Beyond Mission Command: Collaborative Leadership

The Marine Corps is engaged in a lively debate about what the future force should look like.¹ But amid the discussion Force Design 2030 sparked, one topic central to warfighting has not received the attention it deserves: the exercise of command.

Marine Corps doctrine embeds command within the concept of mission command, which has been central to the service’s philosophy of warfare and leadership since 1995.² Mission command has become an article of faith, its tenets receiving rote recitation by senior commanders. Yet, in practice, it is seldom encouraged—at least as it originally was understood when it emerged after the Vietnam War. So, as today’s security environment becomes increasingly complex, questions arise: Does mission command still work? Does a concept born many years before the IT revolution, the rise of artificial intelligence, and multidomain warfare still apply?

Historical Underpinnings

Mission command has a long pedigree. Its genesis is in the teachings of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke “the Elder” in the late 19th century. It further grew in the practice of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, and of von Moltke’s nephew, General Helmuth von Moltke “the Younger.”³ Leaders in the U.S. Navy have long expressed a command philosophy that embraces the essence of mission command. In 1941, Admiral Ernest J. King shared his thoughts on the subject:

I have been concerned for many years over the increasing tendency—now grown almost to “standard practice”—of flag officers and other group commanders to issue orders and instructions in which their subordinates are told “how” as well as “what” to do to such an extent and in such detail that the “custom of the service” has virtually become the antithesis of that essential element of command—“initiative of the subordinate.”⁴

For Marines, mission command is about decentralization and fostering initiative to create tempo. It gives commanders an approach to “reach effective military decisions and implement effective military actions faster than an adversary in any conflict setting on any scale.”⁵ Under mission command, decisions are distributed throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace, framed by the higher commander’s intent and a shared understanding of the context. Its successful application depends not only on delegating authority to the lowest echelons feasible, but also on the promotion of initiative. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, explains:

We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the freedom—and establishing the duty—for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed necessary based on the situation. Mission tactics relies on a subordinate’s exercise of initiative framed by proper guidance and understanding.⁶

Benefits and Shortcomings

The benefits of mission command seem clear, especially at the tactical/operational level. Time is the essential element of combat, and mission command sharpens decision speed and operational tempo. It allows combatants to exploit new information and seize fleeting opportunities, and it creates the expectation of independent judgment and action that does not wait until information can pass up and down the command chain.

Tactical benefits aside, the regular exercise of such initiative and independent judgment equips junior commanders with experience they would never gain under the simpler expectation that they excel under instruction by higher command. This makes the entire leadership structure more resilient and able to sustain excellence over time and in the face of combat losses.

But mission command is not without its critics.⁷ For several analysts, a principal drawback is that it seeks to impose a universal leadership style for all modes of war in all operational contexts. These scholars contend that situational understanding should be the decisive factor in guiding a commander’s approach to command and control. They argue the individual with the best situational understanding—be that a front-line tactical commander or a distant staff officer—should have the authority to implement choices to achieve success.⁸

Others contend that doctrine should embrace a continuum of styles and offer guidance for commanders to constantly assess their operational context while considering their experience levels and confidence, their unit’s proficiency, the quality and judgment of subordinate leaders, the complexity and ambiguity of the environment, and the character of the opposition when determining which approach to employ.⁹

One touted advantage of mission command is its potential to free time for senior commanders. But while it relieves higher headquarters of some tasks and provides junior leaders experience and expertise, the concept shifts potentially complex work to lower echelons with little or no staff capacity for processing options, evaluating guidance, and developing and exploiting their presumed superior situational understanding.

Another downside lies in its applicability within coalition or interagency operations. Many allies, including NATO partners and Australia, have embraced mission command. But some possible future partners have not established the professional development programs necessary to foster the multidimensional understanding and individual initiative essential to its successful practice. Since it is predicated on cohesion, trust, and mutual understanding developed over time, the concept could be difficult or impossible for a disparate coalition or interagency task force to implement quickly or ad hoc.

Sir Rupert Smith has argued that learning quickly how to operate within mission command is a challenge, but is possible.¹⁰ Some U.S. Army officers believe it can work within alliance structures that bring together different cultures.¹¹ The U.S. services should recognize, however, that some likely future allies will not be led by graduates of U.S. service schools and may be unfamiliar with U.S. doctrine.

