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livcr a tn?|.resp>ectcr persons, will de- '*y he’ll
mg Committee. This
com
oaittee,
"Nigh-Low”
(See E R 7
R LMcl'„7UmWalt'Pp- 46-56. April 1976;
pp. 69.72 A" P' 76JU‘y 1976;J- T' 72, August 1976 Proceedings)
Harry Zanders, U.S. Navy majesu • LeSt 1 be accused of lese- such h1 1° presuming to discuss two trovp ^ "ranR‘ng and two such con- °Vct a rl ^aVa^ °^‘cers as Admirals Rick- had H 1 urr»walt let me say that I have Way , a lnSs with one, and, living half North tbe Naval Air Station,
Amok u *11^’ and ti'e giant Coronado of the .10US ®ase> I have seen plenty sloven] °nR'*la*red. bearded, and even era of y,tyi3CSw^° flourished during the
Noth^ Z'8rams-
over isan^one can say about Rick- that R; l S ba<^ as what Zumwalt says: whole N°V6r 'S1 malady £hat afflicts the who is «aVy bet Us hope that Rickover,
MVCr ^ ||* - * * * * *
ably hte,. *nR anti-Zumwalt blast. Prob- But it ^USt disdain the whole thing.
tw° 8rcat ^un t0 sec thesc
other ty gladiators tear into each
"'alls \u' c" doctors plaster their office establish tbe*r itupfessive diplomas, I’ll ship b •, connection with Navy at one"'' *n8 Procedures by saying that Naw c?1116 i was the chairman of the Sh*p Buildi,
resent' consisted of flag officers repother ^ tbe var‘ous “unions” and c° interested activities. This
Ship' *tteC c°haborated closely with the Rear a Characteristics Board headed by expertmital W. K. Mendenhall, a top pljr . ln weaponry and in nuclear ap-
ations.
'Eh
sider' tWo bodies were jointly con- tions f^ rccluirements and specifica-
PrjSg °r che first nuclear carrier, Enter-
cruiSerCVAIsI'65)' and tbe ^rst nuc*ear subny1^ Beach (CGN-9), as well as
19^ aflnes and other types in the 1956s 'P building program. Our recommendations were made to CNO, Sec- Nav, and SecDef. After SecDef’s pruning—they always prune—the program was presented to the appropriate congressional committees by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships for costs, and by me for force levels and operating requirements.
Admiral Rickover felt that the two committees should meet in his cubbyhole on Constitution Avenue. Since only about one-third of us could fit into his little office, 1 finally persuaded him to meet with us in the Pentagon, but only after I assured him that he would be cordially received (he felt that one member of the board might be unpleasant) and that all we wanted was the weight, dimensions, and horsepower of the reactors for the projected ships.
Alas, we were had. He had gone right ahead with the design and development of the reactors for the Enterprise without finding out what tonnage, size, speed, and other essentials the ship would require. As a result, the Enterprise had to be made larger, heavier, slower, and much more expensive in order to accommodate Rickover’s obese reactors. Chalk up one for Zumwalt.
Now for the article, Admiral Zumwalt indicates that Mr. Chafee chose him as CNO because of his agreement with Zumwalt’s views on overall strategy, force levels, and the future composition of the Navy. Maybe. Mr. Chafee was a left-leaning liberal, and, in my opinion, he recognized with sparkling eyes a brother liberal. All would be well.
Zumwalt’s presentation of the problems and postures of the U.S. Navy and of the Soviet Navy are masterful and should be required reading by every Member of Congress and by every "defense intellectual,” the archetype of which is the Honorable Les Aspin.
Zumwalt lays too much stress upon the bias of the “unions”—aviators, submariners, and surface sailors. Some
of the strongest advocates of naval aviation are non-aviators. Arleigh Burke, an outstanding non-aviator, out-aviated the aviators. Admiral R. B. Carney, a great CNO and a non-aviator, had a balanced view of the whole Navy. As CNO he had strongly supported naval aviation. Fleet Admiral King conceived and built a balanced two-ocean Navy. Many aviators did not look upon him as “one of us” because he was a captain when he got his wings. Admiral Forrest Sherman, another great CNO and an aviator, stood for a balanced Navy.
There are many more examples of officers classified as members of a particular “union” who had the breadth of mind to understand and advocate the effectiveness of the Navy as a whole.
