Containerization of global trade has generated extraordinary demand for ultralarge container vessels (ULCVs) with capacities of as many as 24,000 TEUs. Although these leviathans promise economies of scale, they require ports with deep berths, large cranes, and expansive storage yards. They pose formidable physical and cybersecurity challenges—the ships and the ports depend on sophisticated automation and networked digital systems, damage to which can disrupt operations, especially during conflict. And larger ships make higher-value targets, whose loss would have potential to cause great economic disruption. All this has significant implications for international trade and the rules-based order and the U.S. Navy’s role in protecting them.
Infrastructure Strain
Not all ports have the necessary features to accommodate ULCVs, nor can most be upgraded to do so. As the number of ULCV ships grows, the smaller ports will therefore be relegated to feeder roles. This in turn will elevate the strategic value of the few megaship-capable ports, making them critical commercial nodes—and potential targets during conflict. Ports that can handle ULCVs, such as Los Angeles and Long Beach in California and Norfolk in Virginia, have gained and will continue to gain importance for commercial logistics and naval operations, necessitating their protection and readiness for dual-use roles.
The bifurcation exacerbates geopolitical vulnerabilities and rivalries. Traffic concentrations around choke points such as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Suez and Panama Canals heightens those places’ strategic importance, demanding vigilant naval oversight and security, especially for those that can accommodate megaships. The Red Sea crisis illustrates the Navy’s importance in securing vital shipping lanes, in this case in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, crucial for the uninterrupted passage of ULCVs. Simultaneously, China’s funding of global port projects through its Belt and Road Initiative and management of strategic port facilities heightens the risks to the international trading system.
Port Security Challenges
Automated cranes and terminal operating systems are essential for the smooth management of megaships. They also are susceptible to hacking, and most are manufactured in China and operated with Chinese software. (See “Smart Ports—Maritime Intelligence’s Blind Spot,” online, December 2024.)
Bad actors could use these systems to hinder commerce, conceal unlawful actions such as smuggling and terrorist exploitation of containerized freight, or shut down a port’s operation entirely in a crisis. The function of automation in alleviating these dangers is paradoxical. Although it improves efficiency and minimizes human error, it fosters reliance on technology that, if compromised, might incapacitate port operations. Cybersecurity is a growing concern because the dependence on automation appears to be growing faster than the tools to protect it are improving.
And not only in ports. The ULCVs depend on sophisticated networked automation and digital systems, exposing the ships to cyberattacks that may disrupt operations or be used during conflicts.
Emergency preparedness also must improve. Ports accommodating ULCVs must be prepared to manage anything from unintentional spills to sabotage on a scale potentially larger than anything seen since World War II.
Strategic Implications for the U.S. Navy
The U.S. Navy is a guarantor of global maritime trade, and its logistics enterprise depends to a significant degree on commercial ships. This requires alignment among Navy operations and commercial shipping schedules and port facilities, especially for containerized logistics in humanitarian operations or swift deployments. ULCVs can provide more, but where they can operate is more constrained, putting different operational demands on the Navy.
The risk of economic and strategic consequences from shipping disruptions is only magnified by ULCVs’ vast cargo capacities, underscoring the need for heightened maritime domain awareness. This mission extends beyond direct defense like that afforded by Operation Prosperity Guardian. Initiatives such as “friendshipping,” in which nations collaboratively secure sea lanes, also have an important role as part of cooperative maritime statecraft. Activities such as those performed by the five multinational task forces of Combined Maritime Forces, a 46-nation naval partnership, promote security in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Gulf regions.
In the end, as the volume of goods carried internationally is increasingly concentrated on larger ships that can avail themselves of fewer ports, the strategic and operational challenges for the Navy will change. Cyber and physical risks in those ports will pose direct and indirect threats to the global economy and the U.S. fleet, even as Navy logistics must adapt to the new realities imposed by ultralarge container vessels.
