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P^v'et Naval Influence:
°mestic and Foreign 'oiensions
jj'chael J. MccGwire and John
0nneh> Editors. New York: Praeger,
• /. ' ^6l PP- Maps. Append. Bib. W°.00 ($36.00).*
R .
eyiewed by Captain William H. J. ar>thorpe, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
'>pt!>tatri ^an‘horpe, a naval intelligence alC,'aJ,st wh° served as an assistant naval / c e in Moscow from 1971 to 1974, retired ^1 ‘ a[t'Ve auty ‘hi* past summer. Captain Ac^j "r^e 'S a graduate of the Naval Coll en‘^ an<^ ^aS a‘ter“ieci ‘he Naval 1Far wjt‘«e- hie served as an intelligence officer CP °t>era‘‘nR forces, in the office of the
.. °f Naval Operations, and in the Office of Coecfe‘ary of Defense. He has made several . n utions to the Proceedings and the aval Review.)
Th
tjj ose who specialize in the study of e>th °V'et NavV generally belong to jn<jp0^ two groups. One consists of Stud *®ence analysts who tend to Cent^ Soviet naval hardware and con- Ca ^ate on assessing Soviet naval a The other consists of
teij. ars ancl researchers outside the in- ^ce community and the gov- nava,tnt. wh° generally examine Soviet vin' rn,ss*ons and concentrate on di- ^n8 Soviet intentions, bi, nce an understanding of both capa- an tl6S anc^ intentions is important to an assessment of Soviet naval power, tv^,()tXcilange of ideas between these yeargrouPs is vital. During recent ter S’.t^le Principal forum for this in- enct^L0 ^aS ^een t^le tegular confer- J^al. hdd at Dalhousie University, in vl,ax’ Nova Scotia and (in 1977) ashington, D.C. under the en-
%For det
see ^ ai s on ordering books and special prices Intere ®°°k Order Service note in the Books of t0 the Professional Department.
thusiastic and expert guidance of Professor Michael MccGwire. The creative thinking and analysis fostered by these seminars are illustrated by this volume, which contains a summary of the discussions held at the 1974 conference and numerous essays derived from ideas conceived during those discussions.
The essays, mostly written during 1975 and 1976 and frequently first published elsewhere (four essays first appeared as Proceedings articles), reflect the spirit of Dalhousie. They cover the whole range of factors which affect the development of Soviet seapower: foreign policy aspects, domestic institutional and technological considerations, numbers and capabilities of ships and weapons as well as deployment and operations. Although leading thinkers of academic, nonprofit, and commercial research organizations offer original thinking on these subjects, the spokesmen of the defense and naval intelligence community are not represented. Thus, the volume is weakest covering Soviet hardware and capabilities where these analysts could have made their contributions.
In this volume, as at the Dalhousie conferences, Mike MccGwire is the central and most prolific figure. He has written five of the 30 essays, and they stand out as among the best, on the basis of quality of research, originality of analysis, and pertinence. For example, his analysis of the Soviet military policy debate of the early 1970s of which the Gorshkov Morskoy Sbornik articles were a part and the conclusion that a significant shift in Soviet policy concerning overseas military presence occurred in 1973 have since been proven repeatedly by Soviet conduct and events in Africa. In another essay, MccGwire brings his perceptive analysis to bear on the “numbers game.” By comparing Soviet and Western shipbuilding programs, he shows that in the period between 1965-1976 the Western navies, led by the United States, out-built the U.S.S.R. in every category of ship except ballistic missile submarines. These figures not only highlight where the Soviets have put the emphasis of their shipbuilding program but also bring into question some of the trends cited by others.
A number of other analysts have also provided essays worth particular attention. James Barry’s illuminating discussion of the institutional, bureaucratic, and personality factors which influence Soviet naval policy is particularly valuable as a counterbalance to the often expressed idea that the Soviet Navy is solely the product of the genius of Admiral Gorshkov. Rather, it seems that the credit due Gorshkov should be for his political and managerial ability in creating a powerful fleet in view of all the disparate interests. Two essays by Richard Ackley cover the merchant and fishing fleets, providing excellent background for understanding these two facets of Soviet seapower. Finally, an essay by Bradford Dismukes summarizes the occasions during 19671975 on which the U.S.S.R. has employed its navy for political purposes. The list is surprisingly long and underscores the increasingly important peacetime employment of the Soviet Navy.
