Responding to terrorist attacks endorsed by Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, U.S. aircraft—here, a Marine EA-6B and a Navy A-7E and F-14 prepare to launch from the carrier America (CV-66)—paid a surprise call on Libya that still resonates ten years later.
Between April 1983 and November 1985, Middle East terrorism claimed the lives of 265 U.S. citizens. Americans were growing impatient for President Ronald Reagan to carry out his pledge of “swift and effective retribution” against terrorists and their benefactors.1 In December 1985, the frustrating struggle against terrorism and its most galling disciple, Libya’s mercurial leader, Moammar Gadhafi, took a fateful turn.
Two days after Christmas, Palestinian terrorists massacred 20 travelers, including five Americans, at the Rome and Vienna airports. After Italian authorities uncovered evidence of Libyan involvement in the Rome assault, President Reagan banned all travel and commercial transactions between the United States and Libya and ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet to conduct a series of large-scale operations near the Libyan coast. The naval maneuvers—which culminated in a major Freedom of Navigation operation involving the carriers Saratoga (CV-60), Coral Sea (CV- 43), and America (CV-66)—challenged Libya’s claim of sovereignty over the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra and demonstrated U.S. resolve in the fight against international terrorism.2 At a press conference on 7 January, President Reagan declared that “if these steps do not end Gadhafi’s terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken.”3
In late-March 1986, the three carrier battle groups conducted surface and air operations south of 32 degrees 30 minutes north latitude—Gadhafi’s “line of death” across the mouth of the Gulf of Sidra. When Libyan forces fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at Navy fighters operating in international airspace, the Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, activated a contingency plan—Operation Prairie Fire—to neutralize the Libyan threat. In less than a day of combat, the fleet defeated Gadhafi’s most sophisticated air-defense system, confined the Libyan air force to its bases, sank two missile boats, and badly damaged another vessel. To avenge this humiliating setback, Gadhafi sent a cable—intercepted by the National Security Agency—to Libyan embassies around the world, ordering his agents to attack U.S. targets and “cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties.”4 In the early hours of 5 April, Libyan agents detonated a bomb at La Belle Discotheque, a popular haunt of U.S. troops in West Berlin. The blast killed two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman and wounded 229 other innocent people, including 78 Americans.5 Before the bombing, the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin informed Gadhafi that an operation would be carried out soon and that he would be pleased with the results. Afterward, British intelligence intercepted an embassy report that the operation had succeeded and passed it to the United States.6
On 7 April, President Reagan reviewed the evidence concerning the discotheque attack with his chief advisers, and received an intelligence briefing on Gadhafi’s plan for a wave of attacks against U.S. diplomatic missions, airlines, and businesses. Armed with “irrefutable” evidence of Libyan complicity in the bombing, he tentatively approved military action against Libya and directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan an operation that would destroy a significant part of Gadhafi’s terrorist infrastructure, while minimizing U.S. losses and Libyan civilian casualties. His objectives were to avenge the West Berlin bombing, thwart future terrorist operations, and compel Gadhafi to change his behavior regarding international terrorism.7 Secretary of State George Shultz succinctly captured the mood of the meeting: “We have taken enough punishment and beating. We have to act.”8
Actually, U.S. Navy and Air Force staffs in Europe had been developing contingency strike plans since the JCS issued warning orders immediately after the Rome and Vienna massacres.9 General Bernard Rogers, U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, designated Kelso to be the officer in tactical command of the operation with the responsibility “to coordinate detailed joint planning and de- confliction efforts, to integrate other command assets, and to conduct the actual operations if authorized.”10 The code name for the operation was El Dorado Canyon.
