Home Station C2 Will Help Win Future Wars

Throughout history, revolutions in military affairs have significantly changed the means, structures, and forms of armed conflict, and it has been incumbent on the military to adapt to these changes or risk disastrous consequences. Recent advances in technology have created yet another revolution in military affairs, and the Marine Corps must change how it conducts command and control (C2) to provide value to naval forces if it is, per the Commandant’s direction, to act as the joint terminal attack controller of the Joint force.¹

If the Marine Corps conducts C2 for the next generation of warfare the same way it conducted C2 in Iraq and Afghanistan, the service will fail in its mission. To be effective in future conflict, the service must experiment with, train toward, and be ready to command and control forces from home station.

Home station C2 would focus on a command strategy in which the main combat operations center (COC) remains within the continental United States while forward COCs deploy with the troops. This is different than the current Alpha/Bravo construct used across the Marine Corps, in which two COCs of equivalent capabilities both operate within the weapon engagement zone to provide commanders with flexibility and resiliency.

Home station C2 is necessary for four reasons: Technology has changed since the 2003 invasion of Iraq; peer-level adversaries create trade-offs between capability and targetability; contested logistics will be one of the largest challenges facing the joint force in a peer-level conflict; and distance is no longer the tyranny for C2 it once was.

Technology Has Changed

Advances in communication systems since 2003 have changed the environment in which the Sea Services will operate in the next war. In addition to more capable communication pathways and systems, space-based sensors, electronic warfare, cyberspace warfare, and the emerging social media and information landscapes create more avenues of attack for U.S. adversaries. This results in a battlespace that is far more transparent, creating an environment in which the question is no longer if a unit can remain hidden, but rather whether a unit’s purpose can remain hidden.

Today’s underlying communication architectures are superior to those available in the past—spanning greater distances faster. This creates a world in which—unless a unit is using specific line-of-sight systems—5 miles or 5,000 miles is inherently the same, leading to the opportunity for greater dispersion of C2 nodes from the front lines. Through the concept of home station C2, Marine Corps command posts can take advantage of the available communication pathways while minimizing the risks that adversaries can find, fix, and target friendly C2 nodes.

The Trade-off Between Capability and Targetability

In a recent article, Army Major General Curt Taylor stated, “In today’s battle of signatures, you can’t be invisible, but you can look unimportant.”² But how does a unit look unimportant? Within the electromagnetic signature of a battlespace, every unit looks the same from a single-channel-radio aspect. In addition, as more units are terminating classified and unclassified data networks at lower echelons, every unit looks the same. The adversary must then turn to other correlating information to determine a unit’s importance: Is a radar dish nearby? Are artillery units located in the vicinity? How many people are at the command post?

This creates a trade-off between capability and targetability. The ability for adversary forces to target U.S. and allied forces relies on the signature given by the element across the physical, technical, and information domains and the perceived importance of that unit. In early 2021, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) conducted exercise Dynamic Cape, in which the MEF staff was composed of approximately 500 people. Any node with that many members—in addition to the personnel required to operate that headquarters element—is obviously a unit of great importance and therefore more likely to draw enemy attention and fires than a smaller node that could be mistaken for a company or battalion C2 node.

Home station C2 would be a way to resolve this trade-off. With the main COC sustained at a location within the continental United States, each warfighting section could be robustly staffed without incurring adversary targeting risks. It also would enable warfighting function prioritization at the forward COC.

Contested Logistics as the Critical Vulnerability

As referenced in the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, “We should pay special attention to . . . the difficulty of logistics and sustainment on a contested battlefield.”³ It cannot be emphasized enough the difficulty the Marine Corps will face in sustaining a distributed force in contested areas. The increasing distribution of forces across larger geographical areas separated by sea lanes means concepts used in Iraq and Afghanistan will not work. Sustaining Marine Corps forces should be front and center in any plan to deploy forces forward.

