Bases on the Aleutian Islands Would Project U.S. Power Across the Pacific

The Aleutian Island Chain stretches more than 1,000 miles west across the Pacific from the Alaska Peninsula. The rugged islands dot the North Pacific shipping route and guard the approaches to the Arctic. The United States first realized the strategic importance of these remote islands at the outset of World War II, when Major General Simon Buckner Jr., tasked with the defense of Alaska, said the Aleutian chain “formed a spear pointing right at the heart of Japan.”¹ The Japanese had already recognized this threat. Their reconnaissance of the Aleutians in the 1930s enabled successful carrier-based raids against Dutch Harbor and the occupation of Kiska and Attu in 1942. Japan thus prevented U.S. forces from using the islands as a staging point for a campaign against the Japanese mainland.  

Today, U.S. adversaries are again interested in the Aleutians. In August 2023, Russia and China conducted a joint 11-ship naval patrol near the islands, a provocative move that showed the United States needs to increase its naval presence in the region.² With reemerging strategic competition a top priority, the United States should fortify the Aleutians, part of the Pacific’s third island chain, to deter competitors. Specifically, the United States should reestablish a naval base on Adak Island to support naval deployments that protect approaches to the Arctic and sea lines of communication across the North Pacific. It should also build and refurbish air bases in the western Aleutians to position long-range bombers and P-8A Poseidon aircraft for sorties as far away as Taiwan. Washington also could place ballistic-missile defense systems on the Aleutians to counter nuclear threats from China, Russia, and North Korea. Finally, Marines carrying out expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) could turn the Aleutian chain into a choke point thousands of miles long, challenging adversaries’ ability to strike convoys or access the Arctic.

Control the Arctic Crossroads

At 51 degrees North, the same latitude as London, Adak is the southernmost port in Alaska. It is closest to the great-circle shipping lanes that arc between Asia and North America, making it the most logical stop for U.S. warships or convoys traversing the Pacific. While Adak is roughly 1,000 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle, it forms the center of a natural island barrier that could control access to the Arctic.

In 2021, Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan said the Navy was interested in reopening a base on Adak that was closed in 1997. Sullivan claimed the island “is enormously strategic in terms of [being] really the gateway to the Asia-Pacific and the gateway to the Arctic.”³ A base on Adak could provide expeditionary logistics for U.S warship and submarine deployments to control these waters. This would protect existing transPacific and emerging Arctic trade routes. At the same time, it would control access to strategically vital waterways. In any conflict, the Aleutians would become the fastest and safest route for convoys headed to the western Pacific. For example, the distance from San Diego to Okinawa with a stop in Adak is 5,700 nm. The same route through Honolulu is 6,300 nm. More important, Adak sits 2,900 nm from Okinawa while Honolulu is 4,000 nm distant, making Adak the closest U.S. port outside of Guam to Taiwan. 

According to an unclassified Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) wargame, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would likely destroy U.S. bases in the first and second island chains but might hesitate to strike the U.S. mainland for fear of further escalation.⁴ In this scenario, a naval base on Adak might be spared from bombardment and serve as the closest resupply and rearming point for U.S. warships and submarines operating in the western Pacific. In the short term, the Navy should repair the piers and basic port infrastructure on Adak, enhance the facility’s fuel storage capacity, and periodically deploy surface assets to the region for training, familiarization, and deterrence. In the long term, the Navy should consider building additional infrastructure, including repair facilities, hangars, and weapon storage depots to stockpile munitions. This would ensure rapid deployment of forces to the region if conflict erupted in the western Pacific.

In addition to being a shorter route to the western Pacific than one that runs through Hawaii, a northern route through Adak also would provide shipping convoys more security, with assets including antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships, aircraft, and missile-defense installations positioned throughout the chain. This would provide steady sustainment to U.S. forces operating inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. All told, a naval base on Adak would anchor increased U.S. presence to complicate adversary operations in the region. The base would ensure critical sea lines of communication remain open to resupply forces in the western Pacific during any conflict.

Air Power From The Western Aleutians 

Shemya Island in the western Aleutians hosts Eareckson Air Station, which is named after the World War  II colonel who led the air campaign against Japanese forces on Attu and Kiska.⁵ These are the three westernmost geographical points in the United States and remain the most logical locations for an air base. Whether the existing runway on Shemya is refurbished or a new airfield is built on Attu, an air base in the western Aleutians capable of supporting long-range bombers and air-refueling tankers would have a significant deterrent effect. 

Rather than position high-value assets such as carriers within China’s weapons engagement zone, the United States could station bombers equipped with long-range missiles that could threaten Chinese targets from safer stand-off distances, potentially reducing U.S. losses.⁶ Eareckson’s airfield is 2,900 nm from the Taiwan Strait. U.S. B-1B and B-52 bombers have ranges over 6,500 nm, meaning they could strike People’s Liberation Army Navy assets in the Taiwan Strait with antiship missiles and return to base without having to refuel. The B-2 stealth bomber also could complete this mission without refueling, thanks to its range of 6,000 nm, especially if deploying missiles with hundreds of miles of added range, such as the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. Finally, future B-21 long-range bombers are also projected to have the range needed to conduct sorties from the Aleutians to the Taiwan Strait without having to refuel. Australia, Oahu, and even Midway are too far to support such missions without mid-flight refueling, making the Aleutians the logical place to base these assets. Being able to strike Chinese targets without refueling would free valuable tanker assets for other missions, including maintaining nuclear deterrence. But tanker aircraft based in the western Aleutians still could support bomber missions from Hawaii, provide midair refueling in the event of an emergency, and support other aviation sorties across the theater.

