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"Naval Gunfire Today and Tomorrow”
(See pages 52-59, September 1966; pages 132-133 December 1966 Proceedings)
Howard D. Greyber. (Chief, Astrophysics and Geophysics, Martin Company.)—I reflect now that if a battleship had been returned to action, as urged in my first letter to Admiral D. L. McDonald dated 30 November 1965, 16-inch gun support with its powerful impact would have been given to many Army and Marine units in battles within 23 miles of the coast. With some new shell design and other modern techniques, the range could approach 40 miles. Those who are convinced that large guns are obsolete can reflect that a shell is nothing but a confined-explosion, propelled missile.
Today, with 175-mm. guns firing across the DMZ into North Vietnam, one can guess that one or two turrets of 16-inch guns, emplaced about 30 miles inland, would be strikingly useful in attacking infiltration routes. Such armored turrets would not be hurt by enemy mortar attacks.
Suppose it is decided that, after suitable warning to foreign ships and civilian personnel to leave, the Haiphong docks are to be attacked, and rendered useless. Using air-
craft, at least 15 would be lost, costing upwards of $50 million, while an old, lightly manned battleship could do the job in five hours with probably no loss of life to our forces. If a gun with a 55-mile range were developed, the vital rail line from eastern China to Hanoi comes into range from a battleship. Current discussion of recommissioning an -hwa-class battleship is welcome.
"The People Factor”
(See pages 76-88 March 1967 Proceedings)
Michael K. Erickson. (Director, North- American Broadcasting Corporation.)—We take exception to the authors’ comments that radio and television are to blame for a “false” image of our Navy. To my knowledge, the public media have confined themselves to reporting facts. As for “Gilligan’s Island, McHale’s Navy, etc.,” I can only comment that such programs are generally accepted for the fiction that they are, and not as an accurate portrayal of Navy life.
The relationship in civilian life between employer and employee is formal. If I treat my employees with contempt, and I offer them low salaries and pry into their private hves, then I must expect a high turnover rate.
I demand respect for my own privacy, and in return afford it to others. The pay is good. Our employees take a pride in their work and their appearance, being praised for it. The employees are not treated as though the company owns them, and they are not harangued by
seniors within the company. When pay day comes, they are not pressured into mak- mg contributions, and they are not forced to wait in line for their pay to be doled out.
It would be interesting for the authors to usk the producers of Gilligan’s Island and other naval programs about their own Navy experiences. One might be startled to realize that the broadcasting industry is filled with many former Navy men who, in their current work, hope that future generations of youngsters enlisting in the service receive a better deal than they did.
I have said quite enough to outline what matters cause the image of the Navy to be tarnished. Whitewashing, or suppression of the facts just will not do. The public knows these things, since their sons report them back home and later carry their experiences into business life, and even the public media. If something constructive is to be done—and we hope it is—then may I suggest that the enlisted man be treated and regarded as a human being. The first move toward rehabilitating the “modern Navy image” would be to bring the pay of enlisted men into line with civilian standards, as is that of officers.
"The Mine as a Tool of Limited War”
(See pages 50-62, February 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant L. M. Stryker, U. S. Navy. (Officer-in-Charge, Mobile Mine Assembly Team 0321.) There is a discrepancy in the caption for the photo on page 57. The mine shown is actually a Mk 10 mod 1, submarine laid moored contact mine, using chemical horns. Note the three horns that are visible on the top of the mine, center foreground of the photo. Also, the Mk 12 was a submarine-laid bottom mine, not a moored type. I believe the photo should have been of a Mk 10 mod 3 mine, which is a submarine- laid moored influence mine currently in service. Incidentally, the Mk 10 mod 1 mine and all models of the Mk 12 have been obsolete for quite some time. If my memory serves me correctly, they were declared obsolete in the middle of or late 1950s.
"A New Course for the NROTC”
(See pages 80-84, February 1967; page 127, May 1967 Proceedings)
Edwin R. Martinson, Jr., QM3, U. S. Naval Reserve-R. (ROC, Drexel Institute of Technology.) —Mr. Bopp states that 25 per cent of the students’ courses must be in naval subjects, that a midshipman cannot
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marry, and that some midshipmen take the NROTC program for “money only.”
