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"The Future Role of Soviet Sea Power”
(See pages 39-49, May 1966 Proceedings)
Captain William C. Chapman, U. S. Navy (Retired). (Captain Chapman served as assistant U. S. naval attache in Moscow in 1949-1950)—Commander Dudley is to be complimented for his comprehensive, perceptive, and sensible article. One can find but few, minor faults with his factual information or his interpretation of its significance.
Still, by his emphasis on the likely defensive role of the Soviet Navy, he leaves an impression that may be unduly comforting. The booming Soviet interest in the sea has the potential for wreaking havoc with the interests of the United States and its allies. At one end of the scale, Soviet merchant ships have a capacity for economic mischief for world-wide political ends; at the other end, Soviet missile submarines pose the threat of inflicting vital damage to the American homeland.
To look at the awesome extreme, the Institute for Strategic Studies in London currently credits the Soviet Union with more than 120 submarine-launched nuclear missiles. If only one-fourth of these could be delivered successfully against American population centers, as many as 15 million casualties could result. One puzzles over Commander Dudley’s optimism that the missile submarines will not be used for this purpose, since he does seem to admit the possibility of nuclear exchange in his subsequent statement that attacks by “ballistic-missile-type submarines . . . would probably not be prosecuted energetically after the initial stages. . . .”
Soviet missile submarines have three possible missions: (1) deterrence, like our own Polaris force; (2) attack on major fixed targets; and (3) nuclear blackmail. It is difficult to postulate a “defensive” mission for Soviet ballistic missiles once deterrence has failed. The offensive power of the Soviet submarine missile fleet is a concern which must be recorded so that appropriate attention may, if necessary, be devoted to its containment by U. S. naval strength.
Recent statements by Soviet military leaders reinforce the argument that the Soviet submarine missile threat need be taken more seriously. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet. Sergei Gorshkov, has written that “The Soviet Army and Navy are ready at any moment to inflict a crushing blow with all the power of nuclear missile weapons on the aggressor and his accomplices” [italics mine]. The Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, told the recent 23rd Party Congress that the Soviet submarine fleet has expanded its long range operations some 500 per cent in the past few years. Notable publicity has also been given to a supposedly around-the-world submerged voyage by a “detachment” of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines.* While the accuracy of this may be questioned, the American press has also commented on increased Soviet submarine activity.
The impact of the greatly increased Soviet merchant fleet may one day prove more lethal than will the purely military Red forces. Here again the question in regard to Commander Dudley’s article is one of emphasis. He underestimates the size of the Soviet merchant marine; his 1,124 ships of 7.03 million deadweight tons are well below the 31 December 1964 figures of 1,227 ships of 8.21 million tons published by the U. S. Maritime Administration. A more realistic figure as of mid-1966 is 1,746 ships of 9.89 million tons.
Such a fleet can almost carry all the seaborne foreign trade of the Soviet Union. There was a time when Soviet foreign trade was increasing faster than the nation’s capability to carry it across the seas. From 1950 to 1958 the ratio of increase of trade to increase of carrying capacity was 3.1 to 2.4, but this
* See “Soviet Submarines Cruise Around the World,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1966, pp. 156-159.
trend is now reversed. The Minister of the Maritime Fleet, Viktor G. Bakaev, announced in the 13 March 1966 edition of Red Star that “the fatherland merchant fleet has fully liberated the country from foreign dependence for sea transport. Today the Soviet Union is able to deliver any goods anywhere on the terrestrial globe in its own high speed ships.” While concrete evidence to support this statement may be lacking, certainly the trend is in this direction.
Why, then, continue to build toward a fleet twice the present size? Even if one considers balance of payments and cash income, I cannot believe that the answer rests in economic terms alone. Just one aspect of maritime trade, the tanker situation, presents some illuminating considerations. A recent Proceedings article noted that the tanker market already has an excess of carrying capacity such that owners will be fortunate to realize operating costs over the next few years.* In these same next few years the Soviet Union plans nearly to double its tanker capacity, adding two million tons of tankers by 1970. Similarly, the world supply of oil in 1964 was said to have exceeded demand by 15 million metric tons; still, the Soviet Union is going ahead with plans that will probably increase production some 100 per cent in the next ten years (to 500 million tons in 1975). Such increases in ships and in petroleum production cannot be made without substantial investments. Economic considerations as we are wont to think of them offer no rational basis for diversion of scarce investment resources to an already glutted market. On the other hand, political warfare does offer such justification.
