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We are no longer shocked to see two ranks of helmeted policemen
forming a street-wide aisle down which young men can walk, not toward trial or
deportation, but toward induction into their country's armed forces. What
of these young men in the middle? How can we expect them to assume willingly
a responsibility that many of their countrymen view more
as a punishment than a privilege?
The military institution has a distinctive
da:
that
it manages or employs a substantial per-
tar
Us i ' J
> nas an “unlimited liability clause” com- lng the military member to unlimited ser- and sacrifice. Self-interest, family, and
solid
uarity of an order well beyond that re-
cl'tired
Contemporary attitudes toward the war in Vietnam and toward the employment °t force in the Dominican Republic are only le most recent manifestations of a trend ^hich has been gaining momentum for some hme. The dialectic on freedom and security c°ntinues to raise questions of means and ends.
In the face of these strains, military forces Itlu_st continue to induct and train recruits, frying to assimilate them into an institution r'at requires their wholehearted commitment.
< laracter which makes a binding set of norms a°d values at once desirable and essential. Its asic mandate gives the military a near ra°nopoiy of those means of violence avail- that can be employed in a manner bgerous to society.
Its critical nature is emphasized by the fact
Centage of the national wealth, economic Induction, and manpower. The actual and P°tential relationships between the military a^d industrial institutions hold many possibles which, under conceivable circum- s bices, could prove disadvantageous to so- CletY as a whole.
iit addition, the members of the military Services have committed themselves to the . ational service to fulfill a social need. Mili- ry service is not pursued for self-interest or ^ °Iit nor does it produce a product which an be assigned an economic value. The mili- y contract, as Sir John Hackett reminds
aiitt
yice
ven life itself, are committed to the welfare of ciety. The terrors, perils, and pressures of mbat require a motivation and group m almost any other pursuit.
v ^Ttle it must be understood that military ues articulate rather than clash with the a ,?raI American system of values, there is as utinct core °I norms> roughly definable oe “military ethic,” that clearly contrasts . b those prevalent in the civilian commu- b u' "^T>is military ethic provides the rules of avior that make it possible for the military
to function effectively internally, as well as to operate within the civilian social system. This ethic, which tends to be viewed by many as authoritarian and archaic, is in fact highly functional in nature and essential to a viable and efficient military structure.
One function of the military ethic is to provide for society’s protection. It assures that the monopoly of the means of violence possessed by the military institution is not directed toward over-turning the civilian institutions it is pledged to support.
A second function is to provide for proper relationships with other social institutions and to assure that military positions of authority are not used to the advantage of the individuals who occupy them.
A final function is to support the internal operation of the military organization as such in the conduct of its interpersonal and intergroup relationships and in pursuit of the objectives set for it.
The military ethic, in short, supports group solidarity and provides common expectations that are essential to an organization that has the size, nature, complexity, and critical social importance of our military establishment.
In order to understand the military ethic, it is necessary to examine its several components. First, can we enunciate those values which not only protect the social group against its external and internal enemies but also protect the military from wrongful acts by its own members? We frequently refer to these values as Patriotism, Loyalty, Integrity, Obedience, and Sense of Duty. But words alone do not convey adequately the entire substance of the concept as it is felt by the military man himself. Patriotism, for instance, described as loyalty to an abstract set of social, political, and economic beliefs, personified in the state, is more central in importance for the military than for the average citizen. It provides the basic reason for institutional existence. Hence, the values held by military men that concern the observance of fealty to the symbols of nationality and to the national purpose and interest can be expected to be of somewhat higher order than those that might reasonably be expected of his civilian contemporary.
Military discipline, involving a more gen-
eral sense of loyalty toward military and civilian superiors, and obedience to the will of duly constituted authority, has long been recognized as the sine qua non of a successful military organization. The successful inculcation of discipline in members of military organizations is essential. The fear of undisciplined soldiery has been a primary factor of the citizen’s long-standing suspicion of large military forces, and has made mutiny second only to treason in the hierarchy of offenses against society.
