Aircraft carriers: Still Indispensable
Admiral Paparo’s defense of large aircraft carriers is commendable. But his thesis avoids three vital issues that harm if not contradict his conclusions.
Capabilities. Large aircraft carriers are limited in today’s world compared with the advanced missiles and drones readily available to many U.S. allies as well as potential antagonists. True, manned aircraft are indispensable to fleet operations. However, some of the more advanced ship- and submarine-launched missiles and drones have superior performance and are much less costly to procure and support than carrier-based aircraft.
Also, the small “aircraft carriers”—LHA and LHD amphibious assault ships—when operating advanced F-35B Lightning II aircraft can perform many tasks previously assigned to big carriers. Their helicopters and MV-22 Osprey aircraft also are valuable to fleet operations.
Vulnerabilities. As evidenced in the current conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, adversaries are able to launch hundreds of missiles and drones at their enemies in a single attack. Could a U.S. carrier strike group cope with an attack of that magnitude?
One must recall that, in the past, relatively small explosive events on their flight decks totally disabled the large carriers USS Oriskany (CVA-34), Forrestal (CVA-59), and Enterprise (CVN-65). A small attack drone striking aircraft on a flight deck could cause similar disabling events.
And, what of the proliferation of advanced, conventional submarines to several potentially hostile countries? There have been several incidents over the past few decades when advanced submarines have been able to penetrate carrier screens during exercises.
Thus, the potential vulnerabilities of large carriers have increased significantly. Indeed, published reports suggest U.S. carriers are not permitted to operate within 200 miles of the Chinese coast because of those potential threats.
Construction time and cost. The newest full-size carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), and the class is reported to have set new records for construction time and expense.
At least four (and possibly five) LHA-type ships could be built for the cost of one Gerald R. Ford–class carrier. While not equal in many capabilities, the several LHAs could be in multiple locations while the CVN is in only one, and their availability could be an important factor when the CVN is in the yard for maintenance or overhaul. Would a fleet commander rather have one CVN or four or five LHA-type carriers?
No surface warship can equal the capabilities of a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. But the construction of future CVNs must be addressed in the context of their increasing vulnerability and the growing number of alternatives for naval missions.
—Norman Polmar, author, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events
A lesson learned from the 1980s Falklands conflict should be recalled. An expeditionary force lacking carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) is at a severe disadvantage when operating far from friendly airfields on land.
However, bearing in mind the immense cost of supercarriers, one might argue for the smallest carrier able to employ fixed-wing AEW assets, thus enabling a substantial air surveillance envelope.
—Michael A. Titz, Life Member
A Framework for Unmanned Systems at Sea
I read this article with great interest. As a retired surface warfare and engineering duty officer, I began my unmanned surface vessel (USV) design career as the lead on the SAIC/Leidos design team for the Sea Hunter medium-displacement USV and have now been involved with USV design and production for a number of years.
The authors make an important point regarding how unmanned systems can enable distributed maritime operations, and they address four of the key missions for this emerging technology.
As they note, Task Force 59 (CTF-59) has been responsible for numerous exercises, experiments, and demonstrations that couple unmanned systems with artificial intelligence to provide a comprehensive picture of how these systems could relate to shipping in the Arabian Gulf.
In my eight years as chief technology officer for Maritime Tactical Systems, Inc. (MARTAC), a USV designer and manufacturer, I have seen UxS technology mature and, over the past several years, have had a front row seat at CTF-59’s Integrated Maritime Exercises (IMX), the Pacific Fleet-led integrated battle problems, and international exercises such as Australia’s Autonomous Warrior and NATO’s Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping with Maritime Unmanned Systems and Baltic Operations events, all of which have advanced the use of unmanned systems by the U.S. Navy and the navies of our international partners.
Without criticizing the four unmanned system functions the authors call out, I want to stress that these four only scratch the surface of the potentially extensive use of unmanned systems in the maritime domain, specifically as they relate to unmanned surface vessels.
