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Yet, the old “flattop” or at least the large conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) carrier is again in serious trouble. The enemy is not the Soviet Navy but budget watchers in both the Congress and the administration who are eyeing ships that now cost about $2 billion apiece. Even advocates of sea-based air and large carriers are starting to question the cost of these ships, and there is serious doubt whether there will be any follow-ons—or at least more than one—to the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70). The Navy well understands this problem and has suggested a new medium-sized carrier designated CVV which could operate both CTOL and V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft. But by the time the keel could be laid for the CVV in the 1980s, she would cost almost $1.5 billion.
Congressional!Administration Decisions: While the future of another Nimitz-class carrier is in doubt, the story of its “complete” demise may be premature.1 Rather, the whole future of American carrier building can best be summarized as “confused.” Here is how things stand as we approach 1978. As most readers know, there were plans for another Nimitz type, designated CVN-71, to begin building in fiscal year 1979, and there were even proposals for a CVN-72 to begin in the 1980s. Advance funds for CVN-71 were in the fiscal year 1977 budget. Late in 1976, for reasons that are not altogether clear, President Gerald Ford ordered a recision of the funds. It was first thought that this was the recommendation of a major National Security Council study and based on solid military and economic reasoning, but in open testimony, the Navy has said otherwise. When President Jimmy Carter assumed office, he supported the cancellation request, and, in March 1977, the Congress also agreed.
This was indeed a staggering blow for the CVN and large carrier advocates, but these were essentially administration and appropriations committee decisions; the armed services committees had not yet acted on the fiscal year 1978 budget. What appeared to be the proverbial nail in the coffin of the CVN was the failure of the usually pro-large-carrier House Armed Services Committee to restore funds. In fact, the only item specifically related to carriers in the House authorization bill was some money for a carrier service life extension program for present carriers. It would extend their useful service lives by ten to 15 years each. However, last May the House Armed Services Committee showed its displeasure
'For footnotes, please turn to page 40.
over medium-sized carriers by prohibiting transfer of fiscal year 1977 funds for the CVV. Since reprogramming requests are subject to one committee veto, the CVV was killed for 1977.
It is the Senate action, however, that has really added to the confusion. In the Senate authorization bill and report, there are recommendations, studieSi i or funds that amount to six different alternatives:
► The Senate wisely directed the Secretary of Defense “to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of seabased aircraft platforms for both the short and long term.”2 One of the things that has upset many people, especially supporters of large carriers, is that the so-called alterna- fives, such as a medium-size aircraft carrier or V/STOL 1 carrier, are really only concepts. No detailed studies H seem to exist for these ships.
► The Senate restored funds for a CVN. The Senate I - report states, however, that this “. . . in no way | suggests that the committee has made a final decision in favor of building another carrier of this | class.”3 These are simply advance funds that could be j used either for present CVN spare parts or for CVN-71- k
► The Senate authorized research and development fo funds for a medium-sized conventional carrier des- I- ignated CVV which could carry both CTOL and p- V/STOL airplanes, but the report caustically states:
“It was learned that there has been no developmental design on the CW and the cited cost of the program of $2.5 billion is a ‘ballpark’ esti- j ‘ mate. The justification provided leaves much to be desired, and the committee is of the firm opinion that any commitment to the CVV program at this time would be premature.”4
► The Senate report raised the question whether it might be better to build another CVN and extend the servi.ce life of a Midway-class carrier—the USS Midway (CV-41) or Coral Sea (CV-43)—rather than build two CVVs for the $2.5 billion. While statements such as these do not have the force of law, they should not be underestimated. They often reflect true feelings and are indications of future compromise solutions.
► Money was provided for research and development for a V/STOL ship that is being designated VSS for V/STOL support ship.
► Funds were designated for a DD-963 (air capable) destroyer that will use the Spruance-dass hull and engineering plant, modified to support either helicopters or V/STOL aircraft.
The bill that finally emerged from the Senate- House conference essentially acceded to the Senate’s position. The bill called for a comprehensive study of various types of aviation ships. Advance funds for
40
Th.