Perhaps Mr. Bopp does not realize that there is an alternative for the young man who does not want to be so limited. I assume any student enrolled in the NROTC Scholarship Program can get financial aid if he needs it. The ROC or AVROC (Reserve Officer’s Corps or Aviation Reserve Officer’s Corps) is the program for the man who does not want to limit his degree. He joins the Naval Reserve and attends monthly (or weekly) drills. The ROC candidate attends two sessions of Officer Candidate School (OCS) while in college during his summer breaks. During the year, he drills with his unit. While he is in the reserve, he is building his longevity and learning, from the bottom up, some aspects of the Navy the average OCS officer does not learn until he has had some time with the active Fleet.
There are few drawbacks socially from being in the ROC program. The ROC candidate can marry, and usually only one weekend a month is unavailable because of Navy activity. Two summers at OCS are required which are strictly officer training and indoctrination. The ROC candidate is paid according to the pay grade he holds in the reserve structure. In three years (ROC candidates must be at least sophomores to apply), the average ROC candidate can be E-4 and some make E-5. As a general evaluation: ROC candidates can marry, they can carry the subjects they wish, they accrue longevity, they have a three-year active duty obligation, and they receive a commission upon graduation (or after the second OCS summer if it was not taken during college, but after graduation).
The ROC program does not have the advantages of a paid college education and the comradeship of fellow midshipmen (except at OCS), but the ROC candidate does get to see some of the workings of the Navy, from the inside.
★ ★ ★
Thomas R. Old, ROC1 (QM3)—If the Navy would look at the ROC program, it would find that better officers could be produced under the system.
One of the greatest wastes in the reserve program at present is the neglect of the ROC candidate’s knowledge. OCS is not an easy task to complete. The knowledge gained there was meant to be used—not just in Reserve Active Duty Training (AcDuTra) periods.
Respect for the ROC candidate is low. Development of pride in the program would do it much good. The ROC candidate as a seaman is a waste. He should be put in a role similar to that of an NROTC Midshipman. The period of reserve drill attendance should be used to test the ROC candidate to see if he is truly qualified to become an officer.
Retention of the knowledge gained at OCS could be supplemented by classes for the ROC candidate at the local unit and by using the vast skills and knowledge of the officers who are members of his drill unit.
"Cuban Exodus”
(See pages 47-55, June 1966 Proceedings)
Desmond Wettern. (Military correspondent for the London Observer.)—Captain
Cass has one major omission. Nowhere does he mention the work of the Royal Navy’s West Indies Squadron, which, in the 12 months ended 31 May 1966, rescued over 300 Cuban refugees. This work has been going on for several years now. In most cases, the refugees are landed on the nearest islands in the Bahamas group where lighthouse crews or government officials in the larger communities contact Nassau. In the capital, there is close liaison between Bahamian government departments, notably the police, the British Joint Staff and the U. S. Coast Guard m Miami. For many years to come, both the U. S. Coast Guard and the Royal Navy will have to maintain refugee patrols.
"Three-Mile Limit: Obsolete Concept?”
(See pages 24-33, February 1967 Proceedings)
Edward W. Allen. (Chairman, Oceanographic Committee, American Bar Association.)—If changes in this field are possible, an alternative to what Captain Carlisle suggests might be worth consideration. The Navy was, and presumably still is, desirous of having the very widest legal range for air and ocean navigation; hence the narrowest width for territorial seas. It is not primarily interested in the range for customs, fisheries or other ocean uses. At Geneva in 1958 and I960, the United States encountered opposition largely from two directions: nations which already asserted more than a three-mile width for territorial seas, and nations which desired protection for their coastal fisheries but might well have been indifferent to the three-mile width, if not applied to fisheries. It is probable that the United States might not have been so strongly opposed had it not been for the fishery situation.