After weighing several political and tactical considerations, the JCS elected to employ tactical aircraft in a low-level, high-speed, precision night attack. Because the Saratoga battle group had returned to the United States, Kelso on 10 April ordered the Coral Sea battle group, commanded by Rear Admiral Jerry C. Breast, to remain in the Mediterranean. The “Ageless Warrior” and her escorts had just completed what should have been their last port visits before coming home.11 On 12 April, the Coral Sea and the America rendezvoused in the Tyrrhenian Sea, and Rear Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr., Commander Battle Force Sixth Fleet, embarked in the America, assumed operational control of the two carrier battle groups. The battle force updated its attack plans and conducted a practice strike and command, control, and communication exercise with the Air Force’s 48th Tactical Fighter Wing.12
From a list of dozens of terrorist-related targets designated by Navy and Air Force strike planners the Pentagon recommended and President Reagan approved the following: Bab al-Aziziyah Barracks in Tripoli—Gadhafi’s terrorist command center and residence; Murat Sidi Bilal Training Camp near Tripoli—a school for terrorist frogmen; Tripoli Military Airfield—base for IL-76 Candid transports used in support of terrorist operations; and Benghazi Military/al-Jamahiriyah Guard Barracks—an alternate terrorist command center and storage/assembly facility for MiG aircraft. To protect U.S. planes from Libyan fighters, the Benina Airfield near Benghazi was added to the strike package.13
On 12 April, President Reagan dispatched Ambassador Vernon A. Walters to Europe in an 11th-hour attempt to persuade Allied leaders to impose strict diplomatic and economic sanctions on Libya and forestall U.S. military action. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher approved Walter’s request for use of the F-111lFs in a non-NATO mission, but French and Spanish officials would not permit overflight of their countries. Their refusal forced the Air Force to prepare for a substantially longer mission—nearly 6,000 miles, round trip. On 14 April, foreign ministers of the European Community met and approved a package of diplomatic sanctions against Libya, but the measures fell short of U.S. expectations. Convinced that the time to teach Gadhafi a lesson had arrived. President Reagan ordered the execution of Operation El Dorado Canyon.14
Meanwhile, the Third Air Force commander. Major General Thomas G. McInerney, quietly assembled his strike and tanker forces in Britain, and on 14 April he informed Vice Admiral Kelso that the Air Force was ready to carry out the mission. Kelso sent execute orders to Mauz and Mclnerney, setting the time over target for 0200 Libya time, 15 April (1900 Eastern Standard Time, 14 April). A few hours before the strike, Mauz sent the following message to Battle Force Zulu: “TF-60 and USAF F-222s are about to conduct strikes ... in Libya in reprisal for clear and certain Libyan responsibility in recent acts of terrorism. Those who sponsor such acts will . . . understand that retribution will be swift and sure as they contemplate their future activity.”15
At 1713 Britain time (1213 EST), 29 Air Force tankers began lifting off from their bases in the English countryside. The lead KC-10 doubled as the airborne command post for Major General David C. Forgan, operations officer for U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Colonel Sam Westbrook, commander of the 48th TFW. At 1736, 24 F-111Fs and five EF-111As started their launch sequence. The Aardvarks, Ravens, and tankers rendezvoused over southern England and headed southwestward toward the Atlantic. After the formation passed Land’s End, six F-111Fs and one EF-111A, the launch spares, broke off and returned to their bases. The strike force then commenced the first of four silent refuelings en route to Libya.16 According to a veteran Air Force fighter pilot, in-flight refueling conducted at night without radio communication was quite simple. It was “just like day refueling, except you can’t see a #@&$ing thing!”17
Before sunset, the Coral Sea and her escorts commenced a high-speed transit of the Straits of Messina, while the America battle group swept around the west coast of Sicily and passed south of Malta. Eluding Soviet surveillance vessels in the area, the carriers charged to their launch positions in the central Mediterranean.
Shortly after midnight, Libya time, both carriers went to flight quarters. In strict radio silence and with radars in stand-by, the America launched six A-6Es; a seventh Intruder developed a sensor problem and aborted on the flight deck. The Coral Sea launched eight Intruders, but two of them experienced electronic casualties and were forced to abort.18 Over the western Mediterranean, the F-111Fs topped off their fuel and formed into three attack elements. Equipment failure and pilot error soon reduced the Bab al-Aziziyah strike group to seven planes.19
At 0150, while the F-111Fs and A-6Es hugged the deck and bore down on Tripoli and Benghazi, the SAM busters went to work against what Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman described as one of “the most sophisticated and thickest” air-defense systems in the world.20 EF-111As and EA-6Bs smothered Libyan search radars with powerful electronic noise, and A-7Es and F/A-18s fired a devastating barrage of antiradiation missiles (ARMs), carving out attack corridors for the strike aircraft. Roaring toward downtown Tripoli, the pilot of the lead F-111F, Remit-31, observed an A-7E firing a Shrike. “And boy that gave me a warm, fuzzy, good feeling inside,” he commented.21 Jolted to action, the Libyans threw up a curtain of SAMs and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fire, but their effort had little effect, owing to the success of the jammers and ARM-firing aircraft. A. VA-55 pilot remarked that the Libyan missile crews “were looking for us, and they were shooting at us, but as far as I could tell, (the missiles) weren’t guiding.”22
