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*eutenant Peter A. Young, U. S. Navy, Search Project Officer, Navy Personnel & D Center, San Diego—While I do ^ot wholly agree with Admiral Elmo R, umwalt’s views on ship construction
and
to the comments of Robert L.
d°ubt if
t agree that size is as important as it was in World War II. The :K-a m'ssile is the great equalizer in 'k 'Var^are> and vessels as small as the 0fnar”- and "Osa”-class boats are well
^igh-Low’
E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 46-56, April 1976;
!" E. McIntyre, p. 76, July 1976; J. T. j%ward, pp. 69-72, August 1976;
• Sanders, pp. 75-76, September 1976; R. D. c*nl, p. 91, October 1976 Proceedings)
l,
propulsion, and did not wholly aSree with many of his personnel policy act>ons, I feel I must take strong excep-
^tlntyre.
; cannot agree with Mr. McIntyre’s °P*nion that Admiral Zumwalt’s identi- ^ation of the three "unions” in our avy "fostcrs dissent.” On the contrary, Nation of the existence and impor- Cc of these three elements led to re effective and equitable allocation . ^sources between their respective crests. Certainly no one (or two) j. °ng the three can lay claim to the j °n s share of the budget, since all are erdependent in their missions, he task of the CNO should be to use ad^6 Parochial elements to the best Vantage from the aspect of the total ‘Ssi°n commitment of the Navy. Ada Zumwalt pointed out the many y S'antages the "union” situation pro- l . > not the least of which was stimu- tj °n of professional expertise. At no ^ e did Admiral Zumwalt say that he e|a t0 un*^ chese elements, but he ^ state that he wished to optimize the thr2t’S CapabiHty to meet the Soviet
yj ^ arn even less inclined to agree with ^ ■ McIntyre’s statements that: "Little is *PS are outclassed by big ships, and oil n°w as obsolete as sail was to steam.” the survivors of the Eilat
equipped to take on any capital ship with conventional armament.
Certainly nuclear power is the way of the future. But, until technology can catch up with the concept and produce a small, lightweight nuclear power plant at a greatly reduced cost, the economics of the situation dominate the argument. Admiral Zumwalt makes a cogent, logical case for his high-low mix of nuclear and conventional ships.
Admiral Zumwalt’s record as CNO can hardly be classed as one of dissipated opportunities. When Mr. McIntyre mentions "trivial but politically popular personnel matters” I can only hope that he refers to only a few of the more widely publicized of Admiral Zumwalt’s many, many personnel policies, and not to personnel matters in general. Need I remind Mr. McIntyre that the Navy is, first and foremost, men and women who have elected to serve? The most sophisticated ships will not run by themselves.
Admiral Zumwalt’s personnel policies are not all unblemished, shining examples of his intentions, but to attempt to reverse the trend that he started, and which hopefully will continue, would be folly. The so-called "politically popular” policies which he instituted were not exactly popular with those whom Admiral Zumwalt had to worry about politically.
With the advent of the all-volunteer Navy, we can no longer afford to view personnel as interchangeable parts that are readily obtainable and easily replaced. Likewise, we must learn to deal with increasing responsibilities countered by decreasing availability of resources. Admiral Zumwalt seems to have realized this situation and tried to initiate action designed to meet it. The Navy that learns to disregard Admiral Zumwalt’s vision and direction might soon find itself to be "a mere product of times past.”
Finally, the recent buildup of our surface forces, pushed by Admiral Zumwalt, has seemed to me to have been long overdue. The air and submarine forces of the fleet do not seem to have suffered during this period. Incidentally, I have been a card-carrying member of the "aviation union” since I earned my naval flight officer wings in 1968.
"From Volunteer to Mercenary?”
(See W. A. Kiehl, p. 98, April 1976
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. E. Fronczkowski, U. S. Navy— Admiral Zumwalt’s and Commander Kiehl’s articles in the April 1976 Proceedings both took Admiral Rickover to task.
The Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident submarine strategic systems are possible only because of reliable nuclear propulsion. Admiral Rickover deserves to be recognized as the "Father of the Nuclear Navy” for his dedication, energy, and, above all, results. Unfortunately, being successful, he will no doubt generate criticism. His indirect political methods have worked. Congressional support for the nuclear propulsion and strategic systems stand in sharp relief to the support received for other naval systems. Admiral Rickover’s hand can also be seen in the quality and dedication of the men serving on board nuclear ships. There is real challenge in the "nuclear navy.”
Admiral Zumwalt’s criticism centered on the support for high cost, nuclear- powered surface ships. On this issue I am not qualified to speak. But on the other issue, namely Admiral Rickover’s methods, the results speak for themselves.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
1
1
1
!
