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Combat Fleets of the World 1976/77: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament
Jean Labayle Couhat, Editor (Translated by Commander James J. McDonald, U. S. Navy [Retired] ). Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 575 pp. Illus. Append. $49.50 ($39.60 for members).
Commander Thomas A. Brooks,
U. S. Navy
(Commander Brooks completed his undergraduate work in Political Science/Soviet Studies at Fordham University with subsequent graduate work at the University of California and Fairleigh Dickinson University where he obtained his masters degree. He was commissioned via OCS in 1959 and has served tours at sea, overseas, in Vietnam, and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He is currently attached to the staff, Commander Second Fleet.)
From roughly the time of the publication of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History in 1890 through World War II, the capital ship, with her sleek, streamlined beauty complementing her obvious muscle, captured the imagination of generations and became the symbol of national might and an indispensable element of a nation’s prestige. This worldwide fascination with warships led to the publication of a number of standard reference works on navies. Most originated at the turn of the century and many are still being published today.
The latest addition to the field is Combat Fleets of the World which has been published in France as Les Flottes de Combat since 1897 and is now available in an English translation.
It is perhaps inevitable that Combat Fleets be compared with fane's Fighting Ships which is, after all, the English language standard for the field. Looking at the two books, the difference in their sizes is immediately apparent and puts Combat Fleets at an instant advantage. Jane’s is an unwieldy book, incapable of being accommodated on any standard bookshelf. Combat Fleets, on the other hand, although large (8x1016 inches), fits the normal bookshelf. Both publications have approximately 600 pages of useful text and tables; Jane’s adds to its girth with 88 pages of advertising which Combat Fleets spares us.
The organization of the two works is essentially the same, with Jane's being a little easier to follow in that ship classes are set off in bold block letters rather than the small italics used 10 Combat Fleets. Jane’s extra size allows for many more comments and more information on modification, modernization, and naval plans and programs- Jane's also contains more detail on service and yard craft, minor units, and other miscellany not included in Combit Fleets. Smaller format notwithstanding. Combat Fleets manages to include all essential information on naval units of any consequence and still finds space under each applicable country for a section on the naval air arm and weapon systems unique to that navy- Naval guns also receive good Coverage- Pictures of the major aircraft and weapons are often included—a bonus no longer found in Jane’s. Both books have a ship name index; it would have been helpful if Combat Fleets had included aircraft and weapon systems in the index as well.
The pictures in Combat Fleets are quite similar to those in Jane’s or Weyer’s. The line drawings, although fewer, are excellent, and the reproductions are top quality. There are several important classes which deserved better
pictorial or line drawing coverage—even *n art*st s conception. Examples would c the U.S. George Washington (SSBN- 598) and Los Angeles (SSN-688) classes of submarines, the “Trident” SSBNs, and tr*ke cruiser. Artist’s conceptions of the atter two abound, and pictures of the 598 and 688 should be plentiful. An artlst s conception overhead view of the oviet carrier Kiev would be helpful as Weh. It js difficult to get a proper aPpreciation of an air capable ship with- °Ut looking at her flight deck layout, which you cannot do from a water-level Profile. In all, the pictorial coverage is generous, however, and the quality of Photography is excellent.
The translation from the French by Commander James J. McDonald, U.S. avy (Retired), is flawless, although the ftopean system of representing dates ^'th the day first rather than the month Christmas being 25/12/76 rather 1 an the more familiar 12/25/76) is confusing. Having all the measurements ‘n metrics is, I suppose, inevitable, but ortunately there are ample conversion
tab!
tho;
cs in the front of the book to help sc of us who still envision things Casicr in inches and feet.
