Contested Logistics Requires a European Collective Answer

From the battle in the Black Sea to the Red Sea crisis, recent events have underlined the need for navies to adapt to operate in contested environments. In the Red Sea, the military responses to protect freedom of navigation were effective but should not be taken for granted. The European Union’s Operation Aspides and the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian benefited from relatively free maneuver despite the Houthis’ attempts to deny maritime access, and from the uncontested access to port facilities to replenish fuel and ammunitions. However, the situation could be very different in a conventional conflict with an adversary focused on disrupting or destroying logistics assets and facilities. 

In 2022, Ukraine’s targeting of Russian logistics resources proved efficient at hampering the invasion, and the same modus operandi at sea can be expected in the foreseeable future, making contested logistics a critical challenge.¹ If sea lines of communication (SLOCs) were contested and sustainment from logistics hubs or naval assets proved impossible, the feasibility and tempo of a major maritime operation would be significantly undermined.

The challenge of sustaining high-intensity conflict at sea is particularly acute for European navies, which have suffered reductions during the past 30 years. As they now are preparing for high-intensity warfare, they must collectively address the challenges contested logistics pose. They must adapt training and operational deployments to foster doctrinal thinking, develop infrastructures and interoperability in forward bases, and invest in collective sustainment capacities. 

Logistics In High-Intensity Conflict

The relation between a navy’s effectiveness and its ability to provide strong logistics support has been widely theorized. Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasized the need to secure sea lines of communications and underscored cruisers’ dependence on coal after the introduction of steam.² Logistics was a decisive U.S. asset during World War II. The ability to sustain the colossal requirements of the war, the effort in ship production, and the logistical innovations of the Navy and the Marine Corps were crucial.³ 

The Falklands War in 1982 was the last significant illustration of the challenges high-intensity warfare presents to navies. The United Kingdom deployed and sustained a naval force thousands of miles from its main bases to fight a conventional conflict against Argentina. It succeeded thanks to a robust joint organization, the establishment of a forward base, and the incorporation of numerous civilian vessels into the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Despite this victory, however, “the task force remained vulnerable to the interdiction of its supply lines for almost the entirety of the war.”⁴ 

The challenges of high-intensity warfare and its implications for naval logistics faded after the Cold War. Western countries designed their fleets to protect their territories and interests and to engage in expeditionary operations. Sustaining forces ashore with sea-based logistics  received the most attention. For more than three decades, the sea was perceived “not just as a strategic medium of transportation, but as the world’s greatest maneuver space.”⁵ 

Recent events, however, are a reminder of the challenges maritime operations in high-threat environments pose. The increasing need for fuel, ammunition, and maintenance could quickly lead to a logistics culmination point—the moment in which the required resources exceed the supply “up to a point where combat operations cannot be executed as planned.”⁶ For the United States, recent studies show that in a war in the Pacific, U.S. Navy surface ships likely could operate for no more than a few days without support, and that, in the South China Sea, “four to five West Coast-based Arleigh Burke destroyers would be required to maintain one on station, that is, fully combat capable.”⁷ 

In addition, distributed maritime operations would complicate planning and require more flexibility in using logistics assets. Precision-guided long-range missiles would make hubs and bases easy targets, increasing reliance on mobile logistics. Cyber threats also would be detrimental to the operation of infrastructure and logistics tools. This paradigm is a significant issue for navies: Logistics could be the center of gravity in a future conventional conflict at sea. Adapting organization, training, doctrine, and equipment is necessary. 

Sustainment In Contested Environments: A U.S. Priority

For the United States, sustainment during high-intensity conflict is a priority. The increasing complexity of logistics requirements, the prospect of distributed operations, and the prospect of a conflict in an antiaccess/area-denial environment led to the concept of globally integrated logistics in the 2015 Joint Concept for Logistics. It aims to reduce the gap between increasing logistics needs and available capabilities through modularized logistics support, agile resource allocation, rapid and flexible transportation systems, prepositioned capabilities, flexible networks of logistics nodes, and multiple options for lines of communication.⁸ 

