As the Marine Corps shifts its force structure toward the 2030 end state, it is making room in its traditional cannon artillery units for more over-the-horizon fires assets in the form of medium-range and long-range missile batteries. This is an opportune time for the service to consider creating hybrid cannon and missile batteries. A mix of 105-mm M119 cannons and missile launchers would give artillery Marines in the littorals an over-the-horizon threat against enemies in the maritime environment, as well as provide traditional fire support should a determined enemy force come ashore.
This proposal raises two issues: the value added by incorporating traditional cannons in the missile battery, and the utility of the lighter M119 over the M777 for expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and stand-in forces.
The value added is increased survivability against local land-based threats. The Marine Corps is accepting a necessary risk to stay aligned with the naval character of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. Tanks and M777s are difficult to hide and maneuver through littoral jungle terrain—especially given the M777’s requirement for Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs) as its prime mover and ammunition carrier—and cannon artillery does not have the range to influence the actions of an enemy ship captain.
Missile batteries can conduct anti-access/area-denial operations in the littorals and are self-propelled, meaning they have much greater utility in a naval fight than their cannon counterparts. Their value in a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific speaks for itself; however, as the war in Ukraine highlights, the character of the close-in infantry fight remains akin to the familiar character of warfare.
It is not a stretch to envision a conventional enemy raid or assault on land-based positions in the littorals. Indeed, such an action may be the opening to follow-on enemy fleet action. In such a fight, traditional combined-arms tactics likely will continue to reign supreme, and the extended reach of cannons compared with both 60-mm and 81-mm mortars could aid infantry significantly in both offensive and defensive operations.
For this reason, the batteries deployed in support of naval maneuver should consist of two missile platoons, one three-gun M119 platoon, and a headquarters platoon for fire direction and maintenance, an increase of one firing platoon over traditional cannon battery sizes. Such a construct would take nothing away from the over-the-horizon firepower of an antiship missile battery, with the added value of traditional fire support to aid the survivability of the EAB.
When it comes to the survivability of ground forces, more firepower is certainly helpful. Why, then, a smaller 105-mm howitzer over the 155-mm? The M119 cannot shoot as far as the M777, but it has a longer reach than mortars. It is more maneuverable than its larger cousin, allowing for quicker emplacement, displacement, and azimuth of fire shifts. In addition, it can be towed by HMMWV-size vehicles, rather than the much larger MTVRs. Also easier to airlift, the M119 is a more expeditionary weapon system than the M777 and far better suited to movement in challenging littoral terrain.
There would be challenges with this construct. First, there is acquisition, with one possible solution being limited interservice swaps between Marine Corps M777s and Army M119s. Once a predominantly missile battery acquires M119s, there also would be logistical challenges, including staffing and a small unit to oversee maintenance on two vastly different systems. Because Marine Corps artillery schoolhouses are collocated with the Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and plenty of M119s, Marine training on the M119 could be a smoother addition to the curriculum than missiles will be. And while maintenance for the battery would be more complex, it would be manageable.
M119 105-mm cannons are expeditionary weapons that would fill a critical capability gap for Marines deployed in the Indo-Pacific. Their incorporation in missile batteries would reduce the necessary risk the Marine Corps has incurred by transitioning the artillery community to a predominantly over-the-horizon asset, while increasing the survivability of the new missile batteries that enable service involvement in the naval fight.
