Russia’s Okean 2024 exercise ended on 16 September after nearly a week of operations by naval and air units in the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. This year’s exercise was modest in scale and scope compared to earlier iterations of Okean, but it was large relative to other recent naval exercises.
Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly launched the exercise on 10 September. Okean 2024 was designed to review and test Russian naval and air forces’ readiness, command and control, and interoperability.
Moscow claimed to field more than 400 surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries in the exercise, as well as 120 aircraft, 7,000 weapon systems, and 90,000 personnel. Observers were invited from 15 nations. Putin noted the participation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with three warships, one auxiliary, and 15 aircraft. China’s contribution of a four-ship flotilla came as other PLAN units were already underway with the Russian Navy in Exercise Northern/Interaction 2024.
Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev described the exercise format as bilateral, set in two stages, and conducted in 13 sea zones spanning three strategic areas. The Pacific and Baltic Fleets played roles as friendly forces, while the Northern Fleet and Caspian Flotilla were designated as the enemy.
Russia’s reintroduction of Okean reveals several key themes.
Replacing the Quadrennial Military District Exercise
Starting in 2009, the Russian General Staff every autumn conducted a large quadrennial command-and-staff capstone exercise in one of Russia’s four military districts—western (zapad), eastern (vostok), central (tsentr) and southern (kavkaz). These exercises test each district’s capabilities, try out new operational concepts and equipment, and adjust campaign planning. (Russia’s military districts were reorganized earlier this year.) The Southern Military District was on deck for 2024, but combat operations against Ukraine made an exercise in that district redundant.
The last peacetime military district exercise, Zapad 2021, was planned and carried out as a joint strategic exercise with Belarus. Some Russian elements stayed in Belarus after the exercise or moved near the Ukrainian border once back in Russia. In retrospect, this seemed to anticipate Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine, which started five months later.
Putin kicked off Vostok 2022 on 1 September in Vladivostok just prior to opening the Eastern Economic Forum, an important trade event in Russia’s Far East. Vostok 2022 was a smaller, sea-oriented exercise. China participated, as did members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Exercises took place near the Kuril Islands, a disputed island chain Japan considers part of its Northern Territories.
The Russian General Staff did not conduct a major capstone exercise in 2023, with then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu quipping Russia was instead conducting “exercises” in Ukraine. The Russian Navy did train on a smaller scale, with exercises including Ocean Shield in the Baltic Sea and joint military drills with the PLAN in the Sea of Japan.
The lack of a capstone exercise in 2023 reflected a military stretched to its limit. Russian leaders are sensitive to perceptions of Moscow’s power, and the Kremlin may have felt it needed to project strength via a large exercise in 2024 that demonstrated resolve in the face of Western support to Ukraine. It wanted to showcase the commitment of its partners, especially China, and exercise those commands, staffs, and operational forces not fully engaged in the war with Ukraine.
The General Staff’s Battle Rhythm
In April 2020, Norman Polmar marked the 50th anniversary of the first Okean exercise with an extensive review and analysis. Okean 1970 remains the largest peacetime fleet exercise in history. It involved more than 160 warships and submarines, 45 auxiliaries, and hundreds of aircraft. The exercise took place from 14 April to 6 May and signaled the arrival of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov’s oceangoing fleet. During the late 1950s and into the 1960s, Gorshkov sought to transform the Soviet Navy from a coastal-defense force into one capable of countering Western aircraft carrier battle groups.
All four Soviet fleets participated in Okean 1970. Naval aviation simulated complex synchronized strikes against targets in the Atlantic and Pacific, demonstrating the navy’s relatively sophisticated command and control. The exercise also included combined surface and air antisubmarine prosecutions and the largest naval infantry amphibious exercise to that date. It culminated with launches of ballistic missiles from nuclear submarines.
Okean 1975 proved equally ambitious. Complex operations included demonstrations of anti-carrier interdiction, open-ocean surveillance, and multi-platform antisubmarine warfare. As before, the exercise culminated with a simulated naval strategic strike. Confounding Western expectations, Admiral Gorshkov did not carry out an Okean in 1980, perhaps reflecting a change in Soviet naval strategy and heightened tensions because of the Iran hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Polish crisis of 1980–81.
This year’s Okean differed from the fleet exercises of the 1970s in several respects. Early Okeans took place at the end of Soviet five-year planning cycles. Through those large naval demonstrations, Admiral Gorshkov sought to justify to the Politburo the navy’s enormous budget and to assure party leaders of the fleet’s vital role in defending the state and its interests.
In anticipation of Okean 2024, Shoigu, while still Defense Minister, announced in December 2023 the General Staff’s intention to make Okean 2024 the year’s final strategic command-and-staff exercise, with participation by all branches of the armed forces. However, early reporting suggests little participation by ground forces other than naval infantry.
The earlier Okeans garnered prestige and respect. Moscow’s proclamations aside, this year’s Okean reflects a scaled-down navy—one battered by losses in the Black Sea. Russia sails a force of much less tonnage than the Soviet Navy. Operations by corvettes in the Caspian Sea and on Lake Ladoga reflect that smaller scale, but they also point to a change in the view of what the Russian Navy does. For example, smaller warships can sling Kalibr missile salvos and engage in electronic warfare. They are just as capable in these functions as the heavy cruisers of the Soviet era.
The decision to rely on the navy rather than a host military district for this year’s culminating command-and-control exercise was telegraphed 10 months earlier. The General Staff likely wanted the largest show possible within the constraints of the war in Ukraine. While the highly scripted exercise probably included a fraction of the 400 vessels Moscow advertised, it attempted to signal to NATO Russia’s strength and resolve during a major war and underscored its partnership with Beijing in the Indo-Pacific.
Ongoing Military Reorganization
Late in 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a major reorganization of its force structure. It divided the poorly designed Western Military District back into two districts—the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts. Putin codified the reorganization by decree last February, noting Finland’s accession to NATO as a pretext. Another important piece of Moscow’s military reforms was the renewed subordination last year of the Russian Navy’s four fleets and the Caspian Flotilla back under the navy commander-in-chief. The move streamlines Admiral Moiseyev’s responsibilities while dismantling the Northern Fleet’s short-lived authority over the Northwestern Federal District. These moves shade the broader picture of Moscow’s longer-term force reconstitution and modernization. They suggest Moscow perceives a need for a more credible counter to NATO and the West.
It is more difficult to discern with precision the command-and-control dynamics of Okean 2024. Of immediate interest is how the Navy High Command and the General Staff interacted, the authorities granted to the navy commander-in-chief and subordinate commands, and the effectiveness of their orders.
Is Okean Back for Good?
Okean’s return could be a standalone event—a remedy to the immediate political-military problem the Kremlin faced as it planned for 2024. That said, if Admiral Moiseyev and the fleet are perceived as competent in staging a relatively complex exercise, Okean might be back in the years ahead. It could be scheduled concurrent with or as part of military district exercises. If the intent is to mirror the past, the exercise could return every fifth year.
Despite the Russian Navy’s lackluster performance against Ukraine and its losses in the Black Sea, the service remains an important component of Putin’s forces. Its competence in putting on a show amid the pressures of war and Western sanctions might reassure doubters in Moscow.