Combat Fleets must be given very ‘gh marks on the apparent accuracy of strcngth figures. Comparing the major navies in Jane's, Combat Fleets, and un- c assified Department of Defense tabu- ations, there are frequent differences, ut usually they are minor and the egree of general agreement is remark- . • Where significant differences of °Pinion exist, Combat Fleets would aPpear to be generally more conservative ln its estimates, and Jane's frequently is °n the higher side. Both publications ave summary strength figures in the r°nt of each major country’s listings. Combat Fleets includes launch and e,1very dates and ships under construc- tlQn as well as in-service—a useful fea- ‘Urc for an appreciation of trends and
directions.
Coverage of the Soviet Navy is, on the ^h°le, quite good. An interesting ‘fference between Combat Fleets and *he other major reference works is the ■sting of the Soviet “Delta”-class SSBN as a single screw, 11,000 ton boat, when aR references with which this reviewer is amiliar cite her as twin screw and one to t'v° thousand tons smaller. Likewise, the
listing of Soviet naval missiles, although a very valuable feature, is not as complete as it might be, and some of the information is questionable. For example, nowhere else has this reviewer seen the SS-N-3 “Shaddock” credited with ramjet rather than turbojet propulsion, nor seen the SS-N-2 “Styx” credited with a range of only ten miles. Also, there is no mention of the AS-4 “Kitchen,” which has been seen on Tu-22 “Blinders” at air shows, or the AS-5 “Kelt,” which was reportedly fired operationally during the October 1973 Mid East War. On the other hand, Combat Fleets has pictures of Soviet units not found in Jane's and several pictures which are, are of far better quality than those in Jane's.
All the standard reference works have understandable difficulty in treating the older units which are being phased out or put in reserve. Gun destroyers and diesel submarines—U. S. or Soviet—are good examples. How many of those listed are active and how many are in reserve? In Combat Fleets and Jane’s, it is hard to tell; both could take a lesson from Weyer's Flotten taschenbuch 1975 H6 (Warships of the World) where a different face print is used to differentiate active from reserve units.
In all, Combat Fleets of the World is a welcome addition to the field and an excellent and valuable acquisition for any student of naval affairs. Although expensive, it is little more than half the price of Jane’s which for a reference book is every bit as accurate, complete enough for any normal use, and possesses special features not found in the more expensive competitor. Jane's likely will remain the English language standard, but Combat Fleets gives you more for your money.
Finally, Combat Fleets of the World has a certain Gallic flair for excerpting the essence of an issue. Whereas Jane's devotes pages of text to analyzing the Soviet Navy buildup, Combat Fleets opens the Soviet section with a quote from Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei G Gorshkov, which goes straight to the heart of the matter: “Henceforth the flag of the Soviet Navy will float proudly on all the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand that it is no longer master of the sea!”
A Soldier Reports
General William C. Westmoreland. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976. 446 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. $12.95.
Reviewed by Peter Braestrup
(Mr. Braestrup, currently Editor, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian, served as a rifle platoon leader with the First Marine Division in Korea in 1952, and, in his newspaper career, as a correspondent in Vietnam in 1966-1969 for The New York Times and The Washington Post.)
General Westmoreland’s recollections are those of a “company man,” not a boat-rocker. His prose, for the most part, is restrained, even bland; his reflections, and rebuttals of past criticisms, are fleeting, a trifle defensive, seldom bitter. The result is an incomplete, but important, memoir of what it was like to be ComUSMACV—“Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,” a title which reflects the limits of Westmoreland’s role in 19641968.
“The American people can be particularly proud,” Westmoreland writes, "that their military leaders [in Vietnam] scrupulously adhered to a basic tenet of our Constitution prescribing civilian control of the military. ’ ’
Indeed, Westmoreland was scrupulous to a fault. In Honolulu in 1966, President Johnson took him aside and said “I hope you don’t pull a Mac- Arthur on me.” Westmoreland was a bit surprised: “Since I had no intention of crossing him in any way, I chose to make no response.”
