If war were to break out with China, the United States would find one imperative for victory has been neglected: planning for rapid military industrial mobilization to arm and support its fighting forces. A whole-of-nation contingency plan is needed now. The day before will be too late. As John Wayne once proclaimed, “We’re burning daylight.”
Short and Sharp or . . .
Many war planners believe a conflict involving the United States, its allies, and China will be short but sharp. Hopefully, they are right. Nonetheless, China now sails the world’s largest navy, and its arsenal includes hypersonic missiles, stealth fighters, and a rapidly expanding number of nuclear warheads.
China now claims most of the South China Sea, and it is the likely boxing ring for a potential fight. Accordingly, rapid mobilization should prioritize weapons and sensors suited for naval conflict. Prime defense contractors should not be ignored, but the nimble newcomers are more likely to build and deploy the portfolio of arms tailored to the short/sharp fight.
But what if a Sino-American conflict becomes both prolonged and costly and regional hot spots erupt? Controlling escalation will depend on the United States’ ability to rapidly mobilize its manufacturing might, as it did in World War II.
The envisioned contingency plan must be near- and farsighted, perhaps paving the way to the transformation needed for a future conflict—for example, to unmanned platforms, deep sensing, and artificial intelligence.
Reimagining Industrial Mobilization
In 1993, Secretary of Defense William Perry concluded that excess capacity was no longer needed, and consolidation of the U.S. military industrial base ensued. The number of prime defense contractors ultimately narrowed from more than 50 in the 1950s to only 6 today. That consolidation does not fit today’s rapidly changing technology or the type of fight that might occur between the United States and China.
Taking a lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war, a fight that was intended to be short and sharp, the United States would be wise to develop a plan for rapid military industrial mobilization that could be rolled out as soon as red lines are approached or unexpectedly crossed. The 2022 National Defense Strategy recognized that the status quo does not cut it, concluding it is “too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical challenges we now face.” Mobilization must include data science and new weapons and sensors that can be rapidly manufactured at scale and deployed with U.S. fighting forces.
Make no mistake, the military industrial base is evolving, and the military is hungry for new tools. As the National Defense Strategy notes:
We will fuel research and development for advanced capabilities, including in directed energy, hypersonics, integrated sensing, and cyber. We will seed opportunities in biotechnology, quantum science, advanced materials, and clean-energy technology. We will be a fast-follower where market forces are driving commercialization of militarily relevant capabilities in trusted artificial intelligence and autonomy, integrated network system-of-systems, microelectronics, space, renewable energy generation and storage, and human-machine interfaces.
What Is Missing?
Conflict with China would likely erupt quickly, perhaps sparked by an accident in the air or at sea or by a surprise attack on Taiwan. No one knows how long the fight would last. Assuming the National Defense Strategy is correct, and the right strategy is in effect, the United States will need a corresponding framework for rapid military industrial mobilization built on the following essential pillars:
Focused investment. Industry will not be able to do it all, particularly in the short term. To this point, the Replicator initiative currently underway to accelerate existing and funded programs focused on emerging technologies is a precursor to what will be needed. Replicator seeks to build and deploy thousands of drones in 24 months, but that will not be fast enough. Mobilization planners must be highly selective in choosing what levers to pull—and not pull.
Incentives aligned to goals. Unless Congress mandates production, profit-driven companies will need the
right funding mechanisms in place for them to respond quickly. If a company must change its manufacturing base, output, or workforce, it will need to be compensated. Fixed-price contracts will not work.
Mobilization of capital. The post–9/11 response offers important insights on the types of appropriations that will be needed to arm and sustain U.S. fighting forces. Congress and commercial financial institutions will need to act quickly.
Prioritization of unmanned, munitions, and surveillance. Flooding the zone with drones, bullets, and spyglasses will give warfighters the tactical advantage necessary for a strategic victory.
Disruption of Chinese access to semiconductors and rare earth minerals. This is a bridge that must be destroyed. Likewise, these supply chains headed for China must be interdicted.
Battle damage and repair capabilities and locations. Ships, planes, and sensing systems will be damaged or destroyed. The tyranny of distance will necessitate reliance on repair facilities in the region of conflict. For that, regional allies will be critical.
Constant replenishment of networked surveillance, communication, and navigation systems. First strikes likely would be against U.S. warfighters’ ability to see, hear, and find their way around the battlefield. Continuous reseeding of those systems will be fundamental.
“Buy American” relief. U.S. fighting forces will need what they need when they need it. The ability to satisfy that vital demand signal cannot be restricted for the sake of buying American. If we rely on our allies to fight at our side, we surely can buy from them.
Foreign military transfers and sales. Military planners will have to dust off the lessons of the World War II Lend-Lease program. Conflict with China would certainly encompass U.S. western Pacific partners. Akin to the support the United States is providing Ukraine today, they will need help from the United States, and their help will be essential for victory.
Supply chain resilience. Seaborne and air bridges will be critical supply lines that must be protected and maintained for however long the fight goes on. Furthermore, there will be a constant demand to refill those supply ships and planes.
Respect for industry’s legal concerns. Shared technology, patents, and trade secrets will need to be preserved while arms and supplies are flowing to the theater.
Workforce mobilization. Every component of the mobilization plan will need people to deliver on it. A military and civilian recruiting campaign will be needed to rally all Americans to contribute what they can.
To fight fast, the United States must create a contingency plan now to prepare industry for what will be needed for victory. The likelihood and duration of armed conflict with China are impossible to predict, but the goal is clear: to sustain U.S. fighting forces and provide them the tools they need.
Ike famously said, “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.” Such is the case for a contingency plan for the rapid mobilization of U.S. industry that could either deter or defeat China. But it is John Wayne who gets the last words: “We’re burning daylight.”