Lieutenant Todd C. Nichols, U. S. AtoJ[1] One of the junior officer’s greatest plaints, as Commander Hart writes
the lack of opportunity to achieve
deserving officers” being qualified, th°u^0 I think this is due more to pressure have sufficient OODs to steam the ,, than to "make the old man look g°° '
bar£
"The PRC Navy—Coastal
Defense or Blue Water?”
(See B. Swanson, pp. 82-107, May 1976
Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Lieutenant David G. Muller, Jr., U. S. Navy, CinCPacFlt Staff— A symbiotic relationship has evolved between the Chinese Communist Party and the P.R.C. Navy (PRCN): in return for the freedom from political tasks that would interfere with the navy’s mission and for the resources that it requires, the navy gives the appearance of full political participation and is loyal to the Party center in times of stress. As Commander Swanson asserts, the PRCN is in fact highly politicized compared to Western navies, but some of this fervor is superficial, and, compared to the Chinese ground forces, the navy seems nearly apolitical.
The question about the PRCN that most intrigues naval policy analysts is when, or whether, the Chinese Navy will move toward deployments beyond P.R.C. coastal waters. Strictly in terms of hardware capabilities, the PRCN has possessed destroyers and diesel-attack sub-
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marines able to ply the Western Pacific for two decades. It is a policy decision that has restricted the navy to within easy reach of the coast. As Commander Swanson points out, however, the P.R.C. has laid loose verbal claim to marine and geological resources virtually throughout the Yellow and China seas. If China is to assert this claim meaningfully, she will have to deploy naval forces throughout the area to protect Chinese marine economic activity while policing the region against intrusion by other countries.
Where some analysts diverge from Commander Swanson’s estimate of China’s future naval capabilities is over the question of whether the navy will continue to expand beyond the Western Pacific. Commander Swanson states, "The thought of Chinese helicopter carriers, cruise missile-equipped cruisers, and nuclear submarines operating throughout the world by A.D. 2000 is not an unreasonable one.” There is, in fact, no reason to expect that the PRCN will follow the same developmental path as has the Soviet Navy, at least in geographical terms. The U.S.S.R. has direct access to the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Black Sea. Naval expansion into and beyond these regions is logical for the extension and protection of maritime interests. China faces only the Pacific. In light of resource limitations, strategic needs, and traditional economic, political, and military priorities, the thought of Chinese task groups cruising the Atlantic and the Mediterranean is scarcely conceivable. Except for SSBNs, it is easily debatable as well whether P.R.C. naval forces would regularly venture into the Indian or eastern Pacific Oceans within the present century.
"Surface Warfare Officers:
The Need for Professionalism”
(See R. J. Hart, pp. 38-44, June 1976; J. C. Van Slyke, p. 91, October 1976 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Edward D. Brady, U. S. Navy—The idea of a NavSurFPac/ NavSurFLant SWO qualification board perpetuates a growing problem in the Navy and the Fleet. Decision-making and planning are continually being escalated to higher levels with concomitant diminishment of the commanding officer’s discretion to act. This seems to be symptomatic of a general lack of trust and confidence.
When a problem is encountered, we tend to form another board or team 0 experts to travel through the fleet wit corrective action.
The commanding officer does not need someone second-guessing him 10 yet another matter. What is needed is confidence in the commanding office ability to provide an effective SWO PQS program and to determine the qualify tions of individual officers serving if ^lS ship.
To be sure, the CO and squadm11 commander should be held accountab
for their decisions, but the program[2] 1 should be conducted at their level. 1 ensure standardization, the SWO objectives should be clearly defined in PCO and PXO schools and by assisting the COs through the chain of comma*1
The esprit de corps which C01^ mander Hart hopes for will be enhance when the SWO junior officer realizes t*;1 his CO is both a knowledgeable seam*1^ and a trusted and effective planner an decision-maker.
c*ent
inventory of qualified officers to
Meet billet needs. These two factors
Wl officers entering the surface war- community, regardless of commis- w lng source, attend basic Surface arfare Officers’ School in either Coro-
t'ado
f<
or Newport. This has been the case
or
%
th
Secondly, I don’t believe it is neces- fary to send any officers currently serv- lng in primary billets to SWO school, rriuch less all those with less than two years commissioned service, as Contender Hart recommends. Although each man would certainly benefit from (he school, the cost of four months’ a sence to the command, to the officer’s "nsional administrative organization, ar,d to his shipboard OOD qualification w°uld be much greater.
I applaud Commander Hart’s call for S^° qualification boards. The junior °fficer, like the average sailor, craves c°nsistency in pursuit of a goal.
Sea pay may definitely have a benefi- e'al effect on SWO retention. Naval of- fCers do not serve to amass wealth, but ,w have been known to turn money °Wn, and this "special status” along- e the aviator and submariner commu- n,t*es might make a great difference.