This volume is a compendium of the most recent thinking about the peacetime influence of the Soviet Navy, ranging from the strategic nuclear role, to planning and building a wartime fleet, to employment for political purposes. While not presenting a total balanced view of Soviet naval power, it does provide valuable insights into Soviet naval missions and
covert operations,
and
all
The CIA is given top billing in
intentions that balance the readily available information on Soviet naval hardware and capabilities.
The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues
Compiled and edited by Tyrus G. Fain in collaboration with Katherine C. Plant and Ross Milloy, with an Introduction by Senator Frank Church. New York: R.R. Bowker 1977. 1,036 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. $35.00.*
Reviewed by Captain Kenneth A. Knowles, U.S. Navy (Retired)
(Captain Knowles graduated from the Naval Academy [Class of 7927], retired for a physical disability in 1938 and became the Editor, Our Navy Magazine. Recalled to active duty 1941, he served as Head, Atlantic Section. Combat Intelligence [C0M1NCH] and Chief, Intelligence Staff. Tenth Fleet. After World War II. he joined the Central Intelligence Group [CIG1 [later CIA] in 1946, retiring with rank of Assistant Director in 1963 ■)
This edited collection of contemporary government documents on U.S. foreign intelligence represents the first title in the Public Document Series, a private publishing effort seeking to make government documents more accessible to the public.
To one who has spent several decades in the intelligence field, the revelations in this volume are indeed startling. Nurtured in the traditions and philosophy of the “silent service,” it is hard to believe that so much of the intelligence picture is now available for the asking. But times have changed, and the editors of this first of the Public Document Series have done a remarkable job. This volume presents the essential material brought out in numerous congressional hearings, as well as related background coverage. Never before have the clandestine aspects of foreign intelligence been so thoroughly scrutinized in the public forum.
Besides the Introduction, a diatribe by Senator Frank Church against CIA the volume is d*' vided into three parts: History Structure of the U.S. Foreign Intell*' gence Community, Components of the Foreign Intelligence Community, and The Public Issues.
parts of this volume, with regard t0 its internal organizational problem5 and its relations with the other intel' ligence components in the commn' nity. In this respect, the director wears two hats: as Director of Centra Intelligence (DCI), he is responsible f°r coordinating the work of the intell1' gence community, as well as serving as the principal intelligence advisor t0 the president. On the other hand, a5 Director of the CIA, he acts as head 0 the Central Intelligence Agency.
The evidence in this volume ind1' cates there is a built-in conflict 0 interest in the relationships, with 11 natural tendency to favor the vis-a-vis the other components of the
Secret Naval Intelligence Records: A Note for Researchers
Patrick Beesly, author of Very Special Intelligence
Now that the British and American authorities are at last beginning to lift the veils of secrecy that have hitherto shrouded the activities of the Allied cryptanalysts during World War II, historians will be anxious to examine the newly declassified records and make a fresh evaluation of the many factors which contributed to the Allied victory. This brief note is intended to help researchers with this new material but, although it is hoped that it has general application, the writer must make it clear that his own personal knowledge is confined to the naval aspect of this form of intelligence and more from the British than the American point of view.
The original break into the German naval ciphers in the spring of 1941 was entirely a British achievement. However, American cryptanalysts were given access to all British findings and later helped to perfect the constantly evolving decrypting techniques. Probably for this reason the U. S. authorities agreed, after the war, to follow British wishes regarding the maintenance of secrecy and to release nothing previously classified except in conjunction with their ally.
After World War I the various British cryptanalysis organizations were centralized and became part of the Secret Intelligence Service under the control of the Foreign Office. The new unit was given the name Government Code and Cipher School (CG&CS). At the outbreak of World
War II the unit was moved from London to a country house in Buckinghamshire, Bletchley Park (B.P.). So far aS maritime intelligence was concerned, the Admiralty’s OP' erational Intelligence Centre (O.I.C.) was the organization responsible throughout the war for receiving, evaluating^ and promulgating all information, including that obtain**1 at B.P. (Army and Air Force information was handled in ll different manner.) After the war, GC&CS was relocated at Cheltenham and renamed Government Cipher Headquat' ters (GCHQ). It remains under the control of the Foreign Office.
