Maximize the Marine Corps’ Value in the First Island Chain

The preponderance of the U.S. joint force’s combat power cannot be placed at risk to purchase time and decision space. Many capabilities are too expensive, limited in number, and difficult to replace under realistic acquisition assumptions to be considered risk worthy. These assets must be preserved for coordinated decisive actions.

Moreover, China’s robust investments in antiaccess/area-denial capabilities constrain the joint force’s surface and air maneuver options in conflict and provide Beijing with a regional firepower advantage within the first island chain. Despite this relative disadvantage, the joint force will have to contest control of this geography early in a conflict over Taiwan. The joint force must deny China effective sea control and then achieve periods of relatively assured maneuver to enable sustainment and flow forces to the fight in Taiwan. Control of the air and sea in a Taiwan contingency will be decisive and require a command-and-control system of unprecedented complexity. Therefore, the United States should commit its mass of decisive but irreplaceable assets only when conditions are set and there is a higher certainty of success.

Today’s Marine Corps has created the concepts and has begun altering its force structure to meet this requirement. In a clear break from the service’s recent counterinsurgency experiences in the Middle East, Marine Corps force-structure changes and capability investments aligned with the stand-in force (SIF) concept promise new relevance in peer competition and conflict in the Pacific.¹ Small formations spread across the first island chain can conduct reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance and deliver asymmetric kinetic effects throughout the battlespace.² However, a distributed SIF faces many of the same kinetic and nonkinetic threats confronting the broader joint force, and a small service such as the Marine Corps must make best use of autonomy, cost-effectiveness, and scale to minimize formation size and reduce risk. Currently, Marine Corps acquisition practices and philosophy have not fully evolved to best deliver on this value proposition.

More Unmanned Assets to Reduce Risk

Despite ongoing work to align the service with the SIF concept, the Marine Corps still lacks survivable and risk-worthy systems. For example, MQ-9A Reaper drones and other highly capable aircraft require long runways and large logistics trains and are expensive and slow to replace. Meanwhile, the insecurity of rear areas in the western Pacific and China’s interdiction capabilities mean that maneuver on and between islands requires a different perspective and risk framework. Moreover, to enhance survivability through further reductions in formation sizes, SIF equipment must better facilitate expeditionary operations.

The Marine Corps should consider additional investments in attritable, cost-effective platforms with low size, weight, and power to improve maritime domain awareness and logistical supportability. The V-BAT, a vertical takeoff and landing uncrewed aerial system (UAS) made by Shield AI, is a good example. Many defense startups across the country are working on similar platforms that promise asymmetric cost-benefit value propositions.

Imagine an expeditionary advanced base (EAB) composed of a handful of commercial utility trucks. One truck carries 12 55-gallon barrels of fuel with a hand pump for refueling V-BATs and vehicles at forward positions. Another truck holds a UAV cradle to secure a V-BAT in transit. The final truck maintains life support for the squad of Marines tasked to operate the EAB. With flexible service acquisition and requirements philosophies, EABs of this size with intelligence-sensing capabilities could unlock significant commercial transportation and sustainment opportunities. Instead of conspicuous and unnecessary bulky armored vehicles that would have limited mobility, Marines could operate the right-sized vehicles with locally sourced parts and labor. And commercial ferries could transport them without specialized ramps or other modifications.

In conflict, the initial salvos would likely cause high attrition as both sides sought a position of advantage. Roads, runways, fuel depots, and other critical infrastructure would be priority targets as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sought to deny joint force response options. Platforms such as the MQ-9A that require a runway would suddenly have little utility. However, if the Marine Corps possesses many vertical takeoff-and-landing UASs that sense and close targeting cycles for PLA Navy (PLAN) capital assets, it could significantly improve maritime domain awareness.

Better Cost and Quantity

Current and future investments in the MQ-9A and similar platforms guarantee the Marine Corps will face the same cost-risk dilemma as the rest of the joint force—whether to employ a relatively small number of advanced, high-cost capabilities in a contested environment. Furthermore, recent operations in the Red Sea suggest the MQ-9A’s survivability may not be as robust as forecasted. For example, in November 2023 and February 2024, Houthi militants shot down MQ-9As with surface-to-air missiles.³ The PLAN integrated air-and-missile defense system promises to be much more lethal. The Marine Corps recently purchased eight MQ-9As for a total of $138.8 million, or $17.35 million per aircraft.⁴ By comparison, a V-BAT currently costs in the mid-six figures. Assuming a V-BAT costs $500,000, the service could purchase almost 278 V-BATs for the price of eight MQ-9As.⁵

Next, compare the vehicle cost for EAB infrastructure. A Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV) costs approximately $395,000.⁶ A fully featured Japanese Kei utility truck costs around $15,000.⁷ For every JLTV the Marine Corps buys, it could instead purchase more than 26 utility trucks. Costly, exquisite systems are not a good value proposition for the SIF; supportable, plentiful, low-cost systems would have higher combat returns over time because they are risk-worthy and replaceable.

Shifting to less-exquisite systems would also hurt the PLAN by forcing it to deplete its missile magazines more rapidly. If the Marine Corps fielded 278 V-BATs in the first island chain and the PLAN destroyed every system with a 90-percent probability of kill per missile, the PLAN would expend approximately 309 missiles. A PLAN Luyang III destroyer has 32 vertical launch system tubes.⁸ If each Luyang used 50 percent of its tubes for antiair weaponry, the Marine Corps could force the PLAN to expend 19.3 Luyangs’ worth of antiair weaponry. While not necessarily decisive, this magazine depletion would significantly constrain the PLAN’s decision space. The PLAN would effectively be forced to choose between expending its limited number of antiair missiles on UAS targets to avoid detection and tracking, or risking detection to use those missiles against allied aircraft and cruise missiles. 

Further, the missile dilemma is scalable. To bring this vision to reality, the Marine Corps should leverage Replicator, an Office of the Secretary of Defense initiative to field thousands of multidomain, expendable unmanned systems in the next 12 to 18 months. The Marine Corps could field more than 500 low-cost, expendable unmanned systems if it received 25 percent of the forecasted $1 billion in Replicator funds.⁹ With that many systems, the PLAN would require approximately 555 antiair missiles (or the equivalent antiair magazines of 35 Luyangs) to destroy all fielded V-BATs. The Marine Corps could compound this dilemma by pairing attack UASs with sensing platforms, burdening PLAN commanders with constant uncertainty about which air contacts are offensive in nature and forcing them to either deplete their magazines or risk attack. Moreover, with sufficient computer vision capabilities and autonomy, even one-way attack UASs with small warheads could destroy critical PLAN systems such as radars.¹⁰

As the stand-in-force in the western Pacific, the Marine Corps is not just valuable because it occupies key maritime terrain. The Marine Corps must also be able to generate cost-effective effects with a lower risk profile. The SIF concept is sound and provides a unique value proposition to the joint force. Now the Marine Corps must align its acquisitions to achieve its full value proposition.