The soldier inevitably places discipline and obedience high in his value system, since they establish the guideposts for his conduct. He recognizes them as the basis for the trust and confidence which the public has confided in officers and which they in turn place in subordinates. This discipline in our democratic society does not, as some profess to believe, stifle independent thought or imply any reduction in the legitimacy of discussion, argument or dissent. The American soldier knows that he can vigorously argue a point up to —but not beyond—the final decision. As De Tocqueville pointed out a century ago:
A democratic people must despair of ever obtaining from soldiers that blind, minute, submissive, and invariable obedience which an aristocratic people may impose on them without difficulty. The state of society does not prepare them for it, and the nation might be in danger of losing its natural advantages if it sought artificially to acquire advantages of this particular kind. Among democratic communities, military discipline ought not to attempt to annihilate the free spring of the faculties; all that can be done by discipline is to direct it; the obedience thus inculcated is less exact, but it is more eager and more intelligent. It has its root in the will of him who obeys it; it rests not only on his instinct, but on his reason; and consequently, it will often spontaneously become more strict as danger requires it. The discipline of an aristocratic army is apt to be relaxed in war because that discipline is founded upon habits, and war disturbs those habits. The discipline of a democratic army, on the contrary is strengthened in sight of the enemy, because every soldier then clearly perceives that he must be silent and obedient in order to conquer.
As one views American military institutions
there is little danger of them acquiring 3 “blind, minute, submissive and invariabk obedience. .
A sense of duty, of social responsibility, 00 the part of those in positions of command °r leadership is another part of the military ethic. In assuming, in a sense, custodianship for the nation’s security and a large part of its wealth and young manpower, the military man sees a moral obligation to ensure this security, safeguard the wealth, and look aftet the men confided to his care to the best o* his ability. The unlimited commitment tha* he has made tends to cause him to view na' tional security problems as his problem^ problems which he could be required to de' vote his life to solving. It also causes him *° take a very paternalistic view of his subord1' nates, who, like himself, have confided theif lives and welfare to the service of the state) and for whose effective use he is personally responsible. In practically no other segmen* of society does the exercise of leadership °r management encompass the total relation' ship included in the term “command.” Corn' mand responsibility to the soldier is all-en' compassing, a total commitment of response bility, whether for ship, plane or unit. The commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do, and for its welfare, readiness morale, and condition.
Among those values that concern the inter' relationships between the military institution and other social institutions, there exists an' other cluster of values related to loyalty, impartiality, integrity, and responsibility. Here> again, virtues that are common to the genera* society have been reinforced with somewha* more specific meaning and import. Politic3* institutions are perhaps those that are mos* closely associated with the military. Political institutions generate a public consensus 0lj issues, resolve problems, and develop genera* policies and plans for community action. The political institutions are the mechanism hV which society creates its military forces and gives them substance and direction. Loyal*!’ requires the soldier to be obedient and re' sponsive to his political institutions, to obey their dictates and to carry out their bidding’ Since political institutions in democracies are partisan in nature, with political parties
iring 2 ariabk
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and reserve force structure, which are entially military in nature, tend to become , angled in partisan political controversy. lle on one hand the perils of political in- ement appear to threaten the objectivity
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^v°lved in the many restrictions on the pub- hQUtterances °f militarY leaders and in the lu lntf°ctrination programs of the services. a democracy, military leaders are fre- ntly called upon to make public state- v ots. Since their role is that of public ser- they must not make statements that met with the position of the current ad- tv' , lstration. Personal opinions that disagree established official policy should be kept j . n the institutional family as long as the midual is a member. usiness and industrial institutions
seci
^ _
ini ^ !arge extent’
olying these . .
ltary men. In the management of these
ending to replace each other in office periodi- ]e . tfae military, both individually and col- lively, must eschew political positions and
■ 1Vate a posture of neutrality on political 1SsUes.
Military issues of national security are not p ays easy to separate from political issues, tjo ° erns of weapons procurement, base loca- c military man, political non-involvement \.r°vides an equal peril on the other. The Uremberg trials and other war crimes trials out that unquestioning obedience to the meal institution was not always the right as\v,ej\ Thus, while the soldier is not in a Qj. lll°n to question the wisdom or rightness an order, he is expected to be personally P°nsible for its legality and morality, par- Uarly if he loses the war in which the ques- tl0a arose.