Wording to Jane’s Fighting Ships, as many as six
^N-7i were restored, two DD-963 (AC)s were ap- ^r°ved, and $40 million was authorized to maintain atl °ption to decide for fiscal year 1979 which kind of Carrier is required—another Nimitz type, a CVV ^edium conventional carrier, or a V/STOL aviation ? *P- This does not mean that any of these ships will e built. Rather, as the Senate report states, com- rrie[tting on all these different proposals, “In no case 'S any predisposition in favor of one ship type im- the committee’s action is directed solely to- 'Vard the creation of options.”5 In short, the whole ^arrier question, and debate, is far from over, and it °°ks as if 1978 will be the crucial year for decisions.
kSoviet Threat: There is, of course, a certain irony to ‘s confusion and probable decline in impetus to Atr,crican building of carriers. At the same time ^en further American carrier building is in doubt, 116 Soviets are launching a new series of “carriers.” >000-ton Kiev-class V/STOL carriers may be built. ere is even speculation that the Kiev might be just
a stepping-stone from the Moskva helicopter cruiser to a full-fledged CTOL-capable carrier. These new ships would not appear until the late 1980s or early 1990s—just when many American CVs will be reaching 30-plus years of age. Even if the Soviets do not go the next step to a CTOL carrier, a force of six Kiev-class carriers, if concentrated, could give two, three, or even four American CVs considerable problems. Once again, U. S. forces could find themselves in the situation of having quality (in the CV and F-14) but inferiority in numbers.
Western Decline: There is another irony to the whole carrier debate that is being largely ignored. That is the decline of Western European carrier
capability even though the Soviet carriers are being deployed in the North Atlantic-Mediterranean-Black Sea areas. The Netherlands long ago gave up its one carrier, and the British, who used to have many operational attack carriers, are down to one, HMS Ark Royal, and she is slated for retirement in a year or two. Only the French, with two carriers built in the late 1950s, will have an attack carrier capability. On the brighter side, Britain is building two V/STOL ships, and France is scheduled to begin construction of a nuclear-powered V/STOL ship in the near future. These new ships, however, will definitely be inferior in attack capability to the older British and French carriers and will be no match for the Soviet Kiev class.
Possible Solution—More Options: There are some very serious potential problems looming in the coming decades. Western carrier capability is already being challenged, and the seriousness of the challenge for the 1990s will depend upon decisions made in the 1970s because of the tremendous cost and lead time to build new carriers of any size. Since this is a Western and not just an American problem, a “Western” solution should be considered. And, decisions must be made quickly before Britain, France, Australia, and the others who still have some older carriers, abandon them completely. It might already be too late to maintain a British attack carrier capability.
Therefore, added to the list of six options that the Senate report contained should be at least two more. One is to develop a medium-sized attack CTOL carrier, not just for American purposes, but to maintain a Western attack carrier capability. Second, for smaller nations, as a minimum capability and for the future, a common Western V/STOL carrier should als° be developed.
Medium Aircraft Carriers: A medium-sized convex tional takeoff and landing aircraft carrier (CVM) is, course, nothing new. The ships of the 40,000-ton Essex (CV-9) class of World War II could be classify as CVMs. Some of these useful and versatile ship5 were still in service in Vietnam, although by the11 they were unable to handle the latest high- performance aircraft. Several operational CVMs still exist throughout the world. These range from ^ large 64,000-ton U.S. Midway (CV-41) class down t0 the fairly small 20,000-ton former British MajedtC' and Colossus-class carriers operated by Argentina Australia, Brazil, and India. More important from3 “Western” viewpoint is that both the operation^ British and French aircraft carriers would, be classified as CVMs. The 50,000-ton HMS Ark Ro]W would be a perfect example for a Western CVM- Table 1 gives the characteristics of these ships.