Realizing this, the American Bar Association in 1964 adopted a resolution suggesting that the matter might be successfully reconsidered, if the two distinct matters of navigation range and coastal fishery protection were taken up separately, each on its own merits. The resolution was drafted in the office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, and the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilfred A. Hearn at the hearing last year on the so-called 12-Mile Fishery Bill in Congress appeared to recognize such distinction, in which the Department of State therefore also concurred.
The desirability for narrow territorial seas from a navigation standpoint, both for air and water, seems to be so pronounced that instead of burying the three-mile rule, as it is suggested in the article, it is probably more advantageous to have resuscitated it by removing the opposition.
★ ★ ★
Commander B. S. Mallory, Royal Navy —The British did not act unilaterally in this matter of the Corfu Channel incident. Immediately after the mining occurred, the incident was reported to the Mediterranean Zone Board of the International Mine Clearance Organization on which Britain, France, Greece, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia were represented. As a result of their unanimous recommendation, the Royal Navy on their behalf carried out a full sweep of the channel. What is more, some, if not all of the member countries of the Mediterranean Zone Board, sent observers to watch this operation from ships of the Force to see that as far as possible Albanian territorial integrity was properly respected.
I think it would have been helpful if Captain Carlisle had gone on to cite the next paragraph from the book International Law for Seagoing Officers, which I quote here for ease of reference:
Self-help may also take the form of reprisal. The difference between intervention, as defined above, and reprisal is not very sharp. The latter is generally defined as an action by an injured State against a wrong-doing State.
In taking this action, a State is usually resorting to measures which, looked at by themselves, are contrary to International Law. They are nevertheless permitted if and only to the extent that they have been provoked by another State’s violation of International Law. In order to be lawful, in addition to the justification, reprisals must satisfy two further conditions: first, they must have been preceded by a request for redress (Summation) which has been unavailing; and, secondly, they must be proportionate to the offense.
The sweep netted 29 mines in the Channel, of which two were recovered for examination. These showed clearly that they had been recently laid, an act which in time of peace was a breach of the Hague Convention.
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Finally, I should add that the Corfu Channel had been swept on two previous occasions since hostilities had ceased in that area (in 1944 and again in 1945) with the tacit agreement of the Albanian Government and, although the International Court of Justice found that on this third occasion the sweeping was “contrary to the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian people” (not surprisingly!), the Court’s judgement of costs against Albania, “constituted appropriate satisfaction in itself.” The United States, of course, broke off diplomatic relations with Albania on 8 November 1946, Britain having already done so.
"This Way to the Egress”
(See pages 92-97, September 1966, page 132, December 1966, and pages 107—109, March 1967.)
Lieutenant John V. Kjellman, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—I have noted that in my reply in the March issue to Lieutenant Commander Wood’s article “This Way to the Egress,” a typographical error exists in the table of civilian salaries which appears on page 108. The column heading “Per cent in occupation averaging $9,800 or more,” should read “. . . averaging $19,800 or more.”
"Cargo Ship Design”
(See page 73, April 1967 Proceedings)
Captain E. B. Perry, U. S. Navy (Retired) —The article rightfully deplores the high costs of cargo-handling but does not make too good a case for the means by which they may be reduced. His first little table on operating costs is subject to some revision. Audited accounts of some of our great steamship lines for the year 1966 put cargo-handling costs at about 30 per cent of the vessel operating expenses, rather than the 43.3 per cent which the article indicates.
Any article which deals with the characteristics of merchant ships and fails to take account of bale cubic and deadweight is somewhat remiss, for they are two of the “principal preoccupations of those connected with ocean shipping,” contrary to the expressed views of the author. The ship is a great container and we always must consider space and weight.
Tables 1 and 2, which deal with “fleet” performances, lack so many of the essential details as to the numbers of ships, characteristics, turnaround time, cargo mix, container costs, ports visited and the other little things that enter into ship operations that they defy unscrambling. In that they are based upon 1962 or before, prior to much experience in containerization, maybe it is just as well.