During the integrated battle problem series, U.S. Pacific Fleet used USVs to conduct mine countermeasures operations; contested logistics; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and several other missions.
For example, during CTF 59’s IMX exercises, various USVs (including some from my company) demonstrated the ability to do a wide range of missions, including offensive operations similar to those conducted by Ukraine; protection of high-value units; and the ability to launch unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles. Many UxS manufacturers from a number of nations have demonstrated their capabilities in these events, too.
MARTAC is only one of many unmanned systems manufacturers currently developing these vessels. Having seen our USVs perform well in Navy and Marine Corps exercises for nearly a decade, I am convinced the Navy has a golden opportunity to place not only new, but also necessary capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. The capabilities and uses of unmanned systems are limited only by our imagination.
—LCDR U. H. (Jack) Rowley, USN (Ret.)
Lieutenant Commander Ackman’s article is one of many in the past few years advocating for returning amphibious aircraft and seaplanes to the Navy—though this time with a logistical emphasis. It is a capability from which the submarine force would significantly benefit.
Submarines must usually return to a port to carry out a humanitarian or medical evacuation, which could take several days or more, depending on where they operate. Aside from being a risk to force protection, such operations also pull a valuable asset off station from vital tasking or training. Using large amphibious aircraft could shorten the time and be more secure.
For example, a squadron of ShinMaywa US-2s operating out of Norfolk, Virginia, would be able to reach most submarines operating off the East Coast in less than eight hours and (depending on location) reduce the amount of force-protection resources required. If amphibious squadrons were deployed like P-8 squadrons are, this could improve the endurance of in-theater submarines.
In addition to speedy evacuations, amphibious aircraft could allow the expeditious delivery of special operations teams and limited critical parts/supplies or technical support personnel to troubleshoot equipment faster than a return to port. The submarine force is already realizing the benefit of aerial resupply with exercises involving C-17 Globemasters, CMV-22 Ospreys, and CH-53E Super Stallions; long-range amphibious aircraft could only enhance this logistical flexibility.
—LCDR Ben Massengale, USN
Oh boy, another story recounting the tales of the World War II heroes of naval aviation who flew the PBYs and PBMs. While the praise for those guys is well deserved, Lieutenant Commander Ackman’s article is long on romantic history but short on practical application of naval aviation management principles. That Russia and China are developing such aircraft does not mean we need to do so.
The primary mission of World War II seaplanes was reconnaissance, a mission long since superseded by long-range aircraft, satellites, and UAVs. Antisubmarine warfare was another—the P-8 patrol squadrons handle that mission today.
Any new aircraft also requires a support system, and modern aircraft need a lot. Expendable parts, repairable parts, and the people and equipment to repair them. Fuels and lubricants. Aircrew and maintenance personnel berthing and mess facilities. The biggest enemy to aircraft that spend a lot of time floating in the ocean is corrosion. Taken together, all this would require seaplane tenders to haul the support gear and establish forward bases.
We don’t need new seaplanes, however much fun they might be.
—CWO3 Chuck Berlemann, USN (Ret.)
Fuse Indigenous Arctic Knowledge with Technology
In the early 1980s, I participated in special warfare winter exercises in the Aleutian Islands based out of Kodiak, Alaska, and on the sea ice above the Arctic Circle based out of Kotzebue. We operated with a unit of the Alaska Army National Guard composed of native soldiers who claimed their unit origins from the famed World War II “Alaskan Scouts.”
Their local knowledge and tools were invaluable, including the ability to “read” ice for safety and over-ice navigation; unique clothing adaptations that were far superior to our SEAL military-issue cold weather gear; and use of local foods such as seal oil as a high-calorie energy source. These native soldiers also had knowledge of Soviet tactics and operations on the sea ice and broken ice immediately outside our 12-mile territorial waters, much of which was news to me as a naval intelligence officer.