. Commander Hart is certainly correct ln stating that the trend toward surface Professionalism is in the right direction, and I join him in cautioning us against st°pping or reversing it.
financier H. C. George, U. S. Navy, Ureau of Naval Personnel— While I a£ree with the thrust of the article in erms of the need to continue to pursue ^ays to enhance professionalism within . e surface warfare officer community, it ls Wed with sufficient inaccuracies to be Misleading.
The Alford Task Force on Retention, lch reported its findings in 1966, did tl°t recommend additional monetary j^Mpensation for surface officers for two j^sons: (l) Jack of specifically defined aaards associated with surface ship Uty> and (2) the availability of a suffi-
/Mtinue to prevail as obstacles to justi- W such pay.
fate s*on
the past year and includes those cers received from other segments of IrT Unrestr’cted line officer community. Edition, selected officers, who are on
board surface ships and who have not attended basic surface training in the past, are routed back through the school on a case basis. However, to do this for all officers with less than two years’ service is both impractical and unnecessary and would generate considerable instability in officer manning on board ships. Existing fleet training center courses are more appropriate for honing billet functional skills, with quota requests predicated on the judgment of individual commanding officers.
Differentiation between independent steaming and fleet OOD qualification has been defunct for several years. There are two types of OOD qualifications, inport and underway. The latter is what is required by OpNavInst 1412.2.
The 24 months’ qualification period is judged a reasonable time standard against which most surface junior officers can meet SWO requirements. This is especially true since the basic schooling is directly oriented to both the written and practical aspects of the PQS program. However, to cover selected contingencies, OpNavInst 1412.2, as presently written, allows the commanding officer to extend the period to 36 months. Blanket increase of the time allotted for SWO qualification to 36 months is unnecessary and would remove the constructive sense of urgency built into the program. We want our young officers to qualify as soon as feasible so that they can be subjected to other selection processes during their first sea tour which relate to other aspects of surface career progression: e.g., screening for attending the SWO Department Head Course.
Institution of SWO qualification boards under the auspices of the surface type commanders is considered unnecessary and would overlap in charter with similar boards already established to verify surface ship command qualification. In other words, let the determination of achieving basic skills rest with the local command level and reserve the validation of advanced skills for the bailiwick of the type commander.
Commander Hart’s sampling of SWOs, regarding feelings of professional standing, was limited to Naval War College students who, no doubt, got their qualifications under the old program. The present program, which got
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In three different aviation comman'
ds,
the
was
sail'
jobs can be conquered by the old cruf of specialization, and this is necessary certain highly technical jobs or cer staff functions, but, as a general
ru
into full swing in April 1976, is quite elaborate in its demands on participants. I doubt that officers who receive the 1110 designator under that program necessarily believe they stand at the bottom in professionalism.
Improvements in the present 1110 qualification program may be both justifiable and desirable. However, any elaborations or increases in stringency in that area must be balanced against the full spectrum of SWO career development. The present Surface Warfare Officer Qualification Program, coupled with the Surface Warfare Officer Command Qualification Program, offers considerable challenge while also aligning well with normal career progression requirements. We should not hasten to make sweeping changes under the standard of increasing professionalism at the junior officer level lest we generate inappropriate requirements which act as deterrents rather than incentives to keep charging.
Lieutenant Commander Mario R. Man- narino, U. S. Navy, Budget Analyst, Office of Civilian Manpower Management—I appreciated Commander Hart’s article concerning surface warfare officers and I agree entirely. In his footnote number 6, he explained that he had coined the term "seafarer’s badge” and that he envisioned the eventual evolution of a "nickname” for the device. I coined such a nickname for my memo paper as first lieutenant of the USS Saratoga (CV-6o). The surface warfare officer’s badge depicts a ship with a bone in her teeth. From this I derived the word "BONE” as a nickname which conveniently doubled as an acronym for Badge of Naval Excellence.
As It Was, Is Now, and Ever Shall Be
Commander James H. Davis, U. S. Navy {Retired)—It is probable that most officers with significant length of service must have some basic sympathy for the feelings expressed by Lieutenant (junior grade) Knull, officer of the deck of the USS Belknap (CG-26) when she collided with the John F. Kennedy (CV-67). "There but for the grace of God go I,” must have flashed through the awareness of most who read of his collision, trial, and comments.
In a recent Navy Times interview, he made two basic points: first, that many Navy people in responsible positions are not qualified; and second, that the chain of command let him down. While his second contention may have some merit, it is fraught with argumentative possibilities that consign it to the limbo of unresolvables. His belief, however, that many responsible jobs are held by persons inadequately qualified is a perennial truism which deserves scrutiny and defense.