Any method of automatic or mechanized cargo-handling, such as palleting and containerization, could reduce cargo-handling costs, provided that the best weight-space use is made of the unitized cargo scheme and that labor will allow the possible economies two big provisos. Admittedly, about 25 per cent of the cargo offered for transportation is not susceptible to palleting or containeriza- tlon, and many of the parcels offered are not great enough in either space or weight to satisfy a standard container, thus requiring the combining of two or more parcels and therefore defeating the primary idea behind the practice. It must also be recognized that the ship’s cube-deadweight potential suffers under either palleting or containerization; the ship must accommodate herself to the packaging. No ship can be stowed as efficiently, space and weight-wise, as can the break-bulk ship. Sideports are not a new idea; years ago many of our fine little coastwise vessels were so equipped. Unfortunately, our coastwise fleet has sailed over the horizon. Many owners of great overseas vessels are not too keen on a multiplicity of sideports and for a reason for this lack of enthusiasm, consult your favorite naval architect.
The container service should show up best on short trade routes where high value, low cubic freight moves in volume in both directions. On long voyages, the loss of cubic and deadweight will be a considerable handicap to the ship. There are many who feel that
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings ls to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
we are going just a bit too far in considering that containerization is a panacea for the ills of the costs of cargo-handling; maybe a little surgery is required on gang sizes for break- bulk operation. Don’t sell the break-bulk ship down the river.
"The Uncertain Image”
(See pages 72-79, February 1967 Proceedings)
Captain E. G. Kray, FGN. (Naval Attache, Federal German Navy.)—I disagree with some statements made concerning German officers and their relations to their subordinates and especially with those comments made regarding Frederick the Great. Major Hargreaves assumes that the German officers’ structure and posture developed directly from Frederick the Great up to 1918. He overlooks the fact that the military reorganization by General Scharnhorst in 1810 created a new type of Prussian officer. He was very different from the Prussian officer who served under Frederick the Great and who, I am sure, had his counterpart in all European armies. I refer only to the kind of discipline enforced on board men-of-war in those times.
Also, the social structure of the corps of Prussian officers was profoundly changed by this reform to such an extent that in 1914 only 10 per cent of it belonged to the aristocracy, and 90 per cent mainly to the middle-classes. This, I think, is evidence, that the so-called “Junker” was, after 1810, a minority. The word became a political slogan and should not be used in serious considerations such as these in order to avoid wrong conclusions.
The mutiny of forces during the 1918 situation in Germany is in no way proof of what Major Hargreaves says. There were, during World War I, a few major cases of mutiny of fighting forces which were not German.
And finally, let me comment on the statement that Frederick the Great wanted “the rank and file to tremble at the mere sight of an officer.” I am sure he never made such a remark, nor was he “insane,” but was a highly educated and intellectual European who preferred the French language and who was a great promoter of the arts. How could he have followed such concepts? Of course his armies at that time were mercenaries, and the discipline, not only in Prussia, had to take
that into consideration.
I write all this in order to clarify the erroneous concepts about the German officer of the past that are also injurious to the officer of the present. The German corps of officers underwent another major reform in 1956, but it still adheres to the principles laid down and followed by General Scharnhorst. It is proud of those officers of the past who represented these concepts.
"Those First Impressions”
(See pages 104-105, January 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. E. Giese, Jr., U. S. Navy—• One aspect which needs amplification, because the problem is not to be remedied on board ship now or in the future. As many new recruits as possible should be given the opportunity to taste the sea before going to a shore billet.
There was a time when recruits leaving boot camp could expect orders to a ship. A fortunate few, after a suitable exposure to the rigors of the Fleet, could expect orders to shore schools and from there proceed upward in their chosen rating.
From the time of Korea until Vietnam, we
had no “hot” brush fires, and the number of i shore billets for otherwise seaward bound sailors seemed to proliferate geometrically.
Some of these required billets were, and are, no doubt necessary, but others were just as likely to be outgrowths of the idea that to get along with a few less men ashore was unthinkable. With the shore billets in need of men, a new recruit could expect from six months to a year at stations ranging from Litchfield Park to NAF, Monterey, performing tasks ranging from mess cooking to guard duty. He would then report to a ship with a fair amount of time in the Navy but far behind the men who had come aboard straight from recruit training. In addition, he would have quite a few preconceived notions about the Navy based upon associations with other, often ill-advised men in the same category. These preformed ideas are often hard to change, as I have found from the hard experience of command.