In the area of operations at sea, the aviators were successful in establishing a law that all carrier captains must be aviators. And with two notable exceptions all carrier group commanders have been aviators. We have recently had a Commander Sixth Fleet who was not an aviator. And at the Battle of Midway, the turning point of the Pacific War, there were four flag officers—R. A. Spruance, Thomas Kinkaid, W. M. Fletcher, and W. W. Smith. Midway was entirely an air battle. Not one of the flag officers there was an aviator.
As to Admiral Zumwalt’s efforts to train Air Force pilots to operate from carriers, this, I think, would be a mistake as well as a waste of time, effort, and money. Naval aviators and Air Force
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
ON WATCH
By Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
While this book is an unprecedented inside look at the high policies of the Nixon administration, it is also the story of a life in the U.S. Navy — written by the youngest man ever to serve as CNO. In four stormy years he left an imprint which will affect generations of Navy men and women, while simultaneously reshaping the physical Navy with an imaginative mix of low-and high-cost ships appropriate to the Navy’s strategic role.
The dramatic changes were expressions of Admiral Zumwalt’s farsighted and coherent strategy based on clearly expressed principles: The United States cannot police the world; the United States does have interests around the world; the Soviets and other powers will threaten those interests when they can; the U.S. Navy is the best consistent and flexible defense for those interests; to carry out this critical mission the U.S. Navy must therefore be equipped to intelligent but not grandiose purpose, and must have a high morale.
1976. 520 pages. Illustrated. Appendices.
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for
of
clear definition of purpose and metho1
pilots are two different breeds of cat with vast differences in training and outlook. Also, who is going to make the Air Force spend the additional money to buy carrier-adaptable aircraft? It would be much more effective operationally for the Navy to train sufficient pilots to keep the air groups up to strength.
After all, Rickover and Zumwalt are very much alike. Each will probably deny this. Both are possessed of excessive zeal. Both push their own programs against all opposition. Both have explicit faith in their own ideas. Both are eloquent and erudite. Both have accomplished much, and both have done damage through excessive enthusiasm and unrelenting perseverance in furthering their own predilections.
To this, something must be added. Admiral Rickover and Admiral Zumwalt have both served their country with integrity, devotion, and distinction. There is no higher honor.
“Tactical Development in the Fleet”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-23, April 1976;
R. A. Komorowski, pp. 80-81, August 1976 Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. H. Johnson, U. S. Navy, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Pacific—I believe Captain Smith’s article is incomplete. Even after the commitment to actively pursue tactical development and evaluation (TacD&E) has been made, presumably for all the good reasons cited by Captain Smith, and the required assets (people, money, ships, labs) have been mustered, the fulfillment of the effort still faces significant problems. At the base of these problems is a series of complex conceptual questions regarding the nature and role of tactics.
Is a tactic a formal procedure, a set of guidelines, a tactical concept, or an orderly thought process for analyzing and resolving tactical problems? Is the officer in tactical command (OTC) a tactician who analyzes and reacts to changing tactical situations himself, or is he primarily an on-scene commander who executes tactical plans developed by others? Is the typical naval commander desirous and capable of understanding and applying complex tech
nical factors to individual tactical pr0^ lems, or must experts ashore do this f°J him and provide him with simpli‘ie alternatives? Is the key to tactic5 development in starting from the bot tom, researching and documenting m^1 vidual system and equipment cap® bilities and vulnerabilities; or is 11 starting from the top and develop!0? broad, problem-oriented concepts 0 tactical action? The TacD&E effort to date reflects the impact of these u° resolved issues. f
Over the past three years, hundreds tactics documents, under various aliaseS (TacNote, TacMemo, NWP, NWIP, etc.), have been developed and issue • The diversity of content, form, form®1, and intent, all under the guise of tactic*’ is staggering. Some documents itC^ research projects, presenting reams 0 coarsely evaluated facts and figureS Others are glossaries of formal Pf°ce. dures. Some are lessons learned. others describe broad tactical theories- Some are situation oriented, some sys tern oriented, some equipment orient ed. Some spell out tactical decisionsj others support the OTC’s individuJ decision-making role. For any g'ven tactical problem, tactical guidance ranges from nonexistent to hopeless j voluminous, from clear to contradictory' from specific to general, from creative t0 procedural. ^
A full discussion of these issues an how we might solve them is beyond the scope of this letter. It is important, ho"' ever, to note that the Navy TacD®1 effort, although actually producing si? nificant amounts of “tactics” on papef’ has yet to produce comprehensive °( coherently organized tactical guidance for the fleet. Nor has it produced a cle®r game plan for achieving this goal. Thu5, although support and sponsorship TacD&E are crucial concerns, the lack within the current effort is equal l limiting. Until the concepts of tactic5, tacticians, tactical procedures, and oper rating instructions are clearly distil guished and defined, the tactics develop ment effort will miss the clear signpo*15 required for effective action and resuk5, and the support for TacD&E for whic*1 Captain Smith argues will continue to bc spent in pursuit of ambiguous goals a0° cross-purposes.