Some may take comfort from Commander Dudley’s statement that “the key to Soviet tactics . . . will be to avoid Western positions of strength, which is tantamount to avoiding war at practically all cost.” Looking backward, there is no question of the truth of this statement. This has been Soviet policy since Marshal Josef Pilsudski drove the Red Army back from Warsaw in 1920; the few exceptions that the Soviets have made to the policy (e.g., in Finland in 1939) have only confirmed the wisdom of their basic position.
* See Noel T. Adams, “The Tanker Charter Market,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1966, pp. 82-91.
Still, such an observation, however true, describes only the past and the present. For the future, we would be imprudent to take any comfort at all from such speculative forecasts without at the same time undertaking a positive effort to ensure their applicability. Soviet avoidance of war has been a practical matter, and the very practical consideration that the Soviet military is number two in any primary confrontation has always prevailed. The day that the Soviets calculate that they have become number one will spell an end to such tactics. Communists would be committing heresy to forego exploitation of any advantage—especially military—to gain the final victory.
Meanwhile, it would be indeed ironic if the most landlocked of the world’s major powers were to gain political advantages from an acquired ability to disrupt the orderly commerce of the world, or to gain major strategic victories by exploitation of the high seas. The Soviet Union is plainly building toward a capacity to do just that, and in fact is well along the way to that goal. I wish that Commander Dudley had made this more apparent, for his extremely well-done study certainly supports such a conclusion.
"Needed: A Credible Presence”
(See pages 52—61, March 1966 Proceedings)
Irvin Feldman—Lieutenant Commander Withrow states that he “deplores the tendency to employ a 60,000-ton attack carrier in the role of a turn-of-the-century gunboat.” He is right as far as the attack carrier is concerned, but he has not specifically ruled out the use of one of the .fo^x-class CVS-type carriers. The air group one of these carriers employed in the Indian Ocean area might be composed of one squadron of A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, one or two squadrons of A-l Skyraider fighter-bombers, and a squadron of SH-3 antisubmarine helicopters. The employment of one of these carriers with an air group along the above lines might prove most valuable in the Indian Ocean area.
As far as co-operation with the British forces in the Indian Ocean area is concerned, the author does not clarify whether the ships and troops of both countries would operate under a combined command or operate independently but in co-operation.
I believe that a unified command modeled after NATO would benefit not only Great Britain and the United States, but also a nation which requests aid. This organization should also be open to any country in the area that wishes to join.
Anthony Harrigan (Military writer, The News and Courier, Charleston, S. C.)—Lieutenant Commander Withrow rightly stresses the need for an American naval commitment in the Indian Ocean, which an earlier writer for the Proceedings aptly described as the neglected ocean. But if the U. S. has an important strategic stake in the Indian Ocean, it certainly has need of more than the token naval force proposed by Lieutenant Commander Withrow. His proposal is all the more unsatisfactory because of his argument that an aircraft carrier is not needed. A carrier has been the heart of the British naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
The author asserts that needed air support could initially be supplied from British forces. He fails to take account of the fact that neither Great Britain nor the United States is assured of fly-over rights, let alone airfield rights, in East Africa. If ship-based helicopters are to have fighter escort, the fighters almost certainly will have to come from a carrier. Aside from the political complications regarding overflights and airfield use, it must be borne in mind that adequate airfields to support jet aircraft are few and far between in East Africa.
It is worthwhile to compare Lieutenant Commander Withrow’s recommendations for a token naval force with recommendations for a British naval presence in the Indian Ocean made in January 1966 by Major Patrick Wall, M. P., vice chairman of the Conservative Party’s parliamentary committee on defense. Writing in the London Perspective, Major Wall said Britain “must provide adequate amphibious task forces operating in the Indian Ocean with rear bases at, say, Durban and
Perth which afford the essential industrial backing. Two such task forces would be required and could be provided with 7-8 per cent of our Gross National Product provided the present rate of expenditure on semi-obsolete forward bases was pruned. Each task force would consist of a command ship, two carriers, two assault carriers, five guided missile destroyers or cruisers plus the necessary surface and underwater escorts and logistic support.”
