Situated between Poland and Lithuania, both members of the European Union and NATO, Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian exclave on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, as well as the westernmost region of the Russian Federation. The oblast covers approximately 5,800 square miles, with a population of around one million, and its capital is the city of Kaliningrad. As an exclave, the territory shares no borders with mainland Russia and receives much of its supplies by rail via Belarus and Lithuania, although a sea route of some 600 miles connects its port to that of St. Petersburg through international waters. Kaliningrad enjoys the only Russian port free from ice year round, hosting the Baltic Fleet.
The peculiar political-territorial nature of the Kaliningrad Oblast has been an unpredictable geopolitical dilemma and an obstacle to Euro-Atlantic integration of the Baltic region since 1991. At the same time, Moscow has considered the oblast a building block to guarantee its interests in the Baltic and a means to break NATO’s lines of communication. Today, the Russia-Ukraine war has again highlighted the Kaliningrad Oblast’s strategic significance, especially should that conflict expand beyond Ukraine’s borders.
From Prussia to Russia
Historically, the Kaliningrad region was part of the Kingdom of Prussia. It was Prussia’s greatest fortification, whose privileged position guaranteed control over the Baltic Sea. It became part of the German Empire in 1871; however, after Germany’s defeat in World War II, the territory was ceded to the Soviet Union, and Stalin expelled most of the German population and brought in people from Russia and Belarus. Since then, its main city, known in German as Königsberg, has been named Kaliningrad, along with the oblast.
Following dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kaliningrad became part of the newly formed Russian Federation. Moscow had several ideas for the future of the oblast. One envisaged it as a free-trade area with significant regional autonomy, a sort of Hong Kong of the Baltic. Another envisioned the creation of a fourth independent Baltic state alongside Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The most accredited project, which eventually prevailed, was to transform the region into a military outpost that would project power into the Baltic and Eastern Europe. Thus, Kaliningrad turned into one of Russia’s military bastions in Europe, alongside Crimea, the Kola Peninsula, and Trans-nistria.
Given its geographic proximity, Kaliningrad maintained relatively close economic ties with EU member states in the 1990s, although relations worsened during Vladimir Putin’s presidency, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the imposition of EU sanctions. Despite treaties for the movement of people and goods signed in the early 1990s with Poland and Lithuania, tensions between Russia and the West have been growing, with repercussions vis-à-vis Kaliningrad, especially in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Geostrategic Role Of The Kaliningrad Oblast
Sometimes described as the Kremlin’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Baltic Sea, the Kaliningrad Oblast plays an important strategic and military role for Russia.1 The Russian Baltic Fleet’s main base is located at Baltiysk.2 In addition, Russia has installed tactical Iskander missiles, which have a range of 310 miles, in the oblast. In May 2022, Moscow carried out simulated nuclear missile strikes from Kaliningrad.3 A nuclear missile attack from Kaliningrad could quickly disintegrate the main European capitals.
Tactically, in the event of conflict, Russia could form a land bridge from Belarus to the Kaliningrad exclave along the so-called Suwałki Gap, severing the Baltic states, including Lithuania, from other members of the Atlantic Alliance. In this scenario, troops stationed in Lithuania as part of a German-led NATO brigade would be surrounded and cut off from Central Europe.4 In addition, the deployment of long-range antiaircraft, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles could deny NATO forces access to maritime and land areas in the region.
This deterrence tactic, known as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), presumes the best way to prevail over an adversary, especially if it is militarily superior, is to prevent it from deploying its forces in the theater of operations.5 Kaliningrad’s A2/AD capability would hinder NATO’s ability to support its Baltic allies by air, sea, and land via the Suwałki Gap—challenging the alliance’s defensive strategy.
To defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of its founding treaty, NATO would have to break the potential air, sea, and land blockade formed by Kaliningrad. Nevertheless, although most of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities are still based on technologies and doctrines drawn from the Soviet era, Moscow’s strategic position has markedly changed: The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has deprived Russia of its traditional defense in depth, exposing it on the front line to the perceived threat posed by NATO.
For example, in Soviet times Moscow possessed air defense along its periphery, in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic States, but the independence of these states—with the exception of Belarus—has denied Russia the possibility of concentric defensive lines. Furthermore, in the event of an armed confrontation, Russia would have difficulty defending the exclave, mainly because of its distance from the heart of the federation. In this sense, from being a thorn in NATO’s flank, Kaliningrad could turn into easy prey.
