Another Turbulent Year in the Indian Ocean

In the past 12 months, the Indian Ocean region has once again become a canvas on which much troubling activity is portrayed. 

Houthi rebels continued to attack ships traveling to and from the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea. A pattern could be discerned—targeted shipping belongs to Israel and those who support it. Yet some attacks seemed different. Even for a well-organized group with a quasi-state and other battles on land, the Houthi insurgents possessed an unusual quantity and variety of missiles and drones. These realities point to the probability that other entities are sharing maritime domain awareness and suggest the existence of an armament supply and system from external friends.¹ How should the Houthi threat be viewed now, more than 20 months after its executors took to the sea without really getting their “feet wet”? 

The adage that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort”—usually attributed incorrectly to British Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson—describes the unevenness of combat between land- and sea-based forces. Today, fleets need to consider forts more carefully for several reasons, especially in narrow seas and choke points in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific. In many such places there will be no choice but to fight enemy forts—without being fools.

Trade can be disrupted rapidly, while realigning routes takes time and comes with complex costs. Relatively simple ordnance and delivery platform combinations—missiles and armed drones—are being countered with expensive missiles and aircraft.² Ironically, while defensive weapons have to score a hit to be effective, just the threat of Houthi ordnance can achieve second-order effects by disrupting trade and compelling navies to operate farther from the Red Sea or avoid it entirely.³ Despite U.S. Navy and Air Force strikes, the Houthis’ capability for “distributed lethality” on land has not been fully degraded, and, in some ways, the initiative remains with the insurgents. They might choose to taper off if the Israel-Hamas truce holds, but, at press time, this remains far from certain. 

China continues to be an important player in the Indian Ocean region. One significant implication from the Red Sea situation is how much larger the “fort” created by the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) “active defense” and joint multidimensional operational frameworks might loom.⁴ Given the PLA Navy’s (PLAN’s) significant maritime domain awareness and stocks of weapons and delivery systems, this will not change anytime soon. Thanks in part to regular and improving deployments outside the East and South China Seas, China’s growing geostrategic influence remains the biggest concern. The recent voyage by a powerful PLAN flotilla around Australia and near New Zealand, exiting into the Indian Ocean, was a signaling instrument. While the flotilla probably conducted weapons practice in Australia’s exclusive economic zone, doing so during transit passage would not have violated the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. It would, however, have violated rules China asserts for the East and South China Seas.⁵  

Following changes of government in Maldives and Sri Lanka, new agreements have created more inroads for Beijing.⁶ Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others have gravitated closer to China. Bangladesh-India relations have been set back by the overthrow of the Sheikh Hasina government in July. The submarine naval base BNS Sheikh Hasina—soon renamed BNS Pekua after the nearby town—could host Chinese submarines for resupply and repair. 

Meanwhile, India is adapting and responding to these geopolitical changes.⁷ India continues partnering with island and rim nations and their maritime services with ship transfers, training, and patrolling assistance.⁸ Head-of-government visits and the geography, history, and decades of relatively balanced diplomatic relationships have combined with other facets of engagement. Unlike China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Maldives have been democracies in recent decades, an attribute that carries mutual value in relations with India.

India’s robust action in mid-March against the MV Ruen, a ship hijacked by 35 pirates with 17 crew members held hostage on board, was another example of the Indian Navy’s willingness to take calculated risks.⁹   

Indonesia—the Indo-Pacific’s fulcrum nation—is poised to upgrade its strategic relationships, and maritime cooperation with India and Australia will grow bilaterally and trilaterally.¹⁰ 

It seemed for a time in 2024 that issues surrounding Mauritius’s sovereignty over Diego Garcia—and the continuity of the U.S. lease of the territory—were generally resolved. But new governments in Port Louis, Mauritius, and Washington, D.C., and new pressures in London may result in some course changes, partially because of apprehensions about possible Chinese investments and influence extending southward from Maldives into the archipelago.¹¹ The U.S. bomber base on the island may continue to be an issue.

Drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean continues, despite the considerable number of illicit shipments captured by navies in cooperative constabulary duties. Many countries, India included, are not only destinations, but also sources for the trade.

Pakistan acquired two large offshore patrol vessels from Romania and, as part of “brotherly cooperation” with China, is on track to get eight Chinese diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) in the next few years.¹² Despite U.S. sanctions, Pakistan’s missile program has progressed, with that country testing what it claimed to be air-launched and ship-launched antiship ballistic missiles.¹³ 

India commissioned multiple ships in 2024, including two guided-missile destroyers, two guided-missile frigates, one nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, and one SSK, as well as a hydrographic ship, and launched several others. The Indian government has given provisional approval for several nuclear-powered attack submarines as well.  

Amid the gray picture above, the Quad—officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among India, Japan, Australia, and the United States—has evolved considerably since its revival in 2017. The ministerial and leaders’ joint statements at the end of several meetings have expanded the focus on maritime initiatives for the security of seaborne trade; undersea cables; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and improved maritime domain awareness. The ministerial meeting on 21 January 2025, the day following President Donald Trump’s inauguration, was particularly robust and not bashful about the core security benefits of the Quad.¹⁴ 

If 2024 was an oceanic annus horribilis in the Indian Ocean region, for 2025 and beyond only planning, preparation, and cooperation might prevent insertion of “maximus” in that phrase. A free and open Indo-Pacific—mare liberum—will require it.