ledi K' Tauss‘&’ Jr‘ U- S- N‘
of ,/ ’ former Secretary-Tree,
/ the T] r .. , , . ,
‘gen • o. Naval Institute—
diScuera'St and “specialist” cone one 0£C b7 Commander Russell p( the d tbe most pressing problems ^ ay for the Navy, as well.
’ wbo style ourselves more
1 arr> the Two-Headed Ogre ...”
SncHri-K"n'f'PP' 38‘45, APril 1976;J. C.
H ht'hP-79'Julyl976;G L^n.
4u™9?6;ndAvTch-h'pp^-”-
S ' 1976 Proceedings)
Nav™anfer Cra,g S- Campbell, U.S. SaJ' L0f»manding Officer Patrol ZtTJ°rty-Nine-^ events re- Prot, 1/ y Admiral Keener are not happ7 y haPPcning today; they are am r:mn8- As a c°mmanding officer, I of inri' PUally faced with the resolution an im ‘dual attitude crises which have rcearH^aCt tde command as a whole,
On iT t*1C'r outcornes- Psvrl, C surface. it would appear that
^Une th°^ICal test‘nS °f recruits to deter-
selectiv daptabil,ty and an extremely
So*ution Tv!6"1"8 process would be a “"doubtful 1S’ h0Wcver. is a luxury we
I’m d?y Cannot afford-
.*?“ StUCk Wkh 3 tested I M1) relies on some time-
bines thCadership Principles; (2.) comin jjuese Principles with new concepts the dj11^0 resources management and intern C 0pment of improved skills in ablesCrS°nai relationships; and (3.) en- burdemmanding officers to share the and eff° tbcse problems with skilled ar|d off'eCtlve counselors, supervisors, S0 'Cers within the command, for the6 lnd*v'duals will be lost; some, Navy 8°°d °P tbe command and the some' ^°U must i°scl and occasionally, mat,, y°U win- Those successes
ak,C 11a" worthwhile.
rnere it „
'T-ould n° answer to the questions, what? .rnore have been done? If so, quest; ^ k°W^" There is only the n’ Have I done all that I can?”
''Th
p ^°ast Guard’s Personality: I) , r° uct °f Changing °'es and Missions”
Pr°^4^)d1, pp'38'45, March 1976
QaPtai„
Retired) 7 JT' u' ly‘
if , " Jormer Secretary-Treasu generalists than specialists, display varying degrees of parochialism when trying to discuss the problem succinctly.
I served in the Navy from 1937 to 1934, when the presumption was changing that a “Naval Officer” could tackle almost any kind of a job to a weird and wonderful segmentation and compart- mentation leading to specialties and subspecialties. Indeed, even amongst the enlisted personnel in 1937, if a man wore the crossed anchors of the boatswain’s profession, you could pretty well count on him to be able to do anything expected of any enlisted man.
There is no doubt in my mind that we generalists made a lot more mistakes when we were running things than are made today by the combination of generalists and specialists now in the field. But, we also accomplished far more per unit of manpower and had far more effective operational forces per dollar spent than today.
We are in an age of “no mistakes,” which generally means we do as little as we possibly can, for mistakes of omission do not count. The fact that very little really comes out of the cornucopias of R&D of valid operational use to the Navy is hidden from the mistake syndrome on the grounds that R&D is, by definition, risky.
