This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
If President Reagan’s “600-ship Navy,” like Tennyson’s immortal 600-man Light Brigade, is to charge into the mouth of the Hell of modern warfare, we must plan now how we will supply five carrier battle groups from underway replenishment ships, many of which exist only in the imagination of administration speechwriters.
cruisers and/or destroyers, and one fast combat support ship (AOE) or replenishment oiler (AOR). Each carrier battle group will have an underway replenishment group assigned to it made up of one oiler (AO), one ammunition ship (AE), one combat stores ship (AFS), and four destroyers and/or frigates.
In this ideal underway replenishment group, the one multi-product ship would always be ready to replenish the earner or any one of her escorts. An underway replenishment group—AOs, AEs, AFSs, and their escorts—would shuttle to and from the nearest supply base. Upon arrival in the operating area, the supply ships would either replenish the battle group’s units directly, or they would consolidate their loads with the multi-product ship which, in turn, would replenish the battle group. The underway replenishment group would then return to the supply base and repeat the shuttle process. An integral part of the logistics train would consist of the resupply required to keep the supply base stocked with fuel, stores, and ammunition.
Following is an examination of the logistics of replenishment for each of the battle groups. I will concentrate on the Indian Ocean as perhaps the worst case for operations and support.*
The Mediterranean: There are several friendly supply bases within the Mediterranean Sea, including Naples, Italy, and Rota, Spain. These bases are well stocked and ♦For the considerations in this article, the United States will be considered not to be at war, but to be operating in its normal peacetime posture.
49
eedi"gs / August 1983
well situated, and they are just 500 and 1,300 nautical, miles, respectively, from the most likely scene of action—the extreme eastern end of the Mediterranean.
In addition, the Mediterranean Sea scenario for the battle groups could be extended into the North Atlantic where distances for shuttling replenishment become critical. While it is less than 1,000 nautical miles to the resupply ports of the British Isles, it is more than 1,500 nautical miles to the Azores, and nearly 4,000 nautical miles back to the continental United States.
The Pacific: Battle groups operating in the North Pacific Ocean have an even longer logistics train. For example, given operations in support of Japan or Korea in the East China Sea, it is 1,400 nautical miles to the nearest resupply base in Yokosuka, Japan; nearly 3,000 nautical miles to Subic Bay or Pearl Harbor; and nearly 4,000 nautical miles to the continental United States.
The Indian Ocean: For sheer difficulty of resupply, the Indian Ocean is where the battle group will be most difficult to sustain. The principal friendly port currently in use is Diego Garcia, where a great deal of material has been pre-stocked to support the Commander in Chief, U. S. Central Command. But Diego Garcia is 1,700 nautical miles from the probable scene of battle group action: near or in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman. Some supply agreements have been worked out for Mombasa, Kenya, but it, too, is about 1,700 nautical miles from the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the only reliable bases are Perth, Australia, and Subic Bay, both more than 4,000 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz.
The distances and transit times for the underway replenishment groups are outlined in Table 1.
A carrier battle group operating in the Gulf of Oman can expect its single replenishment group to shuttle to Diego Garcia and back in eight days. If the support ships must go to Subic Bay, or Australia, and back, the trip is nearly three weeks. How long the battle group can operate is obviously a function of how long it can go between replenishments. Fuel consumption is primarily a function of the speed at which the ships operate, and the number of aircraft sorties flown in a day. Food consumption is relatively constant—the number of personnel multiplied by meals per day. Ammunition consumption is predicated on the type of offensive operations being conducted within the area of operations. Of course, fuel and ammunition consumption rates increase as the tempo of operations picks up.
Consumption rates have been computed for all cases, and much can be learned by postulating a “typical” consumption rate for the battle group and then comparing it with known transit times to allow for the shuttling of the replenishment groups. Using a relatively modest “typical” figure of four days between underway replenishments for the battle group, at least two complete replenishment groups would be required from a resupply base in Diego Garcia. One group replenishes the battle group and commences the return trip to Diego Garcia, while the other resupplies in Diego Garcia and begins its transit back
Table 1
Operating
Area
Time*
(Days)
Underway Replenishment Group Transit Time Requirements
Distance Round-Tr‘P Resupply (Nautical
Point Miles)
Eastern | Naples | 500 |
Med | Rota, Spain | 1,300 |
North | Portsmouth, U.K. | 900 |
Atlantic | Azores | 1,500 |
| United States | 3,900 |
North | Yokosuka | 1,400 |
Pacific | Subic Bay | 3,000 |
| United States | 4,000 |
Indian | Diego Garcia | 1,700 |
Ocean | Mombasa, Kenya | 1,700 |
| Perth, Australia | 4,000 |
| Subic Bay | 4,000 |
* Assumes 18-knot transit speed for the underway replenishment group, eludes load-out time.
