Diplomacy for Better Stand-In Force Access in Japan

In his Proceedings article “Put III MEF in a Fighting Stance,” Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg laid out two realistic hypothetical scenarios in which III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stands in on key maritime terrain in the first island chain and opposes China’s attempt to forcibly reunify Taiwan. Aiming to achieve surprise, China launches a massive barrage of long-range precision fires to neutralize III MEF. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) targets the MEF’s command and control (C2) and attempts to destroy its aviation combat power on the ground.

In the first scenario, the garrison-like MEF—with families on Okinawa, without resilient C2, and not dispersed to maritime terrain away from easily targeted locations—took a beating and failed to live up to the Marine Corps’ highly touted reputation as a force in readiness. In the second scenario, the ready MEF withstood the attack because it was dispersed, possessed resilient C2, and enabled joint and allied fires. Kerg then demonstrates why the force is not prepared to make the second scenario the reality and recommends several actions to get on track.¹

One critical element needed to get III MEF into its fighting stance in the first island chain is Japanese approval. III MEF understands the importance of the U.S. military’s relationship with the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), and it defends both Japan and U.S. interests by working with the JSDF, particularly with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Western Army.² The Western Army is responsible for sovereign territory from Kyushu down through the Ryukyu Islands to Yonaguni, only 68 miles east of northern Taiwan.³ The Ryukyus, particularly the Sakishima Islands of Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni, are key maritime terrain that will prove valuable in denying the PLA Navy’s (PLAN’s) isolation of Taiwan as described in the American Seapower Project’s War of 2026 scenario.⁴

Both the Western Army and III MEF need to disperse critical capabilities to retain maritime terrain and deny PLAN freedom of action in the East China and Philippine Seas near Taiwan. Both forces plan for and simulate this in multiple bilateral exercises every year.⁵ Obtaining timely approval to get into dispersed fighting positions may mean the difference between success and failure. Approval authority resides with both Japan’s national and prefectural governments based on complex legal constraints put in place after World War II.⁶ To overcome this obstacle, the United States must work with Japan to find a diplomatic solution that ensures the early access needed for stand-in forces to position for protracted conflict. Deterrence should be the motivation for this initiative—the ability to rapidly position credible combat power on key maritime terrain would be a valuable deterrent option. 

The U.S-Japan Security Relationship

To understand the legal complexity III MEF and its partners face in access, basing, and overflight permissions on Japanese territory, one must start with the Japanese Constitution, effective 3 May 1947. In Article 9, Japan formally renounced war. Japan would no longer maintain a land, sea, or air force, nor would it possess the right to belligerency.⁷ In 1954, however, following the Korean War, Japan created its current armed forces, but it carefully described them as self-defense forces to comply with the intent of Article 9 in maintaining nonbelligerence and repudiating offensive capabilities. Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership from 2012 to 2020, Japan further loosened its application of Article 9, expanding its military’s role and increasing defense spending to bolster its commitment to the United States and other partners.⁸ 

The 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security also shapes the current environment. While Article V of the treaty codifies the requirement for mutual support in the event of armed attack against the other, Article VI grants the United States military use of Japanese areas and facilities.⁹ Article VI also specifies that two of its purposes are the defense of Japan and the security of the Far East, but it does not clarify what this latter purpose entails.¹⁰

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governs access, basing, and overflight under Article VI. III MEF planners must follow the requirements of SOFA Article II.4(b) when negotiating limited use of facilities other than the permanent U.S. bases in Japan, such as JSDF facilities or public or private land. The II.4(b) process, as it has come to be known, requires a request to specify the purpose and duration of the use, forces/equipment involved, public safety considerations, and maintenance responsibilities. The request then requires several approvals as it moves up to the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. These include the relevant local government—which, after a hearing, can disapprove the request and the national government is bound to respect that decision—national government approval (pending local government approval), and formal signature at the national ministry level. When that has been achieved, the national government publishes the final approval in a limited-use agreement.¹¹ The timelines associated with this multistep approval process are unsurprisingly quite long—45 days to deploy troops for training to public land and approximately 160 days for private land.¹² The need to disperse forces into resilient, redundant fighting positions will always involve public and private lands away from known JSDF bases, so the II.4(b) process remains a challenge to positioning a credible deterrent force. 