In the past three decades, we have seen the greatest Navy in the world deteriorate to where there is an apparent valid debate whether we are number one or number two. And, we have seen this occur in an environment of ever increasing technical bureaucracy, the vast majority of which is not only remote from the operating forces, but remote from the technical laboratories as well. Without a sound foot in either camp, we fall victims to brochuremanship, salesmanship, and dogma, as well as to a self-perpetuating, highly unionized bureaucracy intent on building cocoons and empires.
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Bendix converters have capabilities up to 100KVA and handle conversions of 400 to 60Hz or 60 U>400Hz. Further, they do away with overvoltages, undervoltages and frequency transients. They have a continuous running life of 10 years, and a plug-in modulardesign for easy maintenance. Bendix converters. They're little wonders on the PHM's. And a wise choice for other seaworthy vessels.
Call us, Bendix Electric & Fluid Power Division. (201) 542-2000.
Or write, Eatontown. New Jersey 07724
The poor generalist has to produce with what he is given. And, when and if he is finally ordered to a technical command where he feels he can do something to straighten out the mess, he finds himself hog-tied and bound, if not gagged, by the organizational and administrative constraints and can say nothing of the ineptness of the so-called specialist.
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Sealif1
on
146-147
page 148 of the photo on pages
isel
San
Pvt-
Pearl Venture, southbound from Francisco, collided with the USNS
The first step in solving this dilemma is to: (1) place under the direct authority of the type commanders that part of the R&D budget involving the applications of technology; and (2) assign the civilian specialists necessary to apply this money properly to the type commanders.
The second step is to transfer every “ripened” project organization (i.e. those project managers whose systems are in the fleet or about to be introduced) to an operating base where the technicians can see the real problems, and learn, first-hand, about the real facts of life.
The third step is to establish some degree of accountability and responsibility in such a manner that the buck can no longer be passed back and forth and around our wonderful bureaucracy. This criteria should be related “down” from an operational requirement and “up” from a technology base, and require specific justifications for future evaluation of performance.
The fourth step is psychological. The generalist must start to disenchant himself of the idea that a specialist is necessarily omniscient or even intelligent, simply because he has a string of degrees after his name. Indeed, he must recognize that a BS in physics leading to a masters means that the individual is starting to narrow his interest (specialize) in that science; and that a Ph.D. presupposes even more narrow specialization and concentration on a specific element or component of the science.
The fifth step, evidently not as critical as it used to be, requires that the generalist recognize that the "half-life” of a specialty in the sciences is about five to six years, and unless the specialist is continuously refreshed and updated he is falling behind. The reason this step is less critical now is because the technological advancements of the 1950s and 1960s are slowing down. Unfortunately, at least a part of the reason for this is because the technicians who evolved this technology explosion are now “managing” things and choking off a great deal of innovation through their own bureaucracies.
In my opinion, we should begin to believe this, because the handwriting on the Navy wall is becoming larger and more legible every day.
“The U. S. Coast Guard and the Control of Oceanic Pollution’
(See H. D. Williams, pp. 146-159, May 1976 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Roy E. Corliss, Assistant to Depuj^ Engineering Officer, Military Command, Pacific—The description is in error. The Liberian cargo ves
Joseph F. Merrell, northbound ff0lin Port Hueneme, 12 miles off Cape San Martin (about 60 miles South of Mon terey, Ca.). The Merrell, fully °Pera
tional, was loaded with governmcn cargo. Note that she did not sink, bul was later scrapped because the cost 0 permanent repairs approached the valuf of the ship.
I would also point out that, conttal to the impressions given in the artidc> the salvage of the Merrell and the 0 spill cleanup was a unified effort of 1 c Regional Response Team, which 10 eluded participation by the U. S. Coast Guard, Military Sealift Command, Pa cific, 12th Naval District Pollutin'1 Response Team, 6th Army, U. S. NaV' Post Graduate School Monterey, C°n struction Battalion Center Port Hue neme, Supervisor of Navy Salvage, NA® Lemoore, NAS Alameda, NAS Imper*a Beach, and California Fish and Gafn'j Department. The U. S. Coast Guaf acted as on-scene commander and Pef formed admirably. The effort was sue cessful and proved the value of prepay tion and training. The lessons learnc have been incorporated in the 17(^ Naval District Contingency Plan.
