Translated as “mission command,” Auftragstaktik is a uniquely German method of decentralized command and control. Proven effective in many of Germany’s wars between 1864 and 1945, it was of greatest value in fast-moving, high-intensity combat.
Despite its success, Auftragstaktik is often poorly understood by the U.S. military. It is not simply a method or technique of command and control; it includes social, cultural, and political ideas of the German Enlightenment.1 Because it is a product of the German military culture and way of warfare, Auftragstaktik cannot be easily transplanted to other militaries. One of its key elements, freedom to act and exercise initiative, repeatedly has been shown as critical to success in combat. Also indisputable is the need for an educated and trained force and strong relationships between higher commanders and their subordinates.
The Beginnings of Auftragstaktik
After Germany’s disastrous defeats in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt in October 1806, General Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, the first Chief of the Prussian General Staff, initiated a drastic reorganization of the obsolete Prussian military establishment. Scharnhorst fostered independent thinking, issuing short and broadly stated orders that left subordinate commanders free to exercise initiative in accomplishing their assigned missions.2 These changes were codified in the Army’s 1812 Drill Regulations for the Infantry.
General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, who succeeded Scharnhorst, was the first to use directives, expressing clear objectives but not providing the methods of their accomplishment. This allowed subordinate commanders to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities, provided their actions were consistent with the main objective.3
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the Prussian Army regressed to its former rigid and formalistic methods of command and control.4 It was not until 1857, when General Helmuth von Moltke Sr. became Chief of the Prussian General Staff, that independent action by subordinate commanders was again emphasized.5 The principles of “leading through the mission” were formally adopted in the German infantry field manual in 1888.6 General Hans von Seeckt, chief of the Reichswehr, is credited as the first to use the term Auftragstaktik in 1920; other sources claim the term was used for the first time in the official Handbook for the Troop Leader issued in 1919.7
Key Elements
The key elements of Auftragstaktik are commander’s intent, freedom to act, initiative, willingness to make decisions, and decisive action.8 During von Moltke’s era, “leader’s intent” became an integral part of situation assessment and military planning.9 Von Moltke differentiated between the intent given to subordinate commanders and general intent applied to the force as a whole.10 Subordinate commanders were not directed how to carry out their assigned missions. In contrast, general intent included how a higher commander would conduct a mission for a force as a whole.
In issuing intent, the higher commander informed subordinate commanders what needed to be done to achieve success even if the initial orders became obsolete because of unexpected changes in the situation. The higher commander issued his intent two command echelons down. He was obliged to express his intent clearly and unambiguously. He also was responsible for communicating to his subordinate commanders the conditions and motives on which his intent was based. The higher commander’s intent was more important than the wording of the order. In the German military, intent was virtually sacrosanct.11
Freedom of action was another critical element of Auftragstaktik. Von Moltke observed:
It is an illusion if the commander thinks that his continuous personal intervention into the responsibilities of subordinates would result in some advantage. By doing so, a commander assumes a task which really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fill the whole of them.12
The higher commander’s intent was meant to set the boundaries for freedom of action for subordinate commanders. The German Army’s manual Troop Leadership issued in 1933 emphasized that the higher commander must allow his subordinates freedom of action “so long as it does not adversely affect his overall intent.”13 The commander’s willingness to accept responsibility was a precondition for freedom of action in carrying out an order.14 Subordinate commanders, however, were not to delegate their responsibilities down the chain of command.15
The commander’s intent allowed subordinate commanders to exercise initiative in case the original plan or order no longer applied or unexpected opportunities arose.16 The Germans accepted the Clausewitzian dictum that uncertainty is an inherent part of war. They insisted that commanders at all levels be accorded considerable leeway to act promptly on their own authority if necessary.17 In fact, an officer who failed to seize the initiative was considered as guilty as one who ignored the orders of his superior.18
The Germans believed that what they called the “emptiness of the battlefield” required fighters who think and act independently, who assess each situation carefully, resolutely, and boldly, and that everyone is crucial for success. Subordinate commanders were expected to act because the higher commander was not able to assess the situation in a timely manner and issue instructions for action.19 Faced with the need to make an independent decision, the subordinate should ask himself: “What order would my superior give me if he were in my position and knew what I know?”20 The Germans’ rapid advance through the Ardennes in May 1940 was the result of independent action by the German corps and division commanders. General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIX Panzer Corps, wrote that he “made all decisions independently until we reached the Atlantic at Abbeville. The higher leadership has mainly exerted a restrictive influence on my operations.”21
Von Moltke emphasized the need for critical thinking and independent actions by subordinate commanders, writing:
Diverse are the situations under which an officer must act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. Most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.22
German commanders were expected to take decisive action, even if that meant diverging from the original plan, provided the action was guided by the higher commander’s intent.23 The Germans insisted that decisive action was the first requirement in war. Inactivity was considered criminal.24
Instructions, Orders, and Directives
Related to freedom of action was succinctness in orders issued to subordinate commanders. Von Moltke differentiated between orders and directives. Directives were issued to subordinate army and corps commanders and contained only a general outline of actions for accomplishing the next objective.25 The format was standardized, and the emphasis was on clarity and brevity.26 Von Moltke issued directives via telegraph. Directives were valid for several days.
