The Multilateral Force (MLF), now nonexistent for all practical purposes, developed into a major bone of contention among the leading NATO nations, and it has proved a boon for Soviet propaganda. Since much of the discussion concerns—and most of the criticism has been directed against—the Federal Republic of Germany, it may be permissible to present a German view on the subject of nuclear weapons and the MLF.
There are two entirely opposed interpretations of the MLF nuclear weapons problem. The Soviets accuse the Federal Republic of trying to attain possession of nuclear weapons by every means—but especially by the MLF. The Americans say that the main idea of the MLF is to avoid proliferation of nuclear arms, and that it is a means for preventing the Federal Republic from getting nuclear weapons into its own hands.
That, then, is how others see us. But, how do we see ourselves? The government of the Federal Republic neither asked for the possession of nuclear weapons nor had it any part in formulating the original MLF concept. Quite to the contrary. When the first A-bombs were dropped in 1945, Germany was completely disarmed and in such a chaotic state that nobody had any time to spare for nuclear problems. Later, when the country was asked to join the Western alliance, only conventional forces were visualized. On 18 August 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared before the West German Parliament (Bundestag):
It has been said that the present Western advantage in Europe depends on the possession of the atom bomb by the U.S.A. However, we must foresee the time when the Russians will think themselves capable of retaliating with atom bombs. . . . Their possession . . . will enable either side to neutralize the other, and military power will again depend on the size and equipment of the conventional land and air forces. . . .
As far as can be ascertained, this was the first time that nuclear weapons were officially mentioned in the Federal Republic. Thinking along “atomic” lines developed but slowly. Even now, there does not exist a single Institute for Strategic Studies or anything similar to it in Western Germany.
So far, the widespread discussion of MLF by our countrymen has been conducted more from feeling than from knowledge. West German public opinion would prefer to ignore all nuclear problems. There has, however, been a strong movement against rearming and especially against any kind of nuclear warfare. And the Communists have been industriously exploiting this attitude.
From the beginning, the Bonn Government was entirely for having nuclear weapons remain under American control, on account of their technical difficulties, prohibitive costs, and of Germany’s particular position as a former enemy. Therefore, during the five years of negotiations before the Federal Republic joined NATO and began to rearm, nuclear weapons did not play any prominent part. There were no difficulties about agreeing to a number of restrictions in the Paris Agreements of October 1954, which made access to NATO possible, and which created the Western European Union.
In an additional Protocol on Arms Control, Article 1 runs as follows: “The Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory any atomic, biological, or chemical weapons.” Article 2 prohibits among other things, the production of guided missiles. Article 3 says: “The size of the stocks of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of the West European Union.”
Thus, only the manufacture of nuclear weapons is prohibited in the Federal Republic. Therefore, our country might acquire these weapons by purchase. However, it must be stated emphatically that neither the Federal Government nor anybody in a responsible position has ever asked for the possession of nuclear weapons. In an article on “NATO nuclear Policy and the MLF” Marshal of the R.A.F., Sir John Slessor, said in 1964,
A major factor in American thinking in this context has been an urge to satisfy the real or imagined aspirations of the Federal Republic for a share in nuclear control, without opening the door to proliferation. ... I know of no evidence that responsible Germans are anxious to have their own nuclear weapons. . . They, like the other European allies, do feel that they should have some real share in the “common” responsibility and authority for decision on defence”. . . .
It must be admitted, however, that on the German side, because American control was taken for granted, the wording of some of the official spokesmen in nuclear matters has not always been fortunate. In September 1956—- ten months after beginning to build up the Armed Forces—Minister of Defense Theodor Blank said:
In NATO strategy the sword will be furnished by the modern long-range and nuclear weapons which are mainly in the hands of the USA. ... It goes without saying that the shield (conventional) forces—and with them the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces)— must be organized and equipped in such a way that they can perform their tasks even in a conflict in which nuclear weapons are employed. . . .
He failed to mention who was to be in control of these weapons. Neither did General Lauris Norstad, when he, as SACEUR, in a press conference in Bonn on 20 March 1957, advocated increasing the nuclear capacity of the NATO forces, including the Bundeswehr because without them defense would be impossible.
Two weeks later, Chencellor Adenauer said to the press:
It is necessary to distinguish between tactical and big nuclear weapons. Tactical weapons represent nothing more than a further development of the artillery. Of course, we cannot dispense with the newest developments in normal armaments for our troops. In any case, we don’t have any big weapons. That the situation is in a state of flux is shown by Great Britain declaring its intention to become a nuclear power. ... We Germans cannot stop that development. We can only adapt ourselves and hope that there will be a détente somewhere and somehow.
