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Since 90% of its oil, the lifeblood of its economy, comes from the Persian Gulf and has to transit the Southwest Pacific, Japan would find itself in dire straits—the names of these straits are Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar—should Indonesia decide to restrict the passage of merchant ships through waters it has proclaimed as its own.
One glance at the map of the Southwest Pacific gives an indication of the geographically strategic position of the Indonesian Archipelago. The 13,667 islands straddle the equator for nearly 3,000 miles from Sumatra in the west to the borders of West Irian, in the east for a width of about 1,000 miles from north to south. They command sea routes that are among the most heavily travelled in the world.
On 13 December 1957, the Indonesian government-then under President Sukarno—scrapped the former Dutch delimitation which provided territorial waters for each separate island and declared that the Archipelago would henceforth be considered an entity. It was declared that all waters lying between the islands of Indonesia ". . . are natural appurtenances of its land territory,” and therefore are subject to complete Indonesian sovereignty. This definition of territorial limits is known as the Archipelago Doctrine. Application of the Doctrine created a 3,000-by-l,000-mile mass of sovereign territory and constituted an added dimension to Indonesia’s already strategic importance.
The Declaration threatened shipping through the area and allowed ". . . freedom of navigation solely at the discretion of Indonesia.” At the time of the Declaration, most of the maritime nations of the world filed
protests with Indonesia, mainly as a technical move to ensure that the Declaration did not gain legal stature through acquiescence. But, in general, the Archipelago Doctrine announced by Indonesia did not generate much international concern for two reasons. First, the north and south passages around Indonesia, although shallow, were adequate for the then-existing shipping. Second, as explained by the Indonesian representative to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva 1958, his country chose to permit use of the passages through the Archipelago and ". . . freedom of navigation provided that it did not endanger Indonesia’s security or damage its interests.” The Indonesian government reiterated and confirmed its position in National Regulations announced in I960 and again in 1962. The legalities, mechanics, and precedents of the Archipelago Doctrine will be examined in more detail subsequently.
Several developments since 1957 give the Indonesian Declaration added and growing significance. One of the most important changes has been the emergence of Japan as an industrial superstate. As this economic giant made its spectacular development, the need for raw materials to stoke its expanding industries increased at an accelerated rate. Of particular importance to the problem under discussion has been the growth of Japanese demand for oil. The kernel of the problem is that 90% of Japan’s oil comes from the Persian Gulf and must transit the Southwest Pacific either around or through Indonesia. Until recently, medium and large tankers could make the transit by taking the shortest route through the Malacca Strait. But since 1958, a second, new, factor is changing this pattern. This factor is Japan’s employment of more and more supertankers in order to benefit from the tremendous economies of scale that accrue to their use. Supertankers that are unable to navigate the shallow passages of Malacca are carrying a steadily growing percentage of the required oil. The only safe passages are through Indonesia. Thus oil, which is increasingly vital to continued Japanese
JAPAN
PHILIPPINE
SEA
PACIFIC
Isthmus of Kra
SOUTH /CHINA
OCEAN
Singapore
Strait
CELEBES
^Strait of Malacca
JAVA
Makassar
Strait
Sunda
Strait
ARAFURA
CORAL /
Lombok
Strait
TIMOR SEA
Torres
Strait
INDIAN
OCEAN
economic health and industrial growth, has become subject to the uncertainties of . . the discretion of Indonesia.”
A somewhat strained analogy may put the situation in perspective. If, in the future, almost the entire supply of oil for the United States had to come via the port of Tampico in Mexico, we Americans would feel rather insecure as regards our sources of energy for the nation. This is not too unlike the situation facing the Japanese. Like Tampico harbor, the waters of the Archipelago that the supertankers must transit are claimed to be Internal Waters. These are waters over which the owning nation has complete sovereignty. Japan and Indonesia are at present on reasonably good terms, as the United States is with Mexico. Similarly, these relations have had strained periods, and there is no guarantee they will remain friendly.
Interesting questions arise. What motivated Indonesia to make such a claim? How dependent is Japan on routes through Indonesia? What alternative courses of action are open to Japan?