‘Information is from the 1976-77 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships.
bThis number changed to two with the decommissioning of the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) on 1 October. cFormer British Colossus class dFormer British Majestic class
Table 1 Operational CVMsa
Country | Name | Number | Yearis) Launched | Displacement | Length | Catapults | Aircraf |
United States | Midway | 2b | 1945-46 | 64,000 | 979 | 2 | 75 |
United States | Lexington | 1 | 1942 | 39,000 | 895 | 2 | training |
United Kingdom | Ark Royal | i | 1950 | 50,786 | 845 | 2 | 36 |
France | Clemen ceau | 2 | 1957-60 | 32,780 | 869 | 2 | 40 |
Argentina | Veinticinco de Mayoc | 1 | 1943 | 19,896 | 693 | 1 | 21 |
Australia | Melbourned | 1 | 1945 | 19,966 | 701 | 1 | 24 |
Brazil | Minas Geraisc | 1 | 1944 | 19,890 | 695 | 1 | 20 |
India | VikrantA | 1 | 1945 | 19,500 | 700 | 1 | 22 |
A new CVM would best be defined as a smalM carrier having a definite “attack” capability, which means, for all practical purposes, that she has the catapults, elevators, and arresting gear needed to operate high-performance jet aircraft. The new ship should be approximately 50,000 tons, 850 feet long, have two catapults, and be capable of operating at least 40 planes. (The 45,000-ton Oriskany [CV-3^ of the improved Essex or Hancock [CV-19] class-opof' ated 70 to 80 planes as a CVA.) While no detail^ plans exist for the proposed American CVV, Admit2* James L. Holloway III has said that “. . . a baseline carrier design would cost about $1.25 billion 1979 dollars. It would displace from 50,000 t0 60,000 tons, be conventionally powered, with 28-t0
^9-knot speed, twin screws, three arresting wires, tw° catapults, and a relatively austere command and c°ntrol and communications suite. . . .”6
F°r a new design, the CVM should, if possible, ave the capability of launching the F-14, and definitely have the capability to launch the F-18/A-18 ^hich is scheduled to join the fleet in the 1980s. It w°uld be foolish to build a CVM without F-18/A-18 Capability, and there is probably no reason why a new ship, even a smaller ship, newly designed, shoulcj not be able to launch some F-l4s. A small SclUadron of F-l4s, a squadron of F-18s, an attack sSuadron of either A-7s, A-6s, or A-18s with an anti- Sut>rnarine squadron and a few electronic warfare pWes attached would make this an extremely flex- formidable carrier.
V/STOL Carriers: Some form of V/STOL carriers has een in the world’s naval inventory since the late 1950s when the U. S. Navy converted some old es- c°rt carriers (CVEs) and Errex-class carriers to amphibious assault ships (LPHs). These were soon fol- lovved by seven new Iwo Jima (LPH-2) class ships, and these are being followed by the five new Tarawa-class L^As. Britain operates two older carriers converted to the V/STOL role—the Bulwark as a commando ship a[id the Hermes as an antisubmarine carrier. Spain is Purchasing Harriers for her old American light car- r'er (CVL), the Dedalo, (ex-USS Cabot) and both Stance and Italy operate “helicopter cruisers” which ^‘ght fall into the V/STOL-carrier range. It is the
Soviets, however, that have really broken new ground in V/STOL employment. They did this first with the two “antisubmarine cruisers,” the Moskva and Leningrad, but it was the launching of the Kiev that has been most interesting. This very intriguing 40,000-ton, 925-foot-long “antisubmarine cruiser” can operate up to 25 V/STOL aircraft and 25 helicopters according to Jane's. In size, she is as large as an Essex. This is truly a multi-mission, sea-control vessel, that has added an entirely new dimension to the Soviet Navy.