There was never any question of Westy “pulling a MacArthur,” or, apparently, of challenging high-level perceptions in the councils of war. Although Westmoreland, in retrospect, suggests that the United States might have pulled out of Vietnam in 19641965 with honor, amid the manifest political chaos in Saigon, he did not so suggest at the time. Nor did he protest what he now records as Lyndon Johnson’s crucial failure to seek public support and an “expression of national resolve” from Congress concerning Vietnam, prior to the dispatch of major combat units. Instead, like the Joint
Chiefs (and the former Kennedistas), he went along with the Administration’s hesitant, ambiguous commitment and the initial tit-for-tat bombing of North Vietnam, which he saw as futile.
He dutifully put up with absurd nitpicking from the Pentagon civilians, with the lack of a unified Indo-China theater command, and with the reluctance of Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford to arm adequately the South Vietnamese allies. Westmoreland did what he could with what he had—and did far better than his critics conceded at the time—always hoping for more troops and for authorization to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and seize the strategic “initiative.”
The general claims no extraordinary prescience. In 1964, he did not urge or foresee massive U. S. involvement, although he (vainly) sought prudent advance logistics preparations; he hoped the hard-beset South Vietnamese could hack it; he feared Hanoi’s reaction to to American intervention. Indeed, he writes, he saw the first Marine landing at Danang in March 1965 simply as a move to protect an air base vital to the bombing of the North, not as the precursor of a 549,000-man deployment. His famed “forty-four-battalion request” went to Washington in June 1965, six months after Hanoi’s regulars first entered the South. He saw “no substitute for victory,” but he duly endorsed Washington’s substitute, possibly to his later regret.
Westmoreland finds it hard to criticize his Commander in Chief and patron—“I have never known a more considerate and thoughtful man than Lyndon B. Johnson.” Understandably, LBJ came to feel sure of Westy. The President invited Westmoreland and his lively wife Kitsy to the White House and the Texas ranch, even confided to the general that he planned not to seek reelection. Yet, as the memoir makes clear, Johnson manipulated Westmoreland for domestic political purposes, twice ordering him home in 1967 to address Congress and press groups and shore up public opinion. Westmoreland realizes, unhappily, that he “may have veered too far in the direction of supporting in public the government’s policy,” even as he “essentially believed" in the policy.
Amid the shock wave of the 1968 Tet offensive, Westmoreland suffered harsh retribution in the press for his prior public optimism. And Johnson was stunned by the major North Vietnamese effort Westmoreland had warned him was coming. Such was the state of mind in official Washington that the President anxiously inquired if nuclear weapons might be needed to save encircled Khe Sanh. Westmoreland’s sanguine reply, which he does not cite in his memoir: no, not unless Hanoi’s home army comes pouring across the DMZ.
In Westmoreland’s view, the unprecedented Communist losses at Tet presented LBJ with a fresh opportunity to adopt a decisive strategy, apply more muscle, and shorten the war. Instead, as the general sees it, the President, faced with domestic political bankruptcy, threw in the towel, sought negotiations, and let the war drag on as public support waned still further.
More in sorrow than in anger, Westmoreland blames the hesitations and duplicities of the Johnson war policy on “the advice of well-intentioned but naive officials and ... its effect on a President so politically oriented that he tried to please everybody rather than bite the bullet . . . .”
In Saigon, Westmoreland saw himself as a kind of tutor to the South Vietnamese, whom he viewed as young West Point cadets in need of guidance and encouragement; he respected some of Saigon’s generals, including Nguyen Van Thieu, and was exasperated, a good deal of the time, by all of them. He apparently docs not share the perception of some old Vietnam hands that cronyism and pervasive corruption, fostered in part by American largesse, continued to sap the authority and cohesion of the Saigon regime, even as its army vastly improved.
Westmoreland also had to deal with what he uncharitably saw as the Marines’ “beach-head” mentality and with interservice Pentagon squabbles over his “single manager” concept for controlling Marine and Air Force tactical air. He says relatively little about the Navy’s strong contributions; Yankee Station belonged to Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp in Pearl Harbor.