Indonesia’s Archipelago Claim. Originally the word "archipelago” was the name given to the Aegean Sea. It was later applied to the numerous islands of the Aegean and now has come to mean any cluster of islands. In the present context the term archipelago has been defined as a formation of two or more islands which geographically may be considered as a whole. Archipelagoes are further categorized as "coastal” (so close to the mainland to be part and parcel thereof) and "mid-ocean” (an independent whole). Historically, territorial waters of archipelagoes have been discussed at most conferences on the law of the sea, but no definitive rules have ever been adopted. Although seriously considered at the Institute de Droit Internationale in its 1889 Hamburg session, and again in 1928 at Stockholm, no decision could be reached. At the Hague Conference of 1930, a proposal was made to recognize the Archipelago Doctrine, but with interior waters to be classified as territorial, and not internal as Indonesia has claimed. No agreement could be reached on the proposal. Similarly, no determination of the question of archipelagoes was reached at either the 1958 or I960 United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea.
The Archipelago Doctrine adopted by Indonesia has the national baselines[1] drawn around the island perimeter-straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands. The claim converted millions of square miles of the high seas to Indonesian internal
waters.[2] The 13,667 islands of Indonesia have a land area of approximately 730,000 square miles. The national territory, under the Archipelago Doctrine, including both land and sea, is 3,364,000 square miles. Although Indonesia claims only a 12-mile territorial waters[3] the longest straight baseline of the Archipelago is some 190 nautical miles long across the Arafura Sea from the Aru Islands to West Irian.
As high-handed as it all seems, the position taken by Indonesia was not unprecedented nor were the supporting arguments without merit.4 The territorial waters policies of two other countries—Denmark and Norway—are of particular importance to this discussion. Denmark claims the waters between and inside the Danish coastal archipelago are internal waters by various enactments over many years. Straight baselines are applied with the maximum length being about ten nautical miles. The three main straits to the Baltic are within the Archipelago but they are permanently open and recognized by the Danes as International Straits.
The Norwegian application of the Archipelago Concept dates from a Royal Decree of 1935 by which straight baselines were established along the coast from the outermost points of the coastal islands. There are 123 baselines in all. The longest ones are 45.5, 44, and 40 nautical miles, and all waters lying within the baselines are Norwegian internal waters. The Norwegian case is significant because this use of straight baselines in the skjaergaard, coastal archipelago, was challenged in the International Court of Justice and the court found for Norway in a judgment of December 1951.
None of the previously described precedents can be precisely equated to the circumstances of Indonesia in that none involved a true mid-ocean archipelago. A more appropriate precedent exists, however, in the case of the Philippines. In supporting their own declaration of the Archipelago Doctrine, the Philippine government very effectively cites the terms under which the islands were ceded to the United States by Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898 terminating the Spanish- American War. Article III of the Treaty describes the area being ceded as lying within a perimeter of latitude lines and meridians.
The United States implied recognition of the Archipelago Doctrine again in 1930 when, in a treaty with
1 Internal Waters—all waters that lie within the baseline, rivers, bays and ports that arc inside the baseline. There is no right of innocent passage and sovereignty is complete.
3Territorial Waters—waters extending seaward from the baseline three, six, twelve or more miles, to the extent of the national claim to territorial limits. The right of innocent passage by ships of all nations through these waters is recognized by International law.
* See G. E. Carlisle, "Three-Mile Limit, Obsolete Concept?” February 1967 Proceedings, pp. 24-33.
Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine and Japan's Jugular 29
the United Kingdom concerning the boundary between the Philippines and North Borneo, the same method of delimitating the boundaries was used. The wording of the treaty described the land and sea areas within the perimetric boundaries as the ", . . territory over which the present government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.” During the I960 Geneva Conference, however, the Philippine representative, Senator Tolentino, stated that his government recognizes the right of historic passage through International Straits and transit of the important straits of the Philippines will not be at the discretion of the Philippine government but available for use by ships of all nations. This is a distinction that the Indonesians have pointedly failed to make.
The Indonesian Declaration of December 1957 was considered, at the time, to have been aimed at the Dutch. Those were the days of the West Irian crisis. The Sukarno government was in the process of wresting control of Western New Guinea from the reluctant Dutch. By proclaiming the Archipelago Doctrine, Indonesia sought to make it difficult for the Dutch to operate in their colony without violating Indonesian territory. The Indonesians attempted to justify their position with the following arguments at the 1958 Geneva Convention:
► The traditional "mean low water” baseline was designed for continental land masses and could not be applied to archipelagoes without harmful effects.