The Soviets were quick to make use of these somewhat ambiguous declarations. In a note dated 27 April 1957, they warned the West German government against equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons alleging that “through its policy of nuclear armaments and by fostering preparations for nuclear war” the West German government endangered the security of the European peoples as well as the vital interests of the German people itself.
Of course, Soviet protests of that kind should not be overrated. In his report to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in New York, Manlio Brosio, the Secretary General of NATO said on 4 October 1965:
Above all, the Allies must not allow themselves to be intimidated by the pressure and threats by which the Soviet Union is attempting at all costs to prevent any agreement permitting Germany to participate in Atlantic nuclear strategy or forces. ... If we had heeded the Soviet Union and its threats, there would never have been an Atlantic Alliance in 1949; Greece and Turkey would not have been admitted in 1951, or Germany in 1954; and there would never have been even a European Economic Community.
Soviet threats are often made for the record, to be used later at a more suitable opportunity. The way to deal with them is either to disregard them completely, or to refute them at once. In the case of the alleged German preparations for nuclear war they were disregarded only at first. Immediately after the Soviet note, on 3 May 1957, the Atlantic Council declared that NATO needed the most modern means of defense in order to deter aggression. In October 1957, General Norstad proposed 30 divisions with nuclear weapons as the minimum for the defense of Central Europe. After its session in December of the same year, the Atlantic Council published the following communique:
…NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be at the disposal of the Allied Supreme Commander Europe.
The Soviet threats were not mentioned, and they subsided under this cool treatment to be revived later on when the MLF discussions and dissensions in NATO offered a better opportunity. In the meantime, everybody had grown accustomed to the fact that tactical nuclear weapons were stationed in the areas held by the new German divisions. Some of the weapons carriers were purchased by the Federal Republic and manned by German soldiers. The warheads remained under U. S. control, however, in accordance with the clauses of the U. S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which strictly prohibited the exchange of nuclear knowledge and the distribution of fissionable material.
This “nuclear isolationism” had ended the wartime co-operation with the British, and is the main reason for the MLF and its difficulties. At that time, the United States attempted (by the Baruch Plan) to put all nuclear capabilities under the United Nations and failed because the Soviets did not co-operate. Reacting to the Soviet threat to Europe, the United States reversed its old policy of avoiding “entangling alliances” and freed, by the Vanden- berg Resolution of 11 June 1948, the way to Marshall Plan Aid, to the recovery of Free Europe, and to the Atlantic Alliance, all political achievements of the first magnitude. On the other hand, the Atomic Energy Act did not prevent the Russians, the British, the French, and now the Red Chinese from creating nuclear armaments of their own. In the Atlantic Alliance, it caused much bad blood and expensive duplication of labor. After the first Russian nuclear detonation, sharing nuclear knowledge with Great Britain and France, or at least creating some kind of MLF, might have proved of considerable political advantage. It is not surprising that these two Allies took offense and went their own way in nuclear development.
Evidently, their attitude was taken as an indication that the Federal Republic was bent on following their example. A more careful examination of the German attitude would have shown that the situation there was quite different. True, as mentioned before, not enough attention was paid to the choice of words by leading men dealing with problems of defense. Yet, there were sufficient indications of the real state of affairs, i.e., of German acceptance of U. S. control of all nuclear warheads in the Federal Republic. First and foremost, it had assigned all its combat troops to NATO, the only member to do so. As a consequence, there were no national staffs which had anything to do with the assignment of nuclear weapons. In training, nuclear defense could not be neglected, but the main army manual (called Truppenführung, i.e. “commanding troops in battle”) dealt exclusively with conventional warfare in its first post-war edition of August 1959. Later editions in 1961 and 1962 were modernized but contained the following introduction:
This manual presupposes that the political leaders of NATO have decided to use nuclear warheads within the framework of the principles of international law, and that on the strength of this decision, the military leaders of NATO have given orders for the use of nuclear warheads—under the custody of the U. S. Army—by units of the army. The release of these warheads is subject to fixed rules and restricted to specially appointed NATO command authorities.
On the whole, a good standing in the Atlantic Alliance and mutual trust and confidence seemed far more valuable than the possession of a few atom bombs. There was little public discussion of nuclear matters until the summer of 1960 when a short document was published by the West German Armed Forces Staff (actually a condensed lecture of the Inspector-General) pointing out that general conscription, membership in NATO, and tactical nuclear weapons in the shield forces were imperative for a successful defense. By the parliamentary opposition and abroad this was taken as a sign that “the generals” wanted no nuclear weapons of their own.
The Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, had seen and approved this document, and he clarified the situation by declaring in Parliament on 15 October 1960:
To begin with, we need precision of terms. . . Under the concept of nuclear armaments we have to understand two technical components: firstly, the means for carrying or firing nuclear war-heads, and secondly, the nuclear warheads themselves. . . . The federal government has never declared itself for increasing the number of owners of nuclear weapons but always against it. It has particularly supported the U. S. standpoint not to expand the manufacture of nuclear weapons beyond the group of present manufacturers. . . .
Then he explained the procedure of U. S. control and said that these weapons could be released only by the unanimous decision of the Atlantic Council. Finally he gave the reasons for stationing tactical nuclear weapons in the areas of the German forces because otherwise the Soviets could count on these sectors being considerably weaker than the others.
A few weeks later, Chancellor Adenauer underlined this idea in a public address to the leading men of his party: “. . . if the German component of the NATO Army—a very important component—does not possess any nuclear weapons it cannot be used in the protective shield which the NATO forces are to form for Western Europe. ...”
Evidently, there was no connection between these statements of leading German politicians and the announcement made by Mr. Christian Herter, the U. S. Secretary of State, at the December session of the Atlantic Council. He officially proposed putting five Polaris submarines under NATO control if other NATO members would undertake to install 100 Polaris missiles on board ships of their own. By that time, Great Britain had created its own nuclear force of 170 V-bombers and missiles. In France, General Charles de Gaulle energetically pushed forward the Force de Frappe, the French nuclear force. Neither nation welcomed the American proposals. This was bound to create a difficult situation for the Federal Republic which had to maintain good relations with the United States as well as with its European Allies.
In a talk to the Council on Foreign Affairs in Washington, on 15 February 1961, Herr von Brentano, the German Foreign Minister, welcomed the new concept of a NATO nuclear force as suggested by the U. S. government. At the same time, he pointed out that many difficulties would have to be overcome.
The inevitable question of rearranging the power of command will raise difficult political and military problems . . . among them strengthening the European right of code- termination in the sphere of nuclear defense. . . The answer to these questions will have to satisfy one absolute requirement: Under no circumstances must it lead to a weakening of the military strength of NATO. . . .
This was probably meant as a gentle warning, but was not followed up. From my own experience I know that from the military side, the Herter proposals were viewed with interest but without any expectations of speedy action. Putting some Polaris submarines at the disposal of NATO was considered as a polite gesture which would not change the situation to any noticeable degree. Their crews would remain all-American, for submarine training is so specialized that nobody saw a way to mix crews (quite apart from the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act). Discussing this problem at a later date in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold Wilson said:
There was at that time a lot of discussion about a mixed-manned submarine force. Now there has been widespread agreement that such a force is not feasible. Most of us would agree to the statement attributed to the naval side—himself a former submarine commander—to the German Defence Minister who said that he would rather swim.
These training difficulties were the reason why the debate on using conventional submarines was short-lived. Soon, the MLF was seen as a force of 25 surface vessels, with eight Polaris tubes each, somewhat similar to the experimental ballistic missile ship USS Observation Island (AG-154), which could easily be disguised as merchant ships. In these “atom freighters,” as they were soon called by the German press, mixed crews were expected not to offer any particular difficulties if the men were selected and prepared with some care.
However, 1961 was election year in the Federal Republic, and important decisions could hardly be expected before the new government was installed in the late fall. In the campaign, defense questions did not play any prominent part. Both main parties acknowledged the need for a conventional and nuclear defense but laid the main stress on arms reduction and nonproliferation. The MLF remained in the background. On 29 November 1961, in the government declaration before the Bundestag, Chancellor Adenauer spoke for strengthening NATO in view of the Berlin Crisis and added:
In the opinion of the Federal Government the plan of a NATO nuclear force should be put into effect as soon as possible. Setting up such a force is necessary in order to bring the armed forces of NATO to the same level of technical development as those of the enemy. With this request the Federal Government will refute, at the same time, the accusation that it is planning to acquire possession of nuclear arms. . . . The defensive character of the German forces cannot be better demonstrated than by the fact that they are under the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander. . . .
Two days before, Minister of Defense Strauss had given a talk at Georgetown University in Washington, D. C., on problems of the Alliance. He asked for closer co-operation within NATO and for joint control of nuclear weapons. Here, and on several other occasions, including a meeting of the Atlantic Council on 15 December 1961, he pointed out that the Soviets had installed 700 MRBMs in their western provinces and the Satellite countries, and that there were no similar weapons in Western Europe to oppose them. This gave the MLF situation a new aspect, as far as the Federal Republic was concerned. France had refused to install any U. S. missiles on French soil. The West German territory (only about 100,000 square miles) was so narrow and so densely populated that it seemed impossible to find room for several hundred MRBM installations whether fixed in hardened positions or on mobile mounts. In this dilemma, the MLF seemed to be a good solution by putting at least 200 of these MRBMs out to sea “where real estate is free.” This was a strong reason for the German government to keep pressing for the MLF.