More recently, I have had three sons in the U.S. Coast Guard, two of whom served in key search-and-rescue coordination roles in Alaska. In addition, I was one of the original authors and university team members for the winning 2013 proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security–sponsored “Center of Excellence in Arctic Domain Awareness” (ADAC) based at the University of Alaska. Hence, I have great respect for the Coast Guard and the challenges it faces operating in Alaskan waters.
ADAC is pursuing a myriad of projects addressing technology applications for maritime domain awareness in Alaskan waters. It also has established linkages with local coastal communities including indigenous peoples. Most of what Ensign DeLillo proposes is available to the Coast Guard from ADAC. Hopefully, his article will reinforce and amplify collaborative initiatives already underway.
—CDR David Williams, USNR (Ret.)
Host Wargames for Warfare Center Civilians
In my article, I described a concept by which tabletop wargaming could be used across all the naval warfare centers to educate the workforce, provide operational focus to its internal research and development efforts, and create a regular venue for cross-warfare and cross-domain collaboration.
I used the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) as one example for one domain, but I neglected to convey that NUWC has successfully employed wargaming for several years for its own workforce development and concept exploration. I regret not providing proper acknowledgment of its activities and accomplishments in this area, which inspired my broader concept.
—Matthew Cosner
The New Tactical Tanker/Transport Aircraft The Marine Corps Needs
My thanks to Master Sergeant Dierkes for his questions and comments regarding my proposal to adopt the Embraer KC-390. I would like to offer a few thoughts in reply.
The KC-390 can be equipped with up to three fuselage tanks (equivalent to the KC-130J cargo bay tanks), each with 8,800 pounds of fuel. Therefore, its ferry range with internal fuel and fuselage tanks is about 5,260 statute miles.
Master Sergeant Dierkes also overlooks several important factors that can affect fuel efficiency and overall operational effectiveness.
The KC-390 is powered by IAE V2510 engines, which have a high bypass ratio—around 4.5:1 to 5:1, which is quite efficient for a turbofan engine. It also features advanced wing and airframe designs. Taken together, these factors allow it to achieve optimal lift-to-drag ratios, reducing fuel burn, especially at higher speeds and altitudes compared to older turbofan engines. The improved thrust efficiency of the high-bypass ratio engines reduces specific fuel consumption, making the KC-390 competitive in this regard. While it is true that turboprops typically have even higher bypass ratios, turboprops are generally most efficient at lower speeds and altitudes.
The KC-390 is significantly faster than the C-130J, with a maximum cruise speed of 470 knots, compared to the C-130J’s 350 knots. This higher speed can lead to shorter flight times and, consequently, lower total fuel consumption over the same distance. Faster mission completion reduces overall operational costs and improves mission turnaround times, especially for longer-range missions.
The advanced materials used in the KC-390’s engines and aircraft systems have lower maintenance requirements and longer intervals between overhauls than those on the C-130J. This not only reduces direct maintenance costs, but also improves fuel efficiency by ensuring engines and systems operate at optimal performance levels for longer periods.
Modern turbofans such as the V2510 bring significant advantages in terms of speed, altitude, range, payload, and reliability, making the KC-390 a superior choice for many mission profiles.
Despite Master Sergeant Dierkes’ appropriate concern about unimproved- field operations, the C-390 Millennium is designed to operate effectively on unpaved runways, and the IAE V2510 engines were chosen because they have a proven track record of durability and resistance to foreign object damage. Several advanced features mitigate the risk, including inlet guide vanes and robust fan blade materials that enhance their ability to withstand the ingestion of debris without significant damage. Advanced blade designs help deflect debris away from the engine core.
Further, the C-390’s high-wing design positions the engines well above the ground, reducing the likelihood of debris ingestion compared to low-wing configurations and those with engines slung beneath the wings. This placement ensures the engines are less exposed to debris kicked up during takeoff and landing.
The C-130J Hercules is indeed a proven platform for unpaved runway operations. However, its composite propellers are not without vulnerabilities. As Master Sergeant Dierkes notes, composite propellers can be susceptible to cracking from impact with rocks and other debris, which poses a maintenance and operational risk.
—COL Albert C. Carpenter, USMC (Ret.)
More Officer Career-Path Flexibility Will Improve Retention
Sailors in the Career Intermission Program may spend up to three years in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), not the “Inactive Ready Reserve.” Along with traditional drilling Selected Reserves, the IRR is part of the Ready Reserve. The “inactive” reserve comprises sailors in category S2 of the Standby Reserve. While the terminology is arcane to some, these are distinctions with a difference.
—CDR C. R. Whipps, U.S. Navy
The Tragedy of the Lost Generation
As an African American sailor on the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) during her maiden deployment (1998) and second deployment (2000), I felt disrespected sailing under that namesake.
While I knew Senator Stennis was a segregationist, I quickly learned that many of my shipmates only knew what the Navy taught them: that he was the “Father of the Modern Day Navy” and a strong advocate of naval superiority. My cruise books refer to the senator as having courage, integrity, dignity, honesty, and an unwavering commitment to public service.
When I would tell my shipmates he was also a white supremacist who proposed legislation to preserve segregation and prevent opportunities for minorities in the Navy, I was often told “Who cares?” or “He was a man of his time.” I found that very troubling, as we were told by Navy leaders we were sailing the world in support of peace and as a symbol of America’s best values—very hypocritical given we were sailing with a namesake who certainly did not represent those values.
We were told the philosophy of Senator Stennis was to always “look ahead,” but I constantly asked myself for whom was this man “looking ahead”? It was obvious he was not concerned about doing so for people who looked like me.
It has been almost 24 years since I left the Stennis, and I am “looking ahead” to the day the Navy practices what it preaches regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion and renames the ship for someone who truly symbolizes America’s values and respects all the men and women who serve this nation. Senator Stennis was never deserving of the namesake honor.
The Navy’s silence on the issue of a potential name change contradicts all of its messaging on the importance of making all sailors feel valued and respected. In recent years, the country has changed names of military installations that honored the Confederacy. It is my hope that Navy leaders understand the negative effects of continuing to name one of its most powerful ships with a diverse crew after a 20th-century segregationist who certainly didn’t “Look Ahead” for all.
—Calvin Hicks
This was an interesting and informative article. But there appears to be an error in Figure 2. It would seem the header in the rightmost column should be “Ratio (B/A)” and not (A/B).
—LCDR Rob Schmidt, USN (Ret.)
CACO: Learning to Lead through Loss
As a retired chaplain with almost 29 years active and reserve service, I found Lieutenant Colonel Kerg’s article informative and insightful.
During my service (1970–98) it was standard practice when possible for a Navy chaplain to accompany the casualty assistance calls officer (CACO), bringing experience, pastoral training, and spiritual resources to help meet the needs of the next of kin. Marine Corps personnel serving the reserve community often obtained chaplain services from the Navy Reserve Center. In my experience, the almost universal assessment of CACOs was that chaplain contributions proved invaluable.
Supporting casualty assistance calls sometimes brought personnel-management challenges. I recall an instance when I called a chaplain, a lieutenant junior grade in western New York, on a Sunday afternoon for a CACO assignment. The chaplain was hesitant to accept the request, perhaps weary from his religious labors that morning, so I pointed out that I had done a CACO call the previous week and the only other O-6 chaplain in the area (a Catholic priest whose civilian position was at a local Catholic High School) had participated in another. The lieutenant replied, “That’s because you’re captains!” I answered, “No, chaplain, that’s how you get to be a Captain!” He accepted the assignment and, I am happy to report, was selected for promotion to O-6 almost 18 years later.
—CAPT Bruce H. Charnov, CHC, USNR (Ret.)