This is the kind of sea power that could ensure command of the Indian Ocean. What Lieutenant Commander Withrow proposes is a force suitable for the Persian Gulf, not for more than 28 million square miles of ocean. As the world’s leading sea power, the United States has to think in terms commensurate with its abilities to create and deploy large naval forces. A token naval force would not be worth the money spent, for it could not deal with a major crisis.
"Half a Career”
(See pages 70—75, February 1966,
and pages 125—126, May 1966 Proceedings)
Captain Ben C. Byrnside, U. S. Navy—• Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber’s article stimulates two definite but opposite observations. First is that I am most pleased and heartened to see that an officer of his rank displays the perception to attempt to analyze the Navy career in its broader aspects. My contemporaries (Naval Academy Class of 1941) and I did not, as I recall, give tangible evidence that we thought or wrote objective articles on this problem.
My second observation is that Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber has omitted many points and considerations which are just as germane—or perhaps more so—than some of the ones he has included.
With regard to officers, his thesis passes over or omits cogent points to the extent that I remain unconvinced that his conclusions are compatible with real life. For example, although deploring the general exodus of officers from the Navy at the 20 year point, the author does not present any data which indicate the number or percentage of qualified, unpassed-over officers with significant career potential who retire voluntarily at the 20-year mark, or the 22-year mark, etc.
As an example, data for retiring captains (llxx) for fiscal year 1964 looked like this:
Tears of service | Number retiring voluntarily |
21 | 5 |
22 | 16 |
23 | 11 |
24 | 6 |
25 | 2 |
26 | 1 |
27 | 5 |
28 | 1 |
29 | 6 Total 53 |
While no objective breakdown is presented for the above (such as retirement for compassionate or family reasons, the lack of productive assignments, or retirements influenced by more lucrative salary), one does gain the impression that this is not an overwhelming number of the potential “productive forties” officers to be leaving the service. Of much more significance in my view is the fact that from 1961 to 1963, 445 line Naval Academy graduates and 1,464 other line officers resigned. If we focus on the critical grade of line lieutenants who graduated from the Naval Academy, 269 resigned between 1961 and 1963, as well as 131 “jaygees.” These represent officers in whom the government has invested significant amounts of time and money, and from whom the Navy received a relatively small return. Compared to the captains, the time during which to amortize the investment has been entirely inadequate.
Now let us take a different tack. By the record, one can determine that in Fiscal Year 1964 there were 10,135 officers between the ages of 35 and 39 as compared with 402 between the ages of 55 and 59. An officer in the 35 to 39 bracket has about a one-in-25 chance of being employed in his chosen profession 20 years in the future. Since most of us consider that a career is necessary for both financial and psychological reasons, the conclusion is drawn that, for an overwhelming majority of naval officers, two careers constitute the normal course of events. This is not a state of affairs brought about by the capricious resignation of captains, but is a system engendered by planned policies. The recent accent on
youth has only accentuated the policy.
Admitting that, for all but a few, the Navy is “half a career,” is this necessarily intolerable? Or even bad? Not if we recognize it and plan for it. No disloyalty is implied by an officer planning a second career; nor should such be inferred by his seniors as long as he does not permit preparation for the future in any way to degrade his ability to perform his present job. Measures which alleviate the conflicts of trying to combine the last year of active naval service with the decisions of eminent retirement, are the areas in which officers need help and consideration.
Actions to discourage the possibility of a second career after a military career, or actions to encourage below-flag-grade officers to hang on past a point-of-no-return (and most of them know when this is), consist of “cruel and unusual punishment,” which is expressly forbidden by Naval Regulation.
Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber has, with all good intentions, applied a tourniquet to the left arm when it is the right arm that is bleeding. Recognizing the accent on youth for military personnel, let us freely admit, discuss, and accept that for most, the military career is not normally a lifetime career. Then let us concentrate on seeing that the government gets the best performance possible for its part of the career, and that the people get the most consideration possible in making the sometimes traumatic change to a new career, even though in that “productive forties” period. It would be hoped that such a challenge would attract more of the officers in the middle and junior grades to prolong their service careers.