My own first introduction to the leading edge of this problem came as I was enlightened as a Naval Academy plebe. I found that a standard answer to a question to which I did not know the answer was, "I don’t know, sir, but I’ll find out.” The implication was on selfqualification. This principle also applied in the classroom, since many of the professors were naval officers fresh from the fleet, and often one jump ahead of the class. An inkling of things to come was delivered by a "Steam” prof during the second class year when he told of reporting to an old four-pipe destroyer as a Lt(j.g.) to find the engineering plant out on the dock, and then was advised by his new CO that he was happy to welcome him as chief engineer.
On the first destroyer I served in, I could not get the CO to qualify me as OOD for the simple reasons that: (1) he had enough OODs; and (2) he couldn’t spare me from the gun director where only three of us were qualified. When my application for flight training made it necessary for him to qualify me, he did it in the forward area while we operated with a fast task force under combat conditions and with darkened ship. After two weeks of screaming profane but excellent advice at me, he retired to his sea cabin except for general quarters. During the next few weeks, I often wished for some screamed advice.
When I was in primary flight training, then-Captain Jimmy Flatley told us of the time when he was Admiral Ernie King’s pilot, and the staff had just received its first R4D. He was walking around the aircraft reading the handbook, when the Admiral said, "Jimmy, let’s go to Washington.” When he advised the Admiral that he hadn’t even been inside the airplane yet, he v/as given the eagle eye and asked, "You re a naval aviator aren’t you?” Both survive to greater triumphs. Admiral King once came to the cockpit of his transport aircraft after a "hairy” landing in Boston under near zero-zero conditions an told his pilot, who had advised against the flight, "You see, son, if we hadn t started, we wouldn’t have arrived.’
To tie the surface and aviation Na'? together, recall the order of the screen commander in a large carrier strike force: "This is Screen Order One an only—no sub gets in; no carrier getj out.” Qualifications of all concerne were assumed.
I was qualified as plane commander f°r the simple reason that they needed one- On each occasion, I was given a signl cantly difficult mission immediately-1 01 sure thousands of others can recall sin11 lar situations.
During more than three years in stroyers, much in close operation svi carriers, it is my firm recollection thf we did not consider that the "flyboys knew much about shiphandling, conclusion based upon daily obser'*1 tion. Accordingly, a major point of ol,r qualification as OODs in destroyers to conn defensively. Most destroyer ors, nonetheless, can recall when wondered how they were going to n»S!l this time. Later, as an aviator, I disc0 ^ ered what many have since comment on, namely that an aviator who ^ flown much formation has a hign' developed "gut” feeling about relat*'^ motion, one that has progressed Bu further than a maneuvering board c3rl demonstrate. |
Is it possible, or feasible, to fully flu'1
ify people, especially line officers,
their duties prior to their assurr>*n£
them? Given time, money, and facifitieS’
it is probably just possible. But barri^j
some fantastic windfall, these comm0
ties are not normally forthcoming. So
- -CP
ta>n
1 c,
extreme specialization grossly limits * officer’s horizons. Even the case of sU^( specialization is only now to the p°*
In the final analysis, we must realis- hcally conclude that everything that r°lls> floats, or flies, including the people wAo control the motion, is a compro- ITllse- And there will always be someone Caught in the bight when the inevitable 'ncident occurs, for after all, someone
alw;
'°nas S. Hoback, U. S. Customs Service
h
1 'tary missions and threats, as well as arrr>arnent and sensors. This is a surprises omission in view of the Coast
Ward’s emphasis on its role as an armed forc - - r
tics
ln time when it can be reasonably evalu- 3ted. And, of course, there’s the time- °nored system of apprenticeship, a [Method that will give outstanding qual- 1 cMion in limited areas, but which will certainly never develop command po- tcr>tial of the type we seek and badly ^eed. Most line officers 1 have known °Ur>d one of the great incentives to eing a career line officer lay in the diver- Slty of duties, the experience of new commands and circumstances, and of nding how to do a new job every two Pr three years. Ninety percent of most bs can be essentially learned in less an a year, and it would take a lifetime |° ^earn all of the remaining 10%. The xury of such fine honing we cannot
afford.
ays has the deck.
^ee N C. Venzke, pp. 91-94, January 1976
Pr°ceedmgs)
n,
ffetor— Capt ain Venzke fails to discuss
rce. If the lack of warship characteris- were confined to the two Polar-class e teakers, there would be little con. w. Unfortunately, the need for naval ^ teakers has increased among the estern powers (especially the United ,Jates and Canada). And, the Polar Star, completed, does not meet the recrement.
k ^hat military purposes does the ice- leaker serve that cannot be handled by vessel built to a civilian standard? The st frequent usage would be sover- gnty ancj jaw enforcement. The next th'St 'mPortant must be the ability of Vessel to operate in a combat or a Qt^ent*al combat zone in support of j er warships or supply ships engaged Arctic operations opposed by another
major power. Exercise of the sovereignty role or an unrelated event could easily lead to an escalation of hostility on the scene without the benefit of a yard period for arming.
