Navy Cryptology Can Be Great at the Basics—Again

Until recently, Navy cryptologic warfare officers (CWOs) were responsible for three disciplines: electromagnetic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SigInt), and cyberspace operations. To be promoted, officers sought experience in all three disciplines.¹ However, the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Navy to create a cyber force apart from the CW community, similar to the Army and Air Force cyber branches.² In response, the Navy created the maritime cyber warfare officer and cyber warfare technician specialties to focus on offensive and defensive cyber operations.

Given recent world events, this separation is a blessing, as it allows Navy cryptologists to rededicate themselves to being experts in EW and SigInt and focus on electromagnetic-spectrum warfare. For example, with NATO supplying Ukrainian forces with the M982 155-mm Excalibur extended-range guided artillery shell, Russia is turning to electronic warfare to fight back. The Russian Pole-21 electronic countermeasures system disrupts the GPS signals that guide Excalibur artillery. Furthermore, Russian signals intelligence integrates with artillery and rocket fires to eliminate Ukrainian firing positions. Ukrainian radio and cellular transmissions also have been targeted through the mobile truck-based Leer3 system, with Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicles flown for extended range. This is not a recent improvisation. Russia established five EW battalions in 2009 and improved its information warfare skills through years of practice in Syria.

While the Russia-Ukraine war has raged, Houthi missile and drone attacks from Yemen against ships in the Red Sea have reaffirmed the need for electromagnetic-spectrum operations to find, fix, and finish threats. To be prepared for future information warfare, the Navy’s cryptologic warfare community should deploy cryptologic technicians (CTs) and CWOs selectively to missions in which their skills are needed and will be used, recruit talent differently, and train smarter.

Subject Matter Experts

The National Security Agency (NSA) defines SigInt as “intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets.” NSA has sole control of SigInt—the Navy cannot operate in the electromagnetic spectrum alone. Authorization to collect and analyze SigInt is tightly regulated to protect citizens’ privacy. Commanders have no inherent right to collect or use it—authority is granted case-by-case. Operational commanders need knowledgeable SigInt advisers to access capabilities while meeting constitutionally mandated requirements.

DoD Instruction 3115.07, “Signals Intelligence,” permits temporary SigInt operational tasking authority (SOTA) to units, platforms, and assets on a “mission-specific basis.” CTs and CWOs support all warfighting domains and must learn to strike a balance between being technical specialists and operational generalists, depending on mission requirements.

Deploy Selectively

Cryptologists need to continually use their tactical skills through selective direct-support deployments. In the direct-support model, specialists deploy globally on board Navy platforms and attached to special operations units.³ They perform sophisticated installations and repairs; identify, locate, and report worldwide threats; and provide tactical and operational intelligence to commanders.

Direct-support teams are deployed for specific missions, not permanently assigned to the units themselves. Teams must quickly demonstrate value to warrant the rack space they occupy. They often will shift among different ships or units during deployments as missions change and require different experts—for example, linguists.

CW specialists should be only on missions that need their specific capabilities. When deployed direct-support personnel do not have the opportunity to use their skills and exercise their SigInt authorities, they burn weeks of operational and personnel tempo for no reason and reduce the CW community’s capacity to support operational units that have a greater need for SigInt expertise. Sailors are a finite resource. The cryptologic resource coordinators (usually O-4 CWOs) on command task forces and fleet staffs must explain to their bosses that there is a cost for misusing cryptology. The desire for enhanced indications and warning must balance the current operational picture versus the future deployer’s need. In short, committing direct-support teams to deployed units must be a decision shared between the operational commanders and the Navy’s information warfare type command, or Naval Information Forces (NavIFor).

Post-mission analysis should validate whether a theater request for CW support was ultimately justified. If results show inefficiency, NavIFor should increase scrutiny on theater requests, enforcing level-of-effort requirements before approving augmentation requests. Every commander wants as many options to maneuver as possible, but the CW community is not manned to support every ship.

Even if the Navy could drastically increase the size of its cryptologist ratings to man every unit, cryptologic technician A schools can take up to 64 weeks to produce specialists for sea duty.⁴ The Navy’s most cost-effective solution to retain CTs and employ their expertise is selective direct support.