► Communications among the thousands of islands would be seriously jeopardized in time of war even though Indonesia were not a belligerent if the intervening waters were high seas.
► In the event of hostilities, the use of nuclear weapons in the interjacent waters would have a disastrous effect on the population of the islands and the maritime resources in the area.
Japanese Oil Imports. Earlier we asked the question: How dependent is Japan on the routes through Indonesia? The spectacular growth of the Japanese economy since the lifting of occupation controls in the early 1950s bears on the answer. Japan must have the energy- producing resources to fuel its growing economy, currently the world’s third largest. The amount of energy consumed in Japan has tripled in the last ten years, and the General Energy Research Council of Japan predicts that it will increase again by a factor of four in the next 20 years.
There has been a changing pattern of energy-producing methods used by Japan. Prior to 1955, coal and other solid fuels accounted for over half the energy source. Since that period, coal has suffered a continuous decline and has been replaced by petroleum as the
major energy source. Figure 1 depicts this change and also indicates that the imbalance will continue to grow. It is significant that even by 1985 atomic energy will account for only 10% of the energy required to support the giant industrial economy. The growth of Japan’s dependence on oil is very relevant to her problem of maintaining secure and uninterrupted transportation routes. A table published in the OECD Observer, October 1970, accents this growing of dependence on oil:
Year | Crude oil required |
| (millions of tons) |
1965 | 146 |
1970 | 220 |
1975 | 309 |
1985 | 550 |
Domestic sources of oil are insignificant and Japan must import almost all of the oil required. Since about 90% of this vital import presently comes from the fields of the Persian Gulf and West Africa the huge volume transported makes the Southwest Pacific route the third largest in the world. The world’s three major sea routes for oil and recent volume figures are as follows:
(1) Mid-East to Europe & Western Hemisphere via Cape of Good Hope—191,000,000 U. S. tons/ year
(2) Mid-East and Africa to Europe via Mediterranean 176,000,000 U. S. tons/year
(3) Persian Gulf and West Africa via Malacca & the Indonesian straits to Japan 145,000,000 tons/ year.
These figures give an appreciation of Japan’s voracious petroleum appetite. As mentioned earlier the Japanese are relying more and more on gigantic tankers to assuage this hunger, and therefore an increasing amount of oil is transiting the deep Indonesian Archipelago passages.
Supertankers. There are numerous advantages to supertankers. First, in the initial investment; it takes less labor, steel, and shipyard design to build a tanker to carry 100,000 tons of crude oil than it does to build two of 50,000-ton capacity each. The savings in steel is also a major concern and results from the fact that the "skin” of any container increases only as the square of its dimensions, whereas the volume enclosed rises as the cube. Operating costs per ton-mile are also lower. Supertanker crews are only slightly larger than those required by smaller tankers. Insurance cost per ton-mile falls off as size increases and bunker costs per ton-mile are less for these giants. One cost that is greater for the supertankers is that of necessary shore facility modification and in-port handling charges. These disadvantages are largely washed out when supertankers
are used over long hauls on long-term regular service. They can cut shipping costs in half on long runs of 6,000 to 10,000 miles when compared to ships of, say,
50.0-ton capacity.
The contracted intentions of Globtik Tankers, Inc., a London firm, are indicative pf the current trend in ship size. Globtik has ordered two 477,000-dwt. tankers from a Japanese yard. When completed—one in 1972 and one in 1973 —they will be chartered for 20 years by the Tokyo Tanker Company. While in service these two ships alone will carry over 3% of the annual Japanese oil requirement.
The Japanese are leaders in construction and use of these goliaths of the oceans.[4] In addition to the Globtik order, other supertanker orders include six in the
250.0- dwt. class for World Wide Shipping of Hong Kong. A recent delivery to a Japanese operator was the Nisseki Maru, built by Ishikawa-Harima Heavy Industries at a cost of about $35,000,000; the Nisseki Maru is 372,400 dwt. The owners are Tokyo Tanker Company, and they have the ship in service on the Persian Gulf to Kagoshima Bay run. She is unable to
1
PER CENT I-
:'See H. F. Oliver, "Gargantuan Tankers—Privileged or Burdened," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1970, pp. 39-51.