Of approximately eight men received from these sources over a two-year period, only one had any idea of what he wished to strike for, or for that matter any idea of just what shipboard life was like.
A second group of men in this category are those scheduled to attend service schools
Just prior to leaving the Navy, men are often given "the less desirable jobs and are left to some degree to their own devices.” Lieutenant Giese further points out that "We should not only strive mightily to ensure that a man is off to a good start, but should just as strongly see to it that men soon to be discharged are treated as valued individuals.”
from four to five months after recruit training—the PSI men (planned school input). The thought seems to be that four or five months spent on board any ship is too short to be of much worth. Hence, they are again sent to a mundane shore billet to mark time. Once in a while a draft of these men will be sent to a ship for a short while, but most often they spend their time waxing decks, sweeping piers, and cutting grass. On one occasion, we were fortunate enough to be sent a number of these men TAD for the duration of a short oceanographic research cruise, and they admitted that “it was the best thing that ever happened to us.” One man even wanted to change his school, since he had been exposed to a shipboard rating much more to his liking.
If an opportunity exists to acquaint a seaman with the sea, then that opportunity must be sought out and used. Send as many as possible to sea to put to use their boot camp training while it is still fresh in their minds. In this way, perhaps we can make more men better seamen and technicians, and, also, be able to reduce the schism so often existing between technicians and the deck seamen and engineers. There are a large number of ships able to take on board these men and afford them the opportunity of at least going to sea three or four times. These are the naval district ships and craft, the reserve training ships, and the numerous other small and often shorthanded afloat commands.
Finally, what of “those last impressions”? A good many men are well treated during their enlistment and suddenly, upon revealing that they would like to try their hand on the “outside,” they become non-entities on board. Frequently, they are given the less desirable jobs and are left to some degree to their own devices. The result is a confirmed short-timer whose sole aim is to spend his remaining days doing as little as possible. A poisoned mind in the Navy is a liability, even when it belongs to a capable man. Also, a discharged man, who thinks he has not had a square deal in the Navy, can often do great harm to the Service by his influence on public opinion.
A man’s impressions of the Navy are born during his early months in the service and are carried out of the service a number of years later. We should not only strive mightily to ensure that a man is off to a good start but also should just as strongly sec to it that men soon to be discharged are treated as valued individuals who performed an honorable service to their country.
"The Merchant Marine: Subsidies and Competition”
(See pages 70-80, January 1967; and pages 116-117, May 1967 Proceedings)
Commander C. S. Bradley, U. S. Navy— The authors set forth some very worthwhile proposals concerning their solution to the merchant marine problem, but their classical hypothesis, reputedly a “central element” of Mahan’s philosophy of sea power, is just another instance where Admiral Mahan has been more often criticized than studied, more often misquoted than quoted accurately.
They deleted from their quotation of Mahan in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783—New York: Sagamore Press, 1957, page 23—the following italicized material as quoted from The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783—Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890, page 26:
This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences . . .
The authors used four laborious pages to refute Mahan’s statement, as quoted incompletely by themselves. Had the authors but known it, they could have made precisely the same point by quoting Mahan himself. (Extracted from Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1911, pages 445-446)).
Admiral Mahan used two paragraphs:
There is one further conclusion to be drawn from the war between Japan and Russia, which contradicts a previous general impression that I myself have shared, and possibly in some degree have contributed to diffuse. That impression is, that navies depend upon maritime commerce as the cause and justification of their existence. To a certain extent, of course, this is true; and, just because true to a certain extent, the conclusion is more misleading. Because partly true, it is accepted as unqualifiedly true. It seems reasonable to say that, where merchant shipping exists, it tends logically to develop the form of protection which is called naval; but it has become perfectly evident, by concrete examples, that a navy may be necessary where there is no shipping.