The type of opposition a U. S. (or Canadian, etc.) icebreaker is likely to meet is no different from that which would attack any other U. S. warship in open waters. In Arctic areas the clearest threat is a high-performance attack aircraft or a patrol aircraft armed with missiles. While this is the most likely method, the icebreaker’s greatest vulnerability is to a nuclear-attack submarine, a relatively new menace. All earlier U. S. icebreakers had been designed before the appearance of the SSN, which can attack under the ice firing her torpedoes upward at the noise generated by the breaker’s movement into the ice. There is also the possibility of opposition from Soviet icebreakers.
Whatever objections to rearming there were in the past, due to the Hague Convention, they are made invalid by the newest Soviet vessel Ivan Susanin, known as a "Modified Dobrinya Nikitch.” She has at least one sister and is clearly an armed icebreaker—a true warship for the Arctic. There has always been much speculation about Soviet icebreaker designs and an underlying military intent. Rumors have been rampant regarding their ability to operate as naval auxiliary vessels, such as submarine tenders, etc. The Ivan Susanin is no covert auxiliary ship, but an undisguised, unapologetic warship with a radar director, plus an effective close-in antiaircraft defense.
In contrast, the Polar Star has no weapons. In fact, she does not even mount an air search radar. There may be some sort of plan to mount light weapons, such as machine guns, but nothing like the useful general-purpose 5-inch and 3-inch batteries originally mounted on the Glacier and the Wind-class icebreakers. To mount an effective armament takes time and a yard, which means it must be done before—not during—a crisis. Since the Coast Guard has the responsibility for providing icebreaker service for the Navy, even in wartime, it would appear logical to provide such armed vessels. Contrary to this need, the Coast Guard has disarmed both its own and the former Navy icebreakers.
The Polar Star appears to have enough deck area and space for an effective weapon and sensor suite. This may mean encroaching on some of the luxury accommodations and functional peacetime layout so beloved by the Coast Guard, an armed service which seems to feel that weapons interfere with its normal business. Perhaps if more attention were paid to the military aspects of this icebreaker design, it would have been possible to obtain funds for more than two vessels. More than two ships are needed, but they must be properly armed "naval” icebreakers so that they can effectively contribute to the national defense.
27 FEB. 1944 { SCOUTING PARTY
MOMOTE
AIRDROME
ft j HfANE
harbor
MILES
assault before this meeting, but °u^ planning group received copies of a
as I joined the staff because, frequei with only two or three days to get
■ntly>
0U(
rouP
ne[3]'
intelligenc reports. I remembered P1 ^ tures of Los Negros Island which relate to this operation.
I stood up and said: "I don’t like
the
th«
tf3f'
bor at the north end of the airs
"Dissidence Is Not A Virtue”
(See A. Burke, pp. 78-79, April 1976; L. D. Chirillo, pp. 79-80, July 1976; B. R. Jackson, pp. 77-78, August 1976 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles Adair, U. S. Navy (Retired) — I agree with Admiral Burke that criticism should be through channels and should relate to constructive suggestions. Two points which I question, however, are the title, "Dissidence Is Not A Virtue,” and the statement that "The SOPs cannot be changed abruptly without disruption and confusion.”
I hesitate to criticize some of the basic statements made by an officer with the experience and qualifications of Admiral Burke. But the very fact of my hesitation makes me wonder if junior officers reading this article might not be deterred from taking future action, or positions contrary to general opinion, because of a strict adherence to the basic positions outlined in this article. While there were modifications stated in the article, these may be forgotten in the future.
I have been fortunate in my duty assignments in the Navy, because, almost without exception, I believed that I could provide contrary recommendations to my superiors and that such recommendations would be considered in the same spirit in which they were offered.
As one who has always encouraged those with whom I worked to come up with a better idea if they had one, I will outline a few differences of opinion which I have sponsored in the past. In this way, I may clarify my points.
In 1955, when I was on duty in the office of the Navy Comptroller, a question arose about a major change in financial reporting desired by the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy called five of us to a meeting on this subject, which we knew he favored. After some discussion, the secretary said, "Let’s see how you all feel about it.” He asked each of us in turn and everyone said, "No, don’t do it.”
The secretary leaned back in his chair and laughed loudly saying, "Well, at least I don’t have a bunch of'Yes’ men.”
It is easy to agree, or to keep quiet, particularly when you know that you have the only contrary opinion. But I have always believed that, when appropriate, I should present my honest opinion and take the consequences. To do otherwise is a failure to support properly those for whom you work.
In 1943-1944, I headed the planning section for the Seventh Amphibious Force which was responsible for General MacArthur’s assault operations. One of our early operations was the assault on the Admiralty Islands. This assault cut off, from the rear, the main Japanese base at Rabaul and gained control of the best harbor in the Western Pacific.