Because planners are not dealing with the peacetime training timelines when simulating crisis and conflict scenarios, how these timelines can be expedited needs to be explored. Japan operates in a legal framework covering several security situations. The three most applicable are (1) anticipated armed-attack situation, (2) survival-threatening situation, and (3) armed-attack situation.¹³ Should Japan declare an anticipated armed-attack situation, U.S. forces would rapidly be given access to JSDF bases and the II.4(b) process could be expedited to provide access to civilian facilities.¹⁴ Japan would declare a survival-threatening situation should an attack against a close ally or partner threaten its survival too.¹⁵ In this situation, in addition to rapid access to JSDF facilities and an expedited II.4(b) process, Japan may request access for U.S. forces to civilian facilities.¹⁶ Finally, for Japan to declare an armed-attack situation, it must either have been attacked or the government must believe an attack is imminent.¹⁷ Only in an armed-attack situation can Japan waive the II.4(b) process and order civilians to make their facilities and property available for U.S. military personnel.¹⁸ However, as Lieutenant Colonel Kerg explained, U.S. forces must have access to dispersed fighting positions before Japan declares an armed-attack situation or it will be too late to position combat power. Without a credible array of combat power before an adversary chooses to attack, deterrence does not exist. 

Expanding Security Relationships

In January 2023, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense met with the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Washington, D.C., in the most recent session of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). The SCC is the highest echelon of the alliance coordination mechanism between the United States and Japan and is commonly called the “2 + 2 Committee.” Both sides reiterated commitments to regional security, defense spending, and mutual support. Both sides also highlighted concerns about China’s aggression and human rights violations, North Korea’s ballistic-missile launches and growing nuclear weapons arsenal, and Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine.¹⁹ The SCC addressed increasing the alliance’s deterrence with more lethal, mobile, sustainable, and survivable forces.²⁰

The 2023 2+2 Talks also signaled the beginning of Japan’s expanded network of allies and partners. The U.S. secretaries and Japanese ministers agreed to expand cooperation trilaterally to include Australia, with special focus on increasing interoperability through trilateral exercises and training events.²¹ This immediately bore fruit in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Exercise Keen Edge 2024. Historically a bilateral U.S.-Japan command-post exercise, Keen Edge 2024 in February included the Australian Defence Force.²² Furthermore, planning for Exercise Pacific Sentry 2025, historically a U.S.-Australia command-post exercise, now includes Japanese participation. 

Way Ahead

Diplomatically, the United States can do more to position III MEF and joint forces to deter war in the western Pacific. Specifically, the United States should:

Use the 2+2 Talks to reinvigorate a whole-of-government approach to the problem. The 2023 2+2 Talks already have borne fruit in expanding alliance and partnering efforts and in realigning U.S. forces to retain more credible combat forces in the first island chain.²³ The United States should seek another round of 2+2 Talks and encourage the Japanese ministers for action on access, basing, and overflight. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Japan could provide the 2+2 ministers a summary of the barriers to better access, basing, and overflight within the Japanese legal framework and II.4(b) process.

Urge Japan to establish a more accommodating agreement. Japan could build off historical precedent and change its legal framework to shorten the bureaucratic process for U.S. force dispersal into areas that would enable the nation’s defense. The 1960 mutual defense treaty requires an amendment to clarify access and shorten the time required by Japan’s legislature (the Diet) to reach a decision.²⁴ Japan could allow both the U.S. joint force and the JSDF to train for rapid dispersal to public and private lands without the bureaucratic delays of the current II.4(b) process. Applied within the context of the current Japanese security situations, the declaration of an anticipated armed-attack situation should trigger this dispersal to credibly deter China and deescalate tension when it occurs. Japan’s national government would more often need to be willing to override local opposition, perhaps offering financial compensation when it comes to the forced use of private lands.

Urge Japan to capitalize on trends in Japanese public opinion favorable to increasing defensive capability. A May 2022 nationwide poll showed a change in Japanese public opinion. Almost 65 percent of those surveyed believed Japan should acquire an ability to strike enemy bases.²⁵ Japan already has used this change in public opinion to legitimize an increase in defense spending. Now, by investing political capital, Japan could more rapidly position its own and allied military capabilities to better protect its homeland and deter regional aggression

III MEF will continue to work with the Western Army and U.S. joint force units that constitute the stand-in force. Through numerous operations, activities, and investments, the stand-in force continues to improve bilateral coordination across critical C2, sensing, fires, and sustainment capabilities. This will not be a highly credible deterrent, however, without diplomatic progress on access and basing with Japan.

The diplomatic progress to date is commendable, but those working a long-term policy for increased access do not feel the urgency that those in the first island chain do. The 2023 2+2 Talks focused on decades-long initiatives to realign the U.S. portion of the alliance posture and the need to increase strategic defense and deterrence capabilities but did not address the immediate need for an operational and tactical deterrent to Chinese aggression. Deterrence requires better and more rapid access for U.S. forces, something Japan might not oppose if it wants to avoid a devastating conflict with global implications.