Approximately 23,000 feet from the aim point, Remit- 31 performed a Pave Tack Toss (see sidebar), sending its four-ton payload to al-Aziziyah. At exactly 0200, the bombs hit 50 feet from Gadhafi’s headquarters-residence building. One minute later, the Paveways from Remit-33 slammed into al-Aziziyah. The eight laser-guided bombs caused substantial damage to the compound, demolishing Gadhafi’s residence and collapsing part of his ceremonial tent. Karma-51 inadvertently selected the wrong radar reference point as it approached Tripoli, causing its bombs to smash into a nearby neighborhood, damaging—somewhat ironically—the French Embassy and a number of homes and office buildings.23 The equipment on three more al-Aziziyah bombers failed and forced them to abort, while either a SAM or AAA hit Karma-52. Pilot Captain Fernando Ribas-Dominicci and weapon systems officer Captain Paul Lorence ejected seconds before their burning F-111F slammed into the sea, but their ejection capsule struck the water before its chutes could deploy fully, and both fliers subsequently drowned.24
The Jewel strike group dropped a dozen laser-guided 2,000 pound bombs on the terrorist training facility at Murat Sidi Bilal. Coaxing his bombs on to the target, the weapon systems officer in Jewel-63 called out: “This one’s for you, Colonel!”25 Although none of the Paveways achieved a direct hit, they damaged several buildings and destroyed a number of training vessels. Closing in on the Tripoli airfield, one F-111F had to abort when it lost its terrain-following radar. The other five Puffy and Lujac bombers destroyed two Candids and damaged three others with 500-pound high-drag bombs.26
Meanwhile, 400 miles to the east, at exactly 0200, the Blue Blasters struck the Benghazi barracks complex with Snakeye high drag bombs. The attack caused considerable damage to the barracks and a MiG-23 assembly facility. Meanwhile, the Warhorses blasted the Benina Airfield with thousands of Rockeye submunitions, gouging craters in the runway and parking apron and igniting fires in several aircraft. The raid demolished at least five fixed-wing aircraft, two helicopters, and four buildings and damaged several aircraft and the hangars.
By 0213, all strike aircraft, except Karma-52, reported “feet wet” to their command-and-control aircraft. While E-2Cs and fighters guarded against a counterattack by the Libyan air force, the carriers recovered their aircraft.28 Meanwhile, the F-111Fs found their tankers, refueled, and loitered for an hour in the hope that Karma-52 would join up. Concluding that the bomber was missing, General Forgan at 0314 ordered the strike force home. The last Air Force plane landed safely in England at 0810 local time, 14 hours and 57 minutes later.29
At 2100 Eastern Standard Time, President Reagan informed the American people that the Navy and Air Force had just conducted air strikes “against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Moammar Gadhafi’s subversive activities. . . . Tonight we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again.” But he hoped that the attack would “diminish Colonel Gadhafi’s capacity to export terror” and would “provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.”30
The bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi was a devastating blow to Gadhafi.31 He emerged from the attack on Babal-Aziziyah unharmed, though badly shaken and depressed. A veteran Washington journalist noted that the strike “broke the psychology that had allowed Gadhafi to intimidate much of the world and revealed that, far from being an international giant, Gadhafi was weak, isolated and vulnerable.”32 More significant, the raid produced a noticeable change in Gadhafi’s conduct regarding terrorism. Although he did not disavow its use, he acted with discernible restraint and softened his rhetoric in support of terrorist groups. Few Libya-backed terrorist plots were uncovered in the months following the attack, and according to the State Department the number of terrorist incidents linked to Libya dropped from 19 in 1986 to six each in 1987 and 1988.33 To preserve terrorism as a tool of state policy, Gadhafi became more covert and disciplined about its use, enlisted more competent surrogates, and adopted stringent security measures to protect the secrecy of his terrorists.34 Later cases in point were the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, and UTA Flight 772 over Chad in 1989.
El Dorado Canyon demonstrated that the discriminate use of force can attain specific national objectives without resorting either to war or a costly commitment of military forces. The joint air strike served as stern retaliation to a terrorist act; it convinced Gadhafi to revamp his criminal methodology, thus reducing his involvement in terrorist activities; and it demonstrated that the United States had both the means and the will to attack the 16 supporters and sponsors of international terrorism. According to one expert on terrorism, “any government contemplating the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy must now take into account the possibility of a military response.”35
A number of factors contributed to the success of the operation. First, the raid was the product of detailed and coordinated Navy and Air Force staff planning, insuring the smooth integration of joint strike and support forces in an intricate night attack. Second, the airborne jammers and ARM-firing aircraft clobbered one of the largest and most modem air defense systems in the world. Third, several new weapon systems—F/A-18, TRAM, Pave Tack, and HARM—performed superbly in a combat environment. Finally, the on-scene commander. Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, was given the opportunity to plan and conduct the joint air strike with minimum interference from Washington. Many of the factors that accounted for the successful raid against Libya would be repeated five years later during the war to liberate Kuwait.