For our purposes, however, it is the new proposed “Western” ships that are of most interest. The only country actually building a new V/STOL ship is Great Britain. This is the controversial “through-deck” cruiser Invincible, officially called an “antisubmarine cruiser” (CAH), capable of operating ten helicopters and five Harriers. The French are scheduled to begin building a nuclear-powered V/STOL carrier which should be carefully watched for a common Western propulsion plant system. Several other countries are planning to build V/STOL carriers of some type. Spain is scheduled to replace the Dedalo with a new carrier, although no sketches are available. In addition, Italian shipyards are showing sketches of a sea control ship in advertisements. Finally, Britain’s Vosper- Thornycroft shipyard has proposals for a “frigate”- size Harrier carrier.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy pioneered the V/STOL concept with its LPHs, we have definitely fallen behind the Soviet Union, Britain, and France in
The Spanish Dedalo, shown here at Mayport, Florida, in the summer of 1977, was first commissioned in 1943 as the USS Cabot (CVL-28). When it is time to replace her, it would he well to have a new Western carrier design available.
developing new, multi-mission, sea-control V/STOL carriers.' This is not for lack of design. In the early 1970s, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., tried to get his 14,000-ton sea control ship approved, but Congress would not authorize the ship. Thus, the Navy will now be investigating the feasibility of building a new V/STOL ship being designated VSS for V/STOL support ship. The latest entries in the V/STOL ship concept are two designs for an “air-capable” version of the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer. One is for an “extended hangar” version capable of operating approximately four LAMPS helos, and the other is the “flight deck” version capable of operating four V/STOL planes and approximately four helicopters. Two of the “extended hangar” DD-963 (AC)s were authorized by Congress this past June. Table 2 shows the data on all these various ships.
In short, there are many different designs for V/STOL carriers to choose from in planning any common Western V/STOL ship. Not only is there a wide quantitative choice, equally important, there are some very intriguing qualitative designs such as the
Soviet Kiev, British “through-deck,” the French mi' clear powered PH-75, and the smaller DD-963(AC) and “Harrier carrier,” to examine for a standard ship.
Table 2 V/STOL Shipsa
Country | Name | Type | Number | Yeatis) Commissioned | Dis placement |
| Aircraft | |
Length | Helo | V/STOL | ||||||
United States | Iwo Jima | LPH | 7 | 1961-70 | 18,300 | 592 | 20-24 |
|
United States | Tarawa | LHA | 2 + 3 | 1976-78 | 39,300 | 820 | 30 |
|
United Kingdom | Bulwark | Commando | 1 | 1954 | 27,700 | 738 | 20 |
|
United Kingdom | Hermes | ASW Carrier | 1 | 1959 | 28,700 | 744 | 20 |
|
United Kingdom | Invincible | CAH | + 2 | 1979-80? | 19,500 | 677 | 10 | 5 |
Spain | Dedalo | CVL | 1 | 1943 | 16,400 | 623 | 20 | ? |
U.S.S.R. | Kiev | ASW Cruiser | 1 + 2-5 | 1976-? | 40,000 | 925 | 25 | 25 |
U.S.S.R. | Moskva | ASW Cruiser | 2 | 1967-68 | 17,000 | 645 | 18 | ? |
France | — | PH | + 1 | 1981? | 18,400 | 682 | 25 | ? |
United States | — | SCS | scratched |
| 14,300 | 640 | 16 | 3 |
United States | — | VSS | proposed |
| 22,000 | 750 | 22 | 4 |
United States | — | DD-963(AC)b | + 2? |
| 8,800 | 563 | 4 | 4 |
United Kingdom | — | Harrier carrier0 | proposed |
| 7,000 | 443 | 2 | 8 |
Spain | Almirante | — | proposed |
|
|
| P |
|
France | Jeanne D’Arc | Cruiser | 1 | 1963 | 12,400 | 597 | 4-8 |
|
Italy | Vittorio Veneto | Helo-Cruiser | 1 | 1969 | 8,850 | 589 | 9 |
|
“Unless other cited, all information is from the 1976-77 edition ofJane's Fighting Ships b Litton/lngalls Shipbuilding handout
'Anthony Preston, "Harrier/Carrier," Navy International February, 1976, p. 23 First digit indicates number in commission; digit following plus sign indicates number proposed or already under construction.