Studies, experiments, and wargames are encouraged to develop doctrinal thinking and help organizations evolve.⁹ The 2022 and 2024 Navigation Plans are supported by the Maritime Sustainment Strategy, which aims to develop a “Sustainment in Depth” approach to support forces from the industrial base to the point of need.¹⁰ In addition, the U.S. Navy is looking to become more resilient by recapitalizing its logistics fleet, which has suffered from diminishing sealift and replenishment capabilities in the past decade.¹¹ It acquired the first John Lewis–class replenishment oiler in 2016, with plans to procure 20.¹² The U.S. Navy also plans to operate next-generation logistics ships by 2030 to sustain its fleet in places where larger supply ships cannot be put at risk. As outpacing the growth of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy does not seem achievable, the U.S. Navy insists on innovation in equipment and doctrine to maintain its lead. 

In contrast, as major European Union (EU) navies modernize their fleets, logistics in contested environments have not been directly mentioned as a priority in their most recent strategic publications. Logistics ships are being replaced with more modern and capable assets, but there is no intent to increase their numbers significantly. Since the end of the Cold War, major European navies have focused on maintaining destroyers, carriers, and submarines in constrained-budget environments. Conducting high-intensity operations in regions more distant than the Mediterranean or Northern Atlantic would require them to build more supply ships. 

Making Sustainment a Collective Priority for the EU

Working together more closely to take up the challenges of contested logistics would allow EU navies to fully leverage their operational experience and high-end capabilities in future conflicts. They should: 

• Enhance training, logistics planning, and doctrinal thinking. European navies have extensive experience in multinational training and operational deployments within the EU and NATO frameworks or through specific multilateral agreements. In recent years, demanding, realistic, high-intensity exercises such as the French-organized Polaris 21 and Orion 23 and the Italian-organized Mare Aperto 24 emphasized unscripted scenarios to increase crews’ resilience and capacity to think offensively.¹³ While logistics aspects were part of these exercises, the ability to operate over a significant period in contested environments with limited or no support from land-based facilities has rarely been tested.¹⁴ Simulating wartime logistics conditions must be stressed in future complex exercises. 

Historian Duncan Ballantine claims, “No constructive exercise in peace can quite duplicate the urgency and stringency of logistics conditions in war,” and historian Kenneth L. Privratsky says conducting training with notional stocks “seldom creates a feel for the magnitude of logistics challenges.”¹⁵ Focusing on realistic logistics challenges, then, should be an objective, to identify the difficulties navies need to address. In addition, as logistic plans “can be considered to be the common denominator of all plans,” wargames and table-top exercises are valuable tools that should be used to better integrate the logistics dimension and enhance operational planners’ and commanders’ estimates.¹⁶ 

Indeed, contested logistics requires navies to demonstrate integrated sustainment and protection functions to defend logistics assets and hubs. Training with civilian ships—which could be decisive in war—also is necessary. To support the military and civilian ships engaged in the Falklands War, the Royal Navy defined operational areas between Ascension Island and the Falklands dedicated to replenishment, repairs, and logistics assistance. Such examples offer interesting ideas to explore during major exercises. 

A further step would be to deploy logistic support groups for operations under EU or NATO command. These deployments could bring together navies with more limited warfare capabilities but proven logistics assets, and could also attract countries that, for political reasons, do not want to participate in combat missions but want to contribute to multilateral operations. Such deployments would develop knowledge and experience in logistics planning and technical support at sea. French and Italian carrier strike group deployments and Standing NATO Maritime Groups are relevant structures on which to build. 

• Improve European forward bases. European navies could strengthen their forward bases to support high-intensity operations. U.S. bases were not ready to fully support a fleet at the beginning of World War II but developed rapidly thanks to the reserves accumulated before the war.¹⁷ In 1982, although 3,400 miles from the Falklands, Ascension Island was decisive in providing required support. Wideawake Airfield became “the salvation for British logistics and operational sustainment to forces in the South Atlantic.”¹⁸ 

European countries would benefit from developing their network of bases and forward-deployed support capacities.¹⁹ When operating in the Mediterranean or Northern Atlantic, they have access to a large network of bases and ports where ships can resupply and, to some extent, conduct maintenance and repairs. But beyond that, except for the Netherlands’ facilities in the Caribbean, only France has an extended network of bases in its overseas territories (La Réunion, Mayotte, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Antilles, French Guyana), as well as in Djibouti since 1977 and Abu Dhabi since 2009. The EU should seek to establish new supply points with partners. Shared bases would make it possible to mutualize infrastructure costs and strengthen interoperability. A significant effort should be made to improve bases’ ability to repair ships with major damage and preposition munitions to prepare for situations in which ships could run out of missiles quickly.

