A little more than ten years ago, I became the commodore of Destroyer Squadron 7, then recently relocated to Singapore, an island nation at the crossroads of the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. My nearly three years in Singapore cemented a lifelong interest in the Indo-Pacific, a region in which I have been privileged to serve multiple times, including three operational commands.
While I was stationed in Singapore, stories of China’s large dredging projects in the Spratly Islands were beginning to circulate. And in November 2015, Chinese leaders announced plans to extensively modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with the stated goal of creating a military on par with the world’s most advanced forces by 2027.
As I have continued to command in the western Pacific, the challenges in this critical maritime region have continued to evolve. With a year in command of the U.S. Seventh Fleet approaching, I offer a few observations on what we are seeing, assessing, and, most important, doing.
Those Chinese dredging projects of a decade ago are now operational military outposts, serving as logistics and basing hubs for PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia vessels, allowing them to sustain their presence throughout the South China Sea. The PLAN buildup has delivered more than 100 new ships over the past decade, bringing its fleet to around 370 ships—and it is still growing. This includes the recent delivery of the PLAN’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier to date, the Fujian, which began sea trials in May 2024.
Seventh Fleet has a front row view of the operational aspects of the “no limits” partnership between China and Russia as they continue to increase their combined military drills. Recently, China joined Russia’s large-scale Ocean 24 exercise—a demonstration of their growing strategic cooperation in the maritime domain. While the PLAN’s partnerships are not as strong as U.S. alliances in the region, China is working more closely with Russia, North Korea, and Iran every year.
A Pivotal Place at a Pivotal Time
The Indo-Pacific region is a global economic engine, producing $2 trillion in trade each year with the United States alone. It contains more than 60 percent of the world’s population, five of seven U.S. treaty allies, and 38 nations of varying size and economic influence. Ensuring the stability and security of this region directly enables the security and stability of the world and, in turn, the American people.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, it became clear how quickly a crisis on this side of the world can affect the daily lives of Americans. As commander of an expeditionary strike group that conducted four patrols in the western Pacific during that challenging time, I am proud to say our forward-deployed forces met their mission, but the pandemic’s effects on global supply chains, freedom of movement, and the economy were significant. If another crisis or conflict were to emerge in this vital region, its effects would reverberate globally.
Forward Maneuver Arm of U.S. Pacific Fleet
Seventh Fleet proudly serves as the forward maneuver arm of the Pacific Fleet, with functional task forces that offer the full range of naval capability above, on, under, and from the sea. Unlike theaters in which the component and numbered fleet commanders are geographically collocated, Seventh Fleet forces are deployed to the western Pacific because the vast maritime expanse from the West Coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean makes it an operational necessity. These naval forces operate between the international dateline and the Indian Ocean to deter aggression and assure U.S. allies and partners, delivering advanced combat capability in the theater every day.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti’s Navigation Plan 2024 focuses on two strategic ends: readiness for the possibility of war with China by 2027 and enhancing U.S. long-term advantage. Simply put, what happens in this theater will define the next decade and, likely, the next century. For the U.S. Navy, maintaining warfighting advantage to provide senior leaders options remains essential.
With a fully operational maritime operations center (MOC), every day Seventh Fleet builds readiness and combat proficiency in the five key capabilities laid out in the CNO’s NavPlan: long-range fires; nontraditional sea denial; counter-C5ISRT; terminal defense; and contested logistics.
Several recent examples stand out. In September 2023, the USS Rafael Peralta (DDG-115) completed the first expeditionary rearm of a U.S. destroyer in Australia. U.S. submarines in Guam and Japan have expanded the options for rearming in this theater to keep them in the fight. Last summer’s Exercise Valiant Shield elevated information sharing with our allies to support long-range fires—integrating allies such as Japan and Australia into combined kill webs in theater. With its MOC at the center, Seventh Fleet is advancing these key capabilities and helping to orchestrate combat capabilities and fires should they be called on in the western Pacific.