“24 Sentai—Japan’s Commerce Raiders” (■SeeE.T. Layton, pp. 53-61, June 1976 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Prank B. Mitchell, U- Navy (Retired)—The blurb heading thc article refers to “Admiral ‘Bull’ Halsey 5 carrier-cruiser force,” etc. When CaP' tain Halsey was my squadron coif' mander of four-piper destroyers in thc early 1930s he was called “Bill” Halsey
and
Halsev , Was known as “Wild invented"u W°dd War 11' the neverdVu6 tCrm “Bul1’” but ' stand he HedSUChin theNavy-11
he detested the term.
T0 cftty ^^'cer’s Alternative stagnation in Rate
Rodtlecatlon Technician First Class ating u <^a^es, U. S. Navy—Fluctu- levels • ^ naval personnel strength
inequ; 0 tdc Bast bavc caused many SeParati'eS WB*cb *ed t0 rancor and even and n °y many highly motivated
stagnat^3 Petty officers faced with
nien | l0n *n rate and supervision by lhan ^ ^uabfied and often less able make ,emsc^ves- The Navy needs to manni^anS now’ whcn, hopefully, naval
Ptovide VCVC*S afe at tbe *°W ht11'1’ t0
iaed „ °f future increases in author- ■jj1*rcnl>tbs> *ar®c or smad- Ceedi„ t0nC and content of many Propast ^S art'cles attest to the fact that P°siti XPans‘ons have placed men in Were0S responsibility which they Theeither ready nor able to handle. systCmPrCSent Petty officer selection derived determ*ned hy a sliding scale examC Prorn experience, service, and majnn.at'°n scores, is inadequate for time cjnality during the
requi W, en quantity is also suddenly • Men with long service but
inadequate professional knowledge or with inadequate practical experience can attain promotions by scoring high on the tests in the case of the latter or, as in the case of the former, by building up high multiples.
Promotion should not be a reward for persistence or length of service alone. The first and primary goal of any promotion policy should be to provide quality management at each rating level at the most value for each dollar expended in salary. A good second class petty officer is far more valuable than a man promoted to first class only because he finally attained enough time in grade in service to overcome a deficiency at the testing table.
I suggest that a promotion system based on two promoting scores would provide an equitable and long-range planning tool for pro-motions. The high score would be raised or lowered in accordance with the allotted vacancies in petty officer rating strengths, but should never be allowed to approach closer than 10% of the lower score. Personnel attaining the high score would be rated with permanent grade. The lower score should be set at a desired minimum level and never allowed to move more than 5% in either direction. Personnel attaining the lower score could be “frocked” to the higher rate, but would retain permanent rank and pay of the lower rate. Movement from frocked status to permanent promotion would be allowed only when a man attained the higher, permanent score.
An increase in force levels would enable the Navy to select proven petty officers to fill the billets required. The personnel serving in frocked status would be required to continue competing in the fleet-wide examinations, and poor performance, reflected in their evaluations, would lead to reversion to permanent rate with a minimum of administrative or legal procedures. Inherent safeguards in the procedures could be the requirement of written warnings of poor performance and requirement for two successive poor evaluations to initiate reversion of rate. The requirement for continued competition in examinations should ensure that an individual in frocked status would continue to improve himself and study for tests.
The gathering force for the requirement for 30 years service before retirement will further aggravate the stalled promotion system in the coming years, and the two-tier system may provide an incentive and means of retaining highly qualified men.
Discussions with petty officers in my command also have convinced me that implementation of this system may finally bring about a long-desired correction of the evaluation system: to deter and prevent the inflation of marks because “he is a good man.” Evaluations could become much more objective by allowing a comparison of performance to the items listed in the “Qualification for Rating Manual.” The only subjective element in the proposed system would be the evaluator’s conception of the relative value of the performance.
The current recommended evaluation method calls for the comparison of the performance with other men of the same rate at the same station. This can cause many inequities in small commands, or among recruiters and instructors. In these latter categories, individuals are preselected for assignment to such duty
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and
the
Navy is now larger and more mo< than ours, and it is in doubt whether naval forces of the United States con perform the mission of keeping the sC lanes open in case of a conflict.
the
th«
,wef'
The travel time of our present 1*°^ based missile forces to their targets in
d-
the
}0
.11
them being immediately followed targeted by Soviet ships and kn* ^ subs. Strategic Air Command airpU*1
because they are proven performers. If ten outstanding men are then compared with each other, the lower rated men on the scale are forced to suffer merely because they are the worst of the best, even though the worst of the best may be better than the best of the worst serving in normal duty billets. A man who consistently has received superior marks can, by reporting to recruit or instructor duty, suddenly drop to the equals or excells category without having lost one whit of his motivation or performance and, as a result, drops in his relative standing with his peers even though he has taken on additional duties associated with these assignments.