On 12 January 1978, the Foreign Secretary made a statement in the House of Commons to clarify the positi°n concerning the release to the Public Record Office (P.R-0^ of “records based on intercepted radio messages of enemV armed forces” and the obligations of those with knowledge of B.P.’s wartime activities who were still subject to the requirements of the Official Secrets Acts. He stated that such people “could now acknowledge having worked as interceptors, cypher breakers, distributors, or users of thlS material and may reveal what they may know of the use made of it in the conduct of the war. Other information' including details of the methods by which this material was obtained, has not been made available to the Publ>c^ Record Office ... it remains subject to the . . . Office Secrets Acts and may not be disclosed.”
The position at the moment is that the results of B.P-
'otelligefu-g community. To minimize 1 ls Problem President Gerald R. Ford issued Executive Order 11905* (18 e ruary 1976) which established two I ePuties to the DCI, one for the intel- 'Sence community affairs and one for operations. The major change ef- seted by the order is the formation of e Committee on Foreign Intelli- 8ence (CFI) which is chaired by the DCI *nd reports directly to the National ecurity Council (NSC). The CFI will ^e responsibility to (1) "control u get preparation and resource allo- |.ati°n for the National Foreign Intel- ,'gence Program,” (2) “establish pol- Cy Priorities for the collection and ,,roducrion of national intelligence,” establish policy for the manage- ent of the National Foreign Intelligence Program,” and (4) “provide guidance on the relationship between *lcal and national intelligence.” bis executive order appears to be a aJor step to strengthen the DCI’s nd in coordinating the activities of
the various organizations within the intelligence community, especially with regard to those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This agency was established in 1961 to coordinate DoD’s intelligence activities to avoid duplication, to furnish an independent viewpoint for the Secretary of Defense, and to be responsible for the national intelligence aspects of the military services. Various congressional committees, however, have been critical of DIA’s inability to fulfill its promise, and one went so far as to recommend that the DIA be abolished.
Of especial interest are the findings and recommendations of the Senate Select (Church) Committee, which are fully set forth in this volume. The major concerns of this committee are guarding against abuse of America’s institutions and reputation (referring primarily to CIA’s covert action operations), ensuring clear accountability for clandestine activities, and creating a framework of statutory law and congressional oversight controls for the agencies and activities of the United States intelligence community.
The Church Committee examined in considerable detail the problems and deficiencies of the intelligence agencies’ organizations, relationships, and operations. The report dwells heavily on the excesses in use of covert action operations and the need to establish more effective oversight controls both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress. The report also emphasizes the need to improve the support for and the quality of finished intelligence and finds this neglect unacceptable for the future.
The report makes a particularly valid comment:
j.°rk are gradually being released to the new and splen- 'vh ^ e<^u*PPed Public Record Office at Kew, London, e the details of the means by which these successes
re obtained remain classified and unavailable to the Public.
■. ®ef°re any records are released they are scrutinized or sirJee^ed ky government officials and any matter still con- S(^ered sensitive is withheld or deleted. Because of per- nel shortages, the continuous process is a slow one, and
no
bcuf
advance information can be given as to when any par- eve ar 'tem available, or indeed, whether it will
Cf.er de released. The weeding process has been much lci2ed and has occasionally led to the needless destruc- °n of valuable material.
^t the
records 'here j
time of writing (August 1978) almost all the
released were naval intelligence ones, although
the *S a fiuant'ty °harmy and air intelligence concerning p day Per*°d- The first batch of records reached the r(.p in December 1975, where they are filed under andfenCe ADM 22^* t0 ^7. They consist of appreciations 0f ^rePorts prepared either by O.I.C. or the naval section her ^ ^hey include all the weekly reports from Decem- sUb until the end of the war made by the famous Marine tracking room to the First Sea Lord and senior
. tubers Cl f ("lip npi/ol C raff TVloll rani PMinfl.r ulinrai 1-Up rarP_
c,se 8ivi
bers of the naval staff. They recurrently show the pre- c°ntemporary intelligence view of the U-boat war,
an estimate °f 'he number of operational German 0ats and their dispositions, and clearly indicate how
up-to-date decrypting was periodically. The first group also contains detailed reports based on “Special Intelligence” (now more generally but incorrectly referred to as “Ultra”) of all the major convoy battles in the Atlantic during that period. There are considerable, although less complete, reports about German surface ships, and many appreciations prepared at B.P. on swept channels, wireless telegraphy procedure, and other specialized subjects. Later files include information on a variety of subjects obtained through the interrogation of prisoners and the examination of captured documents.