11 Practical terms, since the military men serve political parties in different ad- jstrations, they should not do for one administration that which they might regret id°U^ °PPonent §et int° office- Hence, the j^ea °f political neutrality is highly regarded ffie military code. This same principle is
are
°nd only to political institutions in imp tance of their contact with the military. , °ntracts amounting to many millions of a jSrs are inv°lved in the purchase, repair, t maintenance of weapons, weapons sys- - s' equipment, and military installations.
the contract negotiations operations are handled by
contracts and in the development of major weapons systems, there are many temptations for individuals or military services to seek personal or group advantage from firms vying eagerly for their favor and attention. Yet, in the military code, many of the normal business practices become threats to his integrity. The military procurement officer is expected, both by his peers and the public, to retain an integrity and objectivity in his financial dealings that would not be expected of the corner grocer. Military men are not supposed to be
motivated by private financial gain or even future job opportunities. Even the appearance of collusion is regarded unfavorably.
This ideal of integrity and professional objectivity is presumed to be the rule in the development of weapons systems in which billions of dollars are involved. The opportunities for developing mutual influence and interests between industrial corporations, political leaders, and military research and development officers demand the safeguards of the highest degree of personal integrity and professional judgment. The stakes, in terms of national security and public interest, are much too high to permit the normal standards of the market place to govern. As in many other areas, the responsibility the military man must carry demands a level of integrity that will ensure that positions of great authority are not employed for the private gain of the occupant or his associates.
Finally, we have said that the value system of the military institution serves to support the internal operation of its organizations in their interpersonal and intergroup relations, and in fitting them to perform their primary mission of combat. The stresses of combat place high premiums on discipline, group solidarity, mutual trust, and predictable behavior. Discipline is a precondition of military effectiveness since the mutual faith and trust between members of a military team are only too often paid off in blood. Group loyalty connotes placing one’s military group and immediate fellows above all others. Lying, stealing, and engaging in any other negative act that might disrupt the group are punishable offenses. Subordinating oneself, working selflessly for and evidencing pride in the group are correspondingly praised and rewarded. Thus the code is highly functional in maintaining the group under stressful conditions, as well as providing a powerful motivational force for its members in normal times.
Group solidarity and unit effectiveness are rooted to a considerable extent in continuity, tradition, and legitimized leadership. Tradition and continuity reduce confusion and uncertainty and assist the individual in identifying with group standards and goals. The military has always depended heavily on ceremonies that emphasize tradition and
continuity. Military insistence on cercrnoi'' distinctive badges, and traditional procedure is primarily justified on the basis of build1113 group solidarity and cohesiveness. H# standards of appearance and uniformity 0 dress, frequently castigated as “spit a11, polish,” are equally related to the creation0 pride in unit and the development of strops unit solidarity.
The military value system is geared to complex set of motivations that are larg^ intrinsic and internal to the institution. Co# strained by the many restrictions of the c.ode' by law and regulation, subjected to frequfiIl! hardship, and expected to give total conn111! ment to the institution, the soldier seeks hl satisfactions within the institution. The stator reputation, and camaraderie resulting fr°^ group solidarity, organizational esprit, 311 common expectations provide some of dlC greatest appeals. Living within an ethical s)'s tern that sustains mutual faith and confident is another. Above all, there is the sense oftJe votion to the cause of the general communis and the feeling that this service is of vital n11 portance. This sense of vocation is com11101' with that prevailing in the ministry, medicine’ law and the field of education—the so-calle professions. The military, then, differs froll| the professions primarily in the amount 0 individual sacrifice involved and the degree of commitment demanded.
Few would assert that the idealized val*1 system of the military institution is follo'vC by all its members on all occasions. Neithel are the Ten Commandments. However, system does establish a scale of values that111 fluence the attitudes, behavior and perfo1 mance of military men. It is this value syslcl1' that must be accepted by new members of tke military in order to properly assimilate the111'
The total social environment in which °l11 modern military establishment must operate is one characterized by rapid change. Societ- shows the many signs of stress that such Pc riods of change generate. Bureaucracies 35 social institutions—with their complex man agerial techniques—are becoming increasing1' more significant in the study of contempor31^ human behavior. As Dr. Paul Kurtz state in The New York Times recently, “The p0"e^ to make moral decisions is shifting from tn
remonyi
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the
c influence of the community on the atti- ues and behavior of our youth. Thus, with stantially greater economic security, in- tased academic standards and less oppor- Utllty to engage in gainful employment, Uag men are arriving at military age with siderably more education and substan- • T less influenced by the norms that de- 0[Vc from parental and community discipline, experience in the labor force. As social ^ nge magnifies the generation gap, youth l^s been turning in increasing numbers to th ^Cers f°r guidance. This in turn adds to evK .re^uced degree of general consensus being ' 'bited by increasing numbers of today’s th. Much of the enthusiasm, idealism, ofr§y, and increased intellectual preparation tio" °Uth seems to be focused on experimenta- n> protest, and various forms of revolt s inst existing social standards.