The issue of Kaliningrad should be analyzed within the context of NATO’s expansion toward Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space.6 For example, the Kremlin keeps the region highly militarized because it perceives the Euro-Atlantic enlargement in the region as a maneuver aimed at encircling the oblast, perhaps in the hope of subtracting it from Russia. Therefore, Moscow has continued to invest in the military buildup of Kaliningrad in the hope of halting NATO expansion in the Baltic and retaining Russian influence. On the other hand, the main functions Russia attributes to Kaliningrad are maintaining economic ties with the Atlantic Alliance and spreading its influence in the Baltic area.
War in Ukraine and the Role of Kaliningrad
Given its proximity to NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic and its high degree of militarization—specifically, the deployment of Iskander missiles—Kaliningrad would be a critical region should the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalate. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has frequently threatened Poland and the Baltic States with reprisals for their positions on the conflict, often flexing its muscles with military exercises in Kaliningrad and Belarus. Nonetheless, Warsaw and Vilnius were among the first European countries to offer military aid to Kyiv, deepening Moscow’s resentment. The creation of rigid opposing sides in the Baltic now seems self-evident, with the Baltic States and Poland confronting Russia (Kaliningrad) and Belarus along a “new Iron Curtain.”
From a military perspective, the geostrategic position of Kaliningrad presents opportunities and challenges for Russia.7 It provides an early-warning function and air-defense option in coordination with units from the mainland transiting through Belarus. In addition, the Baltic Fleet is positioned to project control over or exercise sea denial in the central Baltic Sea region and ensure access to the Gulf of Finland, with consequences not only for the Baltic States, but also for the security and freedom of maneuver of NATO members Finland and Sweden.
Because Russia does not want and cannot afford a direct confrontation with NATO, Kaliningrad’s main role in the Baltic is to deter the activities of the Atlantic Alliance in the region. Certainly, Moscow could use Kaliningrad as an instrument of pressure against Poland and Lithuania to obtain advantages and concessions—for perhaps exaggerated reasons, the Baltic States fear Russian territorial revisionism could turn to them, underestimating NATO membership’s guarantee of security. The only Baltic territory Russia might wish to control is the Suwałki Gap, to reconnect Kaliningrad to Belarus, a country that is in a union state with Moscow.8 Control of the corridor would keep NATO from maintaining territorial continuity between its Baltic and Central-Eastern European members.
Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO took the security threats posed by Kaliningrad Oblast seriously. Some reports noted Russia could have isolated the Baltic states or attacked Poland in the Suwałki Gap. Indeed, after the opening of Russian hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022, several analysts considered the possibility that the Kaliningrad region could become the next battleground between Russia and the West.
Nonetheless, the war in Ukraine seems to be absorbing all Russia’s efforts. Russia clearly does not possess the material capacity or will to open a second front in the Baltic. At the same time, however, Russia would never allow Kaliningrad Oblast to be taken from it, for historical, strategic, and prestige reasons. The outcome of the war in Ukraine could result in a reassessment of the future political-juridical status of Kaliningrad, closing a question that has been pending since 1945, when this relatively small rim of land became Russian..
Acknowledgments
The article was developed under the “Promoting Order at the Edge of Turbulence” project conducted in the Centre for International Studies and Development at Jagiellonian University. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Polish Academic Exchange Council and Polish National Science Council.
1. Stefan Wolff, “Kaliningrad: Russia’s ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’ Deep in NATO Territory,” The Conversation, 5 May 2022.
2. The other is in Kronstadt in the Gulf of Finland.
3. “Russia Simulates Nuclear Strikes Near EU,” The Moscow Times, 5 May 2022.
4. NATO, “First German NATO Brigade Troops Arrive in Lithuania,” news release, 4 September 2022.
5. Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (2016): 95–116; and Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
6. Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,” Survival 38, no. 2 (1996): 121–42; Lyndelle D. Fairlie, “Kaliningrad: Recent Changes in Russia’s Exclave on the Baltic Sea,” in The NEBI Yearbook (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 1999), 293–312; Christopher S. Chivvis et al., NATO’s Northeastern Flank: Emerging Opportunities for Engagement (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017); and Christian Wellmann, “Russia’s Kaliningrad Exclave at the Crossroads: The Interrelation between Economic Development and Security Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 31, no. 2 (1996): 161–83.
7. Viljar Veebel, “Why It Would Be Strategically Rational for Russia to Escalate in Kaliningrad and the Suwałki Corridor,” Comparative Strategy 38, no. 3 (2019): 182–97.
8. Jonathan Masters, “The Belarus-Russia Alliance: An Axis of Autocracy in Eastern Europe,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2023
