The Surface Navy and the Long War

When grappling with an opponent straining at their utmost, a choke is not instantaneous—but it still hurts. Commerce raiding predates the Peloponnesian Wars, but in a future conflict it may help throttle Beijing’s true center of gravity: their control of 1.4 billion people. China relies on uninterrupted overseas trade and stable economic growth and it simply cannot afford a long war. Allied surface forces can and should establish sea control—just not where one might expect. 

Goliath Feeds from Afar

In 2020, China consumed over 14 million barrels of oil per day (BPD) in peace time. About 600,000 BPD came overland through Russian pipelines, with Kazakhstan accounting for an additional 400,000 BPD. In 2019, China produced a mere 3.83 million BPD domestically. Approximately 62 percent of China’s oil must come by sea, beyond their missile umbrella, under the nose of the U.S. 5th Fleet.

The Department of Defense (DoD) estimates China’s 600-million-barrel strategic petroleum reserve represents a 90 day-supply. Beijing can offset deficits with coal and natural gas, but their war machine runs on oil. China also suffers from chronic food insecurity, feeding one fifth of the world’s population with only seven percent of its arable land. As a net food importer, disruption to American, Brazilian, or Australian grain imports could be disastrous. 

In stark contrast, U.S. oil demands are 20.5 million BPD, with the ability to domestically pump 17 million BPD. No overseas oil imports can be interdicted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). U.S. farmland is the most productive in the world, with only a fraction of China’s population to feed. COVID-19’s economic damage is still being calculated, but the pandemic exposed Western vulnerabilities to a Chinese dominated supply chain. Essential manufacturing has since been quietly reshored to Mexico, Vietnam, and other friendlier economies. 

The Far Blockade 

Commerce raiding and sanctions represent a vital strategy that must be executed in tandem with a methodical assault westward. United States Central Command (CentCom) is well positioned to destroy Chinese power projection, manifested through China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) facilities in Djibouti and the Arabian Gulf. U.S. ships can range far into the Indian Ocean, interdicting China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) as surface raiders. Less capable allied frigates, corvettes, and even littoral combat ships (LCSs) can free up precious guided missile destroyers (DDGs). While economic and diplomatic pressure should be used to divert merchantmen before the use of force, recent conflicts in the Red Sea underline shipping vulnerability to relatively unsophisticated forces. 

A far blockade would be difficult, but effective over time. Thirty days of high intensity conflict would dip deeply into China’s war reserve of energy and food. Captured oil could be diverted to allied refineries (or sold to an oil-hungry India). The same could be done with grain and other strategic commodities, offsetting the disruption to allied economies. Logistically, China cannot sustain distant combat, especially if the United States destroyed their bases from the Gulf of Aden to Myanmar. 

Royal Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Australian forces will be needed to defend critical shipping to East Asia, lest Beijing interdict them. China is unlikely to send forces far beyond their A2/AD umbrella to shepherd tankers home. If they choose to target allied shipping, they risk depleting their magazines and counterattack. 

A Bloody High-End Fight

China’s local superiority in sensors and firepower make for a dangerous nut to crack. Ground based antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with potential hypersonic capability reduce a defender’s reaction time, even if they have an interceptor to match.¹ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warships and aircraft also bristle with long range missiles, many supersonic. Shaping operations to reduce enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be conducted in all domains beforehand.

U.S. forces should initially maintain a wary distance. Scores of drones and patrol aircraft would likely be lost on the periphery as each side forms their respective sensor frontier. Throwing an ill-timed punch could result in the loss of multiple carriers and squadrons of irreplaceable aviators.

However, the first island chain is not impenetrable. China’s Yaogan ELINT, radar, and Earth Observation (EO) satellite constellations form the “eyes and ears” of their A2/AD architecture. Localized platforms (long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, submarines, patrol aircraft, ISR balloons) provide target quality track data needed to complete kill chains. These platforms are networked, expensive, and finite. Their neutralization through electronic warfare, cyber, or kinetic means would create gaps in coverage that could be widened and exploited by a skillful commander. Delaying a full-scale counterattack would buy time to mobilize reservists for support duty and refresher training, freeing up active personnel for force generation. 

To prepare, the surface Navy should invest in more SM-6 missiles, useful for longer range antiair Warfare (AAW) and antisurface warfare (ASuW). They also should stockpile SM-3 interceptors, and upgrade more Aegis baselines for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). BMD ships stationed outside China’s strike range could replace initial losses.² 

Chinese ASBMs constitute a clear and present danger, but their target area of uncertainty widens with range, target maneuvering, and centralized command and control (C2). Hypersonic glide vehicles present a complex maneuvering challenge. Their depressed midcourse altitude shortens radar horizons and makes terminal prediction difficult. Plasma sheathing, however, may blind EO/RF seekers, forcing these weapons to slow to vulnerable speeds. Maintaining a resilient overhead sensor network with survivable connectivity to U.S. BMD shooters would be key. Emissions novel to hypersonic flight can highlight them for tracking, while degrading PLA command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) would further disrupt kill chains. 

Kill the Archer, for He Has Too Many Arrows

Allied ships cannot expect to win the salvo exchange without directly sinking enemy combatants and their formidable magazines. Adapting proven technology could bolster organic ASuW capability. Large unmanned surface vehicle (LUSV) missile batteries are promising, but low rate production is doubtful by 2026. Mounting the Maritime Strike Tomahawk or Naval Strike Missile to DDGs, amphibious transport docks (LPDs), LCS, and even U.S. Coast Guard cutters should be considered. A 70 percent solution now is better than an exquisite solution later. 