alw* commonplace to note that elders have ays complained of the rebelliousness and trh;reSPeCt ob y°uth‘ fr is perhaps equally e to observe that conservatism tends to
lndividual to the large organization.”
The upper strata of organizations appear to demonstrate many of the characteristics of Military organizations. They are hierarchical, S°verned by rules, and encompass a wide ®Pectrum of skills and professions. At the Wer levels of social organization, however, ere appear to be rather pronounced dis- t,nchons between civil organizations and °Se of the military. Whereas the lower level Social groups of military organizations tend to . e c°hesive, encompassing most of the activ- !tles of the members and exerting substantial ‘ufluence over their action and behavior, in e civilian sector the work community, play c°mmunity and living community have be- |.0l.ne increasingly separate. Furthermore, the lng community as a force exerting social f °ntrol over the behavior and attitudes of its tr'ernbers has declined sharply in influence °vcr the last half century, th * b>asfc familY unit has changed from the ^ree-generation, patriarchal family of the n of the century, to a two-generation auly more characterized by mobility and j stability than by continuity and strength, th a^fbon, urbanization and the decline of c rural and small community is weakening
tud,
increase with age, affluence, and social commitment. Yet, looking at the temper and customs of our society over a half-century or more, there has been a gradual and perceptible change in our attitudes and opinions and the values which underlie them. To describe a general set of values for American society or its younger generation would go well beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, some generalization can be made concerning the outline of those values that have specific bearing on the socialization of military recruits.
Despite the bureaucratic nature of our organizational structure and the socially oriented philosophy that has developed with it, the loosening of social controls at the lower organizational levels has led to a progressive increase in individualism. Permissiveness in education and child rearing has led toward a self-centered emphasis on individual autonomy and choice. Self-actualization, selfachievement, self-satisfaction, self-development have been taking on increasing importance in the spectrum of values over those of obligation, duty, and responsibility. As Richard Flacks has stated in a recent paper,
“The only really worthwhile goal of an affluent society with respect to its youth is to promote the maximum possible freedom and opportunity for self-development.” The President’s Commission on National Goals expressed this point in a slightly different way when it stated that “The status of the individual must remain our primary concern. All our institutions—political, social, and economic—must further enhance the dignity of the citizen, promote the maximum development of his capabilities, stimulate their responsible exercise and widen the range and effectiveness of opportunities for individual choice . . Any comparison of this kind of emphasis on the individual contrasts sharply with the group-centered value of the military ethic.
Admittedly, Americans have always been highly individualistic. The basic conditions of frontier life, immigration, free land, and social mobility fostered freedom of inquiry, individual decision-making, and dissent. Yet, this individualism was tempered by the strong family and community ties of a largely rural and agrarian society and by the necessity for group solidarity in the struggle against economic failure and the adversities of the frontier. Highly integrated economic machinery, coupled with the rising affluence of our current society, has added an entirely new dimension to the problem.
The emphasis on individualism has been accompanied by a growing scepticism towards existing standards and mores. The canons of religion, philosophy, art, and literature have been under progressively increasing attack. Absolute standards have successively given way to highly relative and situational ones. Freedom of expression has gained an increasing ascendency over restraint. This raises immediate problems in a military environment. The importance of the public utterances of military personnel in civil-military relations demands that social control be exerted over military self-expression in many of its forms. The individual recruit finds most irksome such restraints, which he rarely encountered in civil life.
