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By Rear Admiral William H. Langenberg, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
Are TAR Officers Necessary?
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During the past several years, pressure has been building for the Navy to get more out of the Naval Reserve. While Congress has generated some of the impetus for this initiative, most of the progress has been fostered by the Navy. In particular, the ascendance of a naval reservist, John F. Lehman, Jr., to Secretary of the Navy and the elevation of Admiral James D. Watkins,
U. S. Navy, to Chief of Naval Operations have accelerated this process.
The One-Navy concept has slowly evolved from concept to reality. To enhance our One Navy, I believe the Navy’s future leaders, those regular Navy officers from grades 0-3 through 0-6, should become more familiar with the Naval Reserve’s capabilities and limitations.
This is important because the Naval Reserve is now a significant force, one which the Secretary of the Navy recently promised Congress will be augmented with new missions, modernized equipment, and greater integration. The programmed fiscal year 1984 personnel strength of the Navy is 565,000. The comparable figure for the Naval Reserve is 122,000. In mission areas, for example, the Naval Reserve now handles all of the Navy’s continental U. S. based logistics airlift and the operation of its light attack helicopter squadrons, 88% of its minesweepers, 86% of its cargo handling battalions, and 68% of its mobile construction battalions. The total Naval Reserve budget for fiscal year 1984 exceeds $1.4 billion. Patently, knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the Naval Reserve should be sine qua non for future active-duty flag officers.
In my view, the best way to increase the knowledge of regular Navy officers at the 0-3 through 0-6 levels with regard to the Naval Reserve is to assign these officers to billets in it as a normal shore or sea tour of duty. Such tours would increase their understanding of the talent and experience extant in the Naval Reserve. Perhaps more important, it would demonstrate to them that these assets can be used to their advantage at relatively low cost.
As a further tangible benefit to the officers assigned to these positions, it would increase the command ashore opportunities for regular Navy officers early in their careers.
There are three common arguments adduced against this proposal. First, active-duty billets in the Naval Reserve are not career enhancing for regular Navy officers, which is probably true. There seems little doubt, however, that these assignments could be made career enhancing by specific direction from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. The rapid rejuvenation of the Recruiting Command from a career graveyard to flag officer producer is cogent evidence that such a metamorphosis can be accomplished.
The second argument is that the Naval Reserve is so unique and complex to administer that full-time specialists are required to fill 0-3 through 0-6 billets. In fact, the Naval Reserve is no more complex than the regular Navy. Furthermore, if a U. S. Navy flag officer, typically inexperienced in the Naval Reserve, can command it, there is no reason a regular Navy 0-3 through 0-6 cannot perform competently in a lesser billet.
The third argument against this proposal is that there is a shortage of regular Navy officers to fill 0-3 through 0-6 billets in the fleet. While valid, this problem can be resolved over time by gradually increasing input at the 0-1 level.
There is one other obstacle to implementing such a program. It is the existence of the training and administration of reserves (TAR) officer community, a corps of full-time active-duty specialists who are employed training and administrating the Naval Reserve.
While I have never been hostile to the TAR officer program, I have reached the conclusion that TAR officers act as an insulator between the Naval Reserve and the regular Navy. Given the present organization of the Naval Reserve, with identified U. S. Navy program sponsors and increasing integration of Naval Reserve forces into the regular Navy infrastructure, I believe such an insulator militates ag- the Total Force objectives.