Prior to 1945, the German Army’s main method for directing groups, armies, and independently operating formations, such as army corps and area-wide operational reconnaissance, was instructions (Weisungen). Issued for operations lasting several days or even weeks, instructions allowed a subordinate operational commander the greatest possible freedom of action within the framework of his assigned mission. Instructions contained only the main points; the way the mission would be accomplished was left to subordinate commanders. German campaigns and major operations were successful in 1939–42 because of sound instructions directing their armies and army groups. Later, instructions essentially were abandoned, followed by large-scale defeats.27
Orders were issued in writing or verbally to tactical units.28 The Germans emphasized that an order should contain what a subordinate needed to know to carry out his mission, nothing more. The more urgent the situation, the shorter the order. Issuing too many orders, especially during combat, when messages might be lost, would risk subordinate commanders losing their independence.29
An order had to be clear, specific, and complete; understandable by the recipient; and in conformance with his situation. The higher commander who issued the order had to put himself in the position of his subordinate. Language was simple and understandable. Clarity, while far more important than format, was never to be sacrificed to brevity.30
Thinking Obedience
Completing the mission required what the Germans called thinking obedience.31 Deviation from the mission was allowed if the situation had changed significantly or if a new situation arose, immediate action was urgent, or the higher commander was not available. However, the subordinate commander was obliged to inform the higher commander about his deviation from the order as soon as possible.32
Disobeying orders was not inconsistent with the German emphasis on freedom of action and initiative. The Germans accepted a subordinate acting contrary to orders as long as his actions were consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Although von Moltke did not condone disobedience, he realized that an order given by a higher commander might become irrelevant by circumstance. In such cases a subordinate commander had a moral responsibility to alter the plan to best achieve the intent of his higher commander.33
In World War II, there were many examples of German subordinate commanders disobeying the orders of the higher commander. After the Meuse River crossing on 13 May 1940, Guderian wanted to extend the Meuse bridgehead by advancing toward Rethel, some 50 kilometers away. His superior, General Ewald von Kleist, commander of the Panzer Group Kleist, initially agreed but changed his mind on 14 May, directing Guderian to stop his advance when he was only 4 kilometers short of Rethel. After Guderian protested, Kleist allowed him to continue to Rethel. The next day, Kleist again ordered Guderian to stop his advance. Guderian disobeyed. He explained in his memoirs, “I neither would nor could agree to these orders, which involved the sacrifice of the element of surprise we had gained and of the whole initial success that we had achieved.” Kleist then allowed Guderian’s corps to advance for another 24 hours. This resulted in the great expansion of the Meuse bridgehead, and the German panzer divisions continued westward almost unhindered.34
No Great Successes without Initiative
The conduct of war was in the past, is today, and will remain in the future largely an art. Uncertainty, friction, chance, luck, and irrationality are inherent elements, and Auftragstaktik is firmly based on these realities. Higher commander’s interference in the authority and responsibilities of subordinates, bypassing subordinates, and zero-error culture are incompatible with true mission command.
Commander’s intent is perhaps the single most important element of Auftragstaktik. It should be much broader than the mission so as to provide subordinate commanders maximum freedom to act; otherwise, they would be unable to exercise initiative. The subordinate commander’s willingness to act independently and aggressively is a prerequisite for exercising initiative, without which no great successes in combat are possible.
1. Charles S. Oliviero, Auftragstaktik: The Birth of Enlightened Leadership (Toronto: Double Dagger Books Ltd., 2022), 1.
2. Stephan Leistenschneider, Auftragstaktik im Preußisch-Deutschen Heer 1871 bis 1914 (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2002), 31–33; and Werner Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership,” Military Review (September–October 2002): 3–4.