Chief Air Controlman L. T. Grigsby, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Swarztrau- ber’s article offers a most practical approach to a problem that seemingly defies solution. His insight into the problem and proposed solution, far reaching in effect, could have tremendous potential if only the right people in the right places could be sold on the idea.
I have noticed for some time that among enlisted as well as many officers there is considerable lost time as they end their career with the normal 20 years of service. In the aircraft carrier I am now serving in, of approximately 170 chief petty officers on board, 25
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per cent are slacking off at varying degrees as they approach the magic number of 20. And, depending on morale, this can increase to an even higher percentage. I have seen divisions and, ultimately, the ship suffer because of an 18- or 19-year chief petty officer passing on his short time attitude to the first termers and, in many cases, career personnel who are his subordinates. During 12 years in the Navy I have seen such cases on every ship or station in which I have served, and in each instance it has been a serious problem, but forcibly overlooked since it seems to be Navy policy to carry such individuals rather than ruin their careers.
At times it becomes almost unbearable when I see this waste. My hands are tied and so are the hands of thousands of other dedicated career petty officers. Myself and others in the service applaud Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber’s efforts.
Commander Edward R. Day, Jr., U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, Air Antisubmarine Squadron 27)—It is highly advisable for those of us in the Navy to evaluate the present retirement system and to envision acceptable alternatives, as it is only a matter of time until the civilian hierarchy in the Department of Defense forces an agonizing reappraisal.
The manner of officer personnel administration in the Navy violates almost every principle of sound personnel management. The changes in the retirement system, as advanced by Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber, offer a positive step toward correcting personnel practices that are wasteful of trained personnel and do not adequately reward our people either for long and faithful service or for truly outstanding performance. A broad- spectrum overhaul of personnel practices is critically needed and must encompass the
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are inivted to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval or maritime interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
vital areas of promotion, continuation, and retirement.
The existing promotion system does not provide adequate incentive for the best qualified, most intelligent, and highly aggressive young officers. Through the grade of lieutenant commander we employ the elementary school system of social promotions with 90 per cent advancement opportunities. The outstanding officer is advanced at the same rate as the barely acceptable officer until he completes three-quarters of his “half a career.” We must provide for the accelerated promotion of all outstanding young officers and at the same time retard the rate of advancement of the average officer. The deep selection of a handful of outstanding officers is not consonant either with our need for large numbers of outstanding middle-management people or with our fallible system of performance evaluation.
The Navy must scrap the idea that one must go up or go out. Training costs and officer recruiting problems are such that we cannot discard thoroughly satisfactory performers when they have reached their intellectual plateau. A staff avionics officer might carry such a responsibility quite effectively and yet evidence no potential for command. We must provide a full career for such an officer and discard him only if his professional growth is not equal to his present grade.
The present retirement system needs revision along lines similar to those described in “Half a Career.” The existing system forces the ridiculously early retirement of officers of limited potential, many of whom are quite excellent performers in their present grade. But worse, it encourages our most outstanding and ambitious leaders to undertake other endeavors in the very prime of life. Remaining to compete for top command in the Navy are the less outstanding officers and the too few truly outstanding leaders that are so “blue and gold” they never consider another career.
It is time the Navy provided a “full career” for officers who are fully equal to their present responsibility as well as for those of truly outstanding potential. This can be done only if, at the same time, large numbers of officers are rewarded with accelerated promotion and the promotion of even larger numbers is retarded or restricted altogether. When this has been accomplished, a full Navy career will appeal to substantially greater numbers of aggressive and ambitious young men who cannot bring themselves to accept “half a career.”
Commander R. E. Engle, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Seadragon, SSN- 584)—Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber proposes offering a very interesting carrot for attracting men to full term naval careers. If implemented and if it is a success, the Navy will be faced with the problem of promotion stagnation. The alternative is to become increasingly selective in promotion and retention. Appropriately applied, this can further serve to enhance the quality of the senior officers and petty officers.
The solution in the officer corps would appear to be simple: an increased attrition through the instrument of the selection boards and the captain continuation board.
The problem with career enlisted personnel is more complex since there is no significant administrative attrition other than the 20 year transfer to the Fleet Reserve. If Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber’s plan works as advertised, and if men were to receive their promotion to chief petty officer after the same number of years as they do now, career sailors would spend one-half to two-thirds of their career as chiefs. To accommodate the lengthened career without forced attrition means either a longer time spent in each of the lower pay grades or an unreasonable increase in the number of CPO billets authorized. Neither of these is a solution likely to enhance the attractiveness of a naval career.
