With stunning success unmarred by incident, the U.S. Navy had been conducting sustained combat operations in the Middle East for the past 14 months. Then, on 22 December, a dark night operating in the dangerous Red Sea, a Navy cruiser fired on and destroyed a U.S. fighter aircraft injuring the two crewmembers. In military parlance, this is known as a blue-on-blue engagement or a friend shooting a friend. “The guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg, which is part of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, mistakenly fired on and hit the F/A-18,” U.S. Central Command said in a statement. “This incident was not the result of hostile fire, and a full investigation is underway.”
In 1952, the New York Times headlined the collision between the USS Wasp (CV-18) and USS Hobson (DMS-26), which resulted in the loss of 176 sailors to include the Hobson’s commanding officer. Subsequently, the Wall Street Journal ran an opinion piece invoking Hobson’s choice. That opinion reinforced the principle of accountability in the Navy’s culture. Yet, there is a stark difference between then and now. The 1952 accident occurred in peace. This incident was in combat.
Once again, past ghosts appear before us posing the timeless questions of how this happened, who caused the error, and what to do. An ongoing investigation will strive to answer those questions, recommend corrective actions, and assign accountability for the errors that led to the accident. Some have prejudged the outcome and now call for the Gettysburg’s captain to be fired.
As we reflect on this accident, we must be reminded of a principle equal to, if not greater than, the hard task of holding accountable those who may have erred in the fog of war. That greater principle is the authority of commanding officers to exercise their best judgment in a split second when operating squarely in the fog of combat, with a torrent of both good and bad information.
Hobson’s choice is an idiom that comes from Thomas Hobson, a livery stable owner in Cambridge, England, in the early 17th century. Hobson would only allow customers to take the horse closest to the door, or no horse at all. It is often used to describe an illusion that many choices are available when, in fact, only one conclusion is predetermined. In the Gettysburg investigation, calling for the removal of the commanding officer is not the only choice. History suggests that the investigation should invoke the fallacy of Hobson’s choice in this unfortunate incident and consider both the principles of accountability and authority.
As a mid-grade naval officer working at the Pentagon in the summer of 1988, I (Vice Admiral Morgan) was a first-hand witness to how civilian and military leaders dealt with a grave mistake caused by the captain of a Navy ship that led to the death of many innocent civilians. Iran and Iraq had been at war for eight years and that summer were attacking each other’s oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, another gray combat zone.
On the morning of 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes (CG-49) fired two guided missiles that destroyed Iran Air 655, killing 290 people. Even though the airliner was emitting a commercial identification friend or foe (IFF) signal and was flying along an established commercial air route at an altitude and speed that posed no threat to the ship, misidentification by human error indicated otherwise, and the captain, under pressure to protect a crew he believed to be in imminent danger, shot down the nonhostile aircraft.
An unusual set of circumstances caused me to be in the Secretary of Defense’s office that morning along with then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe. Huddled around the desk, Crowe and I watched silently as Secretary Carlucci relayed the unfolding tragedy to President Reagan over the phone. After hanging up, Carlucci told us the president had acknowledged the gravity of the accident but directed the Navy to preserve the authority of commanding officers to exercise their best judgment even under the most challenging circumstances. In an instant, Reagan grasped the enormous weight of responsibility commanders constantly carry. A thorough investigation ensued, and the captain was not fired.
For the sake of future commanding officers, the ongoing investigation of the USS Gettysburg/FA-18 shootdown should carefully weigh preserving their authority to act against the need for accountability, particularly when operating in gray zones of undeclared combat hostilities, such as in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden today. In the chaos of combat and imminent danger, the choice to preserve authority does not diminish the need for accountability, as the two principles can coexist.
Mistakes may have been made by a good and well-intentioned captain and crew. A review of operating procedures and protocols may justify holding the commanding officer and others on or off the ship to account for the loss of the aircraft and injuries to the flight crew. But, firing the commanding officer should not be a foregone conclusion. Present and future commanding officers will be watching to see if there is only the horse closest to the door, or none at all. Hobson’s choice is a fallacy in this incident. The Navy must acknowledge the difference between peace and combat. In the profession of arms, both commanding officer authority and accountability must be preserved in equal measure for warships to be fully ready for combat in the future.