But the earlier records are invaluable because they disclose the extent of contemporary knowledge. This is of great importance for it was only when the information reached O.I.C. that practical operational use could be made of it. So one must not believe that because there is a reference in a report to decrypted information, that it was necessarily available to O.I.C. as soon as the original German message was intercepted.
This caveat applies with even greater force to the second major series of releases, which began to reach the P. R.O. in October 1977. They consist of B.P.’s file copies of the actual telexes of translated German naval signals in Hydra cipher (used for all surface ships in the Baltic and North Sea) sent to O.I.C. The following, the executive order to the battle cruiser Scharnhorst to sail from Altenfjord on Christmas Day 1943 (and to her doom 24 hours later), will serve as an example.
"Intelligence resources are overwhelmingly devoted to intelligence collection. The system is inundated with raw intelligence. The individual analysts responsible for producing finished intelligence [have] difficulty dealing with the sheer vol-
command and staff
ume of information. Policymakers want the latest reports, and producers of finished intelligence often have to compete with the producers of raw intelligence for policymakers’ attention. In a crisis situation, analysts tend to focus on the latest piece of evidence at the expense of a longer and broader view.”
(Pity the poor Russian Analyst caught in the overwhelming avalanche of U.S. open sources!)
There is much, much more to read and ponder in this omnibus volume. The testimony of the former DCls, especially that of Willaim Colby, is enlightening and noteworthy. The appendix contains a glossary of intelligence terms, a fine bibliography, and even an order blank and price list for government publications pertaining to U. S. intelligence.
This reviewer can only view with deep regret this outpouring of information, far beyond prudent limits, about our intelligence agencies. It cannot help but bring comfort to our enemies and harm to our national security.
That is not to say that some good has not come out of this massive investigation and revelation. It is clear that the CIA has corrected many of the excesses and abuses, largely in the area of covert action operations, noted by the various congressional committees. The impression that the CIA frequently went off on its own is apparently, from the literature, without foundation. All covert action operations were cleared with the NSC, probably with the blessing of the president. Certainly, every president has had full knowledge of all the major operations.
The intelligence game is a serious, cold-blooded business which cannot become the plaything of the press or the public without serious damage to itself and to the nation. The estab-
* President Jimmy Carter's Executive Order 12036, issued on 24 January 1978, modifies somewhat President Ford's 11905.
lishment of a single congressiona oversight committee could well pr0" vide effective and secure controls and understanding of U.S. intelligence objectives and requirements.
The U. S. Marine Corps Story
J. Robert Moskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. 1,040 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $29.95 (23.95).*
Reviewed by Major Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps
(Major Parks has served in positions in the Marine Corps since he receive his commission in 1963. His articles on foreip” policy have appeared on the pages of the Proceedings and other professional military journals. The great-nephew of Andrew J. Hays, a U. S. [1847-1861] and Confederal1 [1861-1865] Marine Corps officer, Major Parks is writing a monograph in the official Marine Corps series on the Vietnam War.)
8. Text of original.
9. Time of telex message.
In this instance, although the Germans transmitted tbL signal at 1500 on Christmas Day, B.P. did not decrypt i[ until around midnight and it did not reach O.I.C. for another 25 minutes. This, in fact, was swift and left ample time for operational action to be taken. On man) occasions, however, signals took much longer to decrypt’ sometimes days, sometimes even weeks, thus lessening °r completely destroying their operational value. Journalist5 who first examined some of these decrypts on the Press Day for the opening of the new P.R.O. failed to appreciate the significance of these indicators and, until col rected by the writer, concluded that the British had beefl able to .read currently all signals transmitted to and (rod1 Bismarck during the course of the operation which ende in her destruction. It can now be seen that, although t first break into German naval traffic was achieved in March 1941, it was spasmodic and related to February signals. Current reading—decrypting within minutes °r at least hours of the original transmission—was not achieved until 1 June.