As for his beloved Army’s institutional shortcomings, Westmoreland is less than confessional. He rightly praises his troops' overall performance in battle. In retrospect, he writes, he might better have extended the one-year Vietnam tours of all officers to 18 months, to ease the notorious turnover problem; he acknowledges instances of excessive use of firepower in rural areas, but repeats that he issued orders against such abuses; indirectly, he concedes that his orders and his inspector-general system did not cope adequately with rear-area G.I- corruption and occasional maltreatment of South Vietnamese civilians. As for the My Lai massacre, and ensuing negligence by local commanders, Westmoreland deplores the “failure of officer leadership” uncovered by Army investigators in the Americal Division; he carefully notes that he had appointed Major General Samuel Koster as the Americal’s commander “not from personal knowledge” but on others’ recommendation.
Westmoreland is a retired field commander, not a professional historian. Often, he argues his own case inadequately. He still seems a bit puz-
Twenty Years and Twenty Days
N8uyen Cao Ky. New York, N.Y.: Stein and Day> 1976. 239 pp. $8.95.
Reviewed by Brigadier General Edwin ‘ ^'nimons, U. S. Marine Corps
(Retired)
by the South Vietnamese, by cNamara & Co., and by the reluctance 0 Washington politicians to face unpleasant realities. But he feels sure of °nc thing: “history will reflect more avorably upon the performance of the 'nilitary [in Vietnam] than upon that of t e politicians and policy makers.” And e may well be right.
eneral Simmons served in Vietnam in p ^'^966 as G-3, III Marine Amphibious °rce> and Commanding Officer, 9th Mannes, and again in 1970-1971 as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine ^ tvtston• Both tours provided General *rnmons with opportunities to observe *neraI Ky at first-hand. General Sim mons' anne Corps Operations in Vietnam, y • • • 1972 appeared sequentially in the ■ 1. Naval Institute Naval Review* of 1968, 969, 1970, and 197}. His short history, The n>ted States Marines, 1775-1975 [a Naval Kstitute purchase book], was published by 'k,r>g Press this year. Since 1972, General ’tnrnons has been the Director of Marine orps History and Museums.)
At lunch in Danang in 1966 at III arine Amphibious Force Headquarters, * en Prime Minister Ky remarked that abasco was his favorite sauce. General alt said that the man who made it was °ne his best friends. Tabasco began arriving at Ky’s quarters at the rate of a Case a month. When Ky made his hur- |lcd departure from Saigon in 1975, he e t behind a dozen unopened cases. In a capsule, that’s Ky’s whole view of American participation in the Vietnam at: well-intentioned, massive, and ill- advised, as told in this short book with |be wry subtitle, “How and Why the oited States Lost Its First War with China and the Soviet Union.”
The luncheon with Lieutenant Genial Lewis W. Walt, commanding 8eneral of the III Marine Amphibious °rce, came after the Buddhist Revolt °f 1966 in which Ky outmaneuvered the rebellious I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chan Thi. Ky and Walt had their differences, but, as
Ky says, “as so often happens,” they later became good friends; hence, the unending flow of Tabasco sauce.
Not much mention is made of the U. S. Marines nor does Ky have much to say about the U. S. Navy, although he does have a kind word for Rear Admiral William L. Harris, Commander Carrier Group 7, an old friend, who welcomed him on board the USS Midway (CVA-41) after his helicopter exit from Saigon.
Ky is more gentle with American military leaders than he is with American politicians. President L. B. Johnson is an exception to his general disparagement. They apparently met first in February 1966 at the Honolulu Conference. Johnson said, “Boy you speak just like an American.” And Ky liked Johnson “because both of us were men who got things done.”
Ky found Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara optimistic at first, but then increasingly disillusioned. General William C. Westmoreland, on the other hand, was always optimistic (“. . .I’m confident that in the end we’ll win out.”) but lacking in personal magnetism. What was needed, says Ky, was another Douglas MacArthur, “a perfect example of the American military hero.”
Ky characterizes his own role in the war as “long, hard, and varied.”