Before 1974, there may have been ^ need for TAR officers. From the en World War II through 1974, the Nava Reserve was theoretically a trained manpower pool, whose members c be called to active duty upon m°b*' ^ tion. It was essentially administere a separate organization, which had interaction with the regular Navy- Commencing in 1974, however, t ular Navy sponsors were identified each Naval Reserve program, and 1 regular Navy, particularly at the officer level, began to take a more n tive interest in these previously un used but expensive reserve assets. -c In recent years, for example, sPeu|af direction has been given to both reg and reserve commanding officers to enhance mutual cooperation and in action. A mandatory fitness report ^ entry on effective use of assigned n reservists catches the attention of e the most apathetic regular Navy skip per. An analogous directive to Nav Reserve commanding officers to es lish and maintain ongoing comrnun tion with their active-duty counterp3 is in effect. Currently, the readiness rating of regular Navy commands _lS influenced by the readiness of then signed Naval Reserve personnel. 1 Naval Reserve, all members on P3^ status must have an assigned m°bl tion billet, whose readiness criteria established in part by the active du >
level, a joint one-week “charm g.
school” for all newly selected com dores, both regular Navy and reset was recently instituted.
Through such initiatives, the Nav ^ has increased markedly its direct J* Naval Reserve assets. Concurrently’ has diminished the justification f°r TAR officers, who are supposedly^ indispensable specialist administra of the Naval Reserve. 0p
There are about 11,000 TAR Pe ^ nel on active duty, of whom less ^ 2,000 are officers. Because of the* positioning in TAR-coded billets ,
throughout the Office of the Chie Naval Operations and the Naval K
114
Proceedings / Oct»t,er
PolicvhierarChy’ ^AR officers influence relatix ^ ^ec's'ons far beyond their Naw 6 y Sma11 numbers. Many U. S. stanri Pfrsonnel do not seem to underinnuN HeVer’ that these TAR officer views of° "ot.necessarily represent the Wh0 alc lnactive naval reservists
8ani2a°ionPnSC *e VaSt bulk °f thC °r'
ence ^ f7XamPles of TAR officer influ- ntav h° ^^ava* Reserve policy Naval epenfishtening. The National is aKeserve Policy Board (NNRPB) Ports *!n8°'n8 advisory body that reThere *recdy t0 the Navy Secretariat, board currently 20 members on this
Naw ’ «■ W^orn only one is a regular the tap 1Cer' F've members are from rNRpr community. Based on a Reserecommendation, the Naval ordinal W3S divided into two new sub- Sujfac epomrnands. Commander Naval Air R 6 Reserve and Commander Naval tiCai t_C'Serve Force in 1983. As a prac- is com 3tter’ eacb °f the new structures not anmanded by a TAR flag officer, nation lnact've naval reservist. This sit- foresp aPPears likely to continue for the
TARab 6 futUre-
the <?„ f0fficers also have influence on Advis r aCe fanfare Naval Reserve 0ry Committee (SWNRAC).
Periodically with the Deputy
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meetsSOry Committee (SWNRAC). It Chief f’pt'othcally with the Deputy Warfar° hlaval Operations for Surface suCh aC Pn matters °f mutual interest, Kn0x.S tbe ongoing introduction of higatp 3nd Hazard Perry-class
SWN,;A'nt0 the Naval Reserve, group S co.nsists of a flag officer servjstWblcb Includes two inactive re- Cer „ S’ and a subordinate action offi- fying °Up’ which is tasked with identi- and problems, proposing solutions, meetjneparin8 the agenda for SWNRAC latter rP ®f the ten members in the A thr°,Up’ al1 are TAR officers.
Cer jnf|lrd example of current TAR offi- prepara.ence appeared to occur during rePort h'°n (,1 the recently completed Sory G ^ tbe Navy ’s Total Force Advi- identjf r°Up’ which was tasked with keservyin® new missions for the Naval this pr6' According to the Navy Times, thinkin°UP Stained Naval Reserve c1osp °n Possible new missions by
SeptatjlaiSon with the Reserve repre- Ves in all the cognizant Deputy
Ch
^Hief f x au lllc ^ugnizdni uepu SuCh |° ^aval Operations offices. fr°m Tad* almost universally originates Or r)lavR officers, whose views may the ina not he consonant with those of ... ctive Naval Reservists they os-
tensil A
^ration c ' * “
°ver tu n o* Pervasive TAR influence
Klki ^avai
A rePresent-
hist,..,.. ar|d perhaps more vexing il-
j|- ji pw vdoivc i Ai\ miiuence e Naval Reserve is the annual
eedl"Ss 1 October 1984
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115
effort by a retired TAR captain, now a staff member with the House Committee on Appropriations to micromanage the Navy via appropriate wording in the committee’s report on the defense appropriations bill. An analogous illustration is the annual position statement on Navy issues published by the Naval Reserve Association (NRA) which is principally authored by a retired TAR captain. These NRA positions are sometimes opposed to previously published Navy decisions and the majority views of the organization’s own members.
