global coverage. What was not said was that it would require at least 10 million watts of input power to the antenna grid to attain this radiated power at the extremely low frequencies at which Seafarer would operate. No one could explain if these 10 million watts of input power (one tenth the power needs for a city of 100,000 people) would have deleterious effects on the environment.
A second example concerns potential local radiation effects from the antenna grid. The Navy material compared the .07 volts perimeter electric field to be expected on the surface directly above a Seafarer cable to values of 2, 30, and 250 volts per meter to be expected 12 inches from an incandescent light bulb, a color television set, and an electric blanket, respectively. Such comparisons were intended to alleviate fears, but instead engendered a rash of questions such as why was the grid buried six feet deep if the radiation hazard was so low? The reason is for convenience only, just as with telephone lines, for which we have considerable perimeter reference data. In fact, the antenna grid would work equally well if it were suspended in air (as it is at the Clam Lake test site), laid on the surface, or buried deep in the earth. A simple comparison suggested by a member of the audience was one that most Michigan residents could more readily identify with: the radiation above the antenna grid would be less per unit of area than that adjacent to a CR transmitter located in a person’s car or truck.
And so it went. As questions were asked, more suspicions were raised, and the credibility of the official Navy presentation suffered. So my point is to tell the full story the first time in terms that everyone in the audience can understand using examples they can identify with personally. A corollary point is to select experienced and knowledgeable speakers to make the presentations, ones who know how to handle difficult and sometimes hostile questions. In this arena, the unflappability of a presidential press secretary is much to be preferred to the no- nonsense approach of a senior officer used to dealing with a compliant military audience.
Editor s Note: Commander Beam will discuss some often misunderstood technical aspects of the ELF system in the July issue.
“MATASS: A Moored Airship Towed Array Sonar System”
(See F. D. Buckley, pp. 124–127, March 1980 Proceedings)
D. I. Promish—Perhaps neither Captain Buckley nor Lieutenant Rounds was aware of the following bit of airship-sonar history recorded in Alfred Price’s Aircraft versus Submarine (Naval Institute Press, 1973):
“During trials in the autumn of 1917, the blimp proved to be a more effective platform for the operation of hydrophones; the airships did not need to alight on the water before listening could begin, though it was still necessary to shut down the motors. A specially designed hydrophone performed satisfactorily, even when the blimp was drifting with the wind at speeds of up to eight knots. Just before the war ended hydrophone equipment was ordered for all British blimps engaged on anti-submarine patrols; but the armistice came before it was delivered [p. 29].”
“Women in Combat Units: Another Consideration”
(See H L. Sandefer, pp. 21–22, January 1980 Proceedings)
P. E. Spencer—Mr. Sandefer’s discussion is riddled with chauvinistic barbs that should not be permitted to stand without comment. Because women are susceptible to rape, are we to assume Sandefer believes that men are not susceptible to rape, or being raped is qualitatively more damaging than being tortured?
By using such defeating and presently unanswerable problem areas as (1) hostile confinement, (2) rape, (3) senior POW decisions, and (4) conception, Mr. Sandefer has generated many questions. In doing this, he has obscured the basic question: “Why are women not given the opportunity to assume responsibility for themselves?"
Linda Grant De Pauw—That men should be pressed into military service while women remain at home has seemed wrong to some for more than 200 years. In January 1780, this protest was directed ro the head of the British Admiralty:
Sure never, my Lord, was a time more distressing,
When Men only are press'd, tho' we Damsels want pressing;
Then consider our case, and our sweethearts, O spare!
Nor them pressing, oppress us poor Girls with despair!
Or, if you cannot, through the wants of the State,
Press us along with them, we'll venture their fate,
For we'd rather (so much we this measure condemn)
You should press us together, than only press them.
(The British Maiden's Remonstrance and Petition to Lord Sandwich)
“The Potential for Foreign Ownership in the U. S. Maritime Industry”
(See E. G. Frankel, pp. 36–41, February 1980 Proceedings)
Commander L. D. Chirillo, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Shipbuilding capabilities are indispensable elements of sea- power, Seapower is particularly enhanced when methods for building commercial ships can be immediately applied to naval ship construction. Therefore, the need to improve even commercial shipbuilding productivity is a military requirement.
Professor Frankel’s uninformed views of current shipbuilding research in the United States are serious because they mislead naval officials from appreciation of the already proven, and growing, capabilities of U. S. shipbuilders to collectively conceive, initiate, and manage technology transfer projects. His description of U. S. shipbuilders not searching “out voids in technology” and not adopting technology existing in some other fields” was valid ten years ago. His failure to acknowledge the accomplishments of the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP), created by the Maritime Administration (MarAd) in 1971, is a singular omission.
NSRP consists of short-term, pragmatic projects, many of which are neither research nor development. Instead, they are simply the means for acquiring technology from other industries or from shipbuilders abroad.