Establishment of recommended rating levels for each of the qualifications listed in the manual would at last give an objective guide to the evaluator and an attainable goal to the man being rated.
Communications: A Lost Art?
Lieutenant J. Gordon Vaeth, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), National Environmental Satellite Service—Isn’t it time for those of us in the science and technology side of things to start cleaning up our language? By that I mean to start using simple phraseology, statements that are straightforward, and words that are real.
The services’ use of professionally- inspired jargon was never more evident than at a DoD engineering management seminar I recently attended. For two days, we were “incentivized,” “prioritized,” and "particularized.” We were also imbued with such glorious terms as “acquisition discipline,” “econometrics,” “organic maintenance,” and “replication.” Abbreviations and acronyms, many without explanation, flowed like water. And so often were events dated by that Watergate horror expression “point in time” that the temptation was great to keep count.
Mine is more than a nitpicking complaint. At stake is the ability of Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force project engineers and program managers to communicate with persons who are not project engineers and program managers. Such persons include trainees, minority members climbing the ladder of upward mobility, corporate officers, and Members of Congress and their staffs. They include, also, those who conduct program reviews and make funding decisions as “management and budget” pragmatists.
Unlanguage, exemplified by “computerate,” “effectivity,” and “remediate,” is only part of the difficulty. There is also the tendency to introduce needless qualifying words that transform the clear into the unclear and statements of fact into statements of non-fact. It doesn’t take much. Simply insert “may,” “possibly,” “it appears,” “could,” or “I think.” Doubts are instantly generated in the mind of the listener or reader. Such words in reports and study results are devastating.
Not expressing oneself explicitly to others on behalf of one’s program produces unclear specifications and vague or contradictory proposals. These, in turn, convert into protracted contract negotiations and unnecessary amendments and engineering change orders— all of them costly in time, money, and manpower effort.
The sociological price is also steep. If we complicate without reason the language of our profession or discipline, we make it all the more difficult for those who aspire to enter, practice, or advance in it. We do a disservice to the career development programs of the uniformed as well as the civilian men and women of the Navy.
Let’s stop coining words that give the impression they’re more intended to impress than to inform. Let’s strive for more basic English, simpler and easier- to-understand terms, and more selfexplanatory phrases and expressions. Let’s knock off the run-on bureaucratic sentence, the kind made up almost entirely of nouns with hardly an active verb in sight. Why not make greater use of the first or second person, instead of relying so much on that conveniently impersonal and noncommittal third? And let’s keep positive statements positive by avoiding modifiers. If we do only some of these things, it will be to the benefit of our Navy, our profession, and our country.
Is language and how we professionally express ourselves important? In terms of that currently “in” but already fading expression, “You’d better believe it!”
“Ships of Ice”
(See B. H. Shoemaker, pp. 103-106, February
1976 Proceedings)
Aerographer's Mate First Class Ferry L Latham, U. S. Navy—The U. S. NaV? today is ill prepared for operations the Arctic. The Navy turned over t six IFzW-class icebreakers it had to Coast Guard. These icebreakers, are old and have only marginal capa ity in heavy pack ice, are part of aIj icebreaking force which only consists three other ships. The United States ha only a few merchant ships reinforced l withstand the crushing pressures countered in heavy pack ice. The S° Union has over 50 navy and mercha1^ vessels capable of navigating ice-clog?e waters. ,
The submarine has proven an * ship for the Arctic Basin. Cruis*D® hundreds of feet under the ice 1 independent of weather and ice con tions. Today, subs from the Umte States and the U.S.S.R. routinely Patr° under the Arctic Ocean.