The solution may lie in one or more of the following approaches:
• Involuntary retirement or transfer to the Fleet Reserve if specified promotions have not been attained at given years of service or time in rate.
• Bureau of Naval Personnel continuation boards to screen all personnel after specified years of service or time in rate.
• Competitive examination of all men within a given rate when they attain specified years of service or time in rate with attrition adjusted to the needs of the service.
Whatever the method, it must be one that ensures that men do not reach a high plateau too early in their career and then just ride the vents to the end of their service.
Lieutenant James S. Eilberg, SC, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber has pointed out the obvious contradiction in Navy career planning. His proposed retirement pay scales are also persuasive. However, I believe he neglects to mention how extended careers might more than pay for themselves and further benefit both the Navy and the individual.
The costs of recruitment, placement, training, transportation, medical care, etc., that would be saved were the majority of chief petty officers to remain in service for ten more years are enormous. Assuming that the present first-term enlisted attrition rate of approximately 80 per cent were to remain constant for the next ten years, the Navy would save the aforementioned costs for at least two enlistees if one CPO remains in service at least ten years after his first 20 years of service.
And, this is virtually a pure savings. If the CPO retires at the end of 20 years the Navy is still burdened with his retired pay and beneficial care.
Assume that it costs the government 5,000 dollars per annum to maintain a retired CPO and his family or 50,000 dollars for ten years. Assume also that it costs 10,000 dollars a year to maintain a first-term enlistee on active duty, or 100,000 dollars for ten years. Thus, over a ten-year period the total cost to the government is 150,000 dollars if the CPO retires after 20 years of service.
If the CPO were to serve 30 years, the overall cost to the government should not exceed 150,000 dollars; it should be considerably less. Why not then give the difference to the CPO as an inducement to remain in the Navy?
Lieutenant Commander Swarztrauber’s pay scales have one serious drawback—they make it easier for the Navy man with eight to 15 years service to retire; he would be forsaking only a 30 per cent retirement. The objective should be to make the Navy as a long term career just as attractive to the man with ten years service as to the man with 20 years service.
I would propose leaving the present pay scales intact through 20 years of service, and then to add a 50 per cent active duty pay increase, the sum the CPO would receive had he retired. This 50 per cent increase would remain constant as long as the man chose to remain in service. It would not affect the computation of retired pay.
If the CPO had left the service the government would have had to pay as much if not more to hire and maintain transients of considerably less capability than the chief petty officer. Asking him to stay on for ten more years with no immediate pay increase when he can get half pay for doing nothing is a ludicrous proposition. Giving him a 50 per cent bonus to remain in service is an attractive alternative. And, the Navy has retained a valuable and tried asset rather than an expensive liability.
The proposal would also reap several intangible benefits: It would enhance the prestige of the career military enlisted man both in the ranks and among civilians; it would restore much of the expertness and professionalism to the CPO rating; it would enable enlisted men to envision a positive and deserved reward for excellence and service; and, in the final analysis, it would make a strong reality of the term “career Navy.”
"Accommodations, The Squeeze Play”
(See pages 52-61, December 1963 Proceedings)
Commander Thomas B. Wilson, Jr., U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Tarbox has presented an informative account of how the “habitability” problem has evolved and has basically defined today’s problem as one of trying to reduce the number of accommodations to be provided and then trying to find the prescribed space to provide these accommodations in the modern warship. Both problems are formidable and the complete solution will probably never be found.
In addition to reducing the number of men by assigning petty officers to what had been the province of the seaman, I would suggest taking the process one step further along. To
date, these assignments have been in the area of military functions—-job capabilities that are expected of all. If we are to reduce further the number of people we will have to cross department or trade lines and get cross utilization of personnel to maximize personnel efficiency during all shipboard evolutions. The barber could be trained to operate tractors on the flight deck of a carrier during flight operations, the ordnanceman to sound tanks or handle lines during fueling or replenishment operations, both additional jobs tending to equalize the individual’s work load. As an incentive to encourage this type of “moonlighting,” qualification for and performance in the job could be rewarded by additional pay. Normal design work studies will not reveal this type of saving since they neither look at the ship as a whole nor the individual as a “jack” of more than one trade.
