The Arctic has reemerged as a priority front for great power competition. Warming temperatures and decreasing subsea permafrost make new maritime trade routes and access to untapped natural gas and mineral deposits increasingly possible. China is expanding its sphere of influence into the High North, while Russia remains protective of its northern border and sea routes. The United States by itself lacks the resources necessary to sustain a military presence in the Arctic and relies on partners in the region to achieve its goals.1
After the Cold War, the Arctic stood out as one of the last regions in the world where cooperation was the established norm, as the result of intergovernmental forums such as the Arctic Council.2 But some strategists argue this period of “Arctic exceptionalism” is over.3 By analyzing the Arctic through Mahanian and Corbettian lenses, the United States and its NATO allies can confidently position their naval forces to offset the efforts of Russia and China.
Chinese and Russian Mahanian Strategies
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan had a useful shorthand for the importance of sea power: “Whoever rules the waves rules the world.”4 To achieve such dominance, Mahan “stressed the need for harbor infrastructure in remote regions to support mercantile and naval endeavors.”5 Maintaining a strategically positioned military force safeguards national economic agendas even as it deters potential conflicts. In peacetime, this post-Mahanian strategy means using technological advancements and diplomacy to police the seas and project power ashore. These efforts set the foundation for success should war arise. As growing naval powers, China and Russia use post-Mahanian means to achieve the Mahanian objective of ruling the waves.6
China uses its partnership with Russia to legitimize Beijing’s national economic objectives in the Arctic. At the 2015 Arctic Circle Assembly, then-Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming classified China as a “near-Arctic state,” claiming the changing environment has a “direct impact on China’s climate, environment, agriculture, shipping, and trade, as well as social and economic development.”7 That same year, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a Maritime Silk Road as a venue for its economic influence under the broader Belt and Road Initiative.8 China’s 2018 Arctic Policy specifically outlines a northern component—the Polar Silk Road (PSR)—which crosses the Arctic Ocean.
China and Russia have poured research into nuclear-powered icebreakers, ice-enhanced liquid nitrogen gas ships, and polar deep-sea exploration vessels. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Arctic 7, China recognized its need to balance its cooperation with Russia and among the other Arctic countries. The growing polarity within the Arctic Council has slowed China’s ambitious Arctic projects, limiting the effectiveness of its overall strategy and allowing Russia to retain its status as the leading Arctic stakeholder.
Russia holds just over half of the Arctic coastline and population, and Moscow embraces post-Mahanian means to maintain its status as the current Arctic superpower. President Vladimir Putin recognizes the need to balance strategic partnerships in such a way as supports its own economic interests while maintaining its superiority in the region.
The Kremlin has emerged as the gatekeeper to China’s desired PSR. Initially, Russia was not very receptive to China’s role in the region—Moscow was the last Arctic Council member to approve China’s status as an observer nation, believing non-Arctic states do not belong in Arctic affairs.9 But China’s consistent commitments to Arctic research facilities and icebreaker escorts solidified a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. Sanctions resulting from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 further strengthened the partnership.10
The contentious dynamic in the Arctic Council undermined Moscow’s framing of its 2020 Arctic Strategy, which describes military strength in the Arctic zone as a means to preserve cooperation.11 Ominous signs that Soviet-era stations reopened in the Arctic Circle—for both military and commercial use—have further raised concerns.12 As discord shapes the dynamics of the Arctic, military strength emerges as crucial for the U.S. and its allies to safeguard regional strategic objectives.
Corbett-Inspired U.S. Strategies
Sir Julian Corbett emphasized the value of an effective political system to achieve sea power while deterring war. Corbettian theory echoes throughout A Blue Arctic, the U.S. Navy’s 2022 strategic blueprint for the region, and in Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti’s priorities for the fleet. Blue Arctic aims to “maintain enhanced presence; strengthen cooperative partnerships; and build a more capable Arctic Naval Force.” Admiral Franchetti expands on these objectives with her priorities of warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation that supports them. Normalizing Arctic exercises with NATO allies embodies the Corbettian emphasis on effective political systems.
Corbett observed that a fleet with command of the seas can “control the maritime communications of all parties concerned.”13 The remote and vast Arctic region, however, has insufficient sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and undersea cables. Tensions between Russia and other Arctic states have indefinitely stalled SLOC projects such as the Russia Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System, Arctic Connect, and Polar Express. The U.S. and its NATO allies can mitigate this lack of essential infrastructure by combining their naval resources to increase maritime domain awareness, thus using existing Arctic resources to maintain a competitive edge at the northern frontier.
