Retaining enough junior officers to fill billets, much less a number that permits selectivity, is a challenge that resists solution. Talent management boards, surveys, and bonuses have not fixed the problem. But the Navy can make progress by drawing on its strength: highly invested, highly motivated career officers who believe in what they do. Connecting junior officers too busy and nearsighted to see the impact of their work with midgrade officers within their warfare communities could have an outsized effect on retention.
Most junior officers have the opportunity to leave active duty after their first sea tours. In those three years, young officers are so focused on qualifying, learning, managing, and leading that they likely have ignored everything not related to their immediate shipboard tasks. Unless they can identify a role model in the wardroom, they may not see the bigger picture or the value and significance of their work.
In the past, young officers could make connections in their extraprofessional lives—in officers’ clubs, at religious services, or through hobbies. Long before LinkedIn, an officer’s professional network might span multiple time zones. That is not true today. Junior officers are considerably more isolated from their naval peers, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic.
The consequence is that junior officers might end their sea tours with few professional connections outside their commands. They will have had no time to ponder sea power or naval strategy and likely will not have a clear idea where their service fits in the bigger picture. Their experience of the Navy reduces to long hours standing watch, with little to show for their time except some completed qualification cards and a Navy Achievement Medal. Is it any wonder they choose to separate when they do not feel necessary and important? It does not have to be this way.
The Navy has plenty of people who do feel necessary and important, have a good sense of the big picture, and are capable of mentoring subordinates. Sometimes they are commanding officers, but the Navy should stop relying solely on the senior members of wardrooms to mentor junior officers. It should develop a program to connect junior officers with midcareer officers for extended mentorship. Following is a brief framework for such a program:
• A 10-year career gap between mentor and mentee would be optimal. This would pair junior officers with executive officers and striking department heads with commanding officers.
• Mentors should be as far removed from the mentees’ chain of command as possible. The aim should be to allow mentees to voice their problems and issues without fear of embarrassment or reprisal.
• Mentor and mentee need not be collocated; videoconferencing or even phone calls could suffice. Some mentees may prefer a mentor in their homeport, but that could forfeit having the mentor outside the mentee’s chain of command.
• Mentors should be selected. Not everyone has the right qualities to be a good mentor.
• Mentees should be able to choose a mentor with the characteristics they desire. This could be an important factor for women or minority service members. Mentors could provide a short biography or summary of their professional experience.
• No part of the program should be supported by a Navy IT network. Antiquated websites or apps that frequently do not work or require byzantine security settings would make the experience frustrating and quash participation.
• Mentees should have a way to provide feedback on their mentors—but not vice versa. Feedback on mentees should be neither solicited nor accepted.
The Navy can continue to increase pay, bonuses, and benefits, but retention will not improve without job satisfaction. What ails many young officers is the inability to see what it all means, what, after an 80-hour workweek, their sacrifice has been for. If the Navy is going to tout professional pride as part of the compensation package, it should help provide it.