One cannot expect to find in pages of Mahan’s first book on sea power his complete thinking on naval strategy. To quote only his early writings is to quote him out of context. Many today have done just that, ignoring the 20 years of refinement that he added to his writings. The study of Mahan’s works is the study of a philosophy. He adjusted his ideas and writings as the times changed. His final book, Naval Strategy, contains his adjusted views of the changing world of his time and the new military developments that were the first glimmerings of astounding 20th century technological advancements.
★ ★ ★
John J. Clark. (Co-author of “The Merchant Marine: Subsidies and Competition.”) —The paragraph in our article referred to by Commander Bradley was edited for publication. As originally submitted to the Proceedings, it contained a quotation by Admiral Stephen B. Luce critical of Admiral Mahan for not developing more fully the economic dependence of military sea power on the merchant marine.
The classical hypothesis, which sees in the merchant marine the economic basis and necessity for military sea power, did not in fact originate with Mahan. It appears in the first English treatise on the nature and importance of sea power, The Libel of English Policy (approximately 1436), and was current among Mahan contemporaries in England. However, Mahan did accept it as he admits in Commander Bradley’s quotation, and the wide approval accorded his genius assured it a larger audience. As so frequently happens with men who pioneer intellectual pursuits, Mahan’s followers carried his gospel at times to extreme lengths. Thus the classical hypothesis persists to the present day. We see it from time to time in the Proceedings. Our article, therefore, was aimed at an erroneous line of thought without the intention of exclusively faulting Admiral Mahan’s own speculations.
One does detect some doubt in Mahan’s mind concerning the economic basis and necessity for sea power. In his discussion of the elements of sea power, he cites the importance of geography, the character and aptitude of the population, national economic strength, and the philosophy of government. Yet, over and over in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, and The Influence of Sea Power Upon The French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, he returns to the questionable hypothesis. Nowhere in Mahan’s work does he explicitly recognize that military sea power has the same economic basis as all military power; namely, in the existence of an economic surplus above the margin of subsistence. The existence of this surplus which allows the arts and sciences to flourish also permits man to engage in military pursuits. The error of the classical hypothesis arose from the fact that in the early days of sea power the economic surplus originated primarily in the mercantile trades. However, Mahan’s own commentary on the Anglo-Dutch wars (Naval Strategy, pp. 64 ff.) should have alerted him to the importance of balanced economic growth in the development of military sea power and so made more explicit his reasonings on this subject. His analysis recognizes the English economic superiority. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War, on the other hand, hardly provides the best starting point for a reappraisal of the economic basis of military sea power.
Herein lies the source of our difficulties. Although Mahan may have had reservations concerning the classical hypothesis, he did not stop to evaluate critically the economic basis of military sea power. He does not do so in Naval Strategy nor in the quotation offered by Commander Bradley. In short, Admiral Mahan did not pull together his many thoughts on the economic implications of sea power, including his comments on the significance of colonies, international trade, economic warfare, and so forth. Much is left to interpretation by the reader.
★ ★ ★
G. L. Studley. (A corporation president with ten years’ service in the merchant marine.)—Our merchant marine is in a sad state, and no one can deny it would be of vital importance to national defense in case of war. The article starts off as though it were going to give us some answers as to how our merchant marine can be put on its feet and develop into an economically sound service. However, I couldn’t find any practical analysis of the causes of our merchant marine decline nor any reasonable remedies designed to correct the trouble.
In the first few paragraphs, there is a discussion of economic input and output which says in part: “The competitive position of an industry, however, does not rise or fall on a single input cost. A comprehensive analysis must scrutinize the whole cost structure; depreciation, interest, maintenance, insurance, and so forth, as well as labor costs.” This is undoubtedly true unless one particular input factor is a major part of the total. Why aren’t we given this “comprehensive analysis” of the cost operation? Is employment cost 60 per cent or six per cent of the cost of operating a ship? From what little I know about the maritime business, a very large percentage of ship operating cost is in wages, overtime, coffeetime, time off, subsistence, pensions, employment taxes, work rules and minor repairs. In fact, is it not possible or even probable that this one input is the tail that wags the dog? The Proceedings has published many articles that dodge the issue of our merchant marine mess—just plain snow jobs. It would be refreshing to have some clear, simple, unvarnished facts printed.