Under the Ice Lie Chilling Threats
During the Cold War, a high operational tempo of testing tactics and technology helped the U.S. submarine community become the leading service in Arctic operations. Returning to this state of proficiency will solidify deterrence in the Arctic.
The Soviet Union believed the Arctic’s unique and complex environmental factors, such as its isolation and changing ice bodies, rendered it an ideal base for nuclear-powered submarines.14 Moscow's mindset quickly shifted. On 17 March 1959, the USS Skate (SSN-578) became the first submarine to surface at the North Pole.15 Arctic submarine operations became routine. On 5 May 1986, during Ice Exercise (ICEX) 86-1, three nuclear-powered attack submarines simultaneously surfaced at the North Pole.16 The Soviets learned they could not hide strategic nuclear bastions under the Arctic ice. Submarines moving beneath the surface of the Arctic reaffirmed a resilient nuclear deterrence.
Cold War imperatives also compelled U.S. and NATO nations to aggressively modernize their antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. From 23 February to 12 March 1986, Operation Anchor Express shed light on the capabilities and limitations of military technology in the High North. To facilitate new research, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman established the largest Navy ice camp ever, the Applied Physics Laboratory Ice Station. Scientists and engineers tested new ASW sensors and tactics with attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and surface ships.17 Presence operations further highlighted the advanced ASW capabilities and enduring joint doctrine equipped by U.S. and NATO naval vessels and aircraft.
In 2020, four U.S. Navy ships and one Royal Navy ship conducted freedom-of-navigation and ASW operations in the Barents Sea, the first such operations since the 1980s. In Dynamic Mongoose 2022, another ASW-focused exercise, nine NATO nations dedicated 3 submarines, 11 surface ships, and 16 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to train in the Norwegian Sea. Today, ICEX, renamed as Operation Ice Camp, includes representatives from all branches of the U.S. military, in addition to the Royal Canadian Navy, the French Navy, the British Royal Navy, and the Royal Australian Navy. Participating squadrons practice navigation, communication, and maneuvering skills unique to the operating environment. Conducting joint integrated ASW operations demonstrates both commitment and the capability to operate in the harsh Arctic theater.
Operational Partnerships in the Arctic
Safe operations in this expeditionary theater require the U.S. and NATO to combine critical infrastructure with environmental familiarity in the Arctic. Successful exercises can weaken Russia’s and China’s military footprints.
A longstanding partnership between the U.S. Marines and the Norwegian military highlights the importance of amphibious operations to strengthen alliances. During the 1986 Operation Anchor Express, Norway hosted the U.S. Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade. Approximately 20,000 troops representing eight countries tested the limits of their equipment in cold weather and conducted exercises that would protect NATO’s northern flank.18 The U.S. amphibious fleets continue to anchor themselves in this relationship to reaffirm partnerships with Scandinavian countries who specialize in Arctic operations.
NATO recently launched Exercise Steadfast Defender 24, the largest Arctic drills since the Reforger Exercise in 1988. One component, Exercise Nordic Response 2024, focused on high-end amphibious operations, including beach landings on Norwegian shores. These exercises aim to reaffirm joint doctrine and ensure successful operations in the Arctic’s harsh environment. They establish tailored Arctic tactics while reinforcing safety of personnel.
The Russian Navy has also attempted amphibious exercises with the objective of showing its tactics as superior to NATO’s. Ocean Shield 2023 consisted of more than 30 military vessels, 20 support vessels, 30 aircraft, and 6,000 personnel. Because of a redistribution of forces to Ukraine, however, Russia’s “Baltic Fleet has lost its ability to conduct a large-scale offensive amphibious operation.” Russia’s Arctic naval posture has weakened.
Assemble the “A” Team.
Fleet commands consist of staffs responsible for a designated operating area. In 1943, Admiral Ernest J. King established the Ninth Fleet Command, which was responsible for military operations in the High North. After World War II, the Ninth Fleet dissolved into the Atlantic numbered fleet commands. In 2017, Admiral James Stavridis proposed reserving the Ninth Fleet for the High North by establishing a staff specialized in naval operations at the northern front.19 The Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command is responsible for the western and central Arctic. Its naval component includes the Northern Fleet’s Submarine Command and fleet, and the Kora Flotilla’s Arctic surface combatants. For the United States, a more proportional response for peacetime is to provide mission tasking to a destroyer squadron (DesRon) with experience sailing in the Arctic.