“Starting as a platoon leader in the jungle, I became a pilot, commander of the air force, then prime minister and vice president of my country, and finally, for the last three years, a civilian.”
The Ky that emerges from these pages is consistent with the American public image of this best known of South Vietnamese leaders: flippant, outrageous, rash, outspoken, charismatic, disarming, and artfully ingenuous. His most savage criticism is reserved for his arch rival, President Nguyen Van Thieu. Ky calls Thieu corrupt and personally involved in rice speculation, heroin traffic, and black marketeering, and puts much of the blame on him for South Vietnam’s final ignominious collapse.
The most important part of the book is the self-contained chapter, “Limited War: America’s fatal flaws.” There are only two ways to fight a war, philosophizes Ky, either an all-out war or a
limited war. American politicians chose to fight a limited war; so did the Russians and Chinese. The Russians and Chinese fought it the right way; the Americans the wrong way. A limited war must be fought with subtlety, according to Ky, not by employing a “juggernaut.” American forces reached a peak of 541,500 in 1969, yet the United States could not win the war because it had “the wrong army for a limited war. ”
”... America did not want to fight an all-out war. Yet an army of half a million, with an arsenal of advanced weaponry, is an army for total war, not a limited one.”
Given complete command of the war and of the half million Americans, Ky would have fought for a “quick victory” (“. . .an all-out war with no holds barred.”). “If, on the other hand,” Ky goes on to say, “it had to be a limited war, . . . then there was no need for half a million men (Americans).” Instead, the United States should have patiently supported a longterm (ten years or more) people's war (with "no great army, no tragic American casualty lists”). This was the successful strategy of the Russians and Chinese.
Hindsight? Ky says that he said all this to Westmoreland repeatedly from 1964 through 1968 and that in private Westmoreland agreed with much of it. However, ”... the Americans believed that by bulldozing tactics they could win quickly, even though fighting a limited war. But the two do not go together ...”
One wonders how much of this quickly-written, easily-read, book is Ky’s and how much of it is the work of an unnamed, skillful, journalist-editor. Eighty per cent of the book, the overall structure and narrative, might have been written by anyone familiar with (or willing to research) the course of the Vietnam War. The other 20% could only have been supplied by Ky, and this 20% is what makes the book of interest and importance.
Early in the book there is a bitter summation: “Perhaps the United States could never have won the war. But even if one cannot achieve victory, the alternative is not necessarily the humiliation of abject surrender. ’ ’
Books of Interest to the Professional
91
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
Canada’s Wings
°lume I; The Blackburn Shark
NaVAL AFFAIRS
Austro-Hungarian Warships of World War I
^n<? Gr«ger. London: Ian Allan, 1976. 192 pp.
Us- £3.95 (Approx. $6.80).
Although never one of the world’s great navies, the Austro-Hungarian Kriegsmarine Performed quite creditably against heavy 0 ds in World War I. This book, the sixth ^°lume in the publisher’s “Warships of the orld Wars” series, gives specifications for a > and illustrations of many, of the vessels w kh flew its flag, 1914-1918. There is also an interesting section on Austro-Hungarian naval aviation.
Vincent. Sittsville, Ontario: Canada' lngs, 1974. 98 pp. Illus. Append. $6. (Paper).
Thc first volume of a projected series devoted t0 planes which have played an important Part in Canadian aviation history treats the ackburn Shark, a torpedo-spotter-recon- faissance biplane that served on British farriers between the World Wars and was ater employed by the Royal Canadian Air rce °n patrol and antisubmarine duty until 44. It is illustrated with 200 photographs.
duetsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945 tie German Naval Command 1935-1945)
*?icWl Salewski . Two volumes. Munich:
‘krnard & Graefe, 1970 and 1975. 595 and 701 pP- Maps. Illus. Append. Bib. Vol. 1, 82 DM ^d Vol. 2, 98 DM (Approx. $32.00 and
*37.00).
now virtually every important German naval operation of World War II has been the Mtbject of a more or less authoritative study. s'de from the memoirs of Admirals E. aoder and K. Donitz, however, next to Nothing has been written about the naval l8h command in Berlin, which planned and lrected the overall conduct of the German "'at at sea. This massive work, critically “^claimed in German historical and pro- ,essi°nal journals, fills the void with an 1InPeccably documented account of the activities of the Oberkommando der Marine.
olume I covers the period 1935-1941; V°lume II, 1942-1945.