The U. S. Navy needs new ships techniques to conduct operations in ^ Arctic. Some visionary civilians a(1 military men realize that the AfCtl Ocean can be of great military advanW? to the country willing to develop he*v^ ice capabilities and an innovative stfa tegy. SALT has placed the United StatC in the position of the underdog- (-*u defense spending, taking inflation in1 account, is the lowest since 1950 weapon purchasing power. The Sov ^
th«
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The United States must meet
increasing Soviet challenge, and pt°P exploitation of the Arctic Basin offefS a realistic method of offsetting U.S.S.R. ’s preponderant military po
Soviet Union ranges from 15 t° minutes. Delivery time of most of 0]) seaborne missiles is four to 20 minut^ But it is becoming increasingly difficl1 to put our attack subs on station witho11,
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require anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours to reach their targets and by that time a war would largely be over. Our Minuteman sites are well targeted by the U.S.S.R., and we lack even a basic anti-missile defense system such as the ABM installation around Moscow.
How can operations in the Arctic help our position? By developing new missile ships able to continuously operate in the Arctic pack ice; by modifying our nuclear attack submarines and building new missile submarines that would be able to break through ice floes ten to 20 feet thick and launch their missiles; and by developing the means to install, maintain, and support tactical missile launch sites across the Arctic Basin. By allowing ships with nuclear strike capabilities to operate in the Arctic, we could decrease delivery time of our missiles to most prime targets to less than ten minutes! By deploying our submarines in the Arctic pack ice they would be much safer as they could utilize the underwater ridges to keep their positions secret.
We are unfortunately reaching the point where our “nuclear deterent” is a myth. By being able to operate our Navy in the Arctic Ocean off the coast of the Soviet Union we could once again make the Soviet leaders really stop and think before trying to pressure the Free World. The Arctic Ocean is a two-way street, and we can be sure that the Soviets have the Arctic in their future military plans. It is in our Navy’s future also; it just remains to be seen whether the U. S. Navy will be acting in the Arctic ... or reacting.
Vulcan/Phalanx: An Effective Close-in Weapon System?
Timothy C Rizzuto—As we develop the 20-millimeter Vulcan/Phalanx antiaircraft system, it should be remembered that in 1945, during the kamikaze attacks off Okinawa, the 40- and 20- millimeter guns often were not found to be heavy enough to stop a determined kamikaze attack. This discovery was one of the reasons that we rearmed the surface fleet with three-inch antiaircraft guns during the postwar period. The increased destructive power of the three- inch shell was deemed necessary in stopping missile attacks against ships.
One wonders whether a warship armed with a couple of electronically- controlled Vulcan systems will be as effective against cruise missiles as the massed batteries of reliable 20-millimeters that lined the galleries of the old forex-class carriers were against kamikazes. 1 think not. Those guns were manned by sailors who knew that failure to destroy their target could well spell their end.
“Strategic Mobility: Impetus for a Southwest Passage” (SeeJ. W. Dindinger, pp. 33-37, April 1976;
W. J. Stewart, p. 82, July WIG Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Weinert, U. S. Army—I am disturbed by two points relative to Colonel Dindinger’s article: (1) the presumed vulnerability of the Panama Canal in a nuclear environment; and (2) the lack of energy consumption consideration.
Except by use of hand-placed ADM (atomic demolition munitions), the nature of the canal does not make it particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack. If destruction (stopping traffic) were the design of a protagonist, it would be immeasurably easier to sink a loaded bulk carrier in the channel or locks.
But why would destruction be goal? Most ships plying the waterway not U. S. flag carriers, and the can* serves the rest of the world shipP more than the United States.
As for the limitations of the canab ^ continues to have a waiting line transits in spite of the Suez Canal opening; it obviously serves needs many carriers, including the U. S. Nav!
The second point seems a gnevl omission. No treatment of energy nee' for surface effect vehicles (SEVs) or sUt face ships (SESs) is given other than 1(1 tons per hour. Converting to ton mile'
40 ton (fuel) 1
_____ _____ x_____________ x — i
hr. 2000 ton (cargo) 80111
0.00025 ton (fuel) ton mile (cargo)
If the fuel is JP-4, then: 0.00025 t0<1 fuel = 0.50 lb. fuel = 0.0088 cu ft- * 0.06 gal. (per ton mile).
This would make this type vehicle n° particularly efficient if one accepts these performance characteristics. A ten-t0(1 truck getting five miles per gallon useS 0.02 gal. per ton mile. ^
No discussion of options today shod exclude an evaluation of energy requIfC ments—in so doing, Colonel Dinding has made a serious oversight.