Squadrons can be tasked to specialize in specific missions applicable to the Arctic. In September 2021, Rear Admiral Brendan McLane, then-Commander of Naval Surface Force Atlantic, and Rear Admiral Brian Davies, then-Commander of Submarine Group Two, created Task Group Greyhound (TGG). With TGG, Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers stand ready to support sustainment operations and counter Russian undersea threats. Through training, practice, and real-world experience, TGG ships became model ASW platforms.
Sailors of all ranks and rates likewise can specialize in tactical operations and strategy for the Arctic region. Historically, the Navy has established foundations for officers to become instructors in specialized warfare areas. The best example of this is the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center, or TOPGUN. It was created in 1969 with the aim to train aircrew in all aspects of aerial combat. When reporting to a squadron, graduates are expected to teach what they learned to their squadron mates. The surface navy similarly established the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) in 2015. The center trains junior surface warfare officers to become specialized Warfare Tactics Instructors.
Rear Admiral Jim Kilby, founder of SMWDC and its commanding officer in 2016, emphasized the importance of doctrine and tactics: “We need to focus on telling our ships how to use and employ capability correctly and writing the doctrine from the perspective we would like to receive it as operators, not technical writers.” Breaking down the barriers to understanding for all warfighters increases mission success. However, a general warfighting doctrine does not always apply to the Arctic environment.
Exchange opportunities among Arctic states can bolster interoperability. In 1971, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt announced the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The program aimed to strengthen U.S. alliances by challenging junior officers and enlisted personnel to better understand and appreciate allied military cultures. Of the 20 foreign nations within PEP, Norway is the only Arctic state that hosts U.S. service members. While the opportunity to learn alongside navies that regularly operate in the Arctic is limited, the experience and strengthened partnerships gained from each successful tour are undeniable. On their return to the U.S. Navy, sailors share familiarity and experience with their shipmates, enhancing the confidence to conduct successful missions in the High North.
Warfighter specialization can happen at all levels of command. From an experienced DesRon commodore to the humble sailor living amid a foreign community, there is no substitute for specialized experience.
Thaw the Arctic Naval Theater
The U.S. and partner NATO naval forces are prepared to confidently engage in Arctic conflict and win. That confidence should be anchored in joint exercises grounded in Corbettian theory, and in fostering subsurface cold-water operations; amphibious cold-weather operations; and expertly trained warfighters. Leveraging these capabilities does not diminish the shared aspiration for cooperation among all Arctic states.
While Russia remains the leading Arctic stakeholder, its military posture in the region has weakened. Consequently, China’s interest in Arctic investments has waned. In response to the shift in dynamics, the United States and its NATO allies are standing by to thaw the Arctic naval theater.
1. Office of Naval Research, Naval Ice Center, Oceanographer of the Navy, and the Arctic Research Commission, “Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium: Final Report,” April 2001, 37.
2. “Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium: Final Report,” April 2001, 37.
3. Elizabeth Buchanan, Red Arctic (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2023), 160.
4. Buchanan, Red Arctic, 70.
5. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 60.
6. Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific, 142.
7. Rush Doshi et al., “Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions,” Foreign Policy at Brookings (April 2021),15.
8. "Hearing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later," U.S.-China Economic Security Commission, 25 January 2018, testimony by Dr. Joel Wuthnow, Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, U.S. National Defense University: 3.
9. “The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia’s and China’s Evolving Role in the Region,” Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Canadian House of Commons, 26 November 2018, testimony by Stephanie Pezard, The RAND Corporation, 7.
10. James G. Foggo III and Rachael Gosnell, “U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Arctic: Past, Present, and Future,” Naval War College Review 75 no. 3 (2022): 15.
11. Buchanan, Red Arctic, 63.
12. Walter Berbrick, et al., Newport Manual on Arctic Security (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 135.
13. Julian S. Corbett, “Appendix – The ‘Green Pamphlet’ War Course,” in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Middletown, DE: Adansonia Publishing, 2024), 162.
14. Buchanan, 81.
15. James Calvert, Surface at the Pole: The Extraordinary Voyages of the USS Skate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 186.
16. John Lehman, Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 182.
17. Lehman, Oceans Ventured, 181.
18. Lehman, 180.
19. ADM James Stavridis USN (Ret.), Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans (New York: Penguin Books, 2017), 332.