100
use Malacca because her draft is 88 feet. As with all supertankers drawing over about 65 feet, this necessitates trips through the Lombok Strait and then a passage of 900 additional miles through Indonesian internal waters.
Although the Japanese are leaders in construction and use of big tankers, the trend toward the use of larger ships by all maritime nations is unmistakable. In an article in National Ports Council Research and Technical Bulletin, Trevor Heaver describes this trend with the following figures:
In 1969, the average size tanker then operating displaced 33,700 deadweight tons; tankers delivered that same year averaged 128,000 deadweight tons; and those on order for future delivery 146,000 deadweight tons. As of 1 October 1971, on-order figures with shipyards of the world included 188 tankers and bulk carriers with drafts greater than 65 feet. Japanese shipyards account for 78 ships, and most of these are scheduled for service on the Persian-Gulf-to-Japan run. Figure 2 depicts what this trend from the World War II tankers to the Nisseki Maru means in terms of length, draft, and some significant navigation restrictions.
The number of good navigation routes available to ocean-going shipping through the Southwest Pacific is small. There are only about five reasonable portals to the Indian Ocean from the east. These are the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Torres and a route south of Australia. Some facts relevant to this discussion are revealed when these routes for east-west transits are examined.
The northernmost passage, Malacca, has a length of approximately 500 nautical miles. The eastern end of Malacca leads into the Singapore Strait, with some narrow and relatively shallow sections. South of Singapore Island the safe seaway of greater than 10 fathoms is only a mile wide and there are several sections of the Singapore Strait where the shifting bottom sands cause mid-channel depths of only 12 fathoms. Thus, dependence on this channel for all-weather passage for ships drawing more than 65 to 70 feet is not considered prudent by many shippers. This means that supertankers of about 250,000 dwt. and larger find Malacca unsafe. Of course, Malacca has the advantage that it lies between different countries and therefore the Strait, from mean low water on each side, is territorial water and right of innocent passage is recognized.
The next two significant straits to the south are Sunda and Lombok. Sunda Strait lies between the islands of Sumatra and Java. It is deep enough for all existing or planned ships but it falls within the Archipelago of Indonesia. Additionally, after transiting the Strait itself from the west, ships must then make the long passage (up to 700 miles) through the Java Sea
Indonesia’s Archipelago Doctrine and Japan’s Jugulur 31
Deadweight Tonnage | Draft (in feet) | Figure 2 Length (in feet) | Remarks |
16,700 | 30 | 503 | The wartime "T-2” |
32,000 | 34 | 630 |
|
38-40,000 | 35-36 | 660-685 | Can pass through Suez Canal fully loaded. |
65,000 | 39 | 808 | Can pass through Suez Canal partly loaded or in ballast. |
85,000 | 46 | 815 | Cannot use Suez Canal. |
104,500 | 48 | 950 | Cannot use Suez Canal. |
225,100 | 63 | 1,129 | Cannot use Suez Canal. Malacca very dangerous. |
312,000 | 80 | 1,142 | Cannot use Suez Canal. Cannot use Malacca. |
372,400 (Nisseki Marti) | 88 | 1,130 | Cannot use Malacca. |
and Makassar Strait. Lombok Strait, between the islands of Lombok and Bali, provides the safest passage for supertankers and is the one most frequently used. Minimum water depth exceeds 100 feet. Again, Lombok is within the Archipelago and a long passage through Indonesian internal waters is required.
Further east, the Torres Strait, between Cape York, Australia, and New Guinea, is not part of the Archipelago but is much too shallow for supertankers. Pilots of the Torres Strait Pilots Association will not take through the Strait ships that draw in excess of 37 feet.
There remains only one other alternate route between the Persian Gulf and Japan. That is the route circumnavigating Australia south of New Guinea then through the Solomon Islands and on to Japan. Should this route be necessary in the face of Indonesia exercising its "discretion” to deny the use of its internal waters, the trip from the Persian Gulf oil fields to Japan would be about 14,000 miles one way compared to 8,000 via the Lombok route and 6,800 for the Malacca route.