Much of the article is devoted to the cost of ship construction and arrives at the recommendation that U. S. ship operators be allowed to buy their ships in the world market at competitive prices. What is the advantage of buying equipment at bargain Prices unless it can be operated with “output” m excess of “input”? Is depreciation such an important factor in operating expense?
The authors also propose that low interest loans could to some extent replace subsidies.
Who would want to borrow money to lose money? Would a banker accept a money-losing ship as security for a loan? Unless American operating costs are competitive with foreign operations, the United States will not have a merchant marine that can economically survive in a world market.
Some of the readers might like to have a few concrete economic facts in reference to the operating cost of American ships in relation to foreign ships. An active merchant marine is an absolute must for national defense, but I don’t think the problem will ever be solved by theoretical economics. Survival of the merchant marine will eventually depend upon subsidies or public ownership.
★ ★ ★
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R. E. Gardner—Timed as it was with the laying-up of the NS Savannah the lucid presentation of Drs. Clark and Norton deserves compliments. The authors’ findings were emphasized in the recent budget statement of the Secretary of Defense, which attributed
the deterioration of the shipbuilding industry to comparative obsolescence rather than high labor costs and less skilled workers.
The Secretary also stated that the Department of Defense is trying to induce modernization of American yards by awarding contracts in large chunks. I believe, however, that the industry needs more than defense contracts, and I propose that American yards be given government assistance to enter into a merchant shipbuilding program which could provide immediate returns—specifically, the production of standard replacements for the Liberty ships. The American shipbuilding industry was the world’s supplier of the Liberties and could be the supplier of their replacements.
There is, or shortly will be, a demand from the world’s tramp charter trade for 400 to 500 general cargo, bulk cargo vessels of 14,000 to 15,000 tons dwt. to replace the outmoded 10,000-ton Liberty ships. These orders will amount to over $1.4 billion. Companies owning only one or two ships will purchase as much as half of this new construction.
By using modern, high volume, low cost, series production methods, based on a well- chosen design, by granting generous sales terms and being allowed import and other concessions, American yards could still gain a large share of this market. As in the case of the Liberties, basically designed by John L. Thompson and Sons of England, the replacement ships need not be of original American design. To meet the demand of the tramp charter trade, I propose that these vessels comply with the following basic specifications: full-scantling, closed shelter-deckers or ’tween-deckers of 14,000 to 15,000 tons dwt. (without wing tanks so that containerized freight may be carried); a maximum draft of 29 feet; two hatches 60 feet in length and others 30 to 45 feet wide; two-stroke, turbocharged, direct-coupled diesel engines having a speed of 14 to 15 knots or 20 tons fuel oil consumption per day. They should cost $3 million.
In support of the authors’ proposal to allow subsidized lines to import tonnage, it should be noted that Russia, while pushing export sales, is ordering new tonnage from almost every shipbuilding country with the exception of Britain and the United States. Britain is building for her own use and for export, as well as concurrently ordering tonnage from abroad.
American yards could produce faster models of the same design for the liner charter trade, thus creating a base for a viable industry, able to expand into more varied specialized construction, such as large bulk-oil carriers. In any event, sufficient government interest and support will be necessary before the American shipbuilding industry can even consider entering into the proposed building program. Bold, effective, and immediate action is necessary to fully and truly implement the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
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Ultra Top Secret
Just before the Attack Force for the Northern African Operation (TORCH) sailed from Norfolk, a commander on duty in BuPers received a call from the office of CNO. They wanted four officer interpreters to report to a cover address in Norfolk at once. The commander asked what language was desired. He was informed that this was a highly classified affair and that to tell him what language would constitute a security violation. When the commander pointed out that he just had to have some clue, his caller said he would have to take this new aspect of the situation up with his superiors.
The next day, his superiors agreed that this information could be divulged to the commander and four unsuspecting and allegedly qualified French speaking officers were soon en route to Norfolk.
----------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant General J. P. Berkeley, U. S. Marine Corps
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)