The U.S. Navy is in a fight for survival, a quickening battle being waged from the halls of the Pentagon to the boardrooms of industry to hearings on Capitol Hill. The consequence of this contest will determine if the nation is destined for maritime irrelevance and the laying of its prosperity at the whims of autocrats a world away. At the core of the battle are these questions: What sort of Navy does the nation need; and how can it be built?
Fleet composition is a perennial debate, but it is meaningless if there are not enough shipyards or workers to build that fleet. And so, the bigger question is how to recapitalize a shipbuilding industry to produce the required new capabilities and warships. The Royal Navy’s experience in the years prior to World War I is illuminating.
The Royal Navy’s Shipbuilding Revolution
The Royal Navy was going through growing pains that eventually would usher in the modern navy early in the last century. At the center of the modernization were Sir Winston Churchill and Admiral of the Fleet John “Jacky” Fisher. They would lead a revolution in naval warship design and construction that ensured British naval dominance for another three decades. Delivering the navy required then necessitated new shipyard construction techniques, radio-enabled operations, and targeting of long-range naval cannon.1 Not everything needed was adopted.
A classic exchange between Churchill and Fisher occurred in a January 1912 letter in which they discussed the importance of modernization and investment in future capacity: “The luxuries of the present are the necessities of the future.” The letter was triggered by questions about the balance of armor, speed, and weapons to pace Germany’s rapidly advancing navy and new ship designs.
A similar dynamic is at play regarding the fleet the U.S. Navy needs to stay ahead of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Like Great Britain in 1912, the United States today faces a foe intent on outclassing and then defeating its navy. It is a race of technological prowess as well as industrial capacity. The reality being exposed by combat operations in the Red Sea and shipbuilding here at home is that for too long the United States has viewed its Navy as a luxury.
Representative of this post–Cold War thinking is the sacrifice of shipyards, shipbuilding, and modernization for a peace dividend. From 1989 to 2023, this has amounted to more than $1.3 trillion in forgone spending and investment, as measured by growing the Navy’s 1989 budget at actual inflation rates versus the executed Navy budgets. The result has greatly and negatively affected the shipbuilding industry on which the Navy relies to pace the Chinese threat. Reversing this decades-long downward curve requires leadership, vision, and money applied in new ways—conventional thinking is not good enough.
A Navy Needs Warships
Some have argued that it is capability that matters, not the number of ships, but this misses the critical necessity of closing with the enemy in any naval battle. That said, without warships a Navy is just an armed militia, and so it is critical for the United States to cure the ailments of naval shipbuilding and grow its fleet. Unsurprisingly, years of modest increases in naval funding have not expanded shipbuilding capacity or grown the shipyard workforce.
Others have argued the priority must be how the Navy can be a better customer, which would include predictable funding, consistent shipbuilding plans, and an expanded cadre of experienced naval architects.2 Instead, more of the same has resulted in a shipbuilding industry unable to adequately respond, and Congress and the Navy have been unable to ensure industry accountability for delivering needed ships.
Case in point is the 45-day shipbuilding review ordered by the Secretary of the Navy in 2024.3 That review, unveiled in April 2024, followed months of mounting evidence that every naval shipbuilding program was delayed, despite rosy reports to the Secretary.4 Clearly, something needed to change in the dynamics of shipbuilding, and so the Secretary began engaging overseas commercial and naval shipbuilding industry leaders. This is understandable given the record of domestic shipbuilding, but such maritime statecraft has its limits. The nation needs to revitalize its own industry if it hopes to deliver the Navy it needs.
A strong navy is necessary to securing trade, but building that navy is impossible without a commercial fleet conducting prosperity-generating commerce. This is a critical lesson of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal book The Influence of Sea Power upon History. And it is a lesson too many senior leaders have ignored for too long, with less than 0.4 percent of U.S. commerce conveyed on U.S. ships.5 This reality puts in question the means to sustain combat operations and a wartime economy. After decades of neglect, the remedy to the nation’s predicament is to strengthen the maritime industrial base in concert with treaty allies.
Today, the U.S. fleet numbers 296 battle force ships; but it should have been at 321 to stay on pace with earlier plans to reach 355 ships by 2034.6 That 355-ship goal was based on a 2016 force structure assessment and has since been codified into law by Congress. What is most remarkable about the assessment is that, originally, the fleet need in 2016 was 459 ships and that was only lowered to 355 for fiscal reasons.7 Inconsistent budgeting is partly to blame for the Navy’s inability to keep shipbuilding on track, but so, too, is a paucity of shipyard capacity, which drives up costs and creates delays.
Four public shipyards that perform maintenance on nuclear-powered submarines are understaffed, and only a third of maintenance across the fleet is completed on time.8 Growing the fleet will place added strains on overworked shipyards and exacerbate the past-due modernization of its 17 existing dry docks, that—unless more are built—will not be able to sustain even the current too-small fleet.9 New shipyards and workers are needed, but only a revitalized industry will attract the necessary investment and people. For this, a new vision is required.
A New Era of Shipping
The world of shipping is on the cusp of a paradigm shift in part because of changing geostrategic realities and technological innovation. Envisioning and then taking action to lead what could be a revolution in shipping is imperative for regaining U.S. maritime strength. This does not mean “outperforming” China’s heavily subsidized and government-directed shipbuilding and shipping industries. Rather, a smarter approach that changes modern logistics through a blue-ocean strategy is needed—a multifaceted approach that creates new market space rather than continuing to compete in a conventional way. 10 The past helps point the way ahead.