3. Cited in Oliviero, Auftragstaktik, 72–73.
4. Leistenschneider, Auftragstaktik im Preußisch-Deutschen Heer, 35.
5. Paul K. Van Riper, Planning for and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, March 2006), 10–11.
6. Jochen Wittmann, Auftragstaktik: Just a Command Technique or the Core Pillar of Mastering the Military Operational Art? (Norderstedt, GE: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag Berlin, 2012), 39.
7. Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1935), 43–44; and Stefan Erminger, Auftragstaktik—Eine militärische Führungskonzeption in der Entwicklung deutscher Militärgeschichte vom 18.Jahrundert bis in unsere Zeit (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2010), 11.
8. Marco Sigg, “Auftragstaktik—ein deutsches Führungsprinzip,“ Militärgeschichte, nr. 1 (2024), 23.
9. Oliviero, Auftragstaktik, 68; and Van Riper, “Planning for and Applying Military Force,” 10.
10. John C. Coleman, Comprehension or Confusion: Commander’s Intent in the AirLand Battle (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1991), 14.
11. Lawrence G. Shattuck, “Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence,” Military Review (March–April 2000): 67; Edward J. Filiberti, “Command, Control and the Commander’s Intent,” Military Review (August 1987): 56; John F. Antal, “Forward Command: The Wehrmacht’s Approach to Command and Control in World War II,” Armor, November–December 1991, 28; Leistenschneider, Auftragstaktik im Preussisch-Deutschen Heer, 87; Wittmann, Auftragstaktik, 33; and John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters, September 1987, 25.
12. Cited in Coleman, Comprehension or Confusion, 13.
13. Major John N. Rickard, CA, “‘The Full Will of the Commander’: German Command Forward in the Second World War,” The Canadian Army Journal 19.3 (2022): 73.
14. Günter May, Zum Probleme der Auftragstaktik in schwierigen Lagen: Der “Haltebefehl” Hitlers, die deutsche Heeresührung und die Entschlussfreiheit des Truppenführers während der Winterkrise des Russlandfeldzuges 1941/42 (Hamburg: Fährungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1983), 4.
15. Stefan Erminger, Auftragstaktik: Eine militärische Führungskonzeption in der Entwicklung deutscher Militärgeschichte vom 18 Jahrhundert bis unsere Zeit (Norderstedt, GE: GRIN Verlag, 2010), 13.
16. Walter N. Anderson, “Commander’s Intent—Theory and Practice,” Armor, May–June 1998, 46–47.
17. Eberhard Fuhr, Die Handlungsfreiheit der militärischen Führung-Möglichkeiten und Grenzen aufgrund des heutigen Kriegsbildes (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1966), 6.
18. Antulio J. Echevaria II, “Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective,” Military Review 10 (October 1986): 52.
19. Marco Sigg, Der Unterführer als Feldherr im Taschenformat: Theorie und Praxis der Auftragstaktik im Deutschen Heer 1869 bis 1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schüningh, 2014), 86.
20. Leistenschneider, Auftragstaktik im Preußisch-Deutschen Heer, 83.
21. Sigg, Der Unterführer als Feldherr im Taschenformat, 242.
22. Cited in Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung,” 4–5.
23. Antal, “Forward Command,” 27.
24. Nelsen, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” 25.
25. Dirk W. Oetting, Auftragstaktik. Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Führungskonzeption (Frankfurt, a.M./Bonn: Report Verlag, 1993), 15; Wieker, Operation, Operative Führung zwischen Taktik und Strategie—Bedeutung und Entwicklung des Begriffes seit Moltke d. Ae.—Bearbeitung aus der Sicht der Landstreitkräfteführung, 7.
26. Antal, “Forward Command,” 18.
27. Theodor Busse, “Befehl und Weisung-Gedanken zur Befehlserteilung,” Wehrkunde 9 (September 1954): 293–94.
28. Ludwig Freiherr Rüdt von Collenberg, Die Geschichte des Preußisch—Deutschen Generalstabes von seinen Anfängen bis zum Ende des ersten Weltkrieges-Beilagen, ZA/1 2106 P-135, 2nd part, Studien der Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Foreign Military Branch, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, 158.
29. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds., On the German Art of War: Truppenführung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 30.
30. Condell and Zabecki, eds., On the German Art of War, 30.
31. Wolfgang Thomas, “Auftragstaktik. Voraussetzungen, Grenzen und Möglichkeiten,” Wehrkunde 11 (November 1968): 591.
32. Wittmann, Auftragstaktik: Just a Command Technique? 41; and May, Zum Probleme der Auftragstaktik, 4.
33. Oliviero, Auftragstaktik, 76.
34. Cited in Karl-Heinz Frieser with John T. Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend. The 1940 Campaign in the West (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 253–54.