Another method to reduce the number of people is to reduce the number of functions being performed. This would reap a two-fold harvest since it not only provides for personnel reduction, but would remove the requirement for the space allocated to the function in question. The carrying of ship’s boats and vehicles is an example. The boats for the force as a whole could be carried in an inexpensive, special-purpose ship, and vehicles used ashore could be rented when in port.
In any attempt to reduce the amount of space devoted to accommodations we must realize that we have to start with the people requirements if we are to end up with a successful ship—one that people can live in and live in happily. It is from the small ship where the problem is most pressing that the larger ship designer can learn. In yacht design the attempt to provide space for living and pleasure and yet provide endurance, seaworthiness, and speed in a limited size hull predetermines the failure to satisfy anyone completely. The failure must be small enough that the boat is still a pleasure or the design fails and the boat does not sell. The yacht designer accomplishes “the impossible” by economizing on weight and space and ensuring that less material is loafing and more working to its allowable limit while still providing reliability. He can seldom afford the pleasure of reliability through redundancy and looks for duplicate systems and waste space to eliminate. He finds that a great deal of space is provided in walkways through shops, engineering spaces, and berthing, and messing spaces so he makes them combination spaces wherever possible and provides the walkway only once.
The space to start with aboard a naval vessel is the crew’s messdeck. This space, which is virtually all passageway, no longer serves its traditional role of classroom and examination room; closed circuit television has eliminated this requirement. What is needed today is the division size classroom or exam room and/or recreation area adjacent to but separated from the division berthing area. The messdeck area redistributed throughout the ship could well provide this while at the same time serving as individual dining areas. This arrangement was used before and worked well; it could work again.
The same is true of using shop and machinery areas as berthing areas. An example of an ideal space for a living area is the emergency diesel generator rooms on the Essex- type carriers. This space is seldom used effectively. Probably the most desirable feature of these proposals is that they could be back- fitted on most existing ships at minimum cost.
"Admiral Makarov: Attack! Attack! Attack!”
(See pages 57-67, July 1965 Proceedings)
Captain Robert T. Southerland, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Every few years someone stumbles across and repeats old criticisms of ships built to Admiral PopofTs novel designs. Dr. Mitchell reports “these completely worthless Popovkas . . . could be used only as fixed forts.” A few comments in defense of the “popoffkas” appear in order.
The circular ironclads Novgorod and Vice Admiral Popoff were not “popoffkas.” The Emperor of Russia gave the name “popoffka” to a unique ship form designed by Admiral Popoff and built as the Russian Imperial yacht Livadia in 1880, seven years after the first circular ironclad, Novgorod, entered service, and after the Russo-Turkish War had terminated on 31 January 1878. The “popoffka” was an improvement of the earlier ship form made by moderate elongation and fining of bow and stern. In plan view, the true “popoffka” design resembles a pumpkin
seed, and is not circular in shape.
Underwater sections of the circular ironclads were not rounded as shown in the illustration on page 60 of Dr. Mitchell’s article, but were flat. The Novgorod, completed in 1873, was 101 feet in diameter, had 11-inch armor all around, and mounted two 28-ton guns. The Vice Admiral Popoff, finished in 1875, was 121 feet in diameter, had 18-inch armor, and carried two 41-ton guns. Both were flat-bottomed, had a draft of approximately 13 feet, a freeboard of about 18 inches, and had a maximum speed of seven to eight knots. Both were slow by modern standards, wet in a seaway, and were hard to steer. Model tests had been made by William Froude at the Admiralty Experiment Works at Torquay, and he found that the resistance to propulsion was some four to five times as great as that of a conventional hull of the same displacement at eight knots.
But, in discussing the circular ironclads, William Froude said:
There is . . . rather a curious fact in relation to the resistance of these ships . . . up to the highest speed at which we drove them . . . their resistance was just as the square of the speed . . . you might infer from that that there would be some gain in pressing these ships to a high speed.
Others have subsequently made similar suggestions, and in 1962 tests of a circular “discus” form, the Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation found that with the density of the model adjusted to correspond to a 40-foot diameter full scale, the model behaved as a planing hull above a certain equivalent full-scale velocity depending upon surface roughness of the water. A significant reduction in drag was associated with this phenomenon.