The additional monetary costs, should the longer route have to be used, are difficult to calculate because of the many variables involved. These include nationality of the vessels employed in the trade (they would not necessarily be Japanese), World Scale charter rates at the time, and the demand for supertankers for other world routes. In addition, tanker operators are not free and candid with exact cost figures. However, calculations at various World Scale charter rates indicate that the cost of oil transportation by supertanker would be about one-third more via the long route than via Lombok, thus causing a large increase in cost per barrel in Japan. Such an increase to a basic commodity would
have severe repercussions for the cost of end products of Japanese industry and the total economy.
Japanese Alternatives. Although Indonesia has made its formal Archipelago Declaration the government has so far not chosen to exercise its "discretion” to prohibit foreign shipping through its internal waters. Whether this course of cooperation will continue for long is difficult to predict. The Indonesians may be motivated presently by the knowledge that they do not possess the military muscle to close their straits or by a desire to remain on friendly terms with the major user of their waters, namely Japan. The situation could change quickly if, for instance, the support of a powerful ally was available. Or the spirit of cooperation could disappear with a new government that would take exception to real or imagined Japanese overbearing actions in the Western Pacific. There is evidence that the Japanese recognize the insecurity of the situation and are examining their alternatives.
The alternatives Japan has if passage through Indonesia is threatened or denied can be divided conveniently into long-term and short-term courses of action. The long-term alternatives are characterized by actions that can be taken to reduce Japanese dependence on the passages or to guarantee a cooperative attitude on the part of the Indonesians. Short-term alternatives are those choices available immediately if the passages are closed.
First among the long-term alternatives is a proposed deepening of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The Japanese are actively engaging in continuing efforts with the countries bordering these straits to complete a detailed survey. This would supplement preliminary surveys completed in 1969. The government-supported Malacca Strait Council has been established in Japan to promote safety and improvements. Deepening the channel appears feasible if the cooperation of the bordering nations can be obtained. Recent developments do not bode well for the project; Malaysia has extended its territorial waters to 12 miles and, in a joint announcement in November 1971, Malaysia and Indonesia stated that passage through the narrow parts of the Malacca Strait is not guaranteed under International Law. However, since this would deny the right of innocent passage through territorial waters, it is doubtful that this position could ever win any international acceptance. These actions and the difficult negotiations required simply to survey the straits must indicate to the Japanese that a deepened Malacca/Singapore passage is a very questionable alternative.
The second long-term alternative is a passage across the narrow portion of the Malay Peninsula. This passage could take the form of either a canal or a pipeline.
The Japan Land Research Institute, a private venture, made a feasibility study for what is called the Kra Canal in 1966/’ The government of Thailand protested the study to the government of Japan at that time, and in 1968 the Oversea Technical Cooperation Co. of Japan sounded out the opinions of the Thais again. The Thai reaction was still negative probably because of a desire not to offend Singapore by implying a lessening of its strategic importance. Acceptance of a pipeline across southern Thailand is more promising. The Marubeni Iida Co. of Japan completed basic exploration in cooperation with the Thai government in July 1971. This work indicated that a pipeline with a capacity of from 190 to 380 million barrels a year could be constructed for about $250,000,000. Such a pipeline would handle only about 20% of the present requirement, let alone guarantee sufficient future supplies. Both the pipeline and the canal proposals suffer from the same flaw as the present arrangement—dependence on the goodwill of a foreign government for the uninterrupted flow of vital oil supplies.
The third long-term alternative could be to contest the Indonesian Archipelago Doctrine in the World Court. Chances of success would be very slight. There is the precedent of the Norwegian case previously mentioned and, in addition, a general trend toward
increased sovereignty claims over adjacent waters throughout the world. There is almost no chance that the necessary majority could be mustered at the upcoming U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea to declare the Indonesian position invalid.
The last long-term alternative, probably the most practical, is to increase the Indonesian dependence on Japanese good-will to the extent that it balances the reverse dependency, thus creating a situation wherein the Indonesians could not afford to take unilateral action. There is strong evidence that this is occurring. Japan has established an oil partnership with the Indonesian national oil company in North Sumatra and is already Indonesia’s principal export partner. Japanese purchase of Indonesia crude oil rose from 70 million barrels in 1968 to 163 million barrels in 1970. At present, Japan buys slightly over half of all Indonesian crude oil produced. While this is only a small percentage of Japanese oil imports it represents a very significant economic factor to Indonesia. Oil is that country’s premier export, providing almost one-third of the total state income. In addition, Japan is increasing its purchases of petroleum products refined in Indonesia which amounted to 28 million barrels in 1970, more than double its purchases two years previously. Petroleum exports arc the major dependency-building commodities but other enterprises are not neglected. These enterprises include agricultural ventures such as Japanese companies conducting high technology farming development in southern Sumatra and extensive Japanese capital investments and loans throughout the Indonesian economy.