Specific projects are recommended by the Ship Production Committee of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. The membership consists mostly of representatives of shipbuilding firms that compete with each other but are nonetheless cooperative in their intent to improve Productivity throughout the U. S. shipbuilding industry. The projects are managed by a few shipbuilders, in behalf of all, in accordance with unique government/industry cost-sharing arrangements. Each project is assigned by subcontract to a firm known to have perfected a desired technology or to a professional research organization having pertinent expertise. Thus, there is delegation of the research to recognized experts wherever they may be rather than to institutionalized shipbuilding researchers as is the practice abroad.
A Rand Corporation 1976 report of government-funded efforts declared the NSRP to be one of the five most effective research programs in terms of development performed and implementation achieved. Just one example of the program’s numerous accomplishments is offered for corroboration.
The 1979 NSRP publication Outfit Planning provides knowledge of the zone outfitting methods developed by the world’s most competitive shipbuilder, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Company, Ltd. (IHI) of Japan. It is revolutionizing U. S. shipbuilding management techniques by its introduction of concepts such as design being an aspect of planning and the most important computer applications in shipbuilding are for the maintenance of structured material lists that reflect how a ship will be assembled. In order to accelerate implementation, at least two major U. S. shipbuilding firms have retained IHI consultants to guide their transitions from archaic systems-oriented to zone-oriented methods.
Outfit Planning will be supplemented this year by another book which will address a product-oriented work breakdown structure. This subject which employs the principles of Group Technology, an industrial science that is not yet generally recognized, will further revolutionize U. S. shipbuilders’ planning and control methods. As IHI is the research subcontractor, the technology to be described in the publication is based upon shipbuilding methods that are proven to be the world’s most cost- effective.
IHI managers have no reservations about selling their shipbuilding technology because they believe, as Professor Frankel observed, that large numbers of well-educated middle managers are prerequisites for developing and implementing improved shipbuilding methods. Further, they believe that the U. S. shipbuilding industry will never be able to compete in world markets until this particular human problem is addressed. Professor Frankel’s academic area shares the responsibility to meet this challenge because it has not yet participated in developing or teaching improved shipbuilding methods.
“An Alternative to Rotating Radars for Aircraft Carriers”
(See G. E. Miller and R. J. Biondi, pp. 98–101, January 1980; M. D. Carmody, pp. 81–82, April 1980 Proceedings)
Commander Joseph W. Timlin, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Carmody takes the position that the AN/SPY-l radar is not needed in carriers because no high-powered carrier radars are needed at all. He advocates a tactic in which all surveillance and combat- direction data for a battle group would be provided by the airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, permitting the surface ships to maintain complete radio and radar silence until an attack is in progress.
He further seems to be suggesting that even after the battle is joined, only the "self-defense system” radars would be operated, and those only when "alerted” by the AEW aircraft. The primary justifications for his position are the following: (1) “space and air surveillance vehicles” would have difficulty locating the carrier, (2) home-on radiating emission (HORE) missiles could not home on the carrier radars, and (3) the carrier does not require "high-powered radars” because she "already has a much more effective off-board early warning and air control system.”
There is no doubt that radiation silence is a worthwhile tactic under some conditions, and few will question the capabilities of the carrier’s AEW aircraft. However, there are some times and places when an aircraft carrier cannot reasonably operate the current types of fixed-wing aircraft, although V/STOL aircraft may someday change that. Therefore, if the carrier relied only on AEW aircraft for the radar "picture,” it would be blinded when it was not possible or prudent to fly aircraft. Examples of this are severe weather conditions, stormy seas, and a badly pitching flight deck, inoperable catapults, damaged flight deck, restricted waters, etc.
Presumably the “much more effective . . . early warning and air control system” referred to is the E-2C with the AN/APS-125 radar. Let us examine Admiral Carmody’s arguments in support of the quoted statement.
- “Future engagements at sea will require a 360° defense perimeter.” How can the typical complement of four E-2C aircraft maintain continuous surveillance around the whole perimeter “at ranges in excess of 200 miles?”
- “AEW assets can be positioned quickly to meet each situation.” Is this positioning dependent on intelligence from another source? The high power beams from a carrier’s own SPY-l radar can be positioned even more quickly.
- There is little emphasis on the intense electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM) that are certain to characterize future naval engagements, nor recognition of how they will affect the ability of the E-2 s to maintain effective surveillance and air control. SPY-1, with all the inherent electronic advantages of a large surface-based radar, is vastly more capable of operating in a severe ECM environment than is the APS-125 in an airborne E-2C.
- Self-defense systems will be “alerted by the AEW,” “early warning of low-flying missiles would be acquired,” and the “OTC could exercise meaningful C&D.” How can the necessary data for these “alerts” and “warnings” be linked down to the surface ships in the face of massive ECM? Why will C&D based on the E-2C data be more “meaningful” than that based on data from a high-powered shipboard radar such as SPY-1 even if we assume that the links from the AEW aircraft are not jammed? How can AEW be used to designate the carrier’s Phalanx and NATO Seasparrow Surface Missile System self-defense weapon system?
