Before 1940, Pearl Harbor had been something of a forward base. This started to change as events drifted toward war with Japan. The United States began to build up its forces in the Philippines, then a U.S. dependency, and it implicitly made two assumptions. The first assumption was that if war came, it would primarily be in the western Pacific. Second, Hawaii was now a rear area and therefore secure. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese Navy showed these assumptions were wrong.
Could the United States be making a similar miscalculation today?
A Chinese Naval Strike
In a potential conflict with China, especially one fought over Taiwan, it is reasonable to expect the war would start after a period of increasing tensions, which would give U.S. forces the chance to prepare. China would expect rapid U.S. intervention to support Taiwan. U.S. bases in the western Pacific, especially on Okinawa and Guam, would be likely targets for Chinese attack, in particular by missiles. U.S. warships at sea or in port in the region would be under the same threat. While much of the U.S. fleet would presumably be at sea at the start of the war, significant portions would still be at Pearl Harbor and bases on the West Coast. China’s priority would be to target forward-deployed forces, but it would also be prudent for them to eliminate as many potential reinforcements as possible.
How might China do that? They would have several options, none of which are mutually exclusive.
The least likely option would be an attack by missiles launched from People’s Liberation Army Navy submarines and surface ships, especially using YJ-18 antiship cruise missiles with a maximum range of 290 nautical miles. While the salvo size of most PLAN submarines is limited by their number of torpedo tubes—six tubes for Type 093 nuclear attack boats—the latest Type 093s may also have 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes.
However, Chinese cruisers and destroyers have many VLS tubes. Type 055 guided-missile cruisers have 112 tubes, and Type 052D air-defense destroyers have 64. Surface ships would have the advantage of being able to routinely access China’s extensive network of satellites for up-to-the-minute targeting information—the modern equivalent of Japan’s “bomb plot” in 1941, which is described in the book At Dawn We Slept by Gordon Prange et al. These include the extensive Yaogan military satellite constellation, as well as the nominally civilian Jilin constellation, with 300 satellites planned by 2025. Another constellation of more than 300 satellites, the Chutian system of optical, radar, hyperspectral, and infrared satellites, is planned for launch by 2030, along with a variety of other remote-sensing satellites.
Any Chinese ships or submarines near Hawaii would be tracked, closely watched, and probably immediately sunk after they launched missiles. The Chinese know this, but if they are cold-blooded enough to consider the loss an acceptable tradeoff for launching a barrage of missiles, it would be an option. As detailed in At Dawn We Slept, the Japanese were prepared to accept heavy losses to their forces attacking Pearl Harbor.
Container Wars and Beetle Bombs
The next option would be an attack by cruise missiles launched from cargo containers on the decks of container ships or other vessels. The Chinese are developing such systems for launching YJ-18s, with the containers each evidently holding at least two missiles. China has one of the largest merchant fleets in the world (5,997 ships under Chinese registry as of 1 January 2023, along with several hundred other ships sailing under other registries), which means their ships can be spotted just about everywhere. If they want to obscure the potential threat from such ships, they could use Chinese ships sailing under registry of states other than China, or they could use the equivalent of the shadow fleet Russia uses for oil smuggling—a fleet of “…mostly aging ships that sail without the industry’s standard Western insurance, [that have] opaque ownership, frequently change their names and flag registrations, and generally operate outside maritime regulations.”
Another threat would see China take a page from the war in Ukraine: drones, most likely launched from the decks of container ships. While usually slower than cruise missiles, depending on the drone they have the advantage of being much cheaper, with longer range—the Sunflower 200 has a reported range up to 2,000 kilometers—and they can be used in swarms. Their warheads may be smaller than those of cruise missiles. For example, the Sunflower 200’s warhead is no heavier than 40 kilograms, while the warhead of the YJ-18 weighs up to 300 kg. But if one detonates near or on the VLS section of a warship, or near another magazine, the results would likely be catastrophic.
A variation on the drone theme is what this author has nicknamed the “beetle bomb” threat that makes use of low, slow, and small (LSS) unmanned aerial vehicles. China is the world’s leading producer of LSSs and has worked for years to exploit them. While the danger posed by small, cheap drones was recognized even before the war in Ukraine, both sides in that war have emphasized use of LSSs. These drones are generally small and short-ranged, but they offer opportunities for fiendish creativity.
Beetle bombs can be launched in a variety of ways, including from ships in port or close offshore, from containers prepositioned near targets, or from individual people. They are likely to be especially effective against aircraft, air bases, and personnel. They can collide with aircraft to deliver undetonated explosives that would need to be disarmed. They can also crash or scatter scrap on runways to disrupt operations. They can be used against ships even unarmed, but if armed, depending on the amount and type of explosives they carry, these attacks could devastate. If the munitions they carry can penetrate the top armor of a tank, they may also be able to penetrate a VLS hatch cover. Chinese forces could release bombs, individually or in swarms, at intervals to extend the disruption. Finally, if the drones have significant flight time and range, they could be released from one or multiple points and programmed with a variety of courses to pose a multidirectional threat.
Prepare for the Worst
The Chinese have a clear capability to target U.S. bases in Hawaii. They could also threaten bases on the West Coast of the continental United States. The U.S. military must confront the grim fact that, at least at the start of a war, there may be no reliably secure rear areas in the Pacific.
The impact of such a threat would be dramatic. To prepare for it, all U.S. bases in the Pacific and on the West Coast—not just forward bases—need integrated air and missile defenses, including defenses against drones. These should be ready for rapid activation in case of crisis, if not constantly ready even in peacetime. Considering the number of bases that need protection, building adequate defenses is liable to be extremely expensive at a time when the military budget is already stretched.
In March 1941, U.S. Army Air Forces Major General F.L. Martin, the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Rear Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, commander of the Hawaiian Naval Base Defense Air Force, warned about the danger of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. An additional warning came from the August 1941 report written for the War Department by Colonel William Farthing, which warned a possible Japanese attack could use up to six aircraft carriers. Tragically, the commanders they advised (Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel and Army General Walter Short) ignored the warnings. As threats increase and potential adversaries grow stronger, the United States cannot afford to be surprised again, in the Pacific or farther east.