It is hard to credit the allegation of “massive cases of seasickness” during trials of the circular ironclads. To the contrary, E. E. Goulaeff, a Russian naval officer, wrote of the Novgorod:
Her stability is immense, and her steadiness as a gun-platform is greater than that of a ship of any other form . . . the rolling of the Novgorod is very limited indeed . . . the greatest angle of roll which was observed while I had the pleasure of steaming on board the Novgorod for several days at sea, during the
Equinoctial gales, never was such as to expose her lower edge of the side armor—the instrument for measuring the angle of heel showing at that time that the arc through which she was rolling was 6 or 7 degrees: and this was in waves in which ordinary ships steaming the same course as the Novgorod were rolling very heavily. . . .
If one considers it unwise to rely solely on the statements of a contemporary Russian enthusiast, he might give greater credence to the words of Sir Edward Reed, notable naval architect, first Secretary of the Institution of Naval Architects, and, incidentally, Chief Constructor of the British Navy. Sir Edward said:
Having made several passages in this Novgorod over the Black Sea, one of them in eminendy rough weather, I was gratified to find that I made those passages with the greatest possible comfort . . . and when the waves were running to considerable height. . . you sat in the cabin in the deck-house with the ship in a state of almost absolute tranquility—no rolling worth mentioning to trouble you, and scarcely any pitching.
To refute the “worthless” charge, another apt 1875 quotation from Sir Edward is:
I should like to ask those gentlemen who spoke so strongly against this class of vessel, if they will be good enough to refer me and this Institution to any vessel whatever in the whole world, except the Novgorod, which carries at from 7 to 8 knots armour 11 inches thick, and two 28-ton guns. There is no other vessel in the world that does it.
Later that same year, Admiral Popoff considerably improved upon the Novgorod’s characteristics, as noted above.
The Livadia, the “popoffka” built in Great Britain after model tests by the Chief Constructor of the Royal Dutch Navy, was 230 feet in length, had a beam of 150 feet, drew seven feet, was propelled by triple screws, and made 15.75 knots on her official trials. She had a double bottom, a double layer of voids all around her sides, and was truly a floating palace. The Grand Duke Constantine, whom Dr. Mitchell describes as a “comparatively young and very progressive official,” backed the Livadia design and himself took delivery of the ship in 1880. He made the passage from
Great Britain to the Black Sea, accompanied through a severe Bay of Biscay storm by several British guests.
Two quotes by Britishers about the delivery voyage and storm are in order. Mr. W. Pearce, managing director of J. Elder & Company, shipbuilders, said:
This ship has the steadiest platform of any in the world . . . this ship passed through the Bay of Biscay during a week when it is recorded that more ships foundered than in any week during the whole of last year, you will understand that she must be exceptionally steady, and as a matter of fact she rolled only 3 degrees one way and 4 degrees another, and the range of pitching was only 10 degrees. I am sure that no vessel in our navy could have passed through that sea without rolling at the least 25 or 30 degrees.
Sir Edward, also a passenger, estimated wave height during the storm as 25 feet.
Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, Royal Navy, another passenger, had this to say:
I never was in so comfortable a ship at sea in a gale of wind . . . the absence of rolling, the easiness of motion, the great comfort on board, and the handiness of steering, were such as I have never seen before in any other ship under similar circumstances of weather and sea.
Finally, Dr. Mitchell states that in 1876, prior to the Russo-Turkish war, “there was every prospect that the Russians would be badly beaten at sea,” but that the “apparently hopeless odds did not dismay Makarov.” Not everyone could have shared that opinion; the Russian empire elected to declare itself the protector of Christianity in the Balkans, and held that the Turkish atrocities of 1876 justified a declaration of war in April 1877, after due time for deliberation and preparation. The Turks were overwhelmingly defeated.
It is related that with the Turkish Navy possessing “more than a dozen modern ironclads besides smaller vessels, the Russians had only a few unarmored steamers and gunboats, plus two ironclads.” Perhaps Dr. Mitchell refers to the Black Sea Fleet, but by the end ol the 18th century the Russian canal system, extending from St. Petersburg to the Caspian Sea, had already been developed. Although rivers and canals may freeze in winter, sea routes to the Black Sea remain open, and Russia chose the date to initiate hostilities.