Power Plant: One consideration for Americans who are about to undertake the development of common CVM and V/STOL carriers with allies would be the consideration of a power plant. The U.S. Navy ha* studied the feasibility of developing a nuclear- powered CVM, a CVNX, so research and development are under way. For the V/STOL carrier, the French a re planning to build a nuclear-powered ship which should be studied carefully for a common design- Since this is a ship for the late 1980s through the
^st century, all indications are that she should be tludear powered.
There is one very serious problem with developing ‘ c°mmon “Western”-built ship with nuclear power. s will be discussed below, some of the countries as Australia that would be potential buyers of ese Warships may not want a nuclear-powered ves- Se'> while others, such as Brazil, might not have the ^Pertise. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, enrnark, or Norway, which might be interested in
a small V/STOL carrier, might have problems on both these counts. This is a very serious question that must be investigated. To maintain a preponderance of superiority, especially in the V/STOL carriers, will require purchases from a great many countries which might not purchase a nuclear-powered ship.
Market and Development: Would there be a market for the development of new common Western CVM and V/STOL carriers? As critics of the CVV have
(1)
1 + I
2+2 1 9+3 2a 10b (2) 1 + 2
VlSTOL CVM CV 1 1 I
(1) + 1 2 1
pointed out, building only one or two “new” ships is very expensive. Studies indicate that at least five of a class must be purchased for cost-effectiveness reasons, so that is the minimum goal. In the case of the V/STOL ships, there seems little question of finding five buyers, although at this point we have five countries, the United States, Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, apparently going different routes.8 For V/STOL carriers the market seems endless if one considers that countries such as Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and some of the larger Latin American countries might be interested. The CVM problem may be more acute, but up to six countries might be persuaded to purchase from two to three each.
First, for comparative purposes, below is a list of the countries that now operate carriers:
Present Carrier Status
Country
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
France
India
Italy
Spain
United Kingdom
United States (LPH & LHA)
U. S. S. R.
+ indicates building or planned ( ) indicates helicopter cruisers
aCV-42 decommissioned 1 October 1977 bCVN-69 scheduled to be commissioned October 1977
Four of these ten countries could be interested in purchasing a new CVM. These are the United States, which is partially committed, and three countries that now operate CVMs—the United Kingdom, Australia, and Brazil. Australia, in its strategically valuable but vulnerable position, has steadfastly tried to maintain a carrier capability. Until very recently, Australia had two carriers, although one was just for ferrying purposes. If CVM costs could be held to a minimum, it might be interested. Brazil, as many authors are now noting, may be one of the major powers of the future, and thus might be persuaded to purchase a CVM—again, if costs were kept to a minimum. Finally, there is Britain. Despite serious economic problems and predicted military budget cuts, that nation might be persuaded to purchase one, even two new CVMs—especially if they were built in British yards, and especially if there werU minimal American subsidy. It would be in America interests to subsidize construction of two British ' riers. To maintain a British carrier capability in ^ interim, perhaps a Midway -class carrier could ^ transferred to the Royal Navy.
Therefore, there is now the potential of six °! seven CVMs—two or three from the United State5’ two from Britain, and one each from Australia an Brazil. Two more countries might also be persuade to purchase one or more CVMs. These are German) and Japan.9 Selling CVMs to Germany and especial Japan might raise eyebrows; however, in all ^ Western world, they are the only countries with the military and budget potential to truly afford sud1 ships. In fact, they should probably each purchase three CVMs to maintain the normal, one-on-statio9, one-in-training/reserve, one-in-upkeep schedule There would be some training problem for thesC countries, but by the time CVMs were launched 19 the mid-1980s, the countries could have adequate trained pilots and crews. Four new CVMs in Pacific (three Japanese and one Australian) and five new carriers in the Atlantic (three German and t*'° British) would more than double the Western carf>er capabilities in these operating areas.
