Imperial Japan’s decision to launch a surprise campaign across the Pacific in December 1941 was militarily brilliant. Its main goal was to secure oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies—today’s Indonesia—to replace the oil it could no longer import from the United States because of embargoes resulting from the Second Sino-Japanese War.1 Striking directly at those reserves would have likely caused the United States and Great Britain to join the conflict on terms more favorable to themselves. Hence, Japan chose to weaken the Allied forces across the Pacific before going after their oil prize.2 Imperial Japan’s initial campaigns have valuable lessons for considering how China might use its military to seize Taiwan today.
Japan ultimately lost World War II despite several initial victories. Had its leaders better managed their ambitions in the 1930s, Japan might have avoided the embargoes that drove them to war. Still, Imperial Japan’s swift, decisive campaigns crippled two great powers and helped Japan seize the resources it needed at the outset of the war. If the Japanese fleet had pressed its attack on Pearl Harbor for a few more waves, it might have kept the bulk of the U.S. fleet out of action even longer, making its initial strikes even more potent.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) might use a similar strategy to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies before targeting Taiwan.
Protracted Wars
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet, accurately predicted the Japanese would not achieve a complete victory if a war with the United States became protracted. Because of this belief, Yamamoto opted to strike a devastating blow against the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor while simultaneously attacking other Allied positions across the Pacific. He knew that Japan’s only chance to secure its objectives and not face the full wrath of an organized Allied counteroffensive was to strike where the enemy was least prepared and rapidly move to isolate key forces.3
In addition, Admiral Yamamoto had lived, studied, and worked in the United States and was probably aware of the natural-resource disparity between Japan and its future enemy. He undoubtedly concluded that Japan had little chance of achieving victory if the nation had to survive with only its domestic resources.4 Other leaders approved of his strategy to attempt a rapid knockout of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. This would leave Japan the space it needed to secure vital resources that could sustain it during a drawn-out war.
China’s civilian and military leaders today are likely well-versed in Imperial Japan’s World War II strategy. Some in the United States believe any conflict with China would start with a slugging match over Taiwan. While Taiwan is a significant strategic objective for Beijing, historical lessons might lead them to strike other U.S. and allied strategic points swiftly to prevent U.S. forces from interfering.
Taiwan’s government might not even mount a defense if it feels completely isolated—China could thus win a bloodless victory. However, if Beijing opted for a blockade or siege of the island, U.S. forces, led by the Navy, could chip away at PLA forces and eventually break the siege. While the Chinese and U.S. economies are near parity, their access to natural resources is not. A prolonged war would strain both economies, but the United States could sustain itself, while China would struggle with a relative lack of domestic resources. Those resources might not deplete as quickly as Japan’s during World War II, but China likely wants to avoid putting itself at any such disadvantage.
Deception Before Aggression
Imperial Japan’s 1941-42 campaigns were as much about deceiving the Allies as trying to knock them out of the conflict. Japan used extensive deception during its attacks on Pearl Harbor, across the Pacific, and up to the Midway campaign. Catching the Allies by surprise was crucial to Japan’s rapid victories at the start of the war.
The Pearl Harbor raid struck a major, ill-prepared target in an unexpected location, raising fear and uncertainty in the United States. Striking unlikely locations across the Pacific left the Allies in disarray, unaware of Japan’s strategic goal to secure oil reserves. The U.S. population quickly shifted from underestimating Imperial Japan’s expeditionary capabilities to overestimating them. The Allies began to believe that the Japanese military lurked around every corner.5
Japan carried out elaborate signals denial-and-deception campaigns before 7 December, masking the movement of its carrier groups, hiding the production of critical weapons such as battleships and Zero aircraft, and possibly perpetuating stereotypes about its military inefficiency to lull the Allies into a sense of superiority.6 These tactics aimed to give Japan an initial edge before the United States could begin to muster its industrial might. The deceptions could have continued until total victory had the Allies not broken key Japanese encryptions early in the war. Even with those broken encryptions, Japan continued to frustrate the Allies with thorough information operations, sometimes changing their encryptions, while occasionally using old ones to delay Allied decryption efforts.7
Today, U.S. naval officers should understand that, to a certain extent, they may see what China wants them to see. A common belief is that the People's Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) vessels outnumber the U.S. fleet but are technologically inferior. There also is a consistent belief that the PLAN has limited expeditionary capabilities.8 These beliefs largely align with U.S. views of Japanese capabilities before 7 December 1941.