Decrypts so far released cover February 1941 until 27 January 1944. They bear the reference, given in the at*’ ^ example, ZTPG, and consecutive serial numbers. They 11 bound together more or less in order of decrypting, although on occasions urgent messages or groups of mes-
ADM(2)
TO: ID8G ZIP/ZTPG/194876
FROM: NS
5205 KC/S TOO 1527 TOl 1500/25/12/43
FROM: ADMIRAL NORTHERN WATERS
TO: BATTLE GROUP
ADMIRAL POLAR COAST
MOST IMMEDIATE
'OSTFRONT' 1700/25/25/12.
0025/26/12/43 + + + EE/FA
Reading from left to right and top to bottom, we have:
1. Number of telex machine used.
2. Addressee. (Section 8G of the Naval Intelligence Division, namely the section of O.I.C. responsible for German surface ship intelligence. The Submarine Tracking Room was 8S, the Italian section 8EI, and so on.)
3. The sender. (Naval Section of B.P.)
4. Frequency on which original was transmitted, German time of origin (in German zone time), British time of intercept of enciphered message (in appropriate British time, G.M.T. or British Summer or Double Summer time).
5. German originator.
6. German addressee(s).
7. Priority of original.
One of the favorite stories of t^e Cnmmnnrlnnr of rhe Marine Corp-
c°ncerns the death of a universally despised small town scrooge. A young Marine, home on leave, happened to Walk up to the sparse gathering at the 8rave-side service as the minister inquired if anyone had anything to say °” behalf of the deceased. Noting the ' jnCC ’ t^le rnarine stepped forward u declared that “If no one has any-
lng to say for the deceased, I’d like
0 say a few words on behalf of the i-orps!"
Marines are a proud lot, not always ?.eading with deftness the fine line lstinguishing confidence from mod- ,Sty' Much of individual marine pride (-.eriVes from the history of the Marine 0rps, for it is the heritage of all ^ ar<nes. Pride of history and heritage 0nS made the impossible a little easier ^ numerous occasions, whether in Ch norttlem lands of Korea’s
s0sen Reservoir, or the sunny tropic
Cenes of the South Pacific or Viet
nam.
inTJe !ate Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart,
Cue introduction to an earlier his
tory of the Marine Corps, opined that “The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based people is amphibious flexibility.” Current strategists, in avoiding the Marine Corps’ amphibious capability while suggesting that the world revolves around the NATO central region, would benefit from this history. As Liddell Hart has noted, “The practical value of history is to throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present onto the screen of the future.”
J. Robert Moskin’s The U. S. Marine Corps Story is the latest in a long succession of histories of the Marine Corps. Captain John B. Moran’s massive catalogue of publications, Creating a Legend, lists more than 1,000 books relating to some segment of the history of the Marine Corps. Some, like General H. M. Smith’s classic Coral and Brass, record the events of a particular war, as witnessed by one of its principals, while writers like former marine Robert
Leckie (Strong Men Armed, The March to Glory) describe battles from the level of the individual rifleman. Others, such as the Kipling of the Marine Corps, Colonel John W. Thomason, Jr. (Fix Bayonets!, Red Pants, — and a few Marines), recall an era through colorful short stories.
,0ats in the Atlantic or heavy surface ships off Norway. fQ Patience and some background knowledge is there-
Much
th
th,
ciPh,
Refe
by reference, say, AB1234. Thanks to Prof. Dr. Jurgen Rohwer, of the Bibliothek fur Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart, the writer was able to supply the P.R.O. with copies of this German Naval Grid. Unfortunately, in November 1941, the Germans introduced a further complication in the shape of a simple transposition code so that AB1234 might become, say, CD2345, and these codes were changed frequently. Currently there is no crib available for these codes that applied only to operational U-boat traffic.
So far as is known to the writer, the only American cryptanalysis material available consists of a two-volume history (OP20G [U.S.N. O.I.C.]) of the war against the U-boats. Written immediately after the end of the war against Germany, this account is based almost entirely on Special Intelligence. It provides an extremely detailed and accurate narrative of the strategy and movements of U-boats and blockade runners in the Atlantic from the time of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack until Germany’s surrender. Although not a contemporary document in the way that the ADM 223 series is, and therefore somewhat less revealing of contemporary thinking, it is very complete and is easy and straightforward reading. Certain passages appear to have been censored, but there remain some interesting references to radio intelligence problems, including some mention of the weakness of the Anglo- American Convoy cipher.