According to L. R. Hamersly’s A Naval Encyclopedia published in 1881, at the beginning of 1879 the Russian Navy included 30 armored ships and 199 other vessels of all classes and descriptions. At the same time, according to the same publication, the Turkish Navy is reported to have had 15 large ships of various types, plus a small fleet of gunboats and river monitors.
Let’s Show the Grape With the Flag
Commander Raymond A. Komorowski, U. S. Navy—The Department of State has published a list of American wines which a panel of independent experts believe could be served aboard with “pride and confidence.” The All-American carte des vins was in line with the State Department’s attempts to “reduce the balance of payments problem as well as to stimulate market interest in American wines abroad.”
nHUHL
LOGISTICS
By Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer, USN (Ret.)
A basic text in logistics written for the naval officer seeking knowledge in this critical field. Emphasizes applied logistics within the Navy, describes joint, national, and international logistics planning. List Price $7.50 Member's Price $6.00
Whether these objectives will be achieved must await the test of time, but two certain benefits will be the increase of U. S. prestige
among that influential group who measure a nation’s achievement in gastronomic as well as astronautic terms, and the addition of a new and interesting dimension to State Department table conversation. And, it now may be the time to examine once again what advantage might accrue to the U. S. Navy’s showing the United States grape along with the United States flag!
This writer’s last command was a destroyer squadron flagship. During a recent Sixth Fleet deployment, the squadron commander was also the senior destroyer commander in the Mediterranean. The commodore was of a social disposition and enlarged his official social duties to include other delightful occasions, during which indigenous persons of influence, with whom the United States had a mutuality of interest, were entertained.
On these occasions the flagship was both pleased and proud to assist. These events ranged from small luncheons and dinners in the commodore’scabin, to black-tie and seven- course dinners in the wardroom, to luncheon and supper buffets for up to 40 ladies and gentlemen. All this is a common enough experience—in greater or lesser part—for every officer who has been to sea. And common too is that difficult decision as to what and where refreshments might properly precede the occasion on board ship. The judgment as to what is a simple one; an aperitif of some kind is clearly called for. But the where can be mighty troublesome. A hotel room nearby? A waterfront cafe? Almost every facility suffers in some way from inappropriateness of location, or of decor, or of clientele. The simplest, most tasteful, and most appropriate solution —the wardroom or senior mess—is denied us.
It is time to abandon the anachronistic regulation that drives us into some inappropriate bistro for the civilizing pleasantry of a before dinner drink or has us explaining to a foreign listener why the officers of a great Republic are forbidden the taste of the grape on board ship while the listener smiles patronizingly and mentally translates the regulation into what it is—a vote of no confidence.
Has the Navy not earned the right to choose or refuse a glass of wine on board ship by its general temperance in millions of shore leaves in scores of countries? Is not the prestige of the Nation properly advanced by that most civilized and general of customs—a glass of wine with the meal?
Having commanded at sea on three occasions, and having been the guest on board many ships of foreign navies, I would be loath to suggest the introduction of spirits to the same degree that is usual in some other navies and is appropriate to their service. I would suggest some regulation that would chart a course between unnecessary license and stultifying abstinence, add stature to the reputation of the Nation and the Navy that serves it, provide an opportunity for the prudent introduction of our splendid domestic wines to foreign persons, introduce a gracious custom of social behavior to our ships that is reflective of the behavior of the United States and the civilized world, do away with the apologies for our present tasteless approach to the pleasures of the table, and, to drain the barrel, promote good digestion!
The regulations should tend toward the following: No spirits to be served when underway; no spirits other than domestic wines to be served; no spirits to be served in any port in the United States or territories where an officers’ club exists; no spirits to be served on any occasion other than the evening meal, except changes of command, and then only when guests are present for that meal; spirits to be served only on authorization in writing by the commanding officer or appropriate senior, for use in the wardroom or appropriate senior mess.
It is time we laid to rest the implicit, unspoken image that our present regulations evoke of drunkenly carousing officers conning a weaving man-of-war toward destruction on some clearly lighted reef.
Gentlemen, charge your glasses! I propose we toast the United States, the President, and the U. S. Navy—aboard ship and with the wine of our great Republic!
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