Naval bases in foreign countries might not be sufficient during crisis or wartime, however. Opponents could deny access to facilities, and, under military, diplomatic, or economic pressure, host nations might be placed in situations in which agreements cannot be respected. These vulnerabilities should encourage the EU to reinforce the capabilities of French overseas territories’ naval bases. La Réunion in the Indian Ocean and New Caledonia in the South Pacific offer major strategic advantages. 

La Réunion is 2,000 nautical miles (nm) from the Gulf of Aden and 2,800 nm from Ormuz, while New Caledonia is 3,400 nm from the South China Sea. Taking an example from the defeats of Anne Antoine, Comte d’Aché, and Pierre André de Suffren’s fleets against the British in India in the 18th century despite the support of Mauritius, Ballantine explains that “what counted was not the possession of bases strategically situated about the globe, but also the ability of the bases to render real support.”²⁰ 

The base infrastructures of La Réunion and New Caledonia could be enlarged to host several ships from different navies simultaneously. In addition to robust repair and supply capacities, the presence of liaison officers from major European navies could improve interoperability through shared protocols and facilitate regular stopovers. Those measures would guarantee short-notice availability of facilities should operational needs require it and create the conditions for rapid upscaling. 

• Develop collective capacities. Europeans could extend their logistics capabilities through joint research and procurement. First, collective development of support ships seems appropriate and could be easier than more complex warship programs. The 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy aims to procure at least 40 percent of defense equipment collaboratively by 2030, and collaborative projects are strongly encouraged in the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030.²¹ A more standardized EU fleet would improve interoperability and the development of advanced logistics procedures. 

Budgetary instruments such as the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation framework could be adapted to help EU companies increase investments and develop viable systems. Logistics is not an area identified as one of tomorrow’s defense capabilities in the last European Defense Fund’s publication.²² It is, however, likely to foster consensus among member states, and collective procurement could convince navies with more limited capabilities to invest in support ships to be able to contribute to multinational maritime operations. Those programs could be decisive in expanding the European shipbuilding capacity and industrial base.

Second, member states should seek ships designed to face high-intensity operations and threats to guarantee greater resilience. European projects could include advanced self-defense weapon systems to maximize survivability and reduce the number of necessary escorts, as well as extended replenishment at sea capabilities. In that sense, recently acquired ships such as the Italian Vulcano-class and French Jacques Chevallier–class logistics support ships are particularly promising. Their large carrying capacity, advanced interoperability, and extended supply capabilities reduce dependence on port infrastructures.²³ 

A 1956 report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development stated that “flexibility and the ability to modify the logistics system to suit technical changes must be component elements in the logistics provision for any missiles.”²⁴ Nearly 70 years later, it is time to apply a reverse principle: Ships and weapon-system designs should consider wartime logistics constraints to ensure they can be used in conflicts. If shore support is not an option, technical solutions must be developed for complex ammunition replenishment at sea. The U.S. Navy recently tested an at-sea vertical launching system reloading capability that could provide a decisive advantage.²⁵ European navies also should invest in repair ships and tenders to maintain combat power and extend operational reach.²⁶ Finally, in the longer term, European navies should develop unmanned capabilities for forward replenishment to limit the risk to high-value assets. 

Over the past few years, European countries have acknowledged the need to prepare for high-intensity warfare and demonstrated their ambition to play a strategic role at sea in a deteriorating global environment. Often, however, in a world obsessed with the “next big thing” in new technologies, logistics has not garnered sufficient attention, but EU nations must collectively address this key function in the future. Increasing sustainment resilience in contested environments will be crucial to maintaining freedom of action, extending operational reach, and opening operational options. EU navies have been operating in complex situations for decades. Building solid, collective logistics-support capacities will be decisive for them to win in any future conflict.