1 U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 42.
2 David Hoffman and Lou Cannon, ‘Terrorism Provided Catalyst,” The Washington Post, 25 March 1986, p. Al.
3 U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book 1—January 1 to June 27, 1986, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 18.
4 Vox Militaris, “The U.S. Strike Against Libya: operation El Dorado Canyon,” The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, April 1986, p. 136.
5 George J. Church, “Targeting Gaddafi,” Time, 21 April 1986, p. 20; David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War on Terrorism (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 285.
6 Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), p. 404; Martin and Walcott, op. cit., pp. 285-86.
7 Bolger, op. cit., pp. 405-06; Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 518-19; “President Reagan Ordered Air Strikes to Preempt Libyan Terrorists,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 April 1986, pp. 22-23.
8 Church, op. cit., p. 21.
9 RAdm Jerry C. Breast, “The CV in Action . . . BATTLE STATIONS!”, Wings of Gold, Vol. 12, Summer 1987, p. S-27; Col Robert E. Venkus, USAF, Raid on Gadhafi: The Untold Story of History’s Longest Fighter Mission (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 34.
10 Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR, “Crossing the Line,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1986, p. 46.
11 LCdr Robert E. Stumpf, USN, “Air War with Libya,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, pp. 47-48.
12 "Lessons Learned from Operations in the Vicinity of Libya,” Dated 6 October 1987, Partially Declassified, Control No. 567-87, Records of CNO, Box 11, Series VII: Libya, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.
13 Parks, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
14 George J. Church, “Hitting the Source,” Time, 28 April 1986, p. 26; Richard Owen, “EEC Imposes Diplomatic Sanctions Only,” The Times (London), 15 April 1986, p. 1; “Why Britain Backed U.S. Air Attack on Libya,” The Times (London), 16 April 1986, p. 4.
15 CTF Six Zero Message, DTG 141806ZAPR86, Partially Declassified, USS King (DDG-41), Box 2 of 2, Operational Messages in the Vicinity of Libya December 1985-June 1986, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
16 Lessons Learned .... op. cit., p. 34; Martin and Walcott, op. cit., p.303; Venkus, op. cit., p. 13.
17 Venkus, op. cit., p. 22.
18 Bolger, op. cit., p. 421; Lessons Learned .... op. cit., pp. 33-34, 37.
19 Venkus, op. cit., pp. 32-33, 52-53, 71.
20 John F. Lehman, Jr., Command of the Seas (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), p. 373; Lessons Learned .... op. cit., p. 37.
21A U.S. Air Force Combat Pilot, “‘How I Bombed Gadhafi’: A Personal Account of an American Blow Against Terrorism,” Popular Mechanics, July 1987, p. 111.
22 Lee and Holmes, op. cit., p. 28.
23 Ruth Marshall, “View from the Bull’s-Eye,” Newsweek, 28 April 1986, p. 30; Martin and Walcott, op. cit., pp. 305-07; Venkus, op. cit., pp. 72-74, 79-80.
24 Venkus, op. cit., pp. 73, 78-79, 96, 109.
25 Ibid„ p. 81.
26 Walt Morrissette, “DoD Details Civilian Damage in Libya Raid,” Air Force Times, 26 May 1986, p. 12.
27 Ibid.; Parks, op. cit., p. 51.
28 “Countdown,” op. cit., p. 736; Stumpf, op. cit., p. 48; Venkus, op. cit., p. 104.
29 “Countdown,” op. cit., p. 736; Venkus, op. cit., pp. 106-09.
30 “President’s Address to the Nation, April 14, 1986,” Department of State Bulletin, June 1986, pp. 1-2.
31 According to Libyan sources, the raids on Tripoli and Benghazi killed 37 Libyans—including Gadhafi’s allegedly adopted 15-month-old daughter—and injured 93 others, including Gadhafi’s two youngest sons.
32 David Ignatius, “Bombing Gadhafi Worked,” The Washington Post, 13 July 1986, p. B5.
33 L. Paul Bremer, III, “Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature,” Department of State Bulletin, May 1989, p. 75.
34 Noel Koch, “The Hostage Labyrinth: . .. Our ‘No Negotiations’ Policy May Not Have Helped,” The Washington Post, 18 March 1990, p. B4.
35 Brian Jenkins, “What Have We Learned? How Can We Fight Back?” Interview in Newsweek, 15 September 1986, p. 27.
Commander Stanik is the social studies instructor at the Walbrook Maritime Academy in Baltimore, Maryland. He formerly taught history at the U.S. Naval Academy and served as a historian in the Contemporary History Branch of the Naval Historical Center. He is the author of “Effective Retribution The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi, to be published later in 1996 by the Naval Historical Center.