Used properly, “special intelligence” should provide careful and patient historians the means to rewrite the history of war at sea against Germany.
rences can be found on some telexes to the fact that Original was enciphered in ‘Offizier’ or ‘Officer Only’ Mol/I' 3 or trehle encipherment which usually
the 0n8er t0 break and sometimes completely defeated
^cryptanalysts.
ti^ Mtther complication for the researcher (and at the gjve 0r ‘Me O.I.C.’s staff) was the German practice of Mtitude and longitude by grid references. Thus, t>°n 51.23° North 31.46° West would be indicated
e needed to sort the wheat from the chaff and to follow r°ugh any specific operation. cj J1 February 1942, the Germans introduced a new 0[leer Mr their U-boats in the Atlantic, and also another ’ Probably at the same time, for U-boats in the Utllterranean. B.P. was unable to crack these ciphers th * t^e erM °F the year, but from that point it decrypted f ■ni Until the end of the war. Their code names were Pea °n an<^ Medusa respectively. These names did not ap- fer °n s telexes, which were, however, dif- ari^nt'ated from the Hydra cipher still used in the Baltic ?Tp ‘n Norway, by the prefixes ZTPGU for the Atlantic and O Mr the Mediterranean. Presently no telexes of these Series have been released.
k &es were telexed out of order. They are not segregated -^subject matter, class of vessel, or geographical area. areU.S’ routine signals from, say, small craft in the Baltic,
interspersed between important operational ones to
■ «... . - --
Throughout its 203-year history, however, there have been only four published, comprehensive accounts of the Marine Corps. Captain Richard S. Collum’s History of the United States Marine Corps, first published in 1875, was 257 pages in length. Lieutenant Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf wrote The History of the United States Marine Corps, a 584-page volume published in 1939. In 1962, the Naval Institute published Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr.’s 692-page Soldiers of the Sea, by far and away the most definitive one- volume history of any U. S. military service. Regrettably, it is both out of date and out of print. Robert Moskin’s book is not the first book written by an author who is not a marine, but it
is the first "totally independent” (in the words of the publisher) comprehensive history of the Marine Corps.
That there has been somewhat of an incestuous relationship in the writing of Marine Corps history is not necessarily bad. Organizational experience can be invaluable in understanding and evaluating historical data. Indeed, it is against the excellent Soldiers of the Sea. written by a marine, that Moslem's work will be compared.
In comparing Heinl’s and Moskin’s efforts, it is of use to note their similarities. Each volume is well documented. As each is a historical treatise, there is limited use of photographs as "filler,” but those used are relevant. Because each author is both a journalist and historian, each volume reads well—neither bogs the reader down with unnecessary detail. The basic difference lies in style. Moskin writes in a colorless, often insipid manner. In emulating the style of
Robert Leckie or Cornelius Ryan, Moskin endeavors to develop the history of the Corps through its Medal of Honor winners, which does not lend itself to offering a complete picture. In contrast, Heinl is fiercely and unapologetically partisan in his style. But then Heinl is a veteran, not only of combat on the battlefield, but of the wars in the hallowed halls of the Pentagon’s E-Ring and Congress. His empathy lends to a more colorful writing style.
Because Soldiers of the Sea predates Vietnam, one might assume that Moskin’s book is the logical successor to Heinl’s. Unfortunately, this is not true. If Heinl manifests a bias towards the Corps, Moskin reveals his in his reporting on marine operations in Vietnam. His 69 pages on Vietnam are shallow, providing less information than the 33 pages in Brigadier General E. H. Simmons' shorter (342 pages) The United States Marines, 1775-1975, or Brigadier General
Simmons’ scholarly series of articles m the 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1973 Naval Reviews. It appears that after 20 years research on the events preceding Vietnam, Moskin did a "quick and dirty” on that war, prejudiced by his own views of it. On three occasions he raises allegations of “atrocities” by marines in the conduct of their operations—references disproportionate to the few incidents of misconduct which did occur. Moreover, his references are inaccurate. For example, he perpetuates the canard of Cam Ne, as originally and incorrectly alleged, even though he had access to the official files on the matter. Every author is entitled to his own opinions, but he is not entitled to his own set of facts.
Up to its coverage of the Vietnam War, The Marine Corps Story is an alternative to Soldiers of the Sea, but only until the earlier work is updated and republished.