Recruit Differently

Because of the unique deployment structure of cryptologists, only the technicians operating the equipment need to have an enhanced technical background. Prior CWO recruiting has focused on candidates with technical backgrounds, but an understanding of law and regulations is often a CWO’s greatest advantage. CWOs must understand constitutional requirements and DoD regulations to manage their sailors. The Cryptologic Warfare Officer Basic Course, while only six weeks long, covers EW, SigInt, and cyberspace operations. New accessions are targeted for their study in technical degree-granting programs, yet CWOs will never operate EW and SigInt equipment. They lead teams of operators.

CWOs begin their careers not at sea, but with tours at NSA, where they initially qualify in information warfare. New CWOs should embrace some of the timeless principles found in the humanities and use their initial tours to master leadership skills and a broad understanding of the SigInt systems, with CTs specializing in technical schematics. CW community leaders need to understand how to get a sailor with the enlisted classification the mission needs to the right platform, equipped in the right time, and endowed with the necessary level of access. Electromagnetic theory should be taught when needed, but CWOs really need to know how to use the range of authorities governing the electromagnetic spectrum to provide capabilities.

Train Smarter

Other Navy communities may view the direct-support manning model as one that does not afford young CT sailors true sea-duty experiences, but time in garrison is an invaluable investment toward future deployments. Direct-support cryptologists should train ashore when not deployed to take advantage of all intelligence community (IC) resources and further hone their skills.

Direct-support CTs do not rotate home early from deployment once their mission ends, but instead “deploy” back to the IC to integrate with the analysis and production shops of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), NSA, and other IC agencies.

For example, ONI’s Nimitz Warfare Analysis Center is the Navy’s preeminent center of excellence for maritime-domain operational and strategic analysis.⁵ Within Nimitz is SABER (surface warfare branch), specializing in surface-related intelligence support for expeditionary and littoral warfare. For air warfare, SPEAR (air and air defense branch) provides capability analysis on aircraft threats, land and naval air defenses, and Navy/Marine Corps strike warfare. SWORD (submarine warfare division) monitors submarine threats, including worldwide submarine operations, capabilities, and systems.

CWOs and CTs use their time embedded in IC agencies to sharpen the expertise they bring to the fleet when they return to direct-support roles. In addition to providing better SigInt support, they use their knowledge to help operational units craft only those requests for information back to theater and national agencies that are truly needed.

Cryptologists also need to meet periodically with their IC customers to ensure SigInt collection is meeting mission needs. ONI’s Farragut Technical Analysis Center is the Navy’s center of excellence for scientific and technical intelligence analysis of foreign technologies.⁶ Farragut’s analysts and engineers rely on the CW community’s intelligence collection for deep analysis of adversary systems. Direct-support CW personnel use some of their time ashore following missions to meet with Farragut analysts and engineers, a virtuous cycle that allows them to redeploy sharper.

Deployed units on collection missions often get no feedback from the IC on what success looks like. Similarly, the IC remains far removed from the operational constraints of the collectors. Returning CW personnel to these centers of excellence quickly after a collection mission allows the operators to receive feedback on targeting and educates intelligence customers to better inform future tasking.

The November 2023 Proceedings article “Prepare Intelligence Officers for the Undersea Fight” noted that direct-support teams are often led by “first-tour junior officers expected to operate at an at-sea department head level with subsequent tours focused on other information warfare missions.”⁷ Until recently, CWO careers had to balance EW, SigInt, and cyber warfare tasks. Now, cryptologists can take advantage of the Navy shifting cyber into its own community to improve their EW and SigInt expertise.

Marine Corps entry-level intelligence officers focus on specializations such as ground intelligence (0203) or air intelligence (0207).⁸ After gaining four years of expertise, these specialists merge as Marine air-ground task force intelligence officers (0202). Navy cryptologists should emulate this model, but for longer, remaining in a single specialization (EW or SigInt) through initial department head tours (until approximately the six- or seven-year mark). Allowing new officers to learn from department heads who have achieved the additional qualification designator in either EW or SigInt would further enhance the expertise of future CW leaders.

Critics may argue this approach limits cryptologists’ experience by restricting their breadth. However, these officers will be capable problem-solvers in higher ranks through the experience of improving a mission with which they are intimate. Every Navy community conducts business according to its own culture and process, and the CW community is no different.

Navy cryptologic warfare is at an inflection point. From the Black Sea to the Red Sea, the electromagnetic spectrum is proving a crucial domain for U.S. adversaries. With the congressionally mandated separate cyber warfare community taking root, cryptologists should seize the opportunity to refocus on SigInt and EW.