Admiral Carmody gives much importance to the difficulty the enemy will supposedly encounter in locating the carrier if she does not have high- powered radars. He does not explain what will prevent the enemy from assuming that where there are E-2s there is probably a carrier. Or what will have happened to the shadowing surface ships and submarines? Are the other ships in company going to maintain permanent radar silence as well? If not, can the enemy not assume that where there are escort ships there is probably something being escorted? How many Navy ships have four screws? The carrier signature can be picked up at considerable range by submarine hydrophones. Clearly, elimination of the high-powered radar will not guarantee that the carrier will not be discovered; it will just prevent the carrier from taking effective and timely defensive action after she is discovered.
Admiral Carmody correctly points out that if the carrier maintains radiation silence, the HORE missiles will not work very well. However, as soon as the Navy eliminates high-powered radars, our enemies will use active and semiactive radar and infrared-homing missiles against the carrier. The missiles will still be coming; the only difference will be that the carrier will not be able to defend herself as effectively as she could if she were equipped with a SPY-l. The SPY-l’s performance is greatly superior to the best of the current rotating radars and to the AN/ APS-125.
It seems clear that reliance on a single source of surveillance and combat direction data, either shipboard or airborne, will impair the defense of the carrier. A better decision would be to use the E-2s along with a complete suite of battle group radars that complement each other in a mixed strategy adaptable to changing situations- In such a strategy, the carrier suite should include SPY-l (the best surface radar) just as it includes the E-2 (the best AEW aircraft). This combination will enable the OTC to direct and win the air battle despite expected intense enemy jamming activities. This is not now feasible when using either present Navy shipboard or airborne radars or any combination thereof.
(See H. Young, pp. 146–147, March 1980 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I well recall this tale about the water slug torpedo tube shot of likker. It occurred when I was a junior officer in the Norfolk area. Our version was that the Customs folks were tipped off by a disgruntled wife who got the word from her husband who was a crew member of the sub.
“Assault on the Liberty”
(See D. Blalock, pp. 108–109, March 1980 Proceedings)
Daniel E. Keough—Like Mr. Blalock, I too, have waited nearly 13 years to see the true story of this vicious attack come to light. Mr. Ennes is to be highly commended for his excellent and long-awaited book. I share his hope that this book might prompt Congress to reopen its investigation of this shameful affair. However, I do not expect this to happen—especially with an election coming up.
Indeed, the deliberateness of the attack which even included the use of napalm and the shooting up of the liberty’s life rafts to eliminate the problem of survivors, most certainly must have been an "open secret” throughout the Navy and on Capitol Hill all this time. What concerns me now is how this book, published more than four months ago, has been so blatantly ignored by all facets of the press (excepting the Proceedings), TV, and radio media. It seems incredible that a firsthand account of an all-out attack on a non-combatant U. S. vessel by a nation so long in America’s debt, financially as well as politically, is not deserving of mention in such publications as The New York Times, Newsweek, Time magazine, etc. Surprising as it may seem (or is it?), the book has not even made the book review sections of such publications which ordinarily leap at any opportunity to publish an expose. Even “Watergate” pales next to the Liberty attack. After all, nobody died at Watergate.
It is equally surprising to me that a major publishing house like Random House had the guts to publish this hook but appears to have done very little to publicize it. An expose such as this would certainly be a best-seller ‘f the American public were made aware of its existence. It is even difficult to find the book in major bookstores throughout New York City. Most people I know who sought the book finally had to have it specially ordered from either the publisher or the Naval Institute. Perhaps a second book should be written. This °ne could be called the “Cover-up of the Book on the Liberty Cover-up.”
“A Sea-Based Interdiction System for Power Projection”
(See C. E. Myers, pp. 103–106, November 1979; M. C. Franklin, pp. 23–24, January 1980; J. F. Downs and T. W. Jackson, pp.74–75, February 1980 Proceedings)
Captain H. W. J. R. Bergbauer, Jr., U. S. Navy—What better platform exists than the battleship (modified) to demonstrate our capability to counter the brushfires that are the natural result of the superpower nuclear parity? Aegis and Harpoon/Tomahawk would find their optimum placement on such a vessel. A little deck/hangar space devoted to AV-8s/LAMPS would pay extraordinary dividends.
Contingency defusing in this day and age will require, more than ever, that the Navy be prepared to go in harm’s way with a probability of success sufficient to represent a credible force. Our battleships are tailor made to accept the modifications necessary to perform this role.
Lieutenant F. J. Koch, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), U. S. Navy Shipbuilding Liaison Officer—Let us lay to rest once and for all the myth that the USS Missouri (BB-63) was limited to 15 knots as a result of the 1950 grounding on Thimble Shoals.
I had the pleasure of serving in the BB-63 from December 1948 through early 1952. This period included the “grounding,” as well as the first deployment to Korea. As a former auxiliary, repair, and boiler division officer, as well as a qualified engineering officer of the watch, I can testify that the BB-63 made 32 knots and better on every occasion required in support of carrier launch/recovery operations during the Korean conflict.
The proposals currently under review by the Navy to reactivate the Iowa class should have the support of all professional Navy people. The U. S. taxpayer shelled out hard-earned dollars to preserve these ships for future emergencies and contingencies. I submit that the rainy day has arrived, and we would be well served to get on with the program.