________________________ -All the News That Fits
During the Sixties, my reserve unit published a small in-house magazine. None of the staff had any experience and we reinvented the wheel at every issue. This paragraph bailed US out of a perennial problem:
"Every editor faces the ‘empty space’ problem when an article ends midway down on the page. He may insert an announcement, a picture, or write a filler. Fillers replace the white emptiness with text. These short paragraphs may be philosophical or historical. Some are humorous. Their subject should be appropriate for the journal; they should catch the interest of the reader; and, most of all, they must fit the empty space exactly. For example, this is » filler.”
Commander Denis Smith, USNR
It Could Have Been Worse
Our older son was the proud owner of a toy aircraft carrier which propelled Navy and Marine Corps planes into the air. One day our younger son attached one of the planes to hi* new helium-filled balloon to see if it would fly. The balloon and airplane rose higher and higher and finally disappeared from sight. The older boy was philosophical. "Well, at least it’s just the Marine plane that’s gone."
Sylvia S. Rohrbougb (The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings-
Books of Interest to the Professional
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Air Search and Rescue: 63 Years of
Aerial Lifesaving
NAVAL AFFAIRS Die Ausbildung in der deutschen Marine von ihrer Griindung bis zum Jahre 1914: Militar und Pedagogik im 19. Jahrhundert (Training in the German Navy from its Foundation to the Year 1914: The Military and Pedagogy in the 19th Century) Korvettenkapitan Dr. Herbert Graubohm, Federal German Navy. Diisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1977. 444 pp. Bib. Ind. 58 DM (Approx. $29.00) paper.
Social, cultural, and pedagogical histories are interwoven in this examination of the development and content of enlisted training in the Prussian and Imperial German navies from the mid-19th century to the outbreak of World War I.
jjj Combat Fleets of the World 1978/79: Their Ships, Aircraft and Armament
Jean Labayle Couhat. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 651 pp. lllus. $49.50 ($59.60).
The second English-language edition of this classic naval annual, prepared under
the direction of the Naval Institute staff, has been extensively revised. More than 10% longer than the 1976-1977 edition, with over 450 new photographs and line- drawings, it contains descriptions of some 6,500 ships in the 122 navies of the world.
The Great Admirals
Richard Hough. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978. 271 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.96).
The art of the admiral is examined in concise biographies of 21 of its most-noted
practitioners, beginning with Don Juan of Austria and ending with Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey. One of Britain’s best- known naval historians, Mr. Hough is the author of numerous books, among them The Fleet That Had to Die, The Hunting of Force Z, and First Sea Lord: A Life of Admiral Fisher.
Gunboats on the Great River: A History of the Royal Navy on the Yangtse
Cdr. Gregory Haines, Royal Navy (Ret.). New York: Hippocrene Books, 1978. 182 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $8.95 ($8.06).
The Royal Navy maintained a flotilla of gunboats on the Yangtse for almost exactly a century, from the Nanking expedition of 1842 until the Japanese attack in 1941. This well-written report of its operations concentrates on the period between the world wars. As such, it provides a companion volume to Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley’s excellent account of the U. S. Navy’s Yangtze Patrol, published in 1972.
In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978
Kenneth J. Hagan, Editor. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 368 pp. Illus. Bib.
Ind. $17.50 ($15.75).
The broad sweep of American naval history is examined by 17 interpretative essays. As the title indicates, the book is concerned with much more than battles, and ample coverage is given to the evolution of naval policies, politics, and technology. Professor Hagan is a member of the History Department of the U. S. Naval Academy.
The Sea Chaplains: A history of the Chaplains of The Royal Navy Gordon Taylor. Oxford: Oxford Illustrated Press, 1978. 603 pp. Ulus. Append. I'nd.
I 12.50 (Approx. $25.00) ($22.50).
The activities and experiences of the chaplains of the Royal Navy, from the Crusades to the "Cod War” of 1976, are related in a highly readable history of great human interest. Copious appendices list the names of the 5,000 known chaplains, of all denominations, from the earliest times to the present. The author, Rector of St. Giles- in-the-Fields, London, served in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve from 1940 until 1970.
Statens Sjbmakt (Sea Power and the State)
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. 0- Gorshkov. Stockholm: Marinlitteraturforeningen, 1977. 318 pp- 60 (Approx. $10.00).