Another facet of the growing individualism is the declining respect for authority. The patriarchal family and the growing class consciousness of early industrial America
fostered a substantial respect for authority! both in the home and in the community. Two world wars and several decades of culture revolution later, the perceived value of re* gard for authority is substantially reduced’ Rank, age, and position are afforded few oI the outward signs of respect considered nor' mal two generations ago. Even the law is a restraint to be flouted if it appears to obstruct some desired moral end. The civil disobedi' ence techniques of the civil rights movement are but one of the examples of the reduce0 value given to institutionalized authority 111 our general society. The structured authority pattern of the military establishment exists in almost complete opposition to this developing trend. To the young man accustomed to granting scant respect to hlS elders or their standards, the expected responses to military authority provide substantial difficulty.
Equality has long been associated with individualism in the American hierarchy ot values. Since the days of the American Revolution there has been a strong element o* egalitarianism in American thought. Fostered by the frontier and Jacksonian Democracy, there has always been a suspicion and distaste for aristocratic pretensions and class privilege. An emotional involvement win* equality can be detected in most segments o' American society. Much of the recent outcry against the draft has been based upon its unequal treatment of individuals. As the over-all affluence of society has increased, tbe rationale for differential privilege and inequality of treatment has had progressively less support. Thus, the innate sense of equality and the demand for equal privilege is substantially affronted by the hierarchy of rank and privilege in the military services.
Where the divergence of rank and skill Is
s greatest, as in the young officers and tjj .rs with professional education who feel eir expertise is not properly recognized, the °olem is the greatest. There is a continuing in a learning society that generates stantial intergenerational variations in Rational levels. When immediate super- th0rs a.re seen as being less well educated an those they control, the strain on inter- ^ s°nal relationships and individual adapta- n is obvious. Few would deny that this
olem has grown steadily in scope over the Fast 5o
years and it gives no immediate ffirnise of declining.
the attitude of citizens toward their ernment and nation—patriotism—has also tiki*1 subject to a steady, if almost impercep- le> change. As the preoccupation of the of Untry tn world affairs and the importance t 'nternational institutions has grown, so, °> have the attitudes of citizens become less r°chial, somewhat less nationalistic. Under
many influences that tend to emphasize the world scene and to de-emphasize the traditional focus on American patriots and historic virtues, the outspoken sentiment of patriotism has declined in its general acceptance. While, in absolute terms, the feelings of loyalty of the citizen for his government may not have declined substantially, public celebrations and public behavior supporting those feelings have. Compare, if you will, the attitudes with which the nation faced the Spanish American War, World War I, World War II, Korean War, and now the war in Vietnam. The substantial decline in patriotic utterances, rallying to the flag, and public volunteering in the sense of “my country, right or wrong,” is noteworthy, while the social acceptability of draft evasions, criticizing national interests and policies has made increasing gains. Similarly, the respect and veneration with which generations held the veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic have not
been replaced by similar public attitudes toward the members of the more modern veterans’ organizations.
The government appears to be assuming a much different place in the regard of its citizens. The willingness of the individual to support the national welfare and will, as expressed by his elected leaders, appears to be increasingly replaced by a feeling of subordination to an arbitrary and distant authority over which one can exercise little control. Similarly, the feeling that our nation should act directly to support our interests or citizens abroad is being replaced by the feeling that such actions should be referred to an impartial international agency. In view of the requirement for basing military action on the loyal support of the nation, and the importance of patriotism in developing the necessary group cohesion always required by a military organization, the weakening of patriotic nationalism adds to the problem of socializing military recruits.
The threat of external danger to a social group has long been recognized as a potent force in creating strong group solidarity. Patriotism and support for national purposes is strongest when the danger to its welfare and institutions can be popularly perceived as clear and urgent. The American has rallied most enthusiastically to his country’s call for a moral crusade against the enemies who threaten his liberty, his way of life, or his democratic ideals. When the United States is cast in the role of supporting world order, of supporting anti-Communist government and viable economies in underdeveloped countries far from its shores, and when the clear and present danger to American society is far from obvious, the lag in enthusiasm for the sacrifices entailed is pronounced. Short of an all-out confrontation between atomic powers or the creation of strong supranational police agencies, the United States is likely to continue to be required to provide constabulary forces in far-off areas in order to reduce the likelihood of global conflict and to maintain some reasonable semblance of a world order it can live with. Developing enthusiasm for such tasks among soldiers, some of whom were reluctantly inducted in the first place, provides a substantial and continuing challenge in the face of public apathy or outright
A graduate of the U. S. . tary Academy with the Cl^ of 1942, Colonel Hays serV^ in Europe in 1944-47, 19-* 53, and 1962-65. He was ^ Instructor in the Departing of Social Sciences, U. S. tary Academy from 1947
1950, and received his ’
• Co
in Political Science from u
lumbia University. He " PMS at Montana University from 1953 to 1956 arl ' after service with ComSeventhFlt in the VVcstCI^ Pacific, was assigned to Department of the Army Washington, D. C. Since 1965, he has been Direct0 ’ Military Psychology and Leadership, U. S. Mil>ta" Academy.