The last major change to the maritime industry was thanks to two American innovations perfected during and after World War II: modular ship construction and containerization of cargo. Modularization proved critical in World War II by rapidly connecting dispersed U.S. factories. The other innovation that revolutionized shipping was cargo containerization. Containerization was the brainchild of Malcom McLean, who, in 1956, used a repurposed wartime tanker to move 58 truck trailers.
Simply importing commercial or naval shipbuilding from overseas ignores lessons written in blood. Building the world’s most survivable warships is founded on the legacy of American experience in naval battles that provided the basis for exacting and expensive military specifications. At the same time, to remain on the forefront of naval warfare requires seizing the imagination and energy of a new era in shipping. Acting on this opportunity is far from a certainty despite some recent good indications.
The first action was a 29 January 2024 bipartisan, bicameral letter to President Joe Biden signed by Congressman Mike Waltz (R-FL), Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ), and 17 other members of Congress urging him to strengthen the U.S. maritime industry.11 This was followed in April by a legislative agenda for a maritime initiative.12 Thankfully, Congress seems to understand the strategic importance of the nation’s maritime industrial sector and is taking tentative steps to set conditions for a revival of U.S. maritime competitiveness. Inattention to shipbuilding in previous decades has resulted in a commercial shipbuilding sector unable to build the ships the nation needs or sustain the Navy required.13
The next step is the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act, introduced into Congress in December. “By supporting shipbuilding, shipping, and workforce development, it will strengthen supply chains, reduce our reliance on foreign vessels, put Americans to work in good-paying jobs, and support the Navy and Coast Guard’s shipbuilding needs,” Senator Kelly said.14 The act calls for, among other things, adding 250 ships within the decade to the U.S.-flagged merchant fleet by establishing a Strategic Commercial Fleet Program, and it encourages an expansion of the shipbuilding base by offering a 25-percent tax credit for shipyard investments.
Restore Deterrence Through Sea Power
The U.S. maritime industry is strategically important and tied inextricably to the future of the Navy. Sadly, as retired Vice Admiral John Morgan made clear in his October Proceedings article, “we’re burning daylight” to rebuild U.S. maritime prowess for a fight that could begin in this decade.15
Time is not an ally in this endeavor. Action is required in the first 100 days of the new administration.16 First, the President will need to nominate and Congress will need to confirm a team of maritime and naval experts. Second, the President should aim to achieve a fleet of no fewer than 333 warships before he leaves office—achievable by retaining warships until end-of-life and accelerating new shipbuilding. Finally, the administration and Congress should consider novel approaches to expand public naval shipyards and foster the establishment of new commercial shipyards.
All said, there are reasons to be optimistic: Consensus on the threat from China has taken hold, galvanizing tentative steps to more forceful and effective actions; and bipartisan efforts such as the SHIPS for America Act call for consistent investment and corrective action.
1. Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1999), 7–16.
2. Robert G. Keane and Berry F. Tibbitts, “The Navy’s Ship Design Factory: NAVSEA—The ‘Golden Goose,’” Naval Engineers Journal 131, no. 3 (September 2019): 61–78.
3. “SECNAV Del Toro Directs Comprehensive Navy Shipbuilding Review,” Department of the Navy, 11 January 2024.
4. Chris Panella, “As It Looks to Keep Its Edge Over Rivals, the U.S. Navy’s Biggest Shipbuilding Projects are Delayed by Years, New Review Finds,” Business Insider, 3 April 2024.
5. RADM James Watson, USCG, et al., Zero Point Four: How U.S. Leadership in Maritime Will Secure America’s Future (Self-published, 2024), 5–6.
6. Naval Vessel Register, “Ship Battle Forces,” 8 November 2024, www.nvr.navy.mil/nvr/getpage.htm?pagetype=shipbattleforce); and Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, February 2018), 12.
7. U.S. Navy, 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment, “Executive Summary,” 14 December 2016, 2.
8. Megan Eckstein, “Ship Repair Delays Increased In 2022 Due to Labor, Material Challenges,” Defense News, 9 September 2022.
9. Diana C. Maurer, Naval Shipyards: Ongoing Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy’s Ability to Improve Shipyards (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 10 May 2022), 4.
10. W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2015), 22.
11. HON Mike Waltz and HON Mark Kelly, letter to President Joe Biden, 29 January 2024.
12. HON Mike Waltz, HON Mark Kelly, HON Marco Rubio, and HON John Garamendi, “Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy: Reversing the Decline of America’s Maritime Power,” 30 April 2024.
13. Brian Potter, “Why Can’t the U.S. Build Ships?” Construction Physics, 5 September 2024.
14. Mallory Shelborne, “New SHIPS Act Legislation Aims to Revamp Shipbuilding Industry,” USNI News, 19 December 2024.
15. VADM John Morgan, USN (Ret.), “An Industrial Mobilization Plan to Deter or Defeat China,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 10 (October 2024).
16. Jerry Hendrix and Brent Sadler, “Restoring Our Maritime Strength: An Agenda for the Next President’s First Hundred Days,” National Review, 24 October 2024.