In providing these illustrations, I impute no Machiavellian intent to them. It is a relatively common practice for members of a small group in a large hierarchy to make themselves appear indispensable by stressing the esoteric nature of their activities, controlling paper flow, and positioning themselves in key billets. In my view, the TAR officer community merely demonstrates these common human organization practices, and it does so quite effectively.
Recognizing that the TAR officer program has a few outspoken advocates in the Congress and elsewhere, it may be unrealistic to disestablish it overnight. Moreover, it would be imprudent to do so. Pragmatically, it should be gradually phased out, so regular Navy officers can be placed into the open Naval Reserve billets with minimum administrative disruption.
Historically, one of the primary problems in addressing disestablishment of the TAR officer program is the existence of vociferous participants on both sides of the issue. Unfortunately, many of the debates on this subject have generated more heat than light. Viewing the matter objectively, there appears to be a way to confront the issue in a more constructive manner.
During the tenure of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Joseph T. McCullen, b a board was convened under the auspices of the Bureau of Naval PersonB to address this question. It prepared * comprehensive plan for the gradual phaseout of the TAR officer program which seemed to resolve most salient issues, including opportunity for care6 completion by all TAR officers then ^ active duty. This plan was later held > abeyance by the then-incoming Carter administration. If the disestablishmen of the TAR officer program is to be , reconsidered, it seems logical to upda and revise this study as a foundation for further action.
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The Total Force goal is one which should be pursued by all advocates o strong and effective Navy. Let’s get with it by a gradual and thoughtful phaseout of the TAR officer progra^ accompanied by a concurrent input 0 regular Navy 0-3 through 0-6 off1' cers into the resulting open Naval serve billets.
Nobody asked me either, but .
By Captain Edward L. Barker, U. S. Naval Reserve
The Missing Link in the Naval Reserve
What should we do with the Naval Reserve? We are told the regular military forces face a growing squeeze on funds and manpower. This comes as public and congressional pressures mount in this election year to keep defense spending down and as fewer people consider professional opportunities offered by the armed services with an
improving economy. Accordingly, the role of the reserves is expected to expand in the years ahead.
This expansion reflects a move by Congress to augment the reserve forces, filling the gap caused by expanding defense requirements. A recent study addressing this dilemma notes that recruiting goals for the 1980s cannot be met without increased reliance on guard and reserve forces and proposes a plan designed to beef up re-
serve forces, provide more modern ^ equipment, and improve job satisfy and morale. ^
Under current Total Force policy’ reservist is placed on a par with his « full-time counterpart. The Secretary j
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the Navy has stated that,
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of giving lip service, which has alw J been given to the Reserves, make u1 a part of the total force for mobile3 tion and able to carry part of the bn den in wartime.” Consequently, a zontal reorganization was laid out t° put new equipment into the reserve*’ including new frigates and new fiS ^ aircraft. In the wake of the mid-l9 post-Vietnam War political backlas^ the Department of Defense tried to in half the strength of the Navy’s b > lected Reserve. The threat of large resulted in repeated reserve progral1^ reorganizations, a debilitating exerc which created vast turbulence in tbe Naval Reserve. J j
The current proposal to enlarge 3 improve the Naval Reserve should ^ prove useful if for no other reason ^ it does represent a boost to the res^ program as well as congressional c cem. But the problem of what to with the Reserve goes much deepef'
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118
Proceedings / Octobef
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