Air reconnaissance indicated that there were few, if any, Japanese troops in the area of the proposed landing. A quick meeting was called by the Army of all the forces involved, and it was there that the Navy first heard of the assault. The basic plan for a reconnaissance in force with about 840 troops came by dispatch from General MacArthur to his Army Ground Force Commander who called the meeting.
The plan was quickly outlined and was approved by the Commanding General, by the Army Assault Force Commander, by the Army Air Forces Commander, and then the question was asked of Admiral Barbey, Commander Seventh Amphibious Force. He said, "I would like to hear what my planner thinks;” and he turned to me in the rear
The author’s dissenting opinion on the Admiralty Islands landings was at least partially responsible for keeping the Pacific campaign on schedule.
of the room, "Charlie, what do >'°u think of this plan?” .
I had no information regarding rh1
■ o
all
photographs taken in the south'^1 Pacific area by the Army Air Fortf* These arrangements were made as soon
an assault plan, our planning g1 would not have time to receive operation. We should not land on 1 ^ southeast end of Los Negros because the coral reefs near the surface and 1 coral shelf above will make it very d* ^ cult for the boats to unload. Als°> don’t like the jungle behind this landinr area. There is something wrong but I don’t know what it is.”
"We should land inside Hyane
lt>s
.trip
where there is a good sandy beach.
0nly about two miles to the north. We should also send in two LSTs, which will not delay the landing, but will allow us t0 land about 2,200 troops together with tanks, guns, and ammunition which we may need.”
(See J. f
feedings)
•Admiral Barbey commented, "I like your assault plan better.” So did the others in the meeting, and it was agreed t° use the new plan. A short time later, owever, the Commanding General Ground Forces modified the plan back t0 the original one, except that he retained the new assault beach which I oad recommended.
The assault went off as planned. Later 'n format ion showed the coral to be as escribed at the southeast end of Los ~^egros. In the jungle behind that each, however, were a five-inch gun and
2,0 Japanese troops. Nearby, but acr°ss a small inlet were 2,000 additional tr°ops. At the beach to the north, where landed, the rapid resupply of our r°ops, together with a destroyer off the each for gunfire support for two days, Prevented the defeat of our landing force. S
The basic strength of the American People is their inherent initiative and c°nimon sense. Of course in any organisation, civilian or military, there must be •rection to ensure that initiative is anneled into areas for the common S°od. But in measuring suggestions, it !? WeH to keep in mind a statement by Nark Twain” who said, "The man with a new idea is a crank until the idea
Succeeds ”
I would like always to encourage mitiative and new ideas for without cm the military, as well as civilian Usmess, would stagnate.
P°r this reason, I would like to offer a ncw title for Admiral Burke’s article:
Without good judgement and common sense, dissidence is not a virtue.” [4] *
Chandler’s noble cry of anguish in your June issue is exceedingly well done. The tone of his statement—however the specifics vary—is the same kind of distress signal that began to be sounded in the Naval Reserve in 1953, shortly after the regular Navy found a way to duck its responsibility and turned its reserve component over to the TARs.
One of the most perceptive comments originated with a lieutenant (j.g.), U. S. Naval Reserve in 1961. This young officer was in a captive audience, suffering through an interminable flood of hogwash produced in a dog-and-pony show put on by the Naval Reserve Command out of Omaha. It was one of those, "Tell us what’s wrong, how we can do better” approaches in which the TAR presentation team wanted no change, only praise. Finally, the rear admiral himself took the podium—all smile and braid and hearty, expansive front. He gave the tired, perspiring officers and men the old "Level with me, boys! ” My LTJG, who happened to work with me on the staff at that time, stood up very solemnly and said: "Sir, the best thing you can do for the Naval Reserve is to burn down all these damn training centers.”
In 1971, after 18 years of watching the Naval Reserve slide down hill under inept TAR administration, the regular Navy decided to take the conn again. What Commander Chandler describes so colorfully are the symptoms of the considerable trauma resulting from backing down hard.
One of the reasons I do not plan to carry the second volume of my history of the Naval Reserve beyond 1965 is because after that year I became a part of that history. To my knowledge, I hold the distinction of being the only Naval Reserve group commander ever fired. Whatever for? Mainly for three reasons:
(1) because I "forced the hand” of the Chief of Naval Personnel with respect to compliance with Uniform Regulations;
(2) because I refused to rewrite and whitewash a unit inspection report just to save a reservist who was "a friend of a friend” of the Secretary of the Navy; and
(3) because I created a "paper blizzard” by cancelling in one month some 50 obsolete notices and instructions inherited from the officer I relieved and who had just been given a commendatory award by the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District for his "administration of the command.” Little things like that.