New Concepts and Technologies

Mission command may be incompatible with multidomain operations (MDO), the emerging joint warfighting concept that demands detailed planning and continual interaction with higher authority. MDO in practice does not match mission command’s principles.¹² As noted by defense analyst Niklas Nilsson, MDO “implies drastically increased demands for coordination, synchronization, information processing, and situational understanding. It is far from certain that these requirements will be compatible with the decentralized vision of leadership called for by mission command.”¹³

The need for high-level commanders to orchestrate the contributions of organic and supporting capabilities at key times in crisis or combat may require more centralized control than traditional mission command allows. Multidomain integration will likely push many command decisions far up the chain, though it is not yet clear what echelon will orchestrate MDO. For Marines, this may occur at Marine expeditionary force headquarters, or at the Marine littoral regiment. Among NATO allies, there is wide disparity of thought.¹⁴

It is possible that modern command and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies will erase or mitigate the needs addressed by a mission-command approach. These networked technologies might supplant the immediate situational awareness and judgment of the tactical commander in defining an operational situation, even though AI-enabled systems can bring their own flawed biases.¹⁵

Others counter that modern technology—and communication advances such as Starlink—will further benefit the decentralized action inherent to mission command. One pair of forward-thinking professionals argue:

It is no longer true that the best information is at the headquarters or operations center. Instead, it might well be that the leaders at the edge have a situational awareness that is superior to that enjoyed in the headquarters, because they have access to the same digital information augmented with localized awareness of what is happening around them.¹⁶

Of course, this assumes the tactical leader remains connected to the battle management system and has the acumen to appreciate the larger picture, as well as the resources to take appropriate action. With the tactical information environment heavily contested and grimly affected by fires, constant movement, and limited visibility, the task becomes more difficult as the distance to enemy forces shrinks. Emerging peer competitors have a theory of victory that counts on disrupting critical operating systems.¹⁷ It will fall on subordinate commanders to take the initiative when connectivity is broken.

Identifying Alternatives

Is mission command still viable? Or is it a fading concept that is venerated in doctrine, but difficult in practice?

One answer may lie in what authors Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi term “flexive command,” an alternative command framework that accepts the need for a continuum of options commanders might choose from based on circumstances. Command decisions are made at the level with the best grasp of the context. The decisive level of command flexes based on strategic risk, problem complexity, learning costs, and scale of operations.¹⁸ The challenge with flexive command, however, is determining which level of command has superior understanding of the circumstances.

Others propose an iterative approach in which command would move between centralization and decentralization, based, again, on operational demands.¹⁹ But this approach might whipsaw even experienced subordinates, not to mention allies and partners, among constantly changing authorities and reporting protocols.

Still others suggest command should evolve toward a more collaborative approach.²⁰ The Army’s approach to mission command and planning already stresses collaboration. One study of division-level command concluded that a more collective model should supplant commander-centric approaches.²¹ Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, meanwhile, embraced what he calls a participatory style.²² Recent scholarship reinforces the case for team-based approaches by arguing that collaboration is a critical component of the art of higher-level command.²³

Recommending a Collaborative Update

Thirty years ago, the Marine Corps was at the forefront of thought about command and control and tactical decision-making, and the service’s operational experience throughout the post–Cold War era- continued to strongly support mission command. Today, given changes in technology, force design, and threats, it is time to reevaluate this central concept of warfighting.

While the major functions of command are enduring, their implementation changes with the operational context. Other factors, such as the proficiency of commanders, allies, and partners, also matter. A continuum approach therefore is appropriate. An updated doctrine should advise commanders on the command-and-control approaches to take under different circumstances.

The Sea Services should use the term “collaborative command” for this update. While current Marine Corps command doctrine does not emphasize collaboration, great leaders have long recognized the need for input from and open dialogue with subordinates. As Marine Corps Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak advised in a seminal article written nearly four decades ago, “Because you probably don’t know it all, and because your subordinates represent a valuable source of ideas, make it your duty to bring them to the surface.”²⁴

Collaborative command would operationalize Krulak’s advice. It would maximize and combine the creative contributions of all subordinate commanders and their staffs throughout operations. Mission command’s emphasis on decision-making and initiative would remain, but collaborative command would stress engaging all commanders from the beginning of planning.

Commanders at different levels would collaborate during the stages of problem framing, mission statement, intent, and design. Nothing is more empowering for junior leaders than to let them share inputs during these early planning stages. Greater collaboration should generate shared understanding and increased commitment to plans. It should encourage greater trust in delegating to commanders who are well versed in an operation’s logic and intent.

This team-centric approach requires superior leadership skills to establish and sustain an organizational climate in which discourse and expressed dissent are encouraged.²⁵ Don Vandergriff emphasizes mission command as a culture of command.²⁶ Fostering that culture is a vital leadership task. The importance of command climate and shared understanding were at one time explicitly linked in the Marine Corps conception of mission command.²⁷

Commanders should seek input—but not necessarily consensus—from subordinates in framing the problem and settling on an operational design. While this may cost some time up front, it will enrich understanding and commitment to a tactical, operational, or strategic design that is deeper and more enduring than the dedication to a commander’s expressed purpose. Over the long term, it will help foster a deeper bench of officers with strong operational decision-making capabilities.

The Sea Services should align their warfighting philosophy, leadership education, command-and-control training, and planning processes toward this end. Commanders still must exemplify inspirational personal leadership, including the acceptance of physical risk, but modern commanders also must increasingly exhibit competencies in building teams and sustaining collaborative relationships with coalition partners and experts from nonmilitary backgrounds.

Institutional and battlefield success rests on the training and education of leaders able to take disciplined risks and act on independent judgment. Those abilities are key to collaborative command and success in war.