A graduate of the U. S. * tary Academy with the U3*
of 1952, Lieutenant CoI°n.‘
7 ifl
Rehm served in Korea
1953. Following troop assif?0
ments at Fort Hood, TcX
in 1954-56; Camp Campt*^
Kentucky, in 1957-59; al1 _
Panama in 1960-63; he ,l'
ceived his M.A. in Sociol°f"
at the University of ChicaS0
From 1964 to 1968, he was Assistant Professor, M1'
tary Psychology and Leadership, U. S. Mil*taI7
Academy. He is now serving with the 1st Infan '
Division in Vietnam.
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In an achieving society wherein individ**3 goals have increasingly been measured 1,1 terms of economic returns, the intrinsic n*° tivations of the military services are wide' misunderstood. All too frequently the civili3*j critic tends to measure the attractions 0 military service in terms of pay and financ*3 reward. Because these rewards appear modeS such critics tend to downgrade the ambit*0'1 of those who seek to serve and they themseh'*’5 find little attraction in such service. ^ financial rewards increasingly provide tl*<| status symbols and measure the prestige 0 an occupation, the task of reorienting l|lC military recruit toward the intrinsic sa*1'^ factions of the service becomes more 311 more difficult. Even those people who ha'c devoted some time to military service tend t0 become dissatisfied as they compare the*t working hours, responsibility, and pay vV’1 ,j those of a comparable position in some c*v
s Mil1' >eCH
; serv^
, 1950' i was a”
17 t0 M-^
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c is developed. The current absence of
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ns between the increasingly socialized re of our larger structures and the atom-
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t[Qer organizational strata of the “organiza- f a man” phenomenon may presocialize our Ure military inductees. On the other hand,
cJrsuit- Yet, it is highly doubtful that an echve military force can be built solely J°n the basis of a financial motivation.
The character and qualities of a military ablishment are intimately related to the , lety that provides it. The value systems of t society provide the basis upon which the r<; demanding value system of the military £ consensus in society at the local com- city level creates problems for military ’ndividuality at the base. They may be ;d in time as new social structures de- k °P the ability to handle functions of older, [ structures—the family and the com- Cty; As men learn to live and adapt ^selves, their ideals, and their objectives ga ■ restraints imposed by larger social or- l^ations, the differences between the in • ry organizations and their counterparts ^|,Clvd life may be expected to diminish. As 0611 Gnttman has pointed out, the military *Za,aons rePresent a rnajor working rnple of the complete welfare society. It
, V be that the continued extension into ‘Q\Ve
pte Su*3stantial reorientation away from the Setlt emphasis on individualism would Pear to be a long way in the future.
Pr k Second trend tending to alleviate the jjjij. ern lies in the changing nature of the j ‘tary institutions themselves. The chang- *at' * ^ and job structure of military organi- Pos'°-nS creates an increasing percentage of i^ ltl0ns for highly trained specialists, reduc- aiip distinctions between the nature of t;0Uary and civilian jobs. Thus, the transits*1 from civilian occupations to their mili- ijf J c°unterparts can be eased for an increased number of military members. The lack a^^frculation between the skill structure Pro rank structure appears to be in the schCCSS reduction through variable pay Car':rneS’ tile increasing development of of ,er sPecialization and the expanded use Th ec^nicai staff communication channels. ese factors will change the formal expression but not the content of the basic military value system. Although leadership in modern military forces employs manipulative techniques to the maximum extent possible, the emphasis on the need to respect authority and rank are still inherent in military organizations. The question of how best to indoctrinate recruits steeped in egalitarianism and resentful of authority with the needful sense of subordination to superiors remains an open one.