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The joy of rocking the boat was dimmed by the certain knowledge that my four stripes were the end of the road, but I look back on those hectic boatrocking days with far more pride than I could have taken in making rear admiral by keeping my mouth shut.
more and more in an environment
and
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behave if the only information on which they could act were the results of ran dom encounters with other forces? C°n versely, how would the particips
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all
Conflict in Transparent Scenarios
Stewart Baily, Management Systems Analyst—The importance of intelligence in directing aggressive operations, whether military or commercial, is well acknowledged. The outcome of significant campaigns has often been decided by a single visual sighting by aerial reconnaissance or the intercept of a tactical communications signal by an unintended receiver. Of course, several other ingredients are necessary for success, namely the resources to take advantage of the situation described by the intelligence and the commander’s confidence that the information is reliable. Spectacular results have been achieved in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority when bold commanders have so acted. By the same token, unreliable intelligence has produced crushing defeats. I do not intend to recount the myriad examples of successes or failures caused by information accessability to the decision-maker; rather, I would like to look ahead to that not too distant future
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when the traditional practices of deceit and concealment will cease to be as significant factors in the conduct of warfare as in the past. This applies to person-to-person encounters as well as struggles between national entities.
Technological improvements to command and control communications and intelligence systems are being implemented at an amazing pace by nations of all political thoughts. Imagine, if you will, the difference in outcome of Hitler’s Barbarossa campaign in Russia if he had realized that only a few scattered divisions stood between him and his objective. His reconnaissance was, of course, hampered by the prevalent overcast weather of the Russian fall and winter months. The Hitler of today would be assisted by synthetic aperture radars capable of detecting military vehicles from ranges far beyond the range of antiaircraft defenses, at covering areas of
5,0 square miles or more per hour, and in all conditions of weather except for extremely heavy precipitation.
The designers of current information-gathering and information-processing systems have focused their attentions on perfecting the speed, reliability, and security of these systems from a purely technical standpoint. Very little work has been spent on the human factors impact of these systems upon implementation. There are, of course, the usual attempts of symbology shorthand, statistical summation, and nomography. But, given the "big picture,” can a single decision-maker or his staff make order or sense from the total array?
My thesis is: given perfect information concerning the capabilities of his own resources and those of his opponents, as well as perfect intelligence on their intentions, the rational commander with at least equal forces cannot be overwhelmed. The corollary is: the commander with numerically or technologically inferior forces must rely on superior command and control and intelligence to achieve success. This precept is not new. It is found in the writings of Sun Tsu about 500 B.C. Even then, arguments ranged about the relative payoff between investment in intelligence gathering and arms for military forces. Another way of stating this concept is that intelligence is valueless if the opposing force has the same degree of information gathering capability. It1S like playing a game of chess in which both sides are completely aware of the move possibilities of their opponents.
Operations research analysts have begun to establish some quantitative
benefits for improved tactical information. The use of strike damage assessment photographs for example can allow the commander to allocate his remaining weapon systems to more lucrative targets. The use of precision electronic emission location devices reduces the amount of the time the strike aircraft must spend in a defended area and thus reduces attrition of valuable aircraft resources. These are all important contributions, but they fail to grasp the principal role of information accessibility in a conflict situation.
Future conflicts will be carried out
of
the open chess board. Deception concealment are becoming more anu more difficult to achieve. Standard cam ouflage techniques yield to infrared or laser scanning techniques. Sensitive acoustic detectors are available. The im pact of this kind of warfare is difficult to model in a mathematical sense; however, wargaming may offer some insight into the reactions of military commanders operating under such conditions. t I believe that such "lifted curtain^ wars should be established at senior sta seminars, such as those held at the Nava War College or at Fort Leavenwort , with careful attention to control groups- It would provide, for those of us v/res ding with the questions of the sign* cance of marginal improvements command and control, a baseline an limit for quantitative improvements- How differently would the participan
-ants
husband their forces knowing precr where enemy concentrations were at times?
These kinds of issues are at the hea<^ f the design of advanced comma0 'stems. Given the kind of power strut ire which is evolving today, these ki f inquiries could have a profound effec n the capability of the U. S. Navy 1 irry out its mission.
p
William R. Walsh—More articles as thought-provoking as Captain William J- Ruhe’s discussion of cruise missiles would meet the challenge of Mr. Henry Young’s criticisms, in large parr justified, in the same issue. In fact, a thorough exploration of the impact of the antiship missile on naval thought, de- S1gn, and operations would be an excellent choice for a future issue organized around a central theme. Several aspects °f Captain Ruhe’s article could readily fie expanded and full treatment of the subject requires it.
As one example, I doubt that Captain ^uhe intends to imply that an emphasis °n cruise missiles is as fundamentally a different tactical doctrine than carrier- borne airpower, as one might infer from bis article. The advantages of one versus another surely differ by mission.