The Power of Being Here
For a sense of scale, consider that all the land masses on Earth could fit within the Pacific Ocean. Anyone who has travelled or served in this region has experienced its massive size, and even in today’s technology-driven battlespace, transit time through the Pacific is a significant constraint. Fortunately, Seventh Fleet forces are already here—operating and engaging in Indo-Pacific waters, and demonstrating the nation’s commitment to this region. In defense of treaty allies—Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand—or of Guam, Seventh Fleet forces are in position and ready, weeks closer in sailing distance than CONUS-based forces to potential points of need. Whether responding to a natural disaster such as the recent Typhoon Julian in the Philippines, North Korean missile launches, or flashpoints in the South China Sea, Seventh Fleet units do not have to come from somewhere else.
The Power of Partnership
The global system that has fostered peace and stability in this region provides all nations—regardless of size—a chance to prosper. For many countries whose livelihoods depend on the seas, Seventh Fleet engagements with their naval forces help provide the skills they need to operate in their maritime environs wherever international law allows.
Seventh Fleet conducts hundreds of bilateral and multilateral engagements at sea every year, building relationships and trust at the deckplates and advancing partner capabilities. One of the most essential partnerships for regional maritime security is between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and Seventh Fleet—currently the strongest it has ever been. My JMSDF counterpart and I share daily commander’s update briefs. We cross-deck on our ships for high-end exercises such as Valiant Shield and Keen Sword, and our combined operations are advancing unprecedented levels of interoperability from sensor to shooter.
The past year also marked the inaugural and second iterations of exercise Freedom Edge, a trilateral exercise with naval forces from Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Both iterations were conducted at sea with a focus on ballistic-missile defense in addition to expanding air defense, surface, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Having witnessed the three navies working side-by-side from the flight deck of the USS George Washington (CVN-73), I am convinced of the power of these exercises.
Seventh Fleet also conducts regular bilateral and multilateral operations with Australia, Canada, and India, whose advanced navies lend authoritative voices to the global conversation on the need to keep the Indo-Pacific open and free. Last year, Seventh Fleet ships conducted three bilateral Taiwan Strait transits with ships of the Royal Canadian Navy, and just a few months ago, Australian, Indian, Japanese, and U.S. Navy ships sailed together across the Indian Ocean during Exercise Malabar. Every shared engagement strengthens communication, interoperability, and trust among these advanced navies.
Because what happens in Asia affects the entire world, it is deeply encouraging to see the increasing number of European and NATO allies who are deploying naval assets to this theater. Italy, France, and the United Kingdom all deploy carrier strike groups to the western Pacific on a regular basis, and U.S. carrier strike groups operate with them.
Greater Than the Sum of Our Parts
While preparing for the future, it is important never to confuse activity for progress. Seventh Fleet’s job as part of the joint force is to deter and, if called on, fight and win. Through operations and engagements in the western Pacific, Seventh Fleet carries out the CNO’s direction to make the Navy ready for combat, honing warfighting competencies and identifying areas in which willing allies and partners can contribute—in competition and conflict. When China, Russia, and North Korea look seaward, they see dozens of the free world’s navies operating and training together in the most vital waters of the world—and that provides real, continual deterrence.
The overmatch the United States has enjoyed in past contests is not guaranteed in tomorrow’s fight. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific would have grave human and economic consequences worldwide. The charge to deter such conflict rests with the sailors and Marines of the Seventh Fleet as vanguard of the broader joint force in this theater. Every day, Seventh Fleet operates forward, alongside allies and partners, to deter aggression and safeguard a way of life that, over the past 80 years, has lifted a billion people out of poverty, seen democracies increase from 11 to almost 100 today, and enabled small nations to coexist alongside large ones.
From inside the first island chain, Seventh Fleet continuously hones its readiness, capability, and capacity to prevail in any contingency. The young American men and women of this fleet are rowing hard, and they give me confidence in our ability to deter, fight, and win. I am proud to serve alongside them.