The discussions of the government declaration in Parliament and in the press which now started in earnest, greatly increased the general interest in the MLF. At first, opinions were divided, on its military value as well as on its political utility. There were headlines like, The Atom Freighters Will Never Swim, because they were considered as useless from a military point of view. By and by, this gave way to a more sober evaluation. On the whole, it was realized that the MLF ships were not sitting ducks but had a good chance of remaining undetected in the immense traffic in the eastern Atlantic. Armed with Polaris A-3 they would have a sea area of about four million square miles from where they could reach targets in the Soviet Union proper. The mounting Soviet protests were taken as an admission of the considerable nuisance value of the MLF. It was calculated that in comparison with submarines they would cost only half as much as per Polaris unit, with running costs still lower. The result of the discussions was that the MLF was recognized as one of the multiple options needed for deterrence, although not one of the most important options. For the special situation of the Federal Republic it was to be preferred to a corresponding number of MRBMs on land.
If, in this way, the military value and its limitations were clarified, the question of its political utility became more complicated as the discussion went on. Nobody minded that control of the warheads would practically remain in U. S. hands and that the MLF would give the Federal Republic the veto only on the use of about three per cent of the whole U. S. nuclear arsenal. Government and opposition were unanimous in declaring that they did not aspire to the possession of these weapons. What they wanted, however, was sharing in the decision on the actual use of nuclear weapons. The reason was—and still is—the responsibility for our fellow-countrymen in the Soviet occupied zone. The difficulty in getting some share in decision-making lay in avoiding any appearance of trying to join the Atom Club. The Soviets seized on this and used it by a monotonous reiteration of alleged German nuclear plans. They succeeded in making some impression in Allied countries and also in Germany, by pretending that joining the MLF would automatically prevent reunification of the two parts of the country. Of course, that is a pretext because the Soviets had blocked reunification long before the MLF was conceived. Therefore, the federal government did not heed the Soviet attacks and continued to advocate the MLF expressing hope for a speedy solution. It agreed to participate in a mixed crew of eight nationalities manning the guided missile (Tartar) destroyer USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) for two years. As the naval experts had foretold, this experiment was successful but it did not solve any of the political problems. These were discussed in public to an ever increasing degree, and with growing concern the adverse consequences of the MLF project were noted.
France and Great Britain continued to build up their nuclear forces. At the same time, they robustly rejected any German access to nuclear weapons even in the form of the MLF. The French were entirely against any multilateral co-operation because this would have detracted from the value of the Force de Frappe as a political lever. The British wanted the MLF replaced by an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) of their own design. According to Prime Minister Harold Wilson it was to be composed as follows:
• The British V-Bomber force, “except for those aircraft which are needed for existing commitments outside the NATO area.”
• The British fleet of Polaris submarines.
• At least an equal number of U. S. Polaris submarines,
• Some kind of mixed-manned and jointly-owned element in which the existing nonnuclear powers could take part.
• Any forces which France might decide to subscribe.
Wilson added that this force would be under a single authority in which all countries taking part should be represented, the atom- owners each with the right of veto, and the other countries either singly or collectively.
The duties of the governing authority would be to:
• provide the force commander with political guidance;
• approve the force commander’s targeting and operational plans;
• take the decision to release nuclear weapons to the force commander;
• develop agreed policy on the role of all types of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons;
• consult and discuss possible contingencies anywhere in the world which could give rise to the possibility of nuclear weapons being used; and
• co-ordinate targeting by the ANF with the targeting of all U. S. forces in the Atlantic area.
According to Mr. Wilson, the members of this authority would be acting “entirely on instructions from governments,” which was not explained in detail.
This proposal was rejected in West Germany because it seemed to make things more complicated without improving German participation, at least as it was first presented in the press when the “governing authority” was played down or omitted. As to the MLF, the situation would not be changed very much as it would form one of the components of the ANF which otherwise would consist of nuclear elements with national crews and therefore remaining more or less under national control. The “governing authority” would not change that because it was not supranational. Nevertheless, it would be an important step in the right direction by forming a body qualified for occupying itself with all nuclear problems and advising the Atlantic Council in these matters. In the MLF project this material task had been neglected.