Military organizations have relied on instruction, ceremonies, and symbolic rituals of various types to focus the attention of their inductees on the primary importance of loyalty to the nation. This process has become increasingly more complicated as the recruit has become more sophisticated and less impressed with the emotional patriotism common to older generations. Ceremonies and rituals thus tend to be less effective. As the patriotic values tend to diminish, other values will have to be relied on to take their place. Experience generally indicates that organizational or unit loyalties provide a substantial focus for highly professionalized groups. If loyalty to unit or service transcends the importance of loyalty to country and government, our national society can expect to face much the same type of difficulty with its armed forces that other nations have encountered in the past.
If our educational system beginning at primary levels were to place more emphasis on individual responsibilities and duties to others and on the obligations of citizenship, it might be possible to reverse or at least halt the trend. After all, we can hardly expect a young man to assume willingly a responsibility that has been largely explained as a burden rather than a privilege. Increased attention toward training in self-government and citizenship might in time bear fruit and assist in finding solutions to a number of our social problems.
American civilians are strongly bound up with secondary associations rather than with a single dominant primary group. In the military, as we have seen, the reverse is true. The group rather than the individual, is the unit of action. The focus is on the primary group rather than on a multiplicity of secondary associations. The inductee must un-
tion responsible to the extent of its capa1 ties for the welfare of the international co'fl munity. If we are to avoid the ultiin
catastrophe, our nation must use its p0'A" ^ wisely and with restraint. It does not have viable alternative in avoiding internatio113 responsibility.
We have argued that the existence ot effective military force in contempor3 America is affected by the articulation of military value system with that of the lal!f 1 society. We see—as others before us seen—areas of significant strain. The pr°P resolution of these strains is contingent op
derstand and accept this group culture. The need to maintain intact the primary group sense developed in initial basic training should be fostered to the maximum extent. The proliferation in the military of new kinds of units tailored to a specific type of task makes it more difficult to identify a common group culture. As specific rules become less defined, personnel shifts require more adjustment on the part of the individual. Any actions that can be taken within the organization to retain common skill components and to maintain continuity among primary groups would assist in the task of cultivating unit solidarity and group identification.
The process of group identification is substantially assisted by the phenomena of “other-directedness” of our current youth. Their peer group orientation makes it substantially easier for them to accept the standards and norms of the group in which they find themselves, even if it happens to be a military one. This indicates that the maintenance of strong organizational norms and continuity in military units is a critical factor in the socialization processes. If the group has adopted institutional standards and traditions into its value system, the new arrival has less resources to hold out against his peers than may have been true in the past. To that extent the process of assimilating the individual into an existing military unit may be somewhat easier than assimilation into the temporary small group or replacement packet.
The final problem of generating support from a crusading society for intermittent crises and police actions, of various sizes, over prolonged periods of time, far from home, is not an easy one. Already, as in the time of Marius, voices are in full cry demanding the creations of a fully professional force in order to relieve the citizen of this onerous duty. The dangers in this line of action stem from the degree of separation of such a force from its supporting society and the eventual effect such a polity would have on the motivations and attitudes of both the society and its military forces. Civil-military relationships could be expected to take on a much different cast and the systems of recruitment and socialization into the military would rely less on sanctions and social pressures of the co munity and more on the attractive power the military forces themselves. Experie^ suggests that military establishments 'V1 high prestige, status and attracting power not always willing to accept the dictates ■ the social organization which seeks to contr° them.
The wiser course may well lie in should^ ing our responsibilities as a nation, and ' training our youth to accept them. Just as ® individual must show responsibility for community and his nation, so also is the
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recognition by both the military and ^ larger society of all the factors involved- dialogue requires two participants, add has been the purpose of this paper to dev.^ and present the issues from a soldier’s p°' of view. .p
The military does not feel inadequate coping with the problems of socialization '' j have presented. Indeed, the trends of S°c’a. change appear to support solutions in mal areas. On the other hand, the burden of re3<^ lution has been placed principally upon military when in fact the problems are of the community at large. Society in the long run seek to break away from s'"j plistic stereotypes, ideological viewpoints a1’^ rationalizations and see the military aS. ^ social institution of its own creation vvjt1 , can only operate effectively if it is perrnfo^ to retain its place as an integral part of 1 ‘ American community.
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