While the United States should, and must, take*1 leadership role in the plans for a CVM, there mig*11 be some compromise on the V/STOL carrier. Although a new, common V/STOL carrier should be develop^’ considering the British lead in ship design and the French lead in propulsion engineering, perhaps these two countries could build a new V/STOL ship in t*1® same tradition and spirit that they jointly built thc supersonic transport Concorde. The United StateS should definitely play a role and contribute to an) research and development. But since the larget strategic goal is to maintain a Western carrier cap3' bility, if that goal is met through Anglo-Fren^1 leadership, then the United States should willing*)' follow.
The problem for development of a V/STOL carrier >s really size. As previously noted, the sizes vary fro*9 the very small DD-963 (air capable) and Harrier caf' rier capable of carrying only four-eight planes, to American and French sea control designs that C*9 carry from 20 to 25 helicopters and Harriers. Whil£ a single, common V/STOL ship capable of carrying approximately 15 to 20 aircraft seems the logical s°' lution, depending upon the interests of the smallef nations, two ship types could be built. One, a small' er, limited-mission air-capable ship and the other, 3 large, multi-mission, sea control carrier capable
Country | V/STOL (Air Capable) | V/STOL (Sea Control) | CVM |
Argentina |
| 1 |
|
Australia |
|
| 1 |
Brazil |
|
| 1 |
Canada |
| 1 |
|
Denmark | 1 |
|
|
France |
| 2 |
|
Germany | 1 | 2 | 3 |
Italy |
| 1 |
|
Japan | 1 | 2 | 3 |
Netherlands | 1 |
|
|
Norway | 1 |
|
|
Spain |
| 1 |
|
United Kingdom | 2 | 2 | 2 |
United States | _2_ | _2 | _2 |
Total | 9 | 14 | 12 |
Carrying over 20 aircraft. If at least five lesser naval P°Wers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the 1 etherlands made commitments for an air capable stl,P but not a sea control ship, then again for the Sake of maintaining a Western capability, the air caPable vessel should be built. For leadership and in- Cer*tive, the United States should make a commit- ^ent of purchasing at least two—one for each coast r experimental purposes.
On the other hand, an eight-plane V/STOL ship ^nld have serious mission limitations, so a larger /stOL carrier should also be developed. The market ere also seems adequate. Argentina would probably Purchase one to replace her old carrier; Spain might e persuaded to delay purchase of her new ship for a ew years until a common Western design can be apeed upon; and once again, Germany and Japan °uld be asked to purchase at least two apiece. °untries such as Canada might also be persuaded to S^eP up to a sea control carrier. Other potential pursers would be Britain and France (especially if ey co-develop the ship) which might even purchase tw° apiece; Italy which now has a helicopter-cruiser ^'8ht also be persuaded to purchase one. Once ^eloped, with costs kept to a minimum, the mar- et could be tremendous.
The potential for Western buyers of CVMs and STOL carriers as shown by the following table is s‘8nificant. Even half of those proposed would reach e strategic goal of maintaining a Western carrier CaPability.
Conclusions: While this might be an optimistic chart, it is not totally unrealistic. More importantly, these ships might be crucially needed. Even if designs for a new CVM started tomorrow, it would take at least seven to eight years before the first new CVM would be launched. In 1985, the USS Forrestal (CV-59) will be 30 years old, and in the succeeding five years, the USS Saratoga (CV-60), USS Ranger (CV-61), and USS Independence (CV-62) will be turning 30. While these ships will undergo a service life extension program,
Lieutenant George graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961. He served two years in the USS Sole) 0®' 707) with cruises in the Mediterranean Sea and the Re£* Sea-Persian Gulf area. He then served as operations o&' cer in the USS Suffolk County (LST-1173) and the*[1] executive officer in the USS Pulaski County
:ed
it can undoubtedly be safely said that these four CVs will not be replaced by new CVs. And, unless something drastic is done, such as the development of a joint CVM with our allies to get a Western commitment, it would not be surprising if these ships were not replaced by a CTOL carrier at all. With the current trends and moods of Congress, this could well happen. This could definitely happen if Congress looks around and sees that Britain is abandoning its attack carrier as now scheduled. It will be extremely interesting to see what decision the French make when their ships start aging in the 1980s. If France also abandons the attack carrier concept, then a “Western attack carrier capability” will only be an “American attack carrier capability,” and that too will be in jeopardy.