A Swedish translation of Admiral Gorsh kov’s Sea Power and the State has been Pr° duced by the Swedish Naval Literature So ciety, Stockholm,
Very Special Intelligence: The Story the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939-1945
Patrick Beesly. New York: Doubleday, 1978282 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $10.00 ($9-00
The crucial role played by the British miralty’s Operational Intelligence Cen^ (OIC) in the naval war against Germany- classified for three decades, is finally rc’ vealed. The term "Special Intelligence rcr fers to that received from the decoding radio signals sent by the German "Enigma” machine cypher. Mr. Beesly a member of the OIC.
U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washing:011, D.C. (published by the U. S. Government PrintingOfT.ee), 1978. 44 pp. Illus. Availab at no cost by writing directly to: Commandan G-APA/83, U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters. Washington, D.C. 20590.
The U. S. Coast Guard, formed in by the amalgamation of the Life Sav> Service and the Revenue Service, quick to realize the potential value of & craft in saving life at sea. The story 0 aviation component is outlined in an tractive nirrnria 1
The Gazela Primeiro
Allison Saville. Annapolis, Md.: Leeward Publications, in cooperation with the Philadelphia Maritime Museum, 1978. 40 P Illus. $3.95 ($3.55) paper.
At age 87, the barkentine Gazela was the oldest wooden sailing vessel m j world still in active service at the tirnte her purchase by the Philadelphia Mari11 ^ Museum in 1970. Her long car,etfp’s traced in the latest of Leeward s 3 1
Data"
color,
render
series. The illustrations, many in include two double-page waterline ings.
Home at Last!” A Voyage of migration to Liberia, West Africa, in >861-1862
rom the journal of Charles Jones Stewart,
7,e<> Frederick P. Schmitt. Cold Harbor, M Whaling Museum Society, Inc., 1977. 4 PP- Ulus. Map. $1.95 (paper).
^ the winter of 1861, Charles Jones Wart' a bright young man anxious to Set s°mething of the world, booked pas- a8e on the brig John H. Jones, of Cold arbor, New York, for a voyage from shf"' ^°rk to Monrovia, Liberia. The P s steerage passengers were freed slaves cturning to Africa under the auspices of Ste American Colonization Society, and wart s journal represents one of the few rsthand accounts of their voyage.
MiLITARY affairs
^ ^as a Strang er
(R H ^‘r->°>ln Winthrop Hackett, British Army ct>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978. 219 pP- Map. $8.95 ($8.06).
Th
th 6 aut^or was the commander of orie of e British airborne brigades dropped on ^ em in September 1944 in the disaster a ed Operation Market Garden. Badly “unded near the end of the battle, he was den, nursed back to health, and finally Jmited to safety by members of the Dutch n erground. He pays tribute to his
Dutch friends’ bravery and humanity in an absorbing memoir.
No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Royal Navy (Ret.). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978. 172 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. $12.95.
Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom from 1971 to 1974 and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1974 to 1977, Admiral Hill-Norton discusses the status of NATO from intimate, firsthand experience. He concludes that the alliance remains vital to the security of the Western democracies and that it is imperative for the recent decline of its military strength vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact to be reversed.
Royal United Services Institute and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1977/78 The Royal United Services Institute for Strategic Studies. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1978. 430 pp. Illus. Maps. $28.75 ($25.88).
The 88th edition of “Brassey's,” the fourth to be issued under the aegis of the Royal United Services Institute for Strategic Studies, London, contains contributions by distinguished American, Belgian, British, and German authors. It is divided into three parts: a “Strategic Review" of the period from mid-1976 to mid-1977; a round-up of weapons technology; and a bibliography and chronology of defense- related publications and events.
Riistung und Politik in der Bundesrepublik—MRCA Tornado: Geschichte und Funktion des grossten westeuropaischen Rustungsprogramms (Arms and Policy in the Federal Republic—MRCA Tornado: the History and Operation of the Greatest West European Arms Program)
Lt.Col. Dr. Alfred Mechtersheimer, Federal German Air Force. Bad Honnef, Germany: Osang Verlag, 1977. 232 pp. Illus. Map. Append. Bib. Ind. 38 DM (Approx. $19.00) paper.
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called the German-British-Italian collaboration on the MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) Tornado "the greatest arms program since the birth of Christ.” The his-
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