As a strategic deterrent, the longer range, nuclear-armed cruise missile, the type which enters SALT discussions, Would offer the United States a wider range of launching platforms—air, surface, and submerged—which would inCrease our deterrent capability. In partic- rffar, it would complement the role of CVs if numerous surface vessels were so armed, and greatly complicate the task of a preemptive strike against American surface forces. By their nature—slower speeds, less range, and low yields—such strategic cruise missiles are inappropriate f°r a first strike and their addition to ei(her side’s armory would be unlikely to 'unbalance the strategic weapon standoff, ffowever, as with already deployed '•"•'capon systems, this "big bang” deterrent role lies outside more traditional naval roles and Captain Ruhe’s theme.
When sea power is used to project Power ashore, the flexibility of carrier airpower—its ability to carry varied °ads, to loiter, and to perform the sequential type mission commented upon 7 Captain Ruhe as is its characteris- t,c—seems unlikely to be replaced by the ^ruise missile. The cruise missile might ave a role in taking out a specific tar- 8et> afloat or ashore, in the initial phase.
a suppressant, however, the missile 'v°uld be an exceedingly expensive system. As with all missiles, it can bite but not bark, while the very presence of a circling aircraft can deter. The value of the missile to defending forces in resisting such power projections is, however, enormous, as Captain Ruhe points out. Indeed, such missiles narrow the gap between small nations and the projecting units of large nations to an extent not seen since heated round shot could force a sailing squadron to steer well clear of coastal fortifications.
While U. S. deployment of an antiship missile is not really needed for either of the preceding tasks, our reluctance to develop such a system for the third major naval mission, sea control, seems a major error. A preoccupation with carrier air power, whether due to Admiral Zumwalt’s union analogy or because sea control was secondary to projection, has left us in a position where all our non-strategic naval punch is concentrated in 13 large carriers. The majority of other major combatant units built over the last two decades has been designed to protect these carriers. Bereft of the carriers, these other vessels would be seen as the underarmed units they are, ill-equipped for traditional surface combat.
With all our eggs in one basket the Russian choice of weapon systems seems a very rational identification of, and response to, their most formidable possible enemy. The deployment of a large number of antiship missiles in a coordinated attack, with nuclear or conventional warheads, against carrier units represents the classic concentration of force against an enemy even if the weapon platforms are widely scattered. Captain Ruhe comments that, "This is a somewhat different strategy than the traditional sequential strike attacks used by sea-based tactical air forces.”
Please, let us not lose sight of the goal. Captain Ruhe concludes that the main purpose of the large Soviet anti-
Seventeen years after the introduction of the Soviet "Osa” missile-patrol boat (pictured), now in at least 14 nations’ naval inventories, the U. S. Navy has its first antiship missile-equipped frigate, the USS Ainsworth (FF-1090).
ship missile is ". . . to destroy the enemy’s big ships by brute force.” What other way is there?
Given the potential accuracy of cruise missiles, we should equip, as rapidly as possible, a wide range of surface craft with appropriate missiles to give them both the punch and range of possible opponents so that they can safely operate without carrier cover if necessary. Given the proliferation of similar weapons among smaller nations, including rather unstable ones on or near vital commercial waterways, it would be imprudent to do otherwise. As Captain Ruhe points out, the employment of such missiles can effectively deny our Navy control of such coastal waters for fear of losing one of our rare carriers. It is ridiculous for the world’s greatest Navy to be placed in such a position, but we ourselves have contributed far more than we should in order to achieve this unhappy state of impotence. Smaller units, equipped with Harpoon or Exo- cet, could carry the fight into enemy waters, with reasonable chances of success, before carrier support arrived. Without such weapons our ships can only observe and try to protect themselves.
Let us be openminded about any weapon system. While the Russians and several of our allies have been developing what now seem to be reliable and powerful antiship missiles, we seemed for too long to assume that they had no place in our armory. The tide is turning and no long-term harm may result. More articles such as Captain Ruhe’s will help focus attention on this issue.
[1] >» jfl
officer must often "bend the rules delivering letters of qualification, must decide where our priorities he j task assignments for our ships, an believe that proper OOD qualification^ much too far down from the top most lists.
cof1'
the
initial hallmark of all SWOs: qua^ cation as a fleet OOD (task force stea^ ing) during the first sea tour. I d°n^ believe most feel resentment abouc^ "chosen few” being allowed to drive ship, but instead recognize that sever limited operating time precludes e* hours for man-overboard drills, leap*1 ; drills, etc. Thus, we end up with' Commander Hart states, some "uP'
In other words, to qualify even the
minimum of OODs, the comman1
[3]serve {Retired), author of Privateers and 0 Unteers, 1766 to 1866—Commander
destruction of the d- S. Naval Reserve’
Chandler, p. 84, June 1976
^ptain Reuben Elmore Stivers, U. S. Naval