For all practical purposes, the MLF is now where it was five years ago. The mixed crew of the Claude V. Ricketts was disbanded on 1 December 1965. How long the experience gained in this successful operation will last is difficult to say. Politically, the MLF is, for the United States, still a means of avoiding proliferation, for the Soviets, a road to it—they go on asserting that the Federal Republic will get access to nuclear weapons by it. At last, the Secretary General of NATO, some Allies, and the Federal Government have taken a firm stand against these allegations.
The Federal Government has maintained great interest in the MLF. In October 1964, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard explained it in detail to Parliament. “To state it clearly and unmistakably we are striving for an MLF in which as many European countries as possible will participate.” He expressed the hope that the treaty would be ready for signing by the end of the same year. Although he was obviously mistaken in this assumption the 1965 election campaign did not make an issue of the MLF. In the declaration of the new government on 10 November 1965, he again stressed that Germany did not strive for the possession of nuclear weapons and did support non-proliferation.
However, all Allies should participate in nuclear defense according to the degree of menace to their countries and to the amount of their financial contributions to the defense. We think of forms of a common nuclear organization, and we take part in consultations with the Allied Powers. Repeatedly, we have declared that we do not strive for national control of nuclear weapons. However, we should not be kept away from any nuclear participation because we are a divided country. Splitting Germany is an injustice. There should not be added another wrong by impairing . . . the defense against the open threat from the east. Ideas like that weaken the Alliance and strengthen the will of the Soviets to keep our continent divided.
The following discussion in Parliament, in the press, and by leading politicians in television served to clarify the German stand-point. There was general agreement that the Federal Republic should not try to get possession of nuclear weapons, but that it should share in nuclear responsibility. There was also unanimity that it could not commit itself to renounce nuclear sharing indefinitely because there is no proof that proliferation will not continue, apart from the responsibility to the Germans in the Soviet Occupied Zone. It was realized that the MLF had to be regarded not only from a national angle but more so from its influence on the Alliance. Instead of cementing it, the MLF had become a disruptive factor by gaining an exaggerated political influence. This had not been foreseen but had to be taken into account. The Federal Republic had to maintain good relations with the United States as well as with the European allies, especially France.
The general German aims were formulated as: keeping the Alliance strong as best life insurance; and keeping the road open to preunification.
In this context the Federal Republic’s “nuclear” aims were to be:
• participation in planning and targeting
• sharing in the actual responsibility (positive and negative, i.e. including the right to veto the use of weapons stationed on, or directed against German soil)
• participation in technical development for peaceful purposes.
In this situation the MLF could be no more than an option which had to be kept open, however. The obvious conclusion was to explore other ways. The foremost was seen in a European Nuclear Force. This was discussed frequently. It has been recognized almost unanimously, however, that a united Europe must be the first step, a European Nuclear Force the second. At present, there is not much hope that a closer political union can be created in the near future though many Europeans are working for it, and it is bound to happen.
In view of the determined opposition of Great Britain and especially France against any German nuclear participation, the Federal Republic has to keep back in these questions and to watch carefully lest its non-nuclear status should be exploited against it. Under these circumstances, acceptance of the ANF might offer the best solution, after all. Starting with existing components, i.e. U. S. and British planes and submarines, would bring two of the three nuclear allies together and later on might even be attractive to France, especially should the Atomic Energy Act be amended. The MLF part could wait, or could be split up in U. S.-manned “atomic freighters” and some conventional ships with mixed crews. Some Polaris ships should be built in any case, for otherwise the Soviets would gain another chance of bragging about something which actually they did not do. That they will ever hand over control of nuclear weapons to their Satellites is most improbable. As a rule, hegemonic powers are most careful not to let subjugated nations become too strong. Incidentally, the Russians have never answered any questions on whose fingers are on the triggers in their empire.
If the Federal Republic were to stand back for some years in the question of the MLF it could devote more money to the urgently needed strengthening of the land forces in Central Europe by an improved territorial and civil defense which together would increase the value of the fighting forces considerably. In three or four years, the U. S. government will see if the Russians will play ball in non-proliferation. In that time, the British- American part of the ANF could be built up including the beginnings of a governing authority, some Polaris surface ships could be launched. Admission of non-nuclear members would depend on the general situation. Of course, all this is up to the governments involved. In any case, NATO would not be weakened. The main point in all measures, whether political or military, is to keep the Atlantic Alliance together and to strengthen it for it is vital for the Free World whether or not there seems to be a détente. The MLF is only one of many possible projects and has to be handled accordingly.
“. . . the threat of war means the accumulation of more and more atomic bombs.”
H. G. Wells, The World Set Free, published in 1914.