In his July 2023 Proceedings article “Time to Recalibrate: The Navy Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . Again,” Commander Paul Giarra suggested that, given Russia and China’s recent actions, the Navy should reconsider its decision to “voluntarily give up tactical nuclear weapons at sea.”1 While the Navy—and the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole—should evaluate this recommendation, it first must answer a more basic question: Does the U.S. nuclear arsenal meet the requirements of today’s strategic environment?
An analysis of the five published Nuclear Posture Reviews reveals that the assumptions underlying the nuclear arsenal’s configuration from the end of the Cold War to the mid-2010s are misaligned with the evolving nature of great power competition. The United States must recalibrate its nuclear deterrence posture and align the stockpile to address the realities of the current threat environment.
It’s A Dangerous World
Reviewing the U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews from the Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations reveals a dynamic and evolving nuclear strategy landscape, shaped by the changing global security environment and based on the overly optimistic assumption of a benign post–Cold War security environment.2 The current landscape, however, is characterized by rapidly evolving threats, which have reinstated the salience of nuclear weapons and deterrence, albeit in a more complex and multidimensional framework. In addition, the age of the U.S. stockpile has reached an all-time high; the average age of U.S. warheads is between 25 and 30 years old, and no new warhead designs have been introduced since the early 1990s.3 Further, all legs of the triad’s delivery systems are serving well past their design lives, and current modernization programs are over budget, over schedule, and based on wrong post–Cold War assumptions.4
Today, the United States must deter two peer nuclear powers—Russia and China. Outlining the new environment, Admiral Charles Richard, former commander, U.S. Strategic Command, told Congress that neither Russia nor China has been slowing its modernization programs; rather both have conducted an “explosion of capability.”5
Over the past 20 years, Russia has modernized its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal with modern tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Of these weapons, only the strategic warheads were limited by the New START treaty, resulting in Russia stockpiling more than 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons.6 In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the introduction of air-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, new heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of being armed with ten independently targetable warheads, autonomous underwater vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, rail launched ICBMs, and hypersonic cruise missiles.7 Further, Russia has abandoned its no-first-use policy in favor of an escalate-to-deescalate posture.8 This policy change has proven more destabilizing, with direct threats from Russia that it “would not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons against NATO” and nuclear saber-rattling during Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.9 These actions have made the nuclear planning environment much more complicated for the U.S. deterrent mission.
While China’s nuclear arsenal is still much smaller than that of the United States, evidence points to China conducting a rapid buildup of forces. Brad Roberts told Congress in 2016 and 2017 that President Xi Jinping promised China would conduct “a great rise in strategic capabilities” and complete “breakthroughs . . . in strategic deterrence capability.”10 China is in a position to rapidly build its stockpile to levels equivalent to the United States. Some estimates indicate China will achieve parity by 2035, which are supported by its nuclear force buildup and modernization over the past 30 years.11 The buildup and modernization include road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs; new silo fields with approximately 250 new ICBM silos; 12 ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), with plans to complete the next-generation submarine deterrent by 2030, including modern SSBNs and improved SLBMs; and modernization of its bombers.12 Along with Russia’s actions, Beijing’s nuclear buildup threatens strategic stability for the United States and its allies.
Compounding this threat environment, the United States faces significant hurdles in delivering its current nuclear program because of aging infrastructure, manpower shortages, loss of institutional knowledge, and insufficient nuclear production capability. These problems impede the nation’s capacity to fulfill current commitments and to evolve in response to emerging threats. A comprehensive and forward-looking approach, integrating technological advancements and strategic thinking, will ensure the United States maintains a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Army General Mark Milley stated, “We want to keep it a great power competition, and not get into great power war. And the way to do that is through deterrence.”13
Effective Deterrence
To ensure the nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, effective, and agile to respond to future threats, the United States must rapidly implement new policies and recalibrate its deterrence posture. To remain credible in the current security environment, it should:
Commission an in-depth study to determine the most effective nuclear force structure for deterring Russia and China simultaneously.
This study should be conducted with all relevant stakeholders, led by the Nuclear Weapons Council members—including the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee and its advisors—to evaluate the stockpile size and required nuclear weapon capabilities.14 While the United States does not necessarily require a larger nuclear force than the combined total of its competitors to ensure deterrence, it is likely the stockpile will need to increase.15 The increase could take the form of uploading additional warheads to the ICBM and SSBN forces or developing new weapon capabilities such as theater nuclear weapons that can be deployed to Europe and the Pacific.16 Regardless of what is decided, the new structure will have a profound effect on the organizations that support the stockpile, such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the delivery system industrial base.
Rapidly modernize the nuclear triad and the supporting DoD and NNSA enterprises.