One way to mitigate the challenges is to reduce the number of personnel in theater who do not need to be present for operations. The former commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Army Colonel Graham R. White called the concept “employing the capability instead of deploying the capability.” In other words,

for more than 20 years the United States fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from TOCs [tactical operation centers] and joint operations centers (JOCs) that never left the wire or the confines of the forward operating base (FOB) they were on. . . . Why then, were we taking our TOCs “into the box” at combat training centers (CTC). . . . Of course, our TOC would be discovered and killed; it is the largest entity on the battlefield.⁴

In addition to the challenges of staying alive, the logistical nightmare of attempting to deploy, defend, and sustain a force in theater for the comfort of having the staff nearby must be addressed. The requirements for class I (food and water), III (fuel), and V (ammunition) supplies to support these operations centers not only becomes a significant challenge, but also depletes logistical support to those who need to be in theater. Every mission to provide class I, III, and V supplies to a main COC is a logistics mission not being directed to the infantry company preparing for an attack or an artillery battery preparing to launch antiship missiles.

This is not to say the battalion, regimental, division, or MEF commander should not be in theater. There is an immeasurable benefit to the commander being on the ground to assess and understand the situation. However, deploying a small-scale forward COC rather than a large main COC incurs less risk to the command element and the forces in theater.

This idea ties in well with expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept but takes it one step further. The majority of Marine Corps EABs should focus on providing combat power through sensing, fires, or logistical sustainment. Additional EABs designed for robust COC nodes decrease the sustainment capabilities that can support combat power. Performing the majority of C2 from home station would reduce the strain on contested logistics.

As another example, during the recent Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Exercise 24 (MWX 5-24), the force regimental command staff consisted of approximately 160 individuals at the regimental main command post, whereas the regimental forward staff was just 30. By leaving the regimental main command post at home station and deploying only the regimental forward to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, the unit would have put less logistical strain on forces in theater.

In addition, the regimental main stayed at Camp Wilson in Twentynine Palms during the exercise, which was, for the play of the problem, outside the weapon engagement zone. Because of the distance between the regimental main within the scenario and the operating forces, all communication between the two was via beyond-line-of-sight systems.

The current design of MWX does not allow for home station C2 because of the requirement to deploy the regimental COC to Camp Wilson and for battalions to employ Alpha and Bravo nodes within the training area. A future iteration, however, could test the home station C2 concept to determine its limitations and save the cost of deploying the additional regimental main for the entire exercise. If the staff never left Camp Wilson, did they need to be there in the first place?

Distance Is No Longer Tyranny for C2

It is fair to ask whether the tactical operation centers and joint operation centers Colonel White referenced would have been as effective operating from home station. In 2003, with a much more limited C2 and communication infrastructure, these operations centers would not have been as effective. However, technology has changed significantly since the days of large operations centers in Iraq. Using the technology and communication pathways that exist today, units can control forces across a much larger distance.

These conditions change the perspective on how to employ C2 elements, but at the same time, C2 from home station requires a robust and resilient communication architecture that was not available in previous wars. The proliferation of networking capability throughout the world has changed this significantly. Today, a regimental main staff could operate from home station at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, with C2 forces operating in the Middle East just as it would in theater. No matter the physical distance, unless a force is operating using line-of-sight assets, the communication pathways are the same.

The goal for future communication concepts should not be how to operate in a denied and degraded environment, but how to do so through a redundant, resilient architecture, and use C2 forces most effectively with the least risk and lowest logistics requirements.

Get Comfortable with Being Uncomfortable

Home station C2 would significantly increase capability, maneuverability, and ability to deploy Marine Corps forces while reducing the risks associated with targeting and logistical sustainment. In addition, this concept would support the focus of the Marine Corps, which is putting combat troops in proximity to adversary forces to enable the base unit of the Marine air-ground task force to close with and destroy the enemy. It would be a seismic shift in Marine Corps philosophy and would require commanders to accept risk and be uncomfortable with greater distances between units, staffs, and commanders. It is important the Marine Corps become comfortable being uncomfortable from a C2 perspective and trust its communication systems and staffs.

The Marine Corps should continually challenge its own assertions and apply the scientific method to its warfighting philosophy. Home station C2 would be inherently different from how the Marine Corps has fought in the past, but the service—and the entire joint force—must adapt to the changing nature of war, so it is not using 2000s tactics against a more capable adversary in a 2030 war. Not adapting could have disastrous consequences.