Harpoons from decommissioned cruisers could arm fast patrol craft. Land-based fires further deepen magazines and decouple sensors from launch platforms. Deadly AAW/ASuW geometry could be set around choke points the PLAN must navigate. Surface forces should drill closely with the Army and Marines to hone this concept. Additionally, the United States should fast track hypersonic antiship missiles and pair them with the Zumwalt’s larger vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Seamless joint coordination will be paramount, supported by a robust Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) architecture. 

Target Priorities 

The 2022 PLAN amphibious lift capacity amounted to 19,080 troops and 666 assault vehicles per transit. This growing force is meant to seize the initial beachhead. Afterward, China’s vast civilian fleet will have to move hundreds of thousands of troops. Targeting landing infrastructure and sinking PLA troop transports would threaten the invasion most directly, and cannot be accomplished by submarines alone. Therefore, the United States must boost Air Force ASuW capabilities to close the Naval Strike Warfare inventory gap. Amassing long-range antiship missiles (LRASM) and updating existing joint air to surface standoff missiles (JASSM) to target shipping is essential. Innovative systems like Rapid Dragon could allow cargo aircraft operating from austere airfields to launch high volume missile raids. Aegis ships should support these and other strike packages. Excellent identification friend or foe (IFF), de-lousing, and loss of communication procedures mitigate fratricide, but must be drilled regularly with allies and between services. 

In a communication denied environment, distributed satellite systems like Starlink could be used to guide standoff weapons like LRASM, or even explosive USVs. Australia’s long range Over the Horizon radar network is nested deep within the Outback, making it very survivable. Skywave tracks can be correlated with other sensor data to bring precision fires onto the Straits of Malacca or South China Sea. 

A Cultural Shift

Captains must take the initiative to operate flexibly, as they did under William Halsey Jr. and Raymond A. Spruance. Peer adversaries demand skillful emissions control. Third party targeting can complicate localization by enemy forces. Unit dispersion can spread enemy surveillance assets thin. Surface Action Groups can coalesce to coordinate and strike, then quickly disperse, minimizing exposure. Degraded communications will force commanders to conduct tasking without real-time oversight. Baking this into prewar training can ensure wartime unity of effort. This shift toward decentralization and greater trust must be imposed from higher echelons. 

The United States must stress realistic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises with allied diesel boats and absorb lessons learned with humility and adaptation. Supply ships should be retrofitted with torpedo countermeasures and conduct opposed replenishment at sea procedures as standard practice. Fleet oilers will be at a premium so far from home. SSN tasking forward will necessitate aggressive fleet ASW from fixed wing and embarked helicopter squadrons. Stockpiling sonobuoys and torpedoes can offset heavy expenditure rates after the shooting starts. Robust antisubmarine screening will not guarantee immunity, but the elimination of each boat could attrite a potent arm of China’s A2/AD complex. 

The United States’ ability to recover hundreds, if not thousands, of shipwrecked sailors across a contested ocean is currently in doubt. Prolonged war at sea will require alternate means of combat search and rescue. Civilian vessels with helicopter facilities can support this, along with sea planes, high-speed ferries, and diesel subs. The Navy must plan appropriately. 

Fight Dirty, They Certainly Will

Naval Special Warfare can covertly mine Chinese container ships while they onload abroad. Creative means could then detonate these unwitting trojan horses as they transit narrow Chinese harbors. The delay to military traffic could be immense, and at a minimum would divert resources to sweep ships before they enter port. This effort would complement offensive mining operations. 

In this war between great powers, the United States will need to fight dirty. Cyberattacks on port facilities, oil, and gas pipelines are fair game. If U.S. commerce raiders are overtaxed, Letters of Marque could be issued to private military companies with maritime experience. Generous rules of engagement will be needed to address the Chinese Maritime Militia, be they armed or just scouting. Commanders at sea will have to target combatants masquerading as civilians, just as their Army colleagues did on land. 

High end warfare should not blind the United States to low tech threats. Harbor and logistics facilities must be hardened at home and abroad against enemy saboteurs. Clandestinely crewed vessels large or small could ram ships during restricted transit. Normal defensive fire may not be able to stop large merchantmen before collision. Fortunately, the war on terror established capable maritime security squadrons. A mature cadre of active and reserve units can help the Coast Guard enforce strict wartime traffic control. 

Repairing Forward

During the last Pacific war, enormous resources were allocated to repair battle damage in forward areas. Floating dry docks in Ulithi turned around heavily damaged ships at an amazing rate, much to the consternation of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The tyranny of distance is no different today. Japan’s excellent shipyards are a start, but less vulnerable alternatives are needed. 

The United States should source local skilled labor, as well as labor from the Philippines and Australia. Australia’s yards could support repair work but are on their far coasts. These are still nearer than Pearl Harbor (constrained capacity) or San Diego (further still). Mobile dry docks should also be procured for the Philippines or similar havens closer to the battle area.

Just Another Dynasty 

Traditionally, the middle kingdom’s dynasties fell due to famine and unrest. Their current dynasty rules through the most sophisticated police state the world has ever seen. Nevertheless, China’s underlying social contract demands economic prosperity from their leaders. Even today, a billion people are still governed under the “mandate of heaven.” China will show a strong face as this war stretches on, but behind closed doors they may ask themselves: Is Taiwan worth the threat to my own neck?