In the author’s opinion, the long-range threat of the Soviet carrier capability is being greatly underestimated. By the 1990s when the first large Kiev-class carrier will be just 20 years old, the Soviet Union will have undoubtedly gone through three, four, maybe even five generations of new V/STOL aircraft with significant improvements. Even if that does not happen, after fully testing these new Kievs for a few years, either a new class will be started, or there could be the evolution to an attack CVM. In short, the minimum we can expect is more, newer, and a better class V/STOL ship with an improved V/STOL airplane from the Soviets in the mid-1980s. The worst case we can expect is the logical progression to an attack CVM able to operate high-performance airplanes. With the West not building attack carriers, only building a few small or medium V/STOL carriers, and the Soviets building a large V/STOL carrier or even CVMs, there is even the terrible prospect of the West being inferior in carrier capability in both quantity and quality. The consequences of this happening after the turn of the century are too unpleasant even to contemplate, but they are entirely possible. In fact, they might even be predictable. In an article in last month’s Proceedings10 the Chief of Naval Operations stated that we should build one more CTOL carrier (presumably a Nimitz since he mentions only one), but then he states that the eight conventional CVs will be replaced by "pure V/STOL carriers.” Therefore, if the Soviet Union continues building carriers at a normal rate, it could achieve at least quantitative carrier superiority around the turn of the century. Qualitative superiority would be threatened without a new Western CVM as a replacement.
When the facts are all out on cost-effectiveness of building just one or two CVVs and actual potential of V/STOL (especially versus CTOL) aircraft, there is a good chance that CVN-71 will be authorized next year and maybe even the CVN with a Midway-class service life extension will be approved. While this will satisfy short-range requirements, there is still the long-range problem of the Soviet Union building carriers in quantity and being able to concentrate on American carrier forces. However, with a lict*e American leadership, a little American commitmeflt to a common Western CVM, and perhaps two common Western V/STOL carrier types, not only could the West definitely maintain its carrier capable and superiority, it would be in the strongest position since the great naval task forces freely roamed the seas at the end of World War II. On the other hand’ if the West loses its carrier superiority, it loses control of the seas.
The author is indebted to Norman Polmar for making useful comn'e(lts on this article.
1088). While en route to Vietnam, he contract' cancer and was retired. He had been selected for command for his ne*1 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] duty. Following his retirement in 1967, he obtained his M.A. an^ Ph.D. from the University of Maryland in international relations in 19& and 1972. After graduation, he was awarded a public affairs fellowship from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and spent seven months at the Hoover Institute, three months at the America Enterprise Institute, and one year in the office of Senator Bill Brock- From 1974 through 1976, he was a professional staff member on Senate Government Operations Committee and is now a professional member for national security affairs on the House Government Opefa' tions Committee.
[1]See the ten stories on the demise of the new Nimitz-class carrier >n “Notebook,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1977, PP' 123-126.
[2]Senate Report, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, (Wash'
ington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 53.
Hbid.
Hbid., pp. 53-54 Hbid., p. 53
[6]House Armed Services Committee Report Number 95-4, Hearings & Military Posture, p. 929.
[7]The USS Guam (LPH-9) did operate as a sea control ship for experimefl' tal purposes for two years and during that time carried Harriers. Als°’ Harriers do operate occasionally from the LPHs and LHAs, but regulaf and large Harrier operation would probably require some refitting.
[8]This is also a sad comment on NATO “standardization” which “con1' mon” or "standard” carriers would help solve.
[9]There might be some problems with Japan’s constitution although ltS Maritime Self Defense Force has some sophisticated ships. One should also keep in mind that by the mid-1980s, with the U. S. pullout fro#1 Korea, there might be a considerable change in Japan’s defense posture-
[10]Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN, “The Transition to V/STOL, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1977, pp. 18-24.