2
6
4
7
18
7 14 19
8 8 19 19
^ud i^"
Table 2 Available Programmed Replenishment Ships
Ship Type | Available Now | To Be B By FY-< |
Multi-Product Ships: |
| |
AOE | 4 | 4 |
AOR | 1 | 0 |
Single-Product Ships: |
| |
AE | 13 | 2 |
AO | 8 | 18 |
AFS | 7 | 0 |
*An approximate number—several will be retired soon.
Tota1
15
23*
7
50
Proceedings / Augus^
198?
the6 ^attJe group. If Diego Garcia is not available, and A ep'enishment ships must transit to Subic Bay or to la’ at least five underway replenishment groups fjgUrare required to sustain the battle group depicted in
Giy
Itidi' Cn typical scenario of operations outlined for the Or ^cean, we can now answer the question of whether that Reagan Administration’s 15-carrier battle group t.s realistic. Table 2 depicts the number and types $0p p en*shment ships currently available, or planned, to $hjp 0r? an(l sustain the carrier battle group. With these 'Wth ’11 *s Possible to provide each of the 15 battle groups Aqsa multi-product ship. And there are enough AEs and 0 make up 15 shuttle groups, although only seven gutare currently proposed, which is a serious shortfall. enou '°ne replenishment group per battle group is not gr0p^h' ^or example, a minimum of two replenishment ^ w°uld be required for sustained operations in the Whern ^cean scenario, and a worst case scenario exists the k.'n no fewer than five could be required to support gr0uUtt'e group. Given the overall strategy of battle eaSe^s °Perating simultaneously around the globe, a worst e*ist re?u'rement from each of the battle group scenarios 0perS . r as many as 25 URGs in order to sustain the l'or | (.l0ns> considerably higher than the current proposal URGs. There is a clear mismatch between the proposed strategy and the ships that would be required to support that strategy.
In nearly every hot spot and contingency since World War II—in more than 200 incidents—a carrier battle group with escorts has been sent to the scene. The likelihood of simultaneous battle group operations is probable, but what is certain is that the Navy’s traditional peacetime deterrent mission will continue. The 600-ship plan, which is currently sufficient to continue normal peacetime operations, .must be implemented, but it must also be further refined to meet all the facets of the nation’s strategy.
Commander Edwards was graduated from Stanford University in 1965 with a bachelor of arts degree in history and was commissioned via Officer Candidate School. After serving in the River Patrol Force in Vietnam, 1967-68, he served in the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), Brinkley Bass (DD-887), and Orleck (DD-886). He was the executive officer of the USS Haleakala (AE-25), followed by command of Navy Recruiting District, Buffalo, New York. He was recently graduated from the Naval War College and is the prospective commanding officer of the USS Merrimack (AO-179).
51
1n the past 25 years, the U. S. Navy has kept four air- Cfaft carrier battle groups deployed at all times: two nea^r°uPs in the Pacific Ocean and two in the Mediterra- fro ^ea' ^or 20 years, the aircraft carriers were drawn the r ,a hJrce of 12 and were generally deployed outside of he n'ted States for eight to ten months at a time. Each one °^ec' carrier had two relief carriers in home waters, ° 'n training, and the other either in upkeep, repair, or shipsai^ ^ similar scheme was organized for the support
the^T resP°nse to the recentiy established contingency in (j„ . n(lian Ocean, five carriers have been continuously b;icl°ye(l’ mahing it impossible to maintain two carriers as Ad • P.sb°r each deployed unit. Accordingly, the Reagan pi ^^istration has established an aggressive shipbuilding Slip1 11’ Commonly called “the 600-ship Navy.” This plan tain'08 administration’s national strategy of maimer 'n^ a strong global Navy centered around a force of 15 t0 'er battle groups capable of a rapid, powerful response w°rltlatCVer contmgency might arise anywhere in the
pr<y strategy realistic? Can the carrier battle groups ltTJeci power simultaneously around the globe? More tain h ant’ Can t*ie battle groups be supported and sus- d if called upon for a global power projection role? o^Paading the force to 15 carriers requires expanding re6r forces as well. The five-carrier deployment pattern bvo 'reS ^VC ?rouPs °f ships: two in the Mediterranean, sitp 'n Pacific, and one in the Indian Ocean. In an ideal atl°n, each would be made up of one carrier, five