If none of the long-term alternatives prove successful and Indonesia perceives that it would be in its best
Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine und Japan’s Jugular 33
interests to deny Indonesian waters to foreign shipping, Japan would have several immediate alternatives—none of them attractive. The Japanese could, of course, force the straits militarily. This would be recognized by many nations as direct aggression, with all the potentially dangerous consequences of such a label. Another immediate expedient to the Japanese would be to reroute the supertankers around Australia. In very approximate figures this could mean that a barrel of crude oil purchased in the Persian Gulf for about $2.00 might cost $5.00 to $6.00 in Japan instead of around $4.00 if it was shipped by supertanker via the shorter route. Considering Japan’s estimated yearly requirement of over 3 billion barrels by 1985, the additional cost would be very difficult to absorb. As another alternative, the Japanese could return to the use of smaller tankers that could assert the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of Malacca and Singapore Straits. This solution would also substantially increase the cost of transportation. Economies of scale would be lost, charter rates on smaller tankers would skyrocket, and rates on Japanese-owned supertankers on substitute routes would drop. Hence, it appears that none of the available short-term alternatives arc very acceptable.
The Archipelago Doctrine, first proclaimed by Indonesia in 1957 to very muted protests, has achieved new importance because of supertanker developments and Japanese emergence as an economic world giant. Indonesia has reiterated its claim and has passed national regulations solidifying its position. Oil leases have been granted to no less than 32 foreign companies to explore and exploit oil fields in the internal waters of the Archipelago. Whether the sovereignty claim is legitimately recognized or not, Indonesia is not likely to give up the potential revenues from vast, producing concessions by retracting its claim. And as time passes the claim becomes more secure through acquiescence and non-protest.
The present Indonesian government is not now
restricting the passage of merchant ships but reserves the right to withdraw the privilege at any time. The Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied "Government Regulation in Lieu of Act No. 4” promulgated in I960 stated this reservation as follows:
"Differing from innocent passage in territorial waters by foreign ships which is a right recognized by international law, innocent passage in the inland seas is a facility purposely granted by Indonesia. As a consequence of this difference, Indonesia may withdraw the facilities granted in the inland seas ....”
The maritime interests of all nations that use the sea routes of the Western Pacific are seriously threatened, but Japan alone has a vital interest menaced with no immediate recourse that is wholly acceptable. Japan has a need and a desire to continue to grow, but memories of World War II are not completely dead, and visions of Japanese hegemony over all of Oceania are frightening to most Asians. Indonesia is a large, poten- tially-wealthy and developing nation that could easily be provoked by heavy-handed Japanese economic action. Hard bargaining between the two nations over import/export arrangements could drive the Indonesians to feel that it would be "in the national interest” to restrict Japanese shipping through Indonesia. It would appear that if the Japanese are to pursue their best long-term alternative, increasing Indonesian dependence on Japan, they must do it delicately and never lose sight of the potential costs and dangers should a miscalculation push the Indonesians into withdrawing passage "facilities” through the Archipelago.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Class of 1950, Captain Miller has served as Commanding Officer of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Three and as Air Group Commander in the USS Kearsarge (CVS-33). Other assignments have included tours in destroyers and exchange service with the Royal Navy. He holds a Master of Science Degree in Operations Research and is a graduate of the Army War College. This article was written while he was a Fellow at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.
"But when the breezes blow,
I generally go below ...”
Shortly after the attack cargo ship Yancey (AK.A-93) dragged her anchor and ran into the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel, knocking away a section of the bridge, an Army lieutenant colonel was overheard calling out to a Navy friend in the corridors of the Pentagon:
"Hey, Commander, where were you when the ship hit the span?”
—Contributed by Colonel Glenn E. Pant, U. S. Army (Ret.)
[1] Baseline—an imaginary line which forms the boundary from which territo
rial waters arc measured seaward. The baseline of an essentially straight
coastline is considered to lie along the mean low water line of the shore.
Since 1955, petroleum has continued to widen its lead over all other sources of energy in Japan.