Defeating the Houthi antishipping campaign in the Red Sea and fully reopening that vital sea lane will require more than air-defense picket ships operating in a self-defense mode. It will require the capabilities of the full joint force, with naval forces in the lead.
Since October 2023, almost immediately after the Hamas attack on Israel, the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers and the air wing on board the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) have been taking action against Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea. These ships and aircraft have downed hundreds of missiles and drones as well as hit targets ashore in retaliatory strikes. However, the Houthi flow of missiles and drones by their chief benefactor Iran remains largely unimpeded, though there have been some success in interdicting seaborne shipments. With a seemingly unlimited supply of low-cost drones and missiles, the Houthis have no incentive to cease their malign activities. The situation is reminiscent of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, where North Vietnamese ports and supply depots were placed off limits as targets out of fear of wider escalation. The result then and now is a grinding war of attrition.
Currently, the United States is conducting an economy-of-scale operation in the Red Sea with the limited participation of a few close allies. It is largely a defensive, reactive type of operation. Even the United States and United Kingdom airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen have been couched in a defensive context. The results have been predictably disappointing in keeping the Red Sea open to international shipping and defending those commercial ships from attack. Though the U.S. Navy has performed flawlessly in shooting down missiles and drones, commercial ships continue to be hit and most of the major international shipping companies have rerouted their ships to avoid the Red Sea. This negatively impacts the health of the global economy, with implications for inflation and supply chains. Extended shipping transit times mean commercial ships must sail around the tip of South Africa to transport goods and petroleum products between East and West. This adds costs and slows supply chains, which are still trying to recover from the damage caused by COVID-19.
What Can be Done?
The mission to protect shipping is as old as organized navies themselves. The U.S. Navy has ample institutional experience with this mission and need only look back as recently as the 1987–88 Operation Earnest Will mission in the Persian Gulf for an example of a successful one. The Iran-Iraq War had been raging since 1980. Attacks against international shipping had been escalating by both antagonists but chiefly Iran. The USS Stark (FFG-31) was the victim of an errant Iraqi missile attack in May 1987, resulting in the death of 37 sailors. President Ronald Reagan ordered the escort of U.S. shipping and Kuwaiti tankers, reflagged to fly the U.S. colors through the Strait of Hormuz. The operation ran from July 1987 to September 1988 and saw the participation of not only the U.S. Navy but elements of the entire joint force and in cooperation with selected allies. Operation Prosperity Guardian, the current operation in the Red Sea, could borrow aspects of Earnest Will and expand on that model to deliver on the stated mission aims.
To restore the confidence of international shippers in resuming the use of the Red Sea and to blunt the Houthi ability to wage attacks on that shipping, a multidimensional approach is necessary. Due largely to inadequate fleet numbers, the Navy is playing a zone defense in the Red Sea—and a thin one at that. The result is continued successful Houthi attacks against commercial ships outside the engagement arcs of these zones. A designated protected corridor should be established, running from the Red Sea end of the Suez Canal to beyond the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Commercial shipping intending to transit the Red Sea would be required to sail within this corridor or sail at their own risk outside of it. This would concentrate the limited warship assets and should increase their ability to provide effective protection. This concentrated zone defense of a shipping corridor should be complemented with a man-to-man defense of direct escorts of commercial shipping organized into convoys. With escorted convoys sailing through a defended corridor along the length of the Red Sea, the protection of commercial shipping can be achieved with a significant degree of confidence.
Additional measures are required to blunt the Houthi ability to wage attacks. Specifically, arms, munitions, and supplies from Iran must be choked off. An interdiction campaign against Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen in the form of a visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) program should complement the shipping protection mission. This would be similar to Operation Southern Watch, the U.N. sanctions enforcement against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the wake of the first Gulf War. At-sea raid forces in the form of Marine expeditionary units embarked in amphibious ships and joint special operations forces operating from sea bases would provide commanders the option to forcibly seize shipping carrying war materiel to the Houthis as well the capability to conduct raids ashore as necessary. Expanding the participation of international partners in this operation, a proactive information campaign, energetic diplomatic engagement all designed to isolate the Houthis and their international enablers would buttress this effort. Finally, all options should be on the table, including sustained offensive strikes, not necessarily limited to Yemeni territory, to deny the Houthis the means to continue their illegitimate war against international shipping. Many of the elements required for this approach are already in place in some form or fashion. What is missing is a proactive offensive dimension to the ongoing operation.
Great Power Leadership Demands Great Effort
These recommendations would require the commitment of additional ships, airpower, personnel, and the support of critical enablers from across the U.S. joint force as well as the political capital to make the case to the American people and the international community. Equally critical is the political will to see the campaign through to a successful conclusion. Great power leadership cannot be effectively exercised on the cheap. Sea power, still the critical linchpin of great power strength, similarly cannot be conducted on the cheap. The longer the current operation in its present form grinds on with no appreciable reduction in Houthi capability, combined with their continued successful commercial ship attacks, the more damage that is inflicted globally to U.S. deterrence and political credibility.