0 Jack Nastyface:
Memoirs of an English Seaman
William Robinson. London: Wayland Publishers, 1973. 157 pp. Illus. $7.00 ($5.60).
Most personal narratives of the Age of Sail stem from the quarterdeck. This memoir, originally published in 1836, is an exception. William Robinson (“Jack Nastyface”) volunteered for the Royal Navy in 1805, just in time to take part in the Battle of Trafalgar, and deserted in 1811. The latter circumstance explains why, even after a quarter-century, he saw fit to publish his account under a pseudonym. It provides an unvarnished view of the conditions of life before the mast in the Nelsonian navy. The present edition is embellished with George Cruikshank caricatures and other contemporary illustrations.
Nelson
Oliver Warner. Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1975. 250pp. Maps. Illus. Bib.
$10.00.
This newest addition to what the author aptly styles “the Nelson industry” is an attractive pictorial. The narrative theme is Nelson as a man of his time. The pictures include a good selection of seldom if ever before published subjects as well as the old standbys. Among Britain’s most prolific naval writers, Mr. Warner is descended from one of the surgeons who certified Nelson’s disabilities following the loss of his eye in 1794 and of his arm three years later.
[31 Nimitz
E. B. Potter. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 507 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. $16.95 ($13.50).
As Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander, Pacific Ocean Areas, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz headed the greatest concentration of naval power ever assembled and directed the operations which brought about the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Now, ten years after his death, he is the subject of a major biography which portrays the man as skillfully as it traces his career. A member of the History Department at the U.S. Naval Academy, Professor Potter was personally acquainted with Admiral Nimitz and enjoyed the full cooperation of the Nimitz family.
0 Ready for Sea
Captain H. K. Oram, Royal Navy (Retired).
London: Seeley, Service and Co. Ltd. 1974. 250 pp. Maps. Illus. $9.50 ($7.60).
Captain Oram went to sea as a cadet in the British merchant navy in 1911. Entering the Royal Navy in 1913, supposedly for a year’s active duty training as a reserve officer, he stayed on until 1945. These delightful reminiscences trace his career to the end of World War I, by which time he had rounded Cape Horn (twice) in a four-masted barque, served in a battleship and two destroyers in the
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Members may order books of other publishers through thc Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) The postage and handling fee for each such special order book of a United States publisher will be 754; thc fee for a book from a foreign publisher will be $1.00. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked 13 arc Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked 0 arc Naval Institute Book Selections. All prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Please use thc order blank in this section.
Grand Fleet, fought in the Battle of Jutland, and become First Lieutenant of a steam- driven, K-class submarine.
Schlachtschiff Bismarck: Ein Bericht in Bil- dern und Dokumenten (Battleship Bismarck: A Pictorial and Documentary Account)
Ulrich Elfrath and Bodo Herzog. Friedbcrg,
West Germany: Podzun-Verlag, 1975. 160 pp.
Maps. Illus. Bib. 36.00 DM (Approx. $14.50). Available in the United States from Squadron/ Signal Distributors, Warren, Mich.
The battleship Bismarck was in commission for only 277 days, and her single sortie lasted just 215 hours. Yet the events of those hours —her breakout into the North Atlantic, her destruction of the Hood, the air strike which crippled her steering, and her gallant, hopeless fight against overwhelming odds—form one of the epics of World War II. This handsome 8 1/4 in. x 12 in. pictorial traces her career from beginning to end.
Submarines, Diving, and the Underwater World: A Bibliography
FrankJ. Anderson. Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1975. 238 pp. $15.00.