In addition, the United States could construct reinforced hangars on Shemya and Attu to house U.S. aircraft evacuated from China’s weapons engagement zone. The CSIS wargame estimated that, in a conflict over Taiwan, Chinese missiles could destroy 800 U.S. aircraft based in Japan and Guam—many on the ground. If a conflict were imminent, the United States could evacuate its land-based fighters and other short-range aircraft, via refueling stops in Japan, to the Aleutians to avoid likely missile strikes on U.S. bases in Guam and Japan. While the islands are not completely outside the reach of China’s long-range missiles, Beijing might hesitate to order a strike on the Aleutians, as this would be an attack on U.S. territory. That would certainly escalate the conflict and open China to retaliatory strikes on its mainland. In the short term, the United States should rebuild aviation infrastructure in the western Aleutians to support long-range bombers and construct reinforced hangars to protect as many aircraft as possible. 

Nuclear Deterrence

China is projected to triple its number of nuclear warheads to roughly 1,500 by 2035, and North Korea continues to improve its ballistic-missile capability.⁷ The Aleutian Islands could enhance nuclear deterrence by hosting Ground-Based Midcourse Defense systems. Great-circle routes from northern China and North Korea to the West Coast of the United States pass over the Aleutian Islands at two points—at the western and eastern ends of the island chain—providing two opportunities to intercept ballistic missiles. In the event of a conflict or heightened tensions with North Korea, sea- and land-based Aegis missile-defense systems in the Aleutians could offer an additional layer of protection to bases in mainland Alaska and to West Coast cities. 

Deny Arctic Access with EABs

The Marine Corps’ EABO concept was designed to exploit geography by landing small teams of Marines on remote, rugged terrain and to use systems such as antiship missiles or ASW capabilities to deny enemy access.⁸ While the concept was conceived with the first island chain in mind, it translates well to the Aleutians. Marines could establish expeditionary bases throughout the islands to slow adversaries trying to maneuver to or from the Arctic and to protect U.S. shipping transiting the region from enemy submarines. Unlike operations in the first island chain, Marines in the Aleutians would be on U.S. soil and largely outside China’s weapons engagement zone. This means the United States could start training now and construct a limited amount of infrastructure throughout the Aleutians to support Marine Corps deployments and protect troops and valuable equipment from the extreme weather common to the region. In addition, training in the Aleutians would help Marines hone EABO concepts including landing and withdrawing forces, establishing bases, and practicing sustainment.

Deployments to the Aleutians also would position Marines to practice antisubmarine warfare. General David Berger, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote in a 2020 Proceedings article that “by offering forward logistics and support, as well as sensor and strike capabilities, Marine expeditionary advanced bases (EABs) could make a significant contribution to undersea warfare campaigns, including holding Chinese and Russian submarines at risk.”⁹ With China’s growing submarine force and Russia’s long-established fleet both interested in the western Pacific and the Arctic, EABs throughout the Aleutians with ASW capability could provide a strong deterrent.

The U.S. Coast Guard Could Lead the Way

The Coast Guard is the joint force subject-matter expert on operations throughout the Aleutian Islands. It has operated in these waters since the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867. The service routinely deploys cutters to Dutch Harbor and operates MH-60T Jayhawk helicopters and HC-130J Hercules aircraft out of Cold Bay. These frequently fly as far west as Adak for law-enforcement and search-and-rescue operations and to support cutter deployments by delivering parts and people. As the Department of Defense increases its presence in the region, Coast Guard liaison officers could embed with various units to assist with area familiarization and lead joint air and surface patrols. The Coast Guard’s longstanding experience will be necessary to help other services overcome the extreme weather and rugged mountainous terrain common to all the islands. The service also could continue to invest in Dutch Harbor and Cold Bay by maintaining key infrastructure to support the joint force in the eastern Aleutians.

If conflict erupted in the western Pacific, the Coast Guard could immediately increase its cutter presence in the eastern Aleutians. The aim would be to secure Unimak Pass, located just east of Dutch Harbor, which serves as the shipping lane for all traffic between the Pacific Northwest and East Asia. In addition, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft could take the lead on search and rescue, deliver supplies to remote Marine Corps expeditionary bases, and maintain navigational aids throughout the Aleutians.

Unlocking A Powerful Geography

An important way to deter adversaries in the age of strategic competition may be to reestablish a strong joint presence on U.S. soil in the Aleutians to protect sea lines of communication and leverage long-range systems to defeat China’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy. The Coast Guard will be the primary force in the east of the island chain, continuing its law-enforcement and search-and-rescue missions, but it also could help familiarize Department of Defense partners with the complexities and hardships associated with operating in the region. 

Rebuilding the naval base on Adak would allow the U.S. Navy to control the central Aleutian Islands and protect key shipping routes while deterring adversaries. Air bases in the western Aleutians capable of deploying long-range and stealth bombers would provide strong deterrence, given their ability to strike the Taiwan Strait from U.S. soil, and also could house aircraft evacuated from China’s weapons engagement zone, minimizing U.S. losses. Finally, U.S. Marines could establish infrastructure throughout the Aleutians that would enable EABO at the outset of a conflict. These bases would protect vital sea lanes and turn the Aleutians into a 1,000-nm choke point, complicating adversary access to the Arctic. The United States should take full advantage of the Aleutians’ powerful geography to strengthen its position in the Pacific and force its adversaries to reconsider provocative and aggressive action against U.S. allies in the region.