The United States must accelerate its various modernization initiatives, as has been largely advocated by NNSA and U.S. Strategic Command. In 2020, Admiral Richard informed Congress: “The triad is what gives me the capabilities; it’s the inherent flexibility in the triad that enables me to execute those strategies. If we don’t modernize, I lose those capabilities.”17 Richard’s concerns about the state of the triad are well-founded. The United States has allowed its nuclear stockpile to age, exceeding the intended design life. Consequently, DoD and NNSA have initiated modernization efforts across all aspects of the triad. These efforts include the development of the Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia-class SSBN, the B-21 bomber, and the Long-Range Standoff programs, along with several warhead modernization initiatives.18
In addition, the production complex supporting the stockpile must be recapitalized to establish a resilient, enduring enterprise. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States indicated the United States must expand the nuclear security enterprise capacity to:
• Meet the capability and schedule requirements of the current nuclear modernization program of record and the requirements of the force posture modifications recommended by the Commission in time to address the two-peer threat.
• Provide an effective hedge against four forms of risk: technical failure of a warhead or delivery system, programmatic delays, operational loss of delivery systems, and further worsening of the geopolitical environment.
• Communicate to U.S. adversaries that the United States has the technical capabilities and political will—paired with all other instruments of national power—necessary to ensure they cannot gain a geopolitical or military advantage through nuclear arms racing.19
To accomplish these tasks, the United States must fund NNSA and DoD to increase their current capacity, including expanding the defense industrial base; nuclear industrial base; and weapons science, design, and production infrastructure to levels beyond the current program of record. Further, the United States should adopt the recommendations in NNSA’s Production Based Resilience Plan, especially as they detail restoring key production capabilities. The report outlines resiliency plans addressing the facilities, supply chain, human capital, and technology development/adoption for critical production capabilities.20 These capabilities include high explosives, plutonium pits, secondary components, tritium, domestic uranium enrichment, and nonnuclear components.
Finally, the United States must revolutionize its defense acquisition processes. As the Strategic Posture Commission recommends, the United States should “establish agile acquisition pathways and set aside specific budget lines and funding to rapidly acquire and leverage innovative commercial technologies for applications to strategic deterrence.”21 This would allow modernization programs to be delivered at a relevant pace, to meet the rapidly changing threat environment.
Enhance nuclear deterrence with conventional forces during the nuclear stockpile’s restructuring.
During the time it will take to modernize and restructure the nuclear stockpile, the nation should bolster current and future nonnuclear capabilities to enhance deterrence. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States found that the United States has become increasingly vulnerable to growing missile threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.22 The commission acknowledged that current homeland integrated air and missile defenses are inadequate against the threats presented by China and Russia. To address these threats, the United States should develop and field the next generation of integrated air and missile defense, focusing on new early-warning detection and interceptor capabilities necessary to defend the homeland.
In the new threat environment, space is now a fully contested domain, and cyber defense requires a whole-of-government approach.23 To address this, the United States should adopt the Commission’s recommendation to “incorporate cyber [and space] capabilities into strategic and theater campaign plans and the deliberate planning process of the Combatant Commands.”24 In addition, the United States should reevaluate overclassification of these domains. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force General John Hyten on multiple occasions argued that overclassification hurts the Pentagon and impedes the nation’s ability to work with allies and partners, stating, “You can’t deter people if everything you have is in the black.”25
Finally, space and cyberspace capabilities must continue to mature and play a critical role in deterrence planning. Deployed space assets are essential to targeting and early warning systems, and cyber defense protects strategic delivery platforms, warheads, and nuclear command, control, and communication systems.
U.S. long-range precision strike capabilities—once an area the United States dominated—are not keeping pace with the new threat environment. Christian Brose explains in The Kill Chain that “U.S. forces [have] been optimized for more than two decades to fight lesser opponents.”26 For example, during Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States saw a new Russian military. Russia used electronic warfare, communication jammers, air defenses, and long-range precision rockets—largely operating off the U.S. playbook.27 Further, after the 1991 Gulf War and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, China conducted a thorough study of the U.S. military, leading it to build a different type of military to undermine U.S. advantages and exploit U.S. weaknesses. Specifically, China focused on antiaccess and area-denial weapons designed for “how Washington planned to fight and . . . counter America’s approach to warfare.”28 To address these vulnerabilities, the United States increase funding to develop and deploy the next generation of precision strike capabilities.
Strengthen extended deterrence commitments.
In Europe, the United States continues to strengthen its commitment to NATO to deter Russian aggression in the region, most recently with the overwhelming response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To date, the United States has provided billions of dollars in support. The response to the invasion is backstopped by the forward-deployed nuclear weapons in the region that are included in the U.S. modernization programs.29 Such measures could include equipping all F-35s to deliver B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs.
While the United States has directed increased attention to Europe because of the Russia-Ukraine war, it has arguably given even greater emphasis to its extended deterrence commitments in the Pacific. For example, in response to the Chinese threat in the region, the United States has entered into new security agreements with South Korea and Australia. In April 2023, the United States and South Korea signed the Washington Declaration, intended to “reassure South Koreans skeptical of U.S. extended deterrence.”30 In September 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom announced the formation of the newly enhanced trilateral security partnership AUKUS to provide the technology for nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.31 AUKUS also will ensure continued cooperation between the allies to increase joint capabilities and interoperability to increase deterrence in the region.
The United States has gone beyond diplomatic commitments to demonstrate resolve and assure its allies and deter adversaries. In July 2022, a U.S. Navy SSBN made a port call in Guam for the first time since 2016.32 In a bigger show of force, for the first time in 40 years a U.S. SSBN made a port call in South Korea last year.33 Using the submarine leg of the triad as a show of force was an outsized message of assurance to U.S. allies and an explicit deterrence message to adversaries.
These examples of diplomatic commitments and deterrence missions show how the United States can strengthen extended deterrence. No matter which party occupies the White House, the United States must expand such demonstrations to compete effectively.
The Path Ahead
The United States must maintain a credible, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent that is responsive to future threats. Specifically for the Navy, the modernization of the SSBN fleet and the development of new SSN-based capabilities are critical to maintaining a second-strike capability and ensuring strategic relevance. The visibility of submarine assets in strategic deterrence, as demonstrated by recent port calls and exercises, underscores their importance in signaling U.S. commitment and resolve to allies and adversaries.
Ultimately, recalibrating the U.S. nuclear posture is essential for global strategic stability and preventing the escalation of great power competition into conflict. The Navy will be pivotal in ensuring the United States continues to deter adversaries while safeguarding national security interests in an increasingly complex and dynamic security environment.
1. CDR Paul Giarra, USN (Ret.), “Time to Recalibrate: The Navy Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . Again,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 7 (July 2023).
2. The full analysis can be seen in the forthcoming master’s thesis “Same as It Ever Was: Persisting Challenges within the Nuclear Security Enterprise” by Joseph Labrum.
3. National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2023 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2023).
4. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons and Forces Sustainment and Modernization (2018).
5. C. Todd Lopez, “STRATCOM Commander: Failing to Replace Nuclear Triad Akin to Disarmament,” U.S. Department of Defense, 28 February 2020.
6. Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynold, “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 3 (2023): 174–99.
7. Kristensen, Korda, and Reynold, “Russian Nuclear Weapons.”
8. Vladimir Isachenkov, “New Russian Policy Allows Use of Atomic Weapons against Non-Nuclear Strike,” Defense News, 2 June 2020; and Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitsky, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation’: A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” War on the Rocks, 20 February 2018.
9. Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 137; and Peter Dickinson, “Putin’s Nuclear Saber-Rattling Is a Sign of Dangerous Russian Desperation,” The Atlantic Council, 30 March 2023.
10. Brad Roberts, “China and the 2021 Nuclear Posture Review,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Nuclear Forces, June 2021.
11. Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (2023): 108–33.
12. Michael Anastasio, “China’s Approach to the Long-Term Development of Its Nuclear Deterrent,” in Stockpile Stewardship in an Era of Renewed Competition, Brad Roberts, ed. (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 2022).
13. Jim Garamone, “Deterrence Ensures Great Power Competition Doesn’t Become War, Milley Says,” DoD News, 7 December 2021.
14. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), 47.
15. Jake Sullivan, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” National Press Club, 2 June 2021.
16. Such recommendations have been presented and supported by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. See Madelyn R. Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 2023).
17. Lopez, “STRATCOM Commander.”
18. Joseph Clark, “Pentagon Tackling Nuclear Modernization with Proactive, Integrated Approach,” DoD News, 25 August 2023.
19. Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 101.
20. For specific details of the resiliency plans see the UCNI report, National Nuclear Security Administration, Production Based Resilience Plan (Washington, DC: forthcoming).
21. Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 107.
22. Creedon et al.
23. Creedon et al.
24. Creedon et al., 105.
25. Aaron Mehta, “Miles above Top Secret: Does the U.S. Classify Too Much in Space? [Video],” Breaking Defense, 3 January 2022.
26. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2020), 25.
27. Brose, The Kill Chain.
28. Brose, 32.
29. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 1 (January 2023): 28–52.
30. Amber Wilhelm, U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023).
31. “AUKUS: The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, U.K. and U.S.,” U.S. Department of Defense.
32. Fatima Bahtic, “One of U.S. Navy’s Most Powerful Ballistic-Missile Submarines Makes Rare Port Call,” Naval Today, 17 January 2022.
33. The United States also has conducted recent extended deterrence missions using the bomber and ICBM legs of the triad. See Heather Mongilio, “USS Kentucky Makes Port Call in South Korea, First SSBN Visit in 40 Years,” USNI News, 18 July 2023.