A Future Chinese Strategy
A senior naval officer recently told to me the PLAN could not harm the U.S. West Coast with any of its current capabilities. That claim made me recall the words of Admiral Husband Kimmel, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, who said about the attack on Pearl Harbor, “I never thought [they] could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan.”9 This led me to question why the Japanese decided to attack Pearl Harbor, and how China might use its forces in a similar fashion to overtake Taiwan.
The Japanese government’s decision to go to war was flawed, but its military strategy was solid. The only way to achieve their strategic objectives was to first degrade the Allies across the Pacific in such a way that they could not launch a successful counteroffensive. Japan nearly achieved complete victory through rapid strikes on ill-prepared Allied locations, isolating well-prepared fortifications, and elaborate deception campaigns. Similarly for China, a frontal assault or blockade of Taiwan carries too much risk. Surely at least some PLA planners know this and will have proposed an approach akin to what Imperial Japan did in 1941.
(Commander, Submarine Squadron 15, photo by James Caliva)
China would likely identify critical vulnerabilities in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the West Coast. It would develop capabilities in secret that it could use to strike these assets swiftly and effectively, while possibly broadcasting false vulnerabilities within the PLA to appear weak.
When China is ready to put a plan into motion, it may conduct drills around Taiwan or contested islands to distract from their forthcoming strikes. It also might capitalize on global crises requiring U.S. intervention, such as natural disasters in the Pacific or regional conflicts involving nations such as North Korea or Iran. With U.S. forces preoccupied, the PLA could strike the vulnerable targets it identified, then isolate and neutralize key U.S. locations in Guam, Hawaii, and major Japanese bases. Only then would it blockade Taiwan to push for uncontested reunification. While the outcome of such a conflict is uncertain, China would likely try to avoid a prolonged war, using a strategy similar to Japan's in 1941 and 1942.
U.S. naval warriors must look beyond easy assumptions. Preparing for an amphibious invasion or blockade of Taiwan is crucial, but it is equally important to consider different scenarios. The United States cannot afford a Pearl Harbor-type loss, especially since the PLAN can deploy new ships faster than the United States. Plans must be in place for situations in which significant West Coast and Hawaii ports are unusable. The Sea Services need to consider how to project power if shore installations in Guam and Japan are compromised, and how to protect vital logistical assets while reestablishing offensive tempo.
In preparing for a potential conflict with China, the lessons from 1941 and 1942 might provide crucial insights. The thought today should not just be about how the United States will fight in the first island chain—it also must consider how the PLA might attempt to use surprise to keep the United States far away from the first island chain.
1. Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012).
2. Toll, Pacific Crucible.
3. Toll.
4. Tal Tovy, “From the Nisshin to the Musashi: The Military Career of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku,” Education About Asia: Volume 20:2: Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part II, Association of Asian Studies 20 no.2, Fall 2015.
5. Toll.
6. Robert J. Hanyok, “‘Catching the Fox Unaware:’ Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor.” Naval War College Review 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008); Mark Carlson, “The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Zero,” WWII History 23 no. 2 (Summer 2024); Ian W. Toll, Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2021); and Toll, Pacific Crucible.
7. Hanyok, “‘Catching the Fox Unaware.’”
8. J. Michael Dahm. China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force Blue Force. PLA Navy Blue force Development for Realistic Combat Training. China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College. September 2024.
9. Gordon Prange. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1986); Carlson, “Rise and Fall.”