Over 1,500 works pertaining to undersea subjects are listed and cross-referenced by author, title, and subject. Approximately one-half the entries relate to submarine operations in war.
Superpower Confrontation on the Sea:
Naval Development and Strategy Since 1945
Jurgen Rohwcr. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975. 89pp. Bib. $3.00 (paper).
The 26th of the Washington Papers written under the auspices of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, this volume presents a capsule history of the postwar naval competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. One of Germany’s outstanding naval historians and analysts, Dr. Rohwcr is Director of the Library of Contemporary History, Stuttgart, and Chairman of the Work Group for Defense Research of the Federal Republic of Germany.
United States Navy Camouflage of the WW2 Era
Larry Sowinski and Tom Walkowiak.
Philadelphia, Pa.: The Floating Drydock, 1976.
52 pp. Illus. $6.45 (paper).
The development of U.S. Navy camouflage patterns and colors from 1937 to 1953 is detailed in what may well become the definitive study. The photos and drawings by which it is illustrated are numerous and clear.
The United States Navy of Tomorrow
Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, U. S. Navy (Retired). New York: Dodd, Mead and Company,
1975, 180 pp. Illus $5.95.
What will the Navy be like, what new weapon systems and technologies will be deployed, in 1980? In the year 2000? Provocative answers to these questions, based on actual operations or research, are advanced for young adult readers in this well-illustrated book. A graduate of the Naval Academy Class of 1941, Vice Admiral Cagle commanded Carrier Division One in the Gulf of Tonkin and retired as Chief of Naval Air Training and Education in 1974. This is his fifth book.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Ice Bird: The First Single-Handed Voyage to Antarctica
David Lewis. New York: W.W.Norton & Company,
1976. 224 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. Bib. $8.50.
In 1960, Dr. Lewis left a 14-year-old medical practice in England to place third in the first single-handed transatlantic race (won by Sir Francis Chichester). Since then he has made two solo Atlantic crossings, become the first modem navigator to cross the Pacific without instruments, and sailed a catamaran round the world. This book records his almost incredible, single-handed voyage around Antarctica from Sydney, Australia, to Cape Town, South Africa, on the 32-foot steel sloop fee Bird. A number of the illustrations are in striking color.
The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the Contemporary Law of the Sea
P. SreenivasaRao. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975. 313 pp. Bib. $19.95.
In recent years the increasing shortage of conventional food and mineral supplies, coupled with the technological feasibility of developing alternative undersea sources, has focused international attention on the law of the sea. In this study the Deputy Director of Legal and Treaties Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs analyzes approaches to the legal problems of exploiting marine mineral resources from the Truman Proclamation of 1945 to the Third Law of the Sea Conference in 1974, with emphasis on the period since 1958.
The Social Organization of Nautical Education: America, Great Britain, Spain
William R. Rosengren and Michael S. Bassis. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company,
1976. 118 pp. $15.00.
The latest in the Lexington Series on Marine
Affairs, this monograph investigates the differences in the social organization of merchant marine academics in the United Sates, Great Britain, and Spain. It then assays to assess the impact of these differences on the professional attitudes of the maritime cadets. Both authors are sociologists at the University of Rhode Island.
Yacht Sailing Instrumentation
Neil C. Dick. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1976. 96 pp. Illus. $8.95.
An electronics engineer discusses the selection, use, and maintenance of the various electronic instruments available to yachtsmen. Water speed and distance logs, wind instruments, and echo sounders are described in detail.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air
Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (Editors). New York: David McKay, 1976. 348 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. $15.00.
Twenty-three decisive battles, from Tsushima (1905) to Tet (1968), are analyzed by distinguished British and American military historians. Those of primarily naval interest are: Tsushima, by Christopher Lloyd; Jutland, by Peter Kemp; the Battle of the Atlantic, by Stephen Roskill; Midway, by Peter Simkins; and Leyte Gulf, by Stanley L. Falk. Editors Frankland and Dowling are respectively Director and Keeper of the Department of Education and Publications at the Imperial War Museum, London.
Strategic Air Command:
Two-Thirds of the Triad
David A. Anderton. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975. 316 pp. Illus. Append. $12.50.
The history and mission of the strategic Air Command’s bomber and missile force are illustrated and explained. The author has written several official histories for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Arms, Men, and Military Budgets;
Issues for Fiscal Year 1977
William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber (Editors). New York: Crane, Russak &
Company, 1976. 288 pp. $5.95 (paper).
Seven defense analysts examine the existing balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union in regard to both conventional and nuclear forces. They find
1 at while the United States has been dismasting in defense since 1964, during the same period the Soviet Union has greatly 'ncreased its military capabilities. Their som- ^ conclusion; “The current and projected ' ' defense posture is inadequate to meet 1 e threat posed by the Soviet Union.’’
Independence and Deterrence: Britain Atomic Energy, 1945-1952
Margaret Gowing (Assisted by Lorna Arnold). wo volumes. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1975- 503 and 559 pp. Illus. $25.00 each.
°mmissioned by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency, this work is a sequel the same author’s Britain and Atomic nerSy, 1939-194}. It covers the period from War s end to the explosion of the first British Unclear device at Montebello, Australia, in ctober 1952. Volume I describes policy making at the highest levels; Volume II treats •he actual execution of the project. Mrs. lowing is Professor of the History of Science at Oxford.
Indochina: Prospects after ‘The End’
Allen W. Cameron. Washington, D.C.: nierican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Search, 1976. 36 pp. Bib. $2.00 (paper).
"e consequences of the North Vietnamese Vlct°ry in Vietnam are explored in a timely monograph. The author, assistant dean at *he Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, e|ieves that beyond its immediate aim of consolidating its conquest, a process proceeding with surprising rapidity, North Vietnam has the long-term objective of establishing a position of hegemony in Indochina and of major influence throughout Southeast Asia.
The Making of a Missile Crisis:
October 1962
Herbert S. Dinerstcin. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 302 pp. Append. Bib. $14.95.
Most publications devoted to the Cuban Missile Crisis have approached it essentially from an American viewpoint. This study attempts to present a balanced, integrated account of the crisis in terms of the perceptions of the Soviet and Cuban, as well as U.S. governments. The author is presently Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Soviet Studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
SALT II: Promise or Precipice?
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.Jr., andjacquelyn K.
Davis. Washington, D.C.: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies,
1976. 45 pp. Append. $5.95 ($3-95 for paper).
The principal issues of the ongoing Strategic Arms Talks are assessed in light of U.S. security interests. It concludes that the United States should not accept a SALT II treaty that would codify asymmetries favorable to the Soviet Union, and that the failure of SALT would be preferable to an agreement which allows the Soviet Union to maintain the momentum of its existing strategic programs while retarding U.S. research and deployment.
The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East
Matti Golan (Translated by Ruth Geyra Stern and Sol Stern). New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976.280 pp.
Append. $8.95.
Matti Golan is diplomatic correspondent for Ha'aretz, one of Israel’s leading newspapers. Here he presents a generally unsympathetic account, apparently based on leaks from a high-level Israeli source, of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Mideast diplomacy from the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to the Geneva disengagement talks in the summer of 1975. The initial ban on the publication of the book by Israeli censorship was widely reported in the American press.
PLANS
USS Pegasus (PHM-1)
USS Asheville (PG-84)
USS Knox Class Fast Frigate USS Spruance (DD-963)
USS Perry (FFG-7)
Robert C. Morrison. Vida, Oregon: Morrison Repla-Tech, 1975-1976. $2.50 each, $10.00 set.
Though intended for modellers, these well- executed, scale drawings may be of general interest. Each consists of a 24 in. x 35 in. sheet with five perspectives—bow, stern, port, starboard, and overhead—of the pertinent vessel. A set of three sheets of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat is available for $4.00.
Price
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