Special Operations Forces Need Less-than-Lethal Options for Competition

Special operations forces (SOF) are short on capabilities that could challenge adversaries in today’s competition space—capabilities that deliver decisive effects when lethal force is not suitable. As adversaries continue to create dilemmas with activities that fall below the threshold of armed combat, lack of expertise in the intermediate level of force will leave SOF units without the full range of countermeasures.

To address this limitation, SOF not only will have to change how they build enduring advantages, but also must develop capabilities in areas such as nonlethal weapons.

A Focus on Deterrence Through Strength

SOF’s emphasis on supporting integrated deterrence by fielding combat-credible forces narrows its focus to building lethality. But not every deterrence mission is best served by a lethal combat force. In the Philippines, for example, a conventional deterrence model would be challenging to implement.

Part of the first island chain, the Philippines would be a key factor for China as well as the United States in the event of conflict in the region. However, the Philippines also has active disputes with China over contested areas in the South China Sea, and China has resorted to coercive activities that fall below the threshold for U.S. or Philippine armed response.

While the United States seeks to support its treaty ally, an integrated deterrence model is not well suited to address China’s malign activities. The U.S.-Philippine exercise Balikatan 2024 demonstrated the combined force’s ability to use conventional military forces and SOF to sink ocean-going vessels. Despite this show of force, China increased its illegal, coercive, and aggressive activities against the Philippines.

In June at Ayungin Shoal, a swarm of small China Coast Guard vessels and sailors wielding axes, knives, and sticks descended on Philippine Navy SEALs attempting to resupply an outpost. Videos also appear to show the Chinese using lasers and audio devices to impair the SEALs’ sight and hearing. Dozens of similar interactions have occurred throughout the South China Sea.

The strength of U.S. and allied militaries has led competitors such as China to resort to tactics that fall beneath the level of armed combat, undermining the U.S. military’s ability to respond with conventional force. Activities that do not demonstrate lethal intent do not cross the threshold at which traditional lethal capabilities can be employed as a countermeasure or be an effective deterrent. As a result, military forces that focus solely on developing, maintaining, or employing lethal options are at a disadvantage.

Nonlethal Capabilities Can Expand SOF Agility

SOF should press beyond a deterrence-through-strength mindset and develop more capabilities within the nonlethal space. Situations such as those in the South China and West Philippine Seas are coercion problems for which SOF must develop and maintain intermediate capabilities that can counter or defeat the adversary below the threshold of lethal combat.

Intermediate force capabilities (IFCs) fall under four domains: nonlethal weapons, electromagnetic warfare, information operations, and cyber operations. Although SOF maintain numerous capabilities in these areas, nonlethal weapons are not characteristic of these forces. And while the tools in each domain may be more or less appropriate depending on the situation, being able to access all four would open the aperture for countering adversary activities in both in the physical and virtual space.

In addition, if SOF were to incorporate IFCs in their toolkit, they not only would be able to operate more effectively across domains, but also would be better able to manage situations on the verge of conflict. If an adversary used nonlethally intended means in an area that possessed numerous trip wires for crisis/conflict, creating more levels within the escalation continuum would widen the threshold between peace and crisis/conflict. If neither side wished to capitulate but both wanted to avoid escalating to conflict, having only lethal options would push both sides toward one end of the continuum or the other.

If one side were to use nonlethal means with decisive effect and the other possessed only lethal options that could not be used, then the risk calculus would shift the situation toward capitulation for the side with fewer options or toward crisis/conflict. Having nonlethally intended options that match the adversary’s would correct that imbalance—creating equilibrium and allowing more space for escalation or de-escalation.

In gray zone situations, keeping the risk calculus closer to the center while maintaining efforts to resist an adversary can be a way to manage the problem while other instruments of national power such as diplomacy or economic coercion are explored. Additional options that allow one state to contest another without leading to capitulation or conflict may be what policy-makers or diplomats prefer.

If SOF want more options during competition or to better manage situations in which competitors employ tactics below the threshold of conflict, they will need intermediate force capabilities. Nonlethally intended coercive activities are becoming common in flashpoints worldwide, and a lack of options within the space between peace and conflict could push the United States and its allies and partners closer toward capitulation or conflict. With IFCs, SOF could help manage situations while disrupting, delaying